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Abstract 
 
 Years after the Islamic Republic of Iran resumed its nuclear development 
program, Israeli leaders began constructing a narrative aimed at instilling in their polity 
the fear of Iran as an existential threat to the Jewish State. Building upon Israel’s 
geopolitical insecurity, politicians, assisted by societal elites, repeatedly claimed that the 
imminent acquisition of a bomb by Iran’s religious fundamentalist regime undermined 
Israel’s security and threatened the stability of the world order. This project examines 
how Israeli leaders crafted a narrative in which Iran’s rulers sought the destruction of 
Israel; how the Israeli public internalized this perception of Iran as an enemy; and how 
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu incorporated this message into his foreign policy 
agenda and used it in efforts to secure the support of international allies. Through the 
lens of securitization theory, this project analyzes primary source documents to show 
the divergence between the narrative’s content and historical facts. In doing so, it 
highlights how perception eclipses reality when a powerful securitizing actor claiming 
exclusive access to material information identifies a threat source and publicly promotes 
its danger. It then examines how Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu strategically 
embraced populist strategies to advocate for extraordinary action against Iran and to 
bolster his status as a leader and national protector. Taking advantage of Israel’s failure 
in the Second Lebanon War and Iran’s election of a radical and bombastic president, 
Netanyahu chose resonant tropes – misusing history, recasting Holocaust memory, and 
fashioning an overarching moral imperative – to create a permanent crisis and secure 
Israelis’ acquiescence. By 2015, however, he had failed to convince international powers 
that a negotiated deal suspending Iran’s nuclear enrichment program would make Israel 
and the world less safe. This project contributes to our understanding of current and 
future developments in the Israel-Iran enmity, both predictable and unanticipated. 
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Introduction 
 
Understanding the modern conflict between Israel and Iran begins with the 
proposition that it is rooted in the political narratives that each nation’s leaders tell their 
polity about the other. These narratives account for the relational history, the global 
context in which the nations confront one another, and the domestic conditions within 
each country, including cultural, economic, and political norms. A narrative, which 
according to Peter Brooks, “is one of the large categories or systems we use in our 
negotiations with reality,” enables a leader to answer such questions as how did the 
enmity develop, why does or should it persist, is there a danger associated with 
continued conflict, and should something be done to change the situation? 1 Its content 
is both descriptive and normative, but its purpose is argumentative. 
The political narrator seeks to craft a story that will resonate with his listeners so 
that they will support his leadership and his policies. He chooses content that will deliver 
a message or messages that promote his objectives. His choices will reflect 
characteristics of his personal identity, such as his experience, ambitions, biases, 
ideology, and motivations, among other traits. The salience of his narrative, in effect its 
political traction, will depend upon the identity of his audience. 
To be sure, the proposition that narrative is constructed in a dynamic process 
based upon personal choices rather than an account of events and the responses they 
occasion is not consonant with traditional international relations theory. It suggests that 
narrative content need not be entirely or even largely factual, or that the response it 
                                                        
1 While Brooks is referring to literary narrative, his description is applicable to political 
discourse in which leaders offer citizens a compelling story to secure their support for 
their leadership and policies. See discussion infra on the power of the political narrative. 
Peter Brooks, Reading for the Plot: Design and Intention in Narrative, Revised edition 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1992). 
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elicits need not be rational. In other words, the narrative that motivates or justifies the 
foreign policies pursued by one nation toward another is not the inevitable result of 
events that control the narrative. While there are events over which actors have no 
control, there are narratives that influence actions and shape the perceptions of 
observers. Moreover, there are often different narratives that address the same 
temporal space, and sometimes they compete for public acceptance. At a minimum, 
analysis of the difference in narratives about inter-nation conflict allows us to examine 
and compare the forces, both objective and subjective, that shaped the conflict. This 
project undertakes such an analysis, examining the Israeli narrative of its conflict with 
the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
Before elaborating on the details of my study, it is worthwhile considering a 
comparison between two paradigmatic narrative versions of Israel’s relationship with 
Iran to illustrate the nature of my inquiry. I call these versions the historical narrative 
and the threat narrative. The latter draws upon elements of the former, but they reveal 
significantly different messages. The historical narrative is essentially observational and 
analytical. It could be considered academic as it offers to educate listeners either for the 
sake of advancing knowledge, or to inform public discourse regarding policy choices. By 
contrast, the threat narrative is tendentious. It seeks to convince its audience of an 
extant danger by arousing feelings of fear and insecurity. Rather than illuminate 
alternatives, it advocates policy and action. The narrator’s objective is to secure support 
for his proposals and his leadership.  
The historical narrative exists in many iterations that share a basic story of a long 
relationship between two ethnic peoples, namely Persians and Jews. During some 
periods of time, each people occupied a separate geographic space; at other times they 
co-existed, sometimes peaceably, other times antagonistically, within the Persian 
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Empire and later the country of Iran. The establishment of the State of Israel ensued 
after a long history of interaction. The modern factual narrative is fraught with 
ambiguity occasioned by the complexities of the region. The establishment of a Jewish 
homeland surrounded by Islamic Arab nations presented a major disruption in the 
international order. As an Islamic country, Iran shares an identity with Israel’s enemy 
neighbors; its people, however, are not Arab and its Shia population comprises a 
religious minority in a majority Sunni region. Consequently, there is space for covert 
collaboration, if not overt cooperation, among the two nations with “outlier” 
populations. Just as the historical narrative featured periods of conflict and co-existence 
and of tolerance and discrimination over the course of millennia, so, too, the first three 
decades following the establishment of the State of Israel had instances of rhetorical 
warfare as well as collaboration.  
The historical narrative added a recent chapter with a new account of significant 
enmity between the two nations. Two unprecedented disruptive events comprise the 
bulk of the recent story. The first is the 1979 Islamic Revolution, and the second is the 
public disclosure of Iran’s program for development of nuclear technology and 
capability. While it is too early to determine whether these events represent permanent 
directional change in the narrative arc of waxing and waning relations, rhetoric and 
actions by the nations’ leaders have challenged the capacity of those who would offer a 
dispassionate historical narrative to be heard in public debates. At a minimum, these 
events have given rise to the threat narrative, the historical components of which 
obstruct the public’s hearing of a neutral, fact-based analysis.  
In examining the threat narrative, it is important to note that the historical 
narrative does not lead to the conclusion that an unprecedented hostile confrontation 
between Israel and Iran was inevitable. It suggests that the establishment of the 
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theocratic Islamic Republic initiated two changes in the relationship: it ended a formal 
collaborative enterprise between Israel and the Shah, and it intensified the anti-Israel 
rhetoric of Iran’s new leaders. While Iran’s actions can be interpreted as assuming the 
public posture of an enemy, which represents a potential threat to the security of Israel, 
we know that initially the enmity was not total. In an arrangement brokered by the 
United States, Israel secretly provided weapons to the Islamic Republic of Iran to assist it 
during its war against Iraq; and Iran sold oil to Israel. Given the intensification of 
accusatory rhetoric between the two nations, it is understandable that the initial 
discovery of Iran’s program for developing its nuclear capability would lead some Israelis 
to consider whether this development represented the proverbial “tipping point.” Iran’s 
potential for acquiring a nuclear weapon not only challenged Israel’s status as the sole 
nuclear power in the Middle East, it threatened to change the balance of power in the 
region. A nuclear Iran created new uncertainties that magnified the risks, actual and 
perceived. Uncertainty opened space for creative narrative. 
In a factual account, an observer could, however, find reasons not to overstate 
the danger. Even without the potential for rapprochement between the two nations in 
the foreseeable future, Iran was entangled in the labyrinthine conflicts of the Middle 
East, which directed its attention to concerns other than Israel. Iran faced a regional 
quagmire, while all was not copacetic domestically. It had to recover from a long and 
costly war with Iraq. It had a young, educated, and restless population and a 
government split between a clerical establishment and elected politicians. It had a 
religious and political hardline Revolutionary Guard, which wielded power, but did not 
enjoy popular support. It also had more enemies than friends among the nations in its 
neighborhood. The hostility between Shia and Sunni Muslims was often as intense as 
that between Jews and Muslims. Iran’s ambitions and operations, including its support 
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for non-state terrorist organizations that included Israel among their targets, are worthy 
of their own dissertation. The important point is that in Iran’s power maneuverings and 
its threat calculations, Israel was a marginal player. Hence the Iranians fear of Israel was 
not symmetrical to that experienced by Israelis of Iran. 
Among developments material to the factual account, one stands out as a 
potential disruptor of the threat narrative. When Iran declared that it was not 
developing nuclear weaponry,2 a finding backed by United States Intelligence and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in multiple reports,3 it could have introduced 
skepticism into the political discourse that was increasingly vilifying Iran and ascribing 
evil intentions to its rulers. Instead, many professed disbelief, using Iran’s protestations 
to argue against trusting the nation’s leaders. To be sure, the forswearing of weapons 
acquisition did not mean that Iran had neither the capacity nor the knowledge to do so, 
but it did undermine claims that Iran’s possession of and intention to use a bomb were 
imminent. A change in the Middle East power dynamic might still be coming, but it had 
not yet arrived, and there was no certainty that it would ever do so. Even more troubling 
for those unwilling to trust Iran was the country’s election of a politically moderate 
president who wanted to engage with the West, and who expressed a willingness to 
relinquish Iran’s capacity to produce a nuclear weapon. Such conduct, if taken at face 
value, did not fit the threat narrative.  
                                                        
2 Iranian officials have repeatedly denied seeking nuclear weaponry, beginning in 1997 
when President Hashemi Rafsanjani told 60 Minutes, “Definitely not. I hate this kind of 
weapon.” Subsequent Presidents, as well as Iranian nuclear officials, have been 
consistent in their denials of this intention ever since.  
3 The 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) concluded that Iran had suspended 
its effort at achieving nuclear weapons in 2003. Similarly, a 2015 IAEA report stated that 
Iran’s efforts at building a nuclear weapon never progressed beyond feasibility and 
scientific studies. These documents, as well as the response to them, are discussed in 
detail in Chapters 4 and 5. 
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Also incongruent with Iran’s posture as a threat was its willingness to negotiate 
and its agreement to place restrictions on its nuclear development program. As Iran 
acted to increase the probability that it would reach an agreement, which would 
objectively and verifiably reduce the imminence of its acquisition of a nuclear weapon, 
Israel intensified the threat narrative. This was a counterintuitive development. The 
salience of the threat depended upon the belief that Iran not only posed a danger to 
Israel’s security but threatened Israel’s existence. Israeli politicians, facilitated by elite 
opinion makers and public officials, had an instrumental objective in constructing this 
narrative. Thus, they started with their conclusion and worked backward: The primary 
purpose of Iran’s nuclear program was to develop a nuclear weapon that would target 
Israel.  
While the narrative’s conclusion was clear – Iran posed an existential threat to 
Israel – it offered alternative explanations of its nature. Thus, even if the regime did not 
immediately deploy its weapon against Israel, it would fundamentally interfere with 
Israel’s ability to protect itself. In sharp contrast with the historical version, the tropes of 
the threat narrative appealed to emotion over reason. Nuclear annihilation is scary, and 
the idea of fundamentalist Islamic clerics controlling such weapons is even scarier. 
Working backwards, the narrators employed selective historic events as the basis for 
suspecting that Iran’s leaders intended to use their weapon against Israel. They used, or 
more accurately, misused history in two ways. First, by distorting accounts of the 
relationship of Jews and Persians, they framed the threat as a consequence of a historic 
enmity. Second, by analogizing the Iranian regime to history’s mass murderers of Jews, 
they cast themselves in a traditional role as victims, raising the specter of history 
repeating itself. 
 18 
It is worth noting that in the threat narrative the origin of the historical enmity 
traces back to a historic myth canonized as a book in the Hebrew Bible. In the story, a 
Jewish queen, the eponymous Esther, heroically reveals her identity to her husband, the 
Persian King, who intervenes to prevent the carrying out of a plan to murder the Jews of 
the empire. As a myth, it is arguably open to further mythologizing, but there is little 
basis for concluding that it unequivocally validates the ancient enmity between Persians 
and Jews.4 Despite the effort to situate the threat narrative in a history of Jewish 
victimhood at the hands of Persians, the modern Israeli-constructed Iran threat 
narrative is essentially ahistorical.5 It is not concerned with factual accuracy or the 
reality of the events it invokes, but rather with the impact that the narrator’s account 
will produce on the listener. It is crafted to create a perception of a present reality that 
warns of a disastrous future unless Israel takes preventative measures. It is this threat 
narrative and its consequences that are the focus of this study. 
This project posits that the threat narrative is central to understanding the 
nature of the enmity of Israel toward Iran following the 1979 Islamic Revolution and the 
Islamic Republic’s restarting of its nuclear development program. As this is an academic 
inquiry, it employs the frame of securitization theory modified by populism – a theory I 
call “populist securitization” – as the basis for examining how political actors’ 
construction of a threat narrative and dissemination of its messages to their publics 
                                                        
4 Ironically, the strongest case for this position would be to argue that it is the non-
Jewish residents of the Persian Empire and not the Jews who were the ultimate victims. 
Since the King could not withdraw the edict he was duped into issuing by his evil vizier, 
identified as an Aggagite, he authorized the Jews to take up arms against their would-be 
annihilators. The story concludes by recounting the numbers of persons killed by the 
Jews. See Chapter 2 for discussion of the Purim story. 
5 It is inconsequential that the modern States of Israel and Iran occasionally found 
common ground on issues pertaining both to security and to economic development. It 
would be inconvenient to acknowledge that Israel’s assistance to the Shah included 
support for his secret police instrumental in maintaining his increasingly oppressive rule, 
which eventually contributed to the anger and resentment that led to his overthrow. 
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became the foundation for foreign policy and international relations. The populist 
securitization lens enables us to see the human influence on a polity’s perception of 
unfolding consequential events. We see how the securitization processes embraces a 
threat narrative developed by political leaders based upon their personal choices of 
resonant tropes. It achieves traction when listeners internalize its messages and 
experience the emotions the narrator seeks to elicit. Populism is a strategy employed by 
leaders seeking to secure their power. It appeals to a collective identity that achieves 
cohesion and power by excluding the other, comprising those defined by difference and 
dissenters, whom the collective sees as opposing their positions or values.  
Before discussing the methodology for this inquiry, I introduce the subject with a 
brief explanation of how I conceptualize the role of political narrative in public 
discourse. I will then review how I conducted my inquiry. I conclude this introduction by 
outlining the structure of the discussion in this project. 
The Power of Political Narrative 
 
All societies tell stories. Politicians6 invoke these stories and transform them into 
a narrative that they offer repeatedly as they engage in political discourse. The 
promotion of political narrative is frequently a competitive process in which power 
actors seek to influence the beliefs and conduct of targeted publics for the promotion of 
the narrator’s self or cause, or both. A political narrative, such as that examined in this 
project, has two mutually reinforcing elements: a substantive message related to a 
policy position and a vision of the polity who should embrace it. A leader dependent 
                                                        
6 I use politician in a broad sense to encompass more than individuals seeking or holding 
public office. I include public figures and elite actors who influence the political process 
and contribute to shaping public opinion. 
 20 
upon popular support for implementation of his agenda7 must offer a societal vision to 
serve as the foundation for his advocacy enterprise. The vision includes a historically-
based collective biographical identity, which he expects his supportive listeners to 
internalize. A technique for defining this identity is to define a distinctiveness that 
excludes the “other,” meaning those who do not fit the definitional criteria or who 
challenge the narrative’s message. 
The political narrative effectively creates a “communication bond” between 
power and public.8 To resonate with listeners, the narrative will reflect the fears, hopes 
and prejudices grounded in their cultural understandings. Particularly in a dynamic 
environment, to achieve traction the narrative should offer value to listeners’ lives. Most 
often, this takes the form of providing clarity in an environment that would otherwise be 
perceived as unsettlingly ambiguous or uncertain. To secure support for policy 
proposals, it projects certitude about the rightness of the proffered decisions, based at 
least in part on the moral authority inherent in its message. Both the resonance and 
justifications are captured in tropes selected by the narrator and affirmed by supportive 
elites, including public officials, opinion leaders, and the media. A key feature of the 
political narrative involves the position assumed by the narrator. As its constructor, she 
will generally portray her role as the narrative’s agent, who is prepared both to 
disseminate the message and to inherit the mantle of leadership.  
The foreign policy narrative, particularly one addressing issues of national 
security, is a particular species of the political narrative. The political leader has fewer 
                                                        
7 All leaders are to a greater or lesser extent dependent upon popular support. Some 
leaders must find messages that resonate with potential voters, who have the freedom 
to choose among candidates with differing opinions. Other leaders must create an 
appearance of popular support or, at a minimum, avoid alienating those with the power 
to remove them from office.  
8 The term is adapted from W. Lance Bennett and Murray Edelman, ‘Toward a New 
Political Narrative’, Journal of Communication 35, no. 4 (December 1985): 156–71. 
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constraints in crafting content due both to the government’s traditional responsibility 
for the conduct of foreign affairs and to the public’s lack of sophisticated knowledge 
about the foreign entity or entities. The history of the country’s relationship with the 
other, particularly details and nuances, is also likely to be less familiar to the polity. 
When the other is deemed the enemy, the listening publics are generally not interested 
in ambiguity, but rather are looking to their governmental leaders for protection.9 They 
are seeking to make sense of developments and to receive reassurance that their 
leaders have a plan to address their insecurity. Ronald Krebs notes, “Debates over 
national security are in fact often underpinned by dominant narratives that weave 
present challenges, past failures and triumphs, and potential futures into a coherent 
tale, with well-defined characters and plot lines.”10 These narrative elements need not 
be factually accurate; it is more important that they be emotionally resonant.  
The coherency of proposal and justification offered by the leader is fostered by 
the tropes he chooses in crafting his narrative. He seeks not only to develop a unifying 
message as a response to the public’s shared concerns, but also to reduce opposition 
from skeptics or opponents. The appeal to emotion rather than fact facilitates this 
effort. A resonant narrative that appeals to feelings, particularly those of fear and 
insecurity, can effectively obstruct critical inquiry. A narrative embodying an impression 
of reality based upon ideological and cultural understandings disguised as truth will 
inhibit verification efforts. We see this process of development at work in this project’s 
examination of the threat narrative constructed by Israeli officials, notably Prime 
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, about the danger posed by Iran.  
                                                        
9 Ole R. Holsti, ‘Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy’, Journal of International 
Affairs 21, no. 1 (1 January 1967): 39. 
10 Ronald R. Krebs, Narrative and the Making of US National Security (Cambridge 
University Press, 2015). 
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 The story of Israel’s interaction with Iran constructed by Israeli leaders, and 
reinforced by the country’s elites, positioned Iran as an enemy deserving of an active 
response. The justification for extraordinary proposals, including military action, invoked 
historical and identity tropes that sought to elicit feelings of fear and insecurity while 
promoting a societal unity of determination to confront the risk. During the time period 
covered by this project, the enmity played out almost entirely in rhetorical warfare, 
which makes the narrative the critical element in understanding the conflict. The 
narrative used history in three ways. First, it situated the conflict as a continuation of a 
long-standing enmity between Persians and Jews. Second, it claimed that Iran’s rulers 
were the successors to the twentieth century’s Nazi regime that sought to systematically 
eradicate all Jews and succeeded in killing six million of them. Third, it promoted an 
identity of Jews as perennial victims for whom Israel is both the heir of the Zionist vision 
of Jewish homeland and the manifestation of the Jewish resolve of “never again.” This 
included a moral obligation to act preemptively against would-be destroyers.  
The narrative served both as a central feature of Israel’s foreign policy and as a 
basis for seeking international support. Through its recounting in international forums, 
we see how Israel sought to recast itself from an occupying force that oppresses the 
Palestinians to a victim of Iran’s intended annihilation of its state. Fealty to the narrative 
led Israel to challenge would be allies when they embraced diplomacy as a means to 
reduce the risk posed by a nuclear-armed Iran. Israel thus separated itself from its 
Western allies. Having portrayed Iran’s rulers as untrustworthy and ascribed to them 
murderous intention, Israel’s leaders would not accept a compromise that would 
materially modify the narrative. Since politicians are generally not known for religiously 
committing to policy consistency, the decisions of Israeli leaders raise questions about 
the intentions of the Israeli narrator. 
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While the psychology of leadership is beyond the scope of this project, analysis 
of the narrative tropes shows how it advanced the case for the narrator’s agency. In 
particular, Netanyahu positioned himself as the leader most able to confront the enemy 
and to challenge dissenters. Words were both his tools and weapons, pending an 
opportunity to take active measures against the enemy. He offered his narrative as 
more than a contribution to political debate, but as part of a rhetorical war against both 
Iran and his political opponents. The words threatened consequences, one of which was 
the danger that the message would become self-fulfilling to the detriment of his nation 
or international stability. 
Methodology  
 
This project’s focus on narrative necessarily requires examining both the 
available source material that comprises Israel’s political discourse and the events that 
impact the political environment. I present my analysis through a theoretical lens that I 
derived through engagement with the relevant scholarly literature. I developed a 
historical context from accounts in primary materials and the secondary literature.  
Since I am concerned primarily with public narrative offered in political 
discourse, my primary sources are the words of the politicians and public officials, as 
well as contemporary analysis of materials that contributed meaning to and enhanced 
public understanding. To that end, I examined multiple sources to piece together the 
public rhetoric. These included texts of speeches, newspaper accounts, and minutes of 
legislative and cabinet debates. I also interviewed journalists, academics, and authors 
willing to discuss their contribution to or understanding of the political discourse 
concerning historical and contemporary events involving Iran policy.11 Finally, I 
                                                        
11 Unfortunately, many current or former government officials were unwilling to speak 
on the record about Iranian issues. 
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examined cultural and influential materials, including editorials, books, and academic 
reports.  
This project focuses on the Israeli perspective of the threat posed by Iran for 
reasons both substantive and practical. On a substantive level, my initial research and 
my review of the Persian language Iranian press available on line revealed that Israeli 
leaders devoted considerably more attention to Iran as a threat to their nation than 
Iranian leaders voiced concern about Israel’s threat to their nation’s security. Moreover, 
the relative threat perception of each state’s political establishment was asymmetrical. 
Israel painted Iran as an existential threat, while, to the extent that Iranian leaders 
feared an Israeli attack, they suspected it would target Iran’s nuclear facilities. Thus, my 
focus on Iranian rhetoric, for the most part, sought to filter it through the Israeli 
perspective by examining what Israelis and their allies were hearing. The practical 
reason is that I could not gain access as a researcher to Iran.12 Although I was able to 
spend a few weeks as a tourist visiting the country during this project, I was unable to 
conduct significant research or interviews. My observations of life in the areas I visited, 
as well as my monitoring of the Persian media, did not match the impressions conveyed 
in the rhetorical pictures of Iranian society offered by Israeli officials. 
The manageability of the project within the time constraints for its conduct also 
required decisions about language. Since Israeli leaders directed their rhetoric at 
                                                        
12 At the outset of this project in 2014, I had hoped that improving relations between 
Iran and the United States might enable me to travel to Iran to conduct fieldwork. After 
efforts to obtain a visa for language study proved unsuccessful, I received advice that it 
would not be safe for an American citizen to visit as a researcher. As mentioned earlier, 
this was not a disqualifying development. My research has already revealed the 
inaccuracy of my initial hypothesis of a conflict fueled by mutually escalating rhetoric 
based upon the leaders of each nation considering the other as an outsize security risk. 
Field inquiry into the Iranian perspective was therefore not essential to this project. I 
nevertheless found my visit to Iran invaluable as it gave me firsthand observational 
experience of Iran typically lacking in analysis of that country. 
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multiple domestic publics as well as international audiences, I necessarily reviewed 
speeches which were delivered in both Hebrew and English. For my review of opinion 
material and Israeli reporting, I focused primarily on Israel’s English-language press.13 
This enabled me to review and analyze more material, including allowing me to employ 
novel techniques for analysis, such as corpus tracking using computer programming 
software for textual analysis.14  
My research also revealed that that Israeli politicians delivered some of the most 
salient descriptions of Iran as a threat during addresses to English-speaking audiences. 
This finding highlighted the important contributions to this project of English language 
accounts by Israeli leaders and media reports. Highlighting Israel’s security vulnerability 
particularly resonated with those who identified with Israel and the political Zionist idea 
but did not live there.15 Such listeners were important figures in policy advocacy, since 
they usually included organized political constituencies and wealthy individuals, who 
participated in the political debates over Israel in their home countries.16 In addition, 
                                                        
13 When relying upon reportorial accounts, I frequently cross-checked English accounts 
with those in the Hebrew language press to ensure there were no material factual 
differences.  
14 While still in the nascent stages of development as a tool for social science 
researchers, these techniques allow researchers to analyze massive amounts of 
materials simultaneously. By treating text as a singular dataset, researchers can identify 
themes and observe trends that would otherwise be difficult to spot through traditional 
methods of discourse analysis. For the analysis in this project, I relied primarily on the R 
coding program and the method developed by Matthew Jockers in Text Analysis with R 
for Students of Literature. Matthew L. Jockers, Text Analysis with R for Students of 
Literature, 2014 edition (New York: Springer, 2014). 
15 Political Zionism refers to the modern vision of the State of Israel as the embodiment 
of the biblical promise of a Jewish homeland. This motivational philosophy provides an 
instrumental justification underpinning support for a political entity in the contemporary 
world. It is not, as is sometimes mistakenly assumed, based on the historical atrocities 
committed against the Jewish people in the diaspora, including pogroms and the 
Holocaust. By contrast, biblical Zionism is an idea associated with a vision of the land 
and people of Israel to be realized at some future messianic time. 
16 Many of these individuals followed developments in Israel as regular readers of 
Israel’s English-language newspapers. 
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Israeli leaders generally used English when publicly voicing direct appeals to world 
leaders for support of measures to address the Iran threat. At the same time, speeches 
to international audiences frequently filtered back to domestic audiences through 
coverage in the Hebrew press. The reporting often amplified the message or enhanced 
its importance based upon the forum in which it was delivered. It is also significant that 
the largest English language newspaper published in Israel is generally supportive of the 
hawkish position on Iran, which, as this project shows, has become the dominant threat 
narrative advanced by government officials.17  
A limiting factor in conducting background and contextual research is the 
unavailability of classified materials on recent events. Most of the internal 
documentation about Israel’s strategic security debates over Iran is classified, and thus 
impossible to obtain through ordinary research channels.18 I reviewed declassified older 
state records, which allowed for a more complete understanding of the early years of 
the Iran-Israel relationship. The contemporaneous accounts in those documents were 
                                                        
17 The preference for English in this inquiry does not compromise the integrity of my 
conclusion. This project posits that the most consequential audience for the salience of 
the threat narrative are the domestic elite publics and potential international allies, both 
government leaders and world Jewry in the form of organizations and wealthy donors. 
Elite Israelis often participate in both the domestic and international debates, and hence 
speak and understand English. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, for example, 
surrounds himself with English-speaking advisors and often conducts cabinet meetings 
in English rather than Hebrew. In addition, a significant politically active constituency for 
the narrative’s message are the immigrants, who are primarily politically conservative 
on issues of Israeli security. Immigrants from Europe and the Americas are 
approximately a third of the Israeli population. For many, English remains the universal 
language of cross-cultural discourse. The largest immigrant bloc is from Russia, who, 
while maintaining their own linguistic community, are apt to know English even if they 
also study Hebrew. Israel’s education curriculum requires the study of English, ensuring 
that educated Israelis understand the language, especially if they follow international 
affairs.  
18 There are, for example, no listed records for documents pertaining to Iranian-Israeli 
relations in the Israeli State Archives after 1987. 
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particularly helpful in piecing together the history of the relationship between Iran and 
the new Israeli State discussed in chapter two.  
I also had access to unclassified archival material recording officials’ discussions 
concerning relatively recent Iranian policy matters. In particular, I reviewed 
contemporaneous materials from Israel State Archives, the Prime Minister’s Office, and 
the Israeli Foreign Ministry document collections. Additionally, I visited the Israeli 
Knesset Archives to obtain transcripts of parliamentary debates that discussed Iran. This 
provided useful insights into how members of different parties viewed the urgency of 
the Iranian threat across the country’s diverse political spectrum.  
My approach to using this material, which is reflected in the organization of this 
manuscript discussed in the following section, was to create a timeline of interactions 
between Israel and Iran, including rhetorical exchanges, and then to review the various 
accounts and debates among Israelis as well as messages addressed to the international 
community. The absence of a searchable data base for Israeli media outlets complicated 
my comprehensive review of all Iran stories. While I sought information from a variety of 
sources from across the broad media landscape, I chose to focus on the Jerusalem Post 
for this timeline construction. This newspaper provided several advantages from a 
research perspective. It is among the oldest media outlets in the country – dating back 
to the pre-statehood era when it was known as the Palestine Post – and has been 
continuously published throughout the history of the Iranian-Israeli conflict. It is also 
one of the only Israeli newspapers with searchable chronological archives. As a relatively 
conservative paper, it proved a useful tool for gauging the perspective of the Israeli 
right-wing, which encompasses the political parties most concerned with the Iran threat. 
The newspaper chronicled the pronouncements and positions of this faction’s political 
leaders even when they were not part of a ruling government coalition. As opposition 
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leader, Benjamin Netanyahu regularly contributed to its op-ed pages. This source 
enabled me to use both daily coverage and op-ed reviews to generate a single, 
continuous timeline of one media outlet’s Iran coverage beginning in 1989 and running 
through 2015.  
I layered on top of this search other sources of information, including expert 
analyses from Israeli think tanks; speeches and transcripts from the Prime Minister’s 
office; and relevant coverage from other media sources across the ideological spectrum. 
I also added key dates and events relevant to the conflict, such as national elections, 
dates of international negotiations, and regional armed conflicts. Finally, I included 
selective media reports and statements on Israel from Iranian sources. Taken as a 
whole, this timeline made it possible to track the rhetorical shifts in the narrative in 
response to major events.  
Project Organization Overview 
 
I present my findings and analysis in five chapters and an epilogue. I begin with a 
discussion of the theoretical foundation for my inquiry. In chapter one I trace how the 
predominant theories, namely realism and constructivism, offer incomplete analyses of 
international relations. This led theorists associated with the Copenhagen School to 
develop a theory called securitization for identifying and analyzing how nations perceive 
and respond to threats – and for examining the effect this has on their political 
behavior. In the final section of the chapter, I offer an amendment to securitization 
theory based upon the challenges associated with universalizing application of the 
theory. I argue that it is incomplete as it fails to account for human agency in both the 
construction of the threat and its dissemination and resonance. I therefore suggest a 
new understanding that I call populist securitization, which I argue provides a lens for 
this project. In particular, I submit that securitization is useful for examining the 
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construction of the threat narrative, while populism supplies the strategic guidance for 
the securitizing agent in choosing his tropes to achieve his intended ends. 
In chapter two, I present my study of a historical narrative detailing the 
relationship between Iran and Israel up until the 1979 Islamic Revolution. I offer a brief 
look at the political interactions between Jews and Persians and a more detailed 
examination of the relationship between Iran and the nascent state of Israel. This 
political history provides a basis for analyzing the historical justifications offered by each 
country’s modern leaders for their policy decisions related to the other’s state. It 
highlights how history is used, or in this case misused, in development of the threat 
narrative. The historical narrative contrasts with what is remembered and overlooked 
when characterizing the past relations between the two peoples and countries. This 
chapter concludes with a factual account of the deterioration of an alliance between the 
Shah and Israeli leaders and the events leading to the development of the enmity 
occasioned by the Islamic Revolution. The post-Revolution modern history is interwoven 
with my discussion of the development of the threat narrative in subsequent chapters. 
Chapters three through five examine the construction and dissemination of the 
threat narrative. Chapters three and four follow the development chronologically, while 
chapter five uses a thematic approach in identifying the narrative tropes refined and 
articulated by Prime Minister Netanyahu during his second term of leadership.19 Chapter 
three examines the initiation of the securitization process, by which I mean that Israel’s 
leaders recast Iran from a peripheral political issue to a dangerous security threat. I look 
                                                        
19 Netanyahu has served two discontinuous periods as Prime Minister: from 1996-1999 
and again since 2009. His two periods of service are not two four-year electoral terms. In 
the first period he was defeated for reelection after the calling of new elections under 
Israel’s parliamentary system. The second period has involved more than one electoral 
term. I shall nevertheless refer to Netanyahu’s resumption of office beginning in 2009 as 
his second term.  
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at the events and political developments that influenced how top Israeli officials 
described Iran. In so doing, they crafted a narrative that sought to warn Israelis and the 
world of the dangers that Iran posed to Israel. During much of this period, the public 
discourse on Iran took place in discussions limited to elites. When compared with the 
threats of imminent but uncertain disruptions of daily life, the public appeared less 
interested in debating whether and how to address a more abstract threat from Iran. 
 Chapter four looks at the two seminal events that changed the Israeli public’s 
perception of Iran resulting in the acceptance of Iran as an existential threat: first, the 
surprise election to the Iranian presidency in 2005 of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a hardline 
politician with a penchant for making outrageous and anti-Semitic statements; and 
second, the Second Lebanon War in 2006. These events reframed Israeli’s sense of 
insecurity. I show how Israeli officials took some creative license in justifying their 
military’s failure to end the terrorist threat of Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. Casting 
Iran as the real enemy and professing that Ahmadinejad was about to acquire a nuclear 
weapon concretized and intensified the threat. The feeling of insecurity aroused by the 
reinforced narrative, together with domestic political developments, paved the way for 
the return of Benjamin Netanyahu as prime minister.  
 For Netanyahu, Iran had always represented a significant security threat. 
Moreover, he had long articulated a belief that its building of a nuclear capability would 
create an existential danger. Thus, he advocated for extraordinary response measures to 
eliminate the threat. As prime minister he assumed the authorship of a narrative that 
would justify his crusade. Analysis of his rhetoric and actions reveals a two-pronged 
approach: refining the narrative to maximize the public’s sense of insecurity and 
securing his place as leader of the response both domestically and internationally. 
Chapter 5 examines Netanyahu’s strategic choices of rhetorical tropes, which reflect his 
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goal of achieving full securitization of Iran as an existential threat while advancing a 
populist appeal to secure his leadership.20  
I end with an epilogue that notes the developments following the conclusion of 
my period of study. It summarizes the durability and resonance of the narrative, and it 
explores its impact on decisions in the international community concerning whether to 
abandon the international agreement suspending Iran’s nuclear development program. 
This discussion arbitrarily concludes as of May 8, 2018, the day on which United States 
President Donald Trump announced that the United States would withdraw from the 
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA, aka the Iran Nuclear Deal), an objective 
long-sought by Netanyahu in promoting his threat narrative.21 Ironically, while the 
threat narrative appears fixed, the conclusion of the historical narrative is unknown.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
20 Examining Netanyahu’s selection of narrative tropes reveals that Netanyahu’s strategy 
is more reflective of populism than nationalism. In particular, his emphases on relative 
morality, twisting of the historical narrative, disregard of contradictory evidence, and 
rejection of diplomacy secured his foreign policy leadership but have not insulated him 
from challenge and criticism in other areas of his leadership. Additionally, he has 
positioned himself in the Iran debate as the representative of global Jewry, going 
beyond Israel’s national citizenry and sovereignty. The definitional distinction between 
populism and nationalism, however, is not material to this project. 
21 The necessity for concluding the project is compelled by the need to submit the 
dissertation in satisfaction of the requirements of the doctoral program. 
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Chapter One: Theoretical Foundation 
 
I. Introduction  
 
 What is a threat? What is security? These apparently simple concepts are heavily 
contested. The concept of existential threat and the idea that it may be constructed by a 
human agent, rather than objectively real, is the basis for application of securitization 
theory to this project. While it is unnecessary to evaluate how far to expand the concept 
of threat and the scenario in which it arises, the threat at issue in this study attenuates 
the original concept of looming imminent military engagement. To be sure, Iran’s 
potential acquisition of nuclear weaponry arguably poses an existential risk to a nation 
that may be a target of its deployment. Consequently, Israel’s proposed response could 
include military action, possibly preemptively undertaken. I submit, however, that 
although this is not the only, or even an accurate, assessment of the conflict, 
securitization remains a useful analytical frame.22 
 While securitization theory guides us in examining a leader’s motivation for 
identifying a threat as existential and to which he will lead a response, it falls short in 
formalizing the role of situational context. Particularly in settings where the existence 
and the assessment of the threat are disputed, it does not offer generalization of the 
conditions under which he is likely to secure public support for his initiative.  
Securitization nevertheless enables us to begin our inquiry of how and why 
Israelis came to consider Iran an existential threat by examining the development by 
Israel’s leaders of a threat narrative that sought to make Israelis feel insecure. This 
                                                        
22 As with any theoretical analysis of international relations, I am not suggesting that the 
actors are consciously modeling their behavior to conform to the theory’s elements, but 
rather that securitization provides a construct for deconstructing and analyzing the 
human behavior and rhetoric associated with the creation of and reaction to an 
existential threat. 
 33 
requires that we consider both the actor’s motives for his choice of themes and the 
discursive techniques he employs in appealing to his listeners’ emotions. This project 
highlights that, while the public must perceive that the danger exists, neither the threat 
itself nor its characteristics needs to be objectively verifiable. The narrative may suggest 
that the leader chose his content to inhibit verification, by either appealing to emotions 
that diminish concern for veracity or masking personal opinion as fact. 
The theoretical lens for this project has two parts. The first, as mentioned above, 
involves the development process of the threat narrative for achieving securitization. In 
addition to the narrative content, we seek to understand the exogenous events and the 
environmental context as well as the actor’s inherent characteristics that influenced his 
choice of tropes. Second, we look at the contribution of other participants in the 
securitization process, the enablers, who, by their particular promotion of the threat 
narrative advocated certain responses above alternative options.  
I suggest that the inquiry is incomplete, however, if we do not also understand 
the reaction of the polity, especially how and why a sizable portion of Israelis 
internalized the threat and supported the leader who was offering to protect them. I 
thus argue that this inquiry is enhanced by the addition of populist strategies to the 
application of securitization theory. What I call “populist securitization” offers a 
theoretical lens for achieving a more complete understanding of the motivations and 
expectations of the leaders, elite participants, and the collective audiences who 
developed, promoted, and accepted the threat narrative. While I seek to tease out the 
generally applicable elements of the theoretical populist securitization model, it is 
beyond the scope of this project to apply it further. 
Before explaining the applicability of the theory, I begin by discussing the limits 
of the more traditional international relations theories of realism and constructivism to 
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this inquiry. I then examine the importance of emotions in our understanding of leaders’ 
motives and listeners’ expectations, which are effectively overlooked in the traditional 
theories. This provides the foundation for discussing the applicability of securitization 
theory and how its modification by populism produces a more complete analysis of how 
Israelis came to regard Iran as an existential threat and the consequences of doing so. 
II. The Limits of Traditional International Relations Theorizing 
 
A. Realism: Too Narrow 
 
A study of the way Israeli leaders think about and respond to threats, particularly 
those posed by Iran and its nuclear program, requires understanding of the ways in 
which Israelis think about themselves. Realism suggests the logical place to begin this 
analysis because it is the rhetoric Israeli leaders use to justify their policies and actions. 
As Marc Lynch has noted, Israel inhabits a region that is “one of the most realist parts of 
the world, with a high risk of war, deep mistrust, and fierce competitiveness.”23 
Although Israeli leaders have frequently invoked realist logic to highlight the threats 
they face and to justify their response, it is inadequate for understanding the dynamic 
confrontation between Israel and Iran.24 Why has Israel, a country possessing nuclear 
                                                        
23 Marc Lynch, ‘International Relations’, in The Middle East, ed. Ellen Lust (CQ Press, 
2016), 373. 
24 Realism as a modern international relations theory developed in the aftermath of the 
Second World War with the work of scholars such as Hans Morgenthau. In seeking to 
explain the devastation and destruction wrought by the two World Wars of the first half 
of the twentieth century, Morgenthau laid out six principles of political realism: 1) 
politics are governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature; 2) interest 
in international politics is defined in terms of power; 3) power is “universally valid,” but 
its meaning can vary; 4) morality plays a role in political action, but its significance must 
be “filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place”; 5) morality of states 
is not the same as universal moral truth; and, finally, 6) the political sphere is 
autonomous from other schools of thought. Hans J. Morgenthau, Kenneth W. 
Thompson, and David Clinton, Politics Among Nations, 7 edition (Boston: McGraw-Hill 
Education, 2005), 4–15. 
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weapons, built a foreign policy upon casting Iran, a nation that may or may not acquire 
such a weapon, as an existential threat?  
The political realist asks only a single question in assessing the development of 
foreign policy. That question – how does this policy affect the power of the nation? – 
can only provide a starting point rather than a determinative understanding of the 
behavior of states and their leaders. The simplicity is understandable given the pedigree 
of a theory with roots in texts by thinkers such as Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes. 
For example, modern scholars see a comparison between the state’s constant quest for 
power and the contest for survival described in Hobbes’s Leviathan. Hobbes famously 
characterized life in the state of nature as “nasty, brutish, and short,” owing to 
mankind’s overarching desire to survive above all other concerns, even at the expense 
of others.25 Similarly, realists describe a world experiencing endless violent contests, one 
in which possession and deployment of power is the only thing that matters in inter-
nation relations.26 The embrace of power politics analysis is seductive to policy makers 
seeking simple solutions to complex problems. They need not spend much time 
understanding the factors that differentiate nations and shape foreign policy interests.27 
This is dangerous for accurate analysis of actions by Middle East actors, since the 
preoccupation with and compartmentalization of power discounts the mélange of 
religious identities, ethnic hatreds, and domestic political rivalries, which make certain 
international conflicts so intractable.  
                                                        
25 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (First Avenue Editions, 2018), i. xiii. 9. 
26 As Thucydides puts it in the Melian Dialogue, “The strong do what they can and the 
weak suffer what they must.” Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, ed. Sir R. 
W. Livingstone, trans. R. Crawley, First Edition (London: Oxford University Press, 1943). 
27 Although, as Legro and Moravcsik have noted, some modern realists have been forced 
to incorporate these factors, but without attempting to reconcile the contradictions 
they create in traditional realist theory. Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Is 
Anybody Still a Realist?’, International Security 24, no. 2 (October 1999): 7, 
https://doi.org/10.1162/016228899560130. 
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The 1973 Yom Kippur War provides a useful case study for illustrating the 
limitations of realist analysis in the Middle East. Following the surprise attack by the 
Egyptian and Syrian armies against Israel on Yom Kippur 1973, the Nixon administration, 
guided by one of the most prominent and influential practitioners of modern realism, 
Henry Kissinger, concluded that it would be unacceptable to have the Soviet-supplied 
Arab weapons be seen defeating the American-supplied Israeli ones.28 Even the 
suggestion that Soviet-produced tanks, aircraft, and artillery could best a U.S.-supplied 
army would damage the power of the United States in its global confrontation with 
Communism. President Nixon thus authorized a massive military resupply package to 
the Israelis, who were subsequently able to halt Arab advancement and even regain 
much of the territory they had lost.29  
As my research in this thesis will demonstrate, Israeli leaders’ focus on Iran, 
although occasionally justified in the language of realist concerns, in fact accorded lower 
status to realist concerns with relative power both in foreign policy making and, 
eventually, in political discourse. An examination of the Israeli construction of a 
narrative surrounding Iran, therefore, cannot be explained solely by realist-inspired 
practice.  
During the Cold War, the most important variable had been the perception of 
relative power between forces of the East and those of the West. Policymakers did not 
consider cultural and historical memory, nor did they factor in the potential 
consequences of their decisions on societal perceptions. Significantly, this was not a 
realistic version of events on the ground, and the failure to account for these concerns 
                                                        
28 ‘Secretary’s Staff Meeting’, 23 October 1973, Box 1, Transcripts of Secretary of State 
Henry A. Kissinger Staff Meetings, 1973-1977, 
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB98/octwar-63.pdf. 
29 Zach Levey, ‘Anatomy of an Airlift: United States Military Assistance to Israel during 
the 1973 War’, Cold War History 8, no. 4 (2008): 481. 
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often resulted in unanticipated consequences. For example, to those who fought in the 
conflict, the realism of the Nixon administration bore little resemblance to the world 
they experienced. For the Arab armies, 1973 was an attempt to correct the humiliations 
of 1948 and 1967, when Arab coalitions were soundly defeated by the fledgling Israeli 
military.30 For the Israelis, the attack provided further evidence that the Arabs would 
never accept their presence in the region.31 Israelis saw their survival as dependent 
upon their own strength and military self-sufficiency, notwithstanding the massive 
American military resupply. They did not see a role for the numerous layers of conflict 
subtext, including culture, ethnicity, and religion which, at a minimum created different 
perceptions of the reasons for their conflict.32 Realism thus presents a conundrum. On 
one hand, it is far too simple to provide a satisfactory predictive model or explanation of 
consequences since it ignores too many variables that impact decision making. At the 
same time, it still attracts practitioners who insist that consideration of national power is 
a sufficient basis for making or understanding foreign policy decisions. Particularly with 
the end of the Cold War and the subsequent fractionalization of global power in the 
Middle East, we need something more for analyzing the complex relationships between 
states in the region. 
B. Constructivism: Too Broad 
 
Constructivism emerged as a theory in response to the failures of realism to 
anticipate and explain the collapse of the Soviet Union. In contrast to realism, it 
                                                        
30 Simcha Dinitz, ‘The Yom Kippur War: Diplomacy of War and Peace’, Israel Affairs 6, no. 
1 (1 September 1999): 106, https://doi.org/10.1080/13537129908719548. 
31 Hagai Tsoref, ‘Golda Meir’s Leadership in the Yom Kippur War’, Israel Studies 23, no. 1 
(2018): 54, https://doi.org/10.2979/israelstudies.23.1.03. 
32 Over time, American assistance to Israel in 1973 has been reinterpreted as a data 
point in the longstanding alliance between the two nations. Under this interpretation, 
the resupply decision was obvious due to the longtime alliance between the two nations 
and their shared values.  
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embraced the study of the human in seeking to understand the relationship of states.33 
Constructivists view states as led by governments comprised of people, who are subject 
to the psychological factors that govern human interactions, including sets of thoughts, 
norms, and experiences, and the accompanying psychological baggage.34 According to 
constructivists, states’ interactions are the product of human decision-making that must 
account for the characteristics of the decision-maker and the collective that gives the 
state its identity.35  
The term constructivism was coined in 1989 by Nicholas Onuf to describe the 
ways in which “people and societies construct, or constitute, each other.”36 In his 
seminal book World of Our Making, he argues that social realities are as vital to our 
understanding of the world, if not more so, than our physical reality.37 To emphasize the 
contrast with realism, Onuf labels himself an “irrealist”38 as he articulates rules for both 
micro and macro-level understanding of the connection between social construction and 
material considerations in world politics.  
                                                        
33 For nearly half a century, Realists theorized how the Cold War could turn hot and 
spark a military showdown that would determine the fate of the global political order. 
Not only did this not happen, but one of the major super powers collapsed primarily due 
to intra-state factors. This upset many foundational assumptions about the primacy of 
states and the dominance of power politics as an explanation of the relations between 
nations, leading scholars to examine the shortcomings in their theories for explaining 
events. Their approach included new thinking about the nature of the international 
system and its participants. Alexander Bukh, Japan’s National Identity and Foreign 
Policy: Russia as Japan’s ‘Other’ (Routledge, 2010), 2. 
34 Fred Halliday, The Middle East in International Relations: Power, Politics and Ideology 
(Cambridge University Press, 2005), 32. 
35 Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of 
Power Politics’, International Organization 46, no. 2 (1 April 1992): 393. 
36 Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and 
International Relations (Routledge, 2012), 36. 
37 Onuf invokes a variety of philosophers, especially crediting Nicholas Goodman, whom 
he calls “a constructivist to the furthest degree.” Onuf, 37.  
38 Onuf, 37. 
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Constructivism gained additional traction and broader acceptance as a theory of 
international relations in 1992 with the publication of Alexander Wendt’s critique of 
realism in an article entitled “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction 
of Power Politics.” Wendt challenges the primacy of focus on the actions of the “self-
interested state” driven by exogenous considerations because it omits examination of 
the state’s internal processes of identity and interest formation as motivators of foreign 
policy decisions.39 He challenges the realists’ analogy to the state of nature by noting 
that they are unable to account for why some states engage in conflict while others do 
not.40 By offering a drastic reinterpretation of the underlying assumptions of the 
international system, Wendt opened a space for many new analyses and interpretations 
of the history of nations’ relations.  
Refocusing analysis from observable patterns of behavior to interests and 
identities required considerably more effort by a researcher. An inquiry could go in 
multiple directions, pursuing historical detail, psychological and sociological influences, 
and examining idiosyncratic nuances in order to produce a more complete and insightful 
picture of a nation and its decisions in the international system. One challenge 
associated with this approach, however, was the exponential increase in the number of 
variables in play. David Rousseau referred to this as “the constructivist challenge,” 
meaning that the development of models for social interaction can be based on very 
different assumptions and result in “wildly different predictions.”41  
                                                        
39 Wendt rejects the realists’ reliance upon Hobbes and the state of nature. He suggests 
that their perception of a “self-help world” is more likely due to developmental 
processes than to the overall structure of the system. Self-help and power politics are 
institutions, not essential features of anarchy. Wendt, ‘Anarchy Is What States Make of 
It’, 392–94.  
40 Wendt, 394–95. 
41 David L. Rousseau, Identifying Threats and Threatening Identities: The Social 
Construction of Realism and Liberalism (Stanford University Press, 2006), 39. Fierke and 
Jorgensen, similarly, note the “long and winding” path between constructivism as a 
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Whereas the weakness of realist theory overlooked the humanness of actors in 
evaluating the conduct of nations, constructivism rested upon understanding the 
decisions of the human actors in inter-nation relations. If the realists’ analysis of nation 
behavior was underinclusive, constructivists’ examination of motivation risked 
overinclusion and misdirection. Both theories had difficulty isolating the role of emotion, 
perception, and motivation of the actors responsible for nations’ policies. The next 
section discusses the materiality of these factors in foreign policy analysis. 
C. The Missing Role of Perception, Emotion, and Motivation 
 
World leaders and shapers of foreign policies usually present their decisions as 
based upon calculations of “facts,” including prioritization of national interests, and, 
often, analyses of outcomes.42 Similarly, analysts presume that most leaders base their 
conclusions on objective reasoning. Yet the choice of what to designate as fact, the 
interpretation accorded those facts, and the processes for reaching a conclusion are 
products of complex and opaque psychological processes.43 Political actors harbor 
motives for advancing proposals in public discourse, as do the people they seek to 
convince to support their cause. All use some calculus for measuring the potential 
impact of the proposed policy, but they are also influenced by often unacknowledged 
emotional concerns. Most scholars who advance theories of international relations 
overlook the impact of emotional influence on decision-making. Almost no literature 
                                                        
philosophical endeavor and constructivism as an empirical research tool. Karin M. Fierke 
and Knud Erik Jorgensen, Constructing International Relations: The Next Generation 
(Routledge, 2015), 39. 
42 This will obviously change depending on the leader and system of government 
involved. An absolute dictator’s policy priority might reflect the regime’s, or even their 
personal survival at the expense of the population, while a democratic leader might seek 
more nation-based goals. This distinction will matter more when I discuss the concept of 
securitized populism later in this chapter.  
43 Jonathan Mercer, ‘Emotional Beliefs’, International Organization 64, no. 1 (2010): 2. 
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exists on the role of emotionally-grounded beliefs in political science, and little exists in 
political psychology.44  
 Admittedly, a definition of emotion as a variable among other influential factors 
is difficult to isolate. It is a complex and malleable concept, which is hard to generalize. 
Yet realists, who look at outcomes and analyze the power relationships that led to the 
results, provide only a partial understanding of a conflict. Simplification creates a 
distorted perception of reality. As one scholar explains, if power distribution is the only 
meaningful variable, then the danger of realist thinking is summed up by the adage 
“when holding a hammer, every problem looks like a nail.”45 
Realists presume that all actors are rational, ignoring that these actors’ decisions 
may be motivated by any number of human characteristics, such as bias, revenge, or 
even altruism.46 History is littered with examples of poorly conceived military 
adventurism premised on faulty assumptions, bigotry, or overly idealistic moral 
standards.47 As E.H. Carr recognized in his post-World War II analysis of the Soviet 
Union, realism that ignores human concepts such as morality is fundamentally 
“unreal.”48 States do not suddenly become technocratic automatons independent of 
norms developed in human societal interaction just because they are operating on an 
                                                        
44 Mercer, 2.  
45 W. M. Wagner, R. Baumann, and V. Rittberger, ‘Neorealist Foreign Policy Theory’, 
German Foreign Policy Since Unification. Theories and Case Studies, 2001, 151. 
46 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Updated edition (New York: 
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(New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 164.  
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of racially motivated conflicts by colonizer toward the colonized. Alistair Horne, Hubris: 
The Tragedy of War in the Twentieth Century, Reprint edition (Harper, 2015); Peter 
Beinart, The Icarus Syndrome: A History of American Hubris, Reprint edition 
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international rather than domestic level. Any assessments of global interactions will be 
incomplete if premised on the assumption that humanity stops at the border. This 
results in a theoretical model that analyzes the decisions of states in the international 
arena which does not account for the factors that influence the decision-making 
process.49 
Constructivists build their theory upon the idea that humans make up states, and 
the leaders of these states bring their humanity to decision making. The challenge in 
acknowledging that emotions matter is how to assess their impact among the many 
other influences. In seeking to provide an overarching theory for the understanding of 
international relations, accepting a role for idiosyncratic emotions complicates the 
discussion. Cognition, as Jonathan Mercer points out, cannot be considered 
autonomously.50 How to measure the effect of emotion on cognition is particularly 
difficult. It is the interaction of cognition and emotion that form beliefs,51 which in turn 
instruct action. “Emotional beliefs,” according to Mercer, such as trust, nationalism, 
sense of justice, and credibility are defining elements of state and societal identity.  
The challenge for theorists rests in acknowledging that, while some beliefs may 
be based on a careful consideration of facts, they may also be founded upon feelings. 
Feelings may influence the creation or acceptance of fact. Humans interpret reality in 
significantly different ways, often seeing reality as they want it to be rather than as an 
objective observer may see it. Hence, we need to understand motivation. Further, we 
                                                        
49 Colin Elman, ‘Horses for Courses: Why Not Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy?’, 
Security Studies 6, no. 1 (Fall 1996): 12–13. 
50 Mercer, ‘Emotional Beliefs’, 2. 
51 K Fiedler and H Bless, ‘The Formation of Beliefs in the Interface of Affective and 
Cognitive Processes’, The Influence of Emotions on Beliefs, 1 January 2000, 144–70. 
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may also need to consider whether the decision maker is aware of the feelings that are 
biasing his identification of facts.52  
Failure to recognize the difference between the belief that something is true and 
a verifiable fact can confound our analysis of international relations if we are unwilling 
or unable to discern the motivation that lay behind an actor’s decision. To be sure, it is 
not always apparent in “real time” that the decision-making process has involved 
fabricated fact masquerading as the calculus for the chosen action.53 This occurs most 
frequently when the actor prefers an outcome for which he seeks a justification. The 
comedian Stephen Colbert coined the term “truthiness” to describe politicians who 
assert as fact something they feel to be true whether or not there is evidence to support 
its veracity.54 Examples abound, ranging from officials who confess the absence of 
evidence for their beliefs to those who admit that they intuitively feel something is true. 
For example, Richard Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State during the George W. Bush 
administration, asserted publicly and without evidence that Iran was maintaining a 
                                                        
52 My decision to concentrate on populist securitization as the theoretical frame of this 
project does not mean that realist considerations do not figure into the decisions of 
world leaders. In the study that follows, I examine the rhetoric and actions of humans as 
revelatory of leaders’ motivations rather than ascribing these same motivations directly 
to states themselves. This allows for a more thorough accounting of the foreign policy 
decision making process, one which does not take realist rhetoric simply at face value. 
Examining the posturing of states vis-à-vis one another and their broader geopolitical 
strategic objectives is beyond the scope of this study. 
53 The speed of information has increased this scourge. The rapidity with which people 
are able to respond to events means it is not always entirely clear on what basis people 
are acting or reacting, and they may be motivated by completely false stories, so-called 
“fake news,” that have gained traction prior the establishment of a factual accounting. 
54 Stephen Colbert, in the first episode of his show, “The Colbert Report,” coined the 
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as a parody of a conservative political talk show host, Colbert declared, “I don’t trust 
books. They’re all fact, no heart.” Stephen Colbert, ‘The Word - Truthiness’, The Colbert 
Report (Comedy Central, 17 October 2005), http://www.colbertnation.com/the-colbert-
report-videos/24039/october-17-2005/the-word---truthiness. 
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secret nuclear weapons program, declaring, “I believe it, but I don’t know it.”55 This and 
other emotionally-based presumptions proved consequential for American foreign 
policy. Similarly, President George W. Bush explained that his determination to engage 
with Russian President Vladimir Putin had been justified by their first interaction: “I 
looked the man in the eye,” he said, “I found him to be very straightforward and 
trustworthy…I was able to get a sense of his soul; a man deeply committed to his 
country and the best interests of his country.”56 
It is most challenging to analyze situations in which actors mistakenly insist that 
their beliefs and conclusions are based upon facts. Often guided by what psychologists 
call confirmation bias, a decision maker with a strong desire to view a situation in a 
particular way rationalizes that his characterization of the situation is, in fact, real. The 
combination of emotion and impression fosters a situation in which decision makers, 
when confronted with conflicting information or views, rationalize that what they are 
hearing is either incorrect or immaterial to the policy proposal.  
It is also possible for a leader to deliberately fabricate facts to justify a course of 
action he believes to be in his own or his nation’s best interests. This occurs most often 
under conditions of uncertainty where it is difficult to determine the veracity of the 
claim. The actor’s motivation may only be recognizable in hindsight, when it is too late 
to undo the consequences.57 Capturing this behavior in a generalizable theory is a 
                                                        
55 Seymour M. Hersh, ‘The Iran Plans’, The New Yorker, 10 April 2006, 
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56 Caroline Wyatt, ‘Bush and Putin: Best of Friends’, BBC News, 16 June 2001, 
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57 A particular danger associated with overlooking emotion in foreign policy scholarship 
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ethics and morality in drafting foreign policy, the discussion is frequently incomplete. 
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challenging endeavor. It suggests the need to engage in deeper considerations of human 
psychology to explore variables that are not only unobservable but highly contestable. It 
is questionable whether from a theoretical perspective this will be helpful.  
Still, for a project examining the policy choices of national leaders who are 
confronting issues consequential to the future of their nation and the security of its 
inhabitants, we need a theoretical framework that assists our analysis of human 
behavior. We need an analytical approach that is not limited to focusing on outcomes. 
At the same time, we need an approach that focuses our attention on variables material 
to our understanding of a particular relationship between nations. Constructivists 
offered a partial solution by focusing on the process of identity formation rather than 
delimiting the substance.58 Their use of identity influenced both the methodological and 
conceptual adaptation by securitization theorists.  
IV. Securitization 
 
 There are instances in which conceptualizing identity is less elusive and more 
consequential. In particular, conflict sharpens identity because it often requires an 
identity-affirming choice in opposing an adversary.59 In such situations, national identity 
is forged by the reaction of the populace in one nation to the encounter with the other, 
as well as by the feeling of solidarity with fellow “compatriots.”60 National solidarity 
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identity. 
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involves citizens internalizing their shared objectives to embrace values and objectives 
that produce a collective identity. When facing the possibility of experiencing armed 
conflict, the fundamental value driving the formation of the collective is the shared 
desire for security from the threat posed by the adversary. 
 Understanding security concerns and their societal effects are essential inquiries 
of a project examining relations between states in the Middle East, particularly when 
one of those countries is Israel. Insecurity has marked the existence of the Jewish people 
from biblical times to the present. Similarly, the search for security has dominated Israeli 
political discourse since the founding of the state in 1948. Israel’s struggle to survive is 
an identity trope voiced both by Israelis and Jews around the globe.61  
In this section, I look at how security concerns have informed refinement of 
constructivism by the development of securitization theory. I begin with an overview of 
how security studies provided the foundation for the new theory. I then look at the key 
concepts of securitization, examining the meaning of the requisite existential threat and 
the elements of the securitization process. I conclude this section with a discussion of 
how securitization theory informs this project.  
A. From Security Studies to Securitization  
 
Security studies developed from the neorealist tradition of scholars as a way of 
studying the use of force by states in the international arena. In an article entitled “The 
Renaissance of Security Studies,” Stephen Walt defined the discipline as the “study of 
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61 Neta Oren, ‘Israeli Identity Formation and the Arab—Israeli Conflict in Election 
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the threat, use, and control of military force.”62 In its original formation, scholars 
assigned the term “security” a strict interpretation, which limited the discipline to 
realism’s focus on the technical specifics of power and force. This provided a means of 
measuring and interpreting relative power relations among states. Security studies 
methodically categorized the world into regional subsystems based on competing 
interests, thereby providing an analytical framework for evaluating the threats that 
nations posed to one another.63 Proponents argued that intellectual contestation 
involving rigorous analysis of contingency scenarios would yield ideas by which states 
could better craft security policies that responded to the multitude of threats they 
confronted. 
That scholars created an entire academic discipline devoted to the study of 
security is hardly surprising given the political climate of the era in which it developed. 
During the Cold War and the nascent nuclear age, debates over security policies 
dominated scholarly inquiry, policymaking, and politics. The scars of World War II were 
still fresh in the global psyche, and the threat of nuclear annihilation magnified fears of 
future military confrontations.64 The conflicts between East and West, communism and 
democracy, colonial powers and their colonized subjects, among others, fed a global 
paranoia.65 Since not all of these conflicts involved considerations of war-fighting, over 
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time scholars grew skeptical that “security” study could only be undertaken by those 
with military expertise or well-versed in the “national security mindset.”66 This 
questioning coincided with the rise of constructivism as an academic discipline, which 
challenged the logic of realism as the basis for analyzing the relations between nations.  
The failure of the realists to anticipate such major upheavals as the collapse of 
the Soviet Union or Iran’s Islamic Revolution highlighted the need to think about conflict 
more broadly. Scholars raised new kinds of questions, such as what is the role of 
domestic arrangements in international behavior; should our understanding of modern 
conflicts involve more than military analysis; how should we account for non-traditional 
actors and methods of warfare by non-state terrorists and insurgency campaigns; and 
will new types of weapons change our understanding of warfare.67 Ironically, the 
diminution of the overarching threat of nuclear war to global security magnified the 
significance and consequences of what had been regarded as marginal or less significant 
security concerns. Theorists and strategists challenged us to think anew about the 
meaning of threat and security. This meant focusing on the role of human actors.68  
B. Toward a Theory of Securitization 
 
Scholars began by asking the obvious question: “What is security?” And they 
settled on a simple definition: “Security is about survival.”69 The simplicity of the 
proposition provided the conceptual flexibility necessary to reorient the field toward 
generally applicable principles of what it means to survive. Survival necessitated 
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identifying a threat, determining the intensity of the feared harm, and acting to reduce 
the probability that such harm will happen. Those engaged in the new security studies 
sought to create a framework for analyzing a threat, most especially one so serious as to 
threaten existence. When a danger reached the status of being an imminent existential 
threat, the scholars spoke of the securitization of that threat.70 They recognized that a 
threat could come in many different forms and that the perceptions of the risk might 
differ. More importantly, they realized that risk perception is often subjective and thus 
may not reflect objective reality.71 A threat appearing credible could induce fear of 
catastrophic harm to a polity even when the probability of its occurrence is low. This 
meant that an existential threat need not be “real” to produce a collective sense of 
insecurity.  
This redefinition enlarged consideration of security issues from exclusive focus 
on the realm of the physical – such as the gain or loss of territory, manpower, or 
materiel – to include the emotional. Understanding security involved more than 
calculations of physical safety; it necessitated examination of the origins and meanings 
of the human desire for security. In a conflict, security could involve a zero-sum 
confrontation in which one group’s search for security could create a sense of insecurity 
in the other. Booth and Wheeler referred to this inquiry as “the security dilemma,” by 
which they meant that “those weapons that states can use for their own self-protection 
potentially or actually threaten harm to others.” This animated the debate over the line 
between “legitimate self-defense” and “predatory behavior.”72 Theorists needed to 
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acknowledge the role of psychology, emotion, and identity concerns in shaping 
perceptions of security.  
Scholars sought to identify paradigmatic applications of the new theory in order 
to reduce the occasions for ambiguous ascription to any situation. They singled out the 
category of existential threats as presenting a situation that creates such a profound 
sense of collective insecurity that the polity is likely to demand or condone 
extraordinary state action in response. In the process they sought to identify the criteria 
for achieving this securitization. 
C. Securitization Theory 
 
The Copenhagen School argued that securitization theory allowed for analyzing 
how an actor invokes or constructs an existential threat to effect fundamental political 
change.73 They posited that securitization need not be limited to military threats, but 
may apply to scenarios in which a threat may be neither evidentially obvious nor 
indisputably imminent.74 Particularly in a conflict between nations pervaded by 
uncertainty, a national leader may aim to instill a sense of insecurity and fear of harm in 
a polity as a justification for a policy objective. In the absence of an observable imminent 
threat, a leader constructs a threat narrative, which contains a political “speech act” 
that defines the threat as existential. This narrative then justifies his proposed 
extraordinary response.75 In non-authoritarian regimes, the agent often enlists elite 
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allies from both the public and private sectors, such as the military, the media, the 
communities, and the academy, among other influential spheres, both to validate his 
message and to effect change.76  
A value of securitization theory rests in its acknowledging that, while the 
perception of danger may be based upon a careful consideration of facts, it may also be 
founded upon emotion. Moreover, feelings may influence the creation or acceptance of 
fact. The threat perception drives an expectation of response, both in the pursuit of 
foreign policy and the operation of domestic politics. The development of a threat as 
existential is a symbiotic process between leaders and constituents. For their part, 
political leaders construct or magnify a serious security challenge to a receptive 
audience. Unless the threat is immediately evident and publicly perpetrated by 
identifiable enemy actors, the leader must engage in a co-dependent enterprise with his 
constituents to sustain the fear. They are not, however, equal partners. Leaders control 
the information to characterize the danger and thus can manipulate the message 
toward their desired ends. They can, for example, fill the interstices of uncertainty to 
make the threat more real, or they can devise a narrative that elevates uncertainty into 
the cause of insecurity. They can assign characteristics and motivations to the enemy, 
such as endowing the enemy with impressive strength and evil intent.77 Conversely, they 
can characterize their nation as weak or vulnerable, and thus unprepared to prevent an 
attack. Most importantly, the leaders control the justification for their proposed 
response. Especially where she is urging sacrifice, the leader must present a narrative 
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designed to achieve collective acquiescence. A securitized threat is often one that 
justifies actions that would be unacceptable or unjustifiable in normal times. If the polity 
accepts the leader’s characterization, it validates the legitimacy of the threat and 
evinces its willingness to accept, or at a minimum not to oppose, the proposed actions. 
In doing so, they affirm the securitized status of the issue.78  
i. The Foundation: Existential Threats 
 
 Drawing upon constructivists’ concept of identity, securitization theorists 
recognized that the collective’s confrontation of a serious threat affects both identity 
and actions. Perceiving a threat of death, destruction, or even permanent disruption of 
one’s way of life produces a sense of urgency for preventative action. The realization of 
a looming disaster can alter people’s perceptions and judgments of observed facts and 
affect their capacity to reason and to render moral and ethical judgments.79 
Securitization scholars posited that their theory assisted the understanding of that class 
of threats in which societies experience such existential challenges.80  
The concept of existential threat has several dimensions, including its situational 
context, its characteristics, and its impact. The situation is important for giving rise to 
the perception of danger. As a theoretical proposition, identifiable criteria are 
unnecessary where the conditions contribute to the belief of those living in them that 
they face an identifiable risk to their life as they currently live it. Securitization involving 
inter-nation confrontation most frequently occurs in a profoundly uncertain 
environment. The collective fear is compounded by the absence of evidence regarding 
the seriousness of the threat, the probability of its occurrence, the likely extent of the 
                                                        
78 Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, Security, 33. 
79 As Dr. Samuel Johnson once said, “Depend upon it, sir, when a man knows he is to be 
hanged in a fortnight, it concentrates his mind wonderfully.” 
80 Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, Security; Wæver, ‘Securitization and Desecuritization’. 
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harm, and the means of prevention.81 Recognizing the subjectivity of situational 
perceptions, securitization theorists posited that assessments of reality were not the 
only drivers of decision making.82 That a threat may be perceived or invented by the 
actors, but not be verifiable by independent evidence, is a salient dynamic in our 
understanding of the situation. As will be examined in this project, Israeli leaders not 
only claimed that Iran’s development of a nuclear weapon was imminent, they ascribed 
to Iran’s leaders the intent to use it to annihilate Israel. Such claims were plausible but 
unverifiable.83 Nevertheless, the perception of Iran as an existential threat became a 
primary focus of Israel’s foreign policy. 
While there are many types of threats, the characteristics of a securitized threat 
are those that inform the calculus of the believability in the threat’s existence and its 
capacity to produce injury. I suggest that the characteristics fall into three categories 
that I call obviousness, imminence, and the nature of the danger. Obviousness refers to 
the degree to which those who witness or experience the situation objectively recognize 
that their existence is threatened. A nation that has been invaded by a foreign army is 
evidently fighting for its existence. By contrast, a state fighting to maintain its control 
over another country on a different continent may have a harder time convincing its 
people that the outcome poses an existential risk to their way of life. Imminence 
represents the temporal element of the calculus. A state confronting a hostile army 
                                                        
81 The leader’s ability to control the distribution of these details, either through himself 
or through trusted state apparatuses or institutions, grants him unique authority in the 
creation of situations of insecurity.  
82 Richard Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter-
Terrorism (Manchester University Press, 2005), 1, 21, 23; Weldes, Cultures of Insecurity, 
13; Wendt, ‘Anarchy Is What States Make of It’. 
83 Israeli and American leaders discounted verifiable evidence that Iran was not pursuing 
military applications as it developed its nuclear program. To the present time, media 
reporting and public understanding of Iran’s program presumes that Iran was building a 
bomb. See discussion in chapter 4. 
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amassed on its border, which is poised to invade, is in recognizably imminent danger. A 
state locked in a dispute with a foe possessing nuclear weapons, by contrast, may or 
may not believe that it is a likely target of such a weapon in the near-term. The threat is 
present, but the probability that it will materialize in the foreseeable future can be quite 
low.  
The nature of the danger refers to the type, manner, and extent of the injury 
threatened. It is the most debatable element of the calculus. The evident meaning is the 
risk of death, annihilation, government overthrow, or foreign domination. In short, it 
refers to a radical and permanent change in one’s existence. Adapting the 
constructivists’ understanding of identity, some security theorists argue that the 
concept of harm can be expanded to encompass challenges that threaten certain 
essential and fundamental features of society. This has provoked a debate over how far 
to expand securitization theory beyond situations not associated with actual or probable 
military engagement. Do political threats to “our democratic way of life,” or social 
threats “to life as we know it,” or challenges to our identity such that we may “no longer 
recognize who we are as a people” qualify as existential threats? Do such situations lend 
themselves to analysis through the lens of securitization theory? These challenges are 
worth noting in understanding the analytical framework of securitization, but they need 
not be answered in this project. We can agree that a narrative claiming a nuclear-armed 
nation is intending to use its bomb against a targeted nation in the near future would, if 
believed, be seen as an existential threat by its putative intended victims. We can, of 
course, debate whether the claims are true or the analysis is accurate, but that is a 
different calculus. 
When a threat is so politically urgent that government leaders deviate from the 
norms of appropriate conduct to protect their citizens, the extraordinary transforms the 
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ordinary. This could involve asking or demanding sacrifice from individuals for the sake 
of protecting the collective or taking preemptive action against an adversary in defiance 
of international law. In non-authoritarian regimes, political leaders face a high bar when 
claiming state entitlement to compromise individuals’ freedom in order to secure the 
collective from the threatened harm.84 It has long been accepted that a government can 
mandate sacrifice by its citizens during wartime. It is more controversial when a nation 
claims that the danger of an attack merits aggressive measures that would not be lawful 
absent the threat. It is most problematic when there is no basis for verifying that a 
threat exists.  
For a threat to be perceived as existential, fear must permeate the collective and 
manifest itself in the political consciousness. When the threat and its implications are 
not unquestionably evident – when, for example, there is no direct past experience that 
demonstrates the danger posed by the other – the fear must be learned through the 
dissemination of information about the other’s dangerousness.85 The messages are 
often part of a narrative designed to be stored in the collective emotional memory of 
the citizenry. At the same time, they are designed to mobilize citizens. The leader seeks 
                                                        
84 See for example, Leslie E. Gerwin, ‘The Challenge of Providing the Public with 
Actionable Information during a Pandemic’, The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 40, 
no. 3 (1 October 2012): 630–54. Gerwin notes how the threat of an emergency in a 
constitutional regime can be used by public authorities to arrogate to themselves 
extraordinary powers to abrogate constitutional protections and human rights. 
Historically, leaders have sought public support by identifying a scapegoat “other” as 
one source of the threat.  
85 W. W. Grings and M. E. Dawson, Emotions and Bodily Responses: A Psycho-
Physiological Approach (New York: Academic Press, 1978); Daniel Bar-Tal, ‘Why Does 
Fear Override Hope in Societies Engulfed by Intractable Conflict, as It Does in the Israeli 
Society?’, Political Psychology 22, no. 3 (1 September 2001): 603. 
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to activate listeners to demand that their government take measures to ameliorate the 
threat.86 He may also elicit their commitment to his particular policies.87  
 The leader seeks the public’s trust by appearing to identify the source of the fear 
and then proposing response measures perceived as effective. Huysmans called this 
process “security framing,” referring to how a leader characterizes the threat and its 
origin through the deliberate manipulation of fear and trust.88 In an environment of 
uncertainty, such manipulation can produce unanticipated consequences. In a study of 
Israeli society, Bar-Tal explained that a society “oversensitized by fear tends to 
misinterpret cues and information as signs of threat and danger, searching for the 
smallest indication in this direction, even in situations that signal good intentions.”89 
Fear can also be contagious; it can infect the collective in a way that mutes the critics or 
those with calmer instincts.90 An emotionally based appeal can deter challenges by 
invoking the counterfactual that the threat, if unaddressed, will produce the feared 
harm. Few political leaders want to risk being viewed as reluctant to protect the nation’s 
security or failing to consider the consequences of wrongly belittling the risk. A skillful 
                                                        
86 The securitization theorists also invoke the Hobbesian version of the State of Nature 
to explain the origins of the fear that animates their theory. They explain that the 
uncertainty concerning whom to trust in the sparse and unforgiving world described by 
Hobbes creates fear. The self-interest of people operating at their basest level raised the 
fear that violence could come from anyone at any time. To live in this world meant 
constantly suspecting others, since each person lacked information about whether the 
other’s intentions were benign or malevolent. The inherent desire to survive left an 
individual uncertain about whether force or cooperation would best achieve this 
objective. Jan H. Blits, ‘Hobbesian Fear’, Political Theory 17, no. 3 (1989): 417–31; 
Huysmans, The Politics of Insecurity, 53. 
87 As I explain in the next section of this chapter, I suggest a leader who seeks to 
promote his leadership as part of a securitization process is engaging in what I call 
“populist securitization.” 
88 This observation was not unique to securitization since most human interaction 
depends largely on individuals distinguishing between those they can trust and those 
they do not. Huysmans, The Politics of Insecurity, 51.  
89 Bar-Tal, ‘Why Does Fear Override Hope in Societies Engulfed by Intractable Conflict, as 
It Does in the Israeli Society?’, 609. 
90 Booth and Wheeler, The Security Dilemma, 62. 
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politician can even conflate fear and trust by convincing the public that its inability to 
trust others is itself a source of insecurity. As we will see, Israeli politicians across the 
political spectrum eventually embraced the perception of Iran’s nuclear threat, 
discounting as untrustworthy intelligence conclusions that Iran was not engaged in 
nuclear weapons production.  
The introduction of fear into the political discourse can have a powerful 
disruptive effect. It can challenge existing beliefs, or it can obscure reasoning, resulting 
in ill-conceived actions.91 It can elevate a security concern above other issues that 
objectively pose a greater risk to a country. A continuing fear can alter the political 
landscape.92 Demagogues are especially adept at manipulating fear as a strategy to 
attract a political base of conservatives, reactionaries, nationalists, and nativists who are 
responsive to themes that vilify the proverbial other, i.e. those excluded from their 
collective identity.93 If the leader’s message resonates with a sufficiently large base, the 
leader’s narrative may become the presumptive source of truth, making it harder for 
opponents to challenge this largely accepted version of the threat.  
ii. The Process of Achieving Securitization 
 
Achieving securitization – meaning that the public fears an existential threat and 
supports extraordinary polices to respond, allowing the government to institutionalize 
the threat as a foundation of its foreign policy – is the result of a process. A political 
                                                        
91 Daniel Bar-Tal, ‘Why Does Fear Override Hope in Societies Engulfed by Intractable 
Conflict, as It Does in the Israeli Society?’ Political Psychology 22, no. 3 (1 September 
2001): 601. 
92 Experiencing prolonged fear of attack may prompt an overly aggressive response in 
the form of a first strike. In this scenario, the enemy’s actual intentions are irrelevant; 
perception is all that matters. The Americans invaded Iraq in 2003 fearing that Saddam 
Hussein had weapons of mass destruction and refusing to believe contrary evidence.  
93 Christina Schori Liang, ed., Europe for the Europeans: The Foreign and Security Policy 
of the Populist Radical Right, 1 edition (Aldershot, England ; Burlington, VT: Routledge, 
2007), 4. 
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leader initiates the securitization process and then guides it with his words and actions. 
The central focus is the threat narrative. Analysis of its content and promotion enables 
us to identify its messages, the publics it addresses, and its stated and implied purposes. 
Examination of its public and private dissemination may reveal the narrator’s motivation 
as well as allow us to assess the narrative’s impact by looking at the support both he and 
the policies receive. We can see and test the presence of fear.94 This analytical approach 
does not require that we debate the psychological characteristics of the actors or 
otherwise speculate on hidden motivations. That may be a worthwhile endeavor, but 
securitization theory enables a more defined and less hypothetical inquiry.  
Deconstructing the process of building a threat narrative, theorists have 
identified three principal elements which they designate as the referent object,95 
meaning the threat target; the speech act, referring to the verbalization of the threat as 
well as its narrative content; and the securitizing agents or narrators. Through this 
analytic frame, the theorists offered a method for understanding the policy pursuits of a 
nation that positions itself as endangered by one or multiple enemies.  
1. The Referent Object 
 
According to scholar Barry Buzan of the Copenhagen School, securitization is an 
intersubjective process through which a threat is imbued with the “saliency sufficient to 
have substantial political effects.”96 The nature of the threatened injury may vary 
depending upon the source of the danger and its capacity for harm. Categorically, it may 
                                                        
94 Barry Glassner, ‘Narrative Techniques of Fear Mongering’, Social Research 71, no. 4 (1 
December 2004): 819. 
95 As explained below, the referent object is not necessarily the audience for a speech 
act. The referent object refers specifically to the threat target, while the people who are 
the audience for the speech act are responsible for deciding the validity of the speaker’s 
claims. In some cases, the referent object may include the audience as citizens of the 
state or as people who may be in danger, but this is not always true.  
96 Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, Security, 33. 
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be predominantly physical, political, psychological, economic, or something else, but it 
must result in producing in the listener feelings of insecurity sufficient to stimulate 
demands for response measures. The challenge may target physical safety, territorial 
control, or living environment, or it may threaten key features of one’s identity that will 
alter continued existence.97 Buzan refers to the target of such threats as the “referent 
object,” which he claims can be a collective entity, such as the nation-state, a formal or 
informal group, or an individual. The referent object can, but need not be the audience 
the speaker is addressing. The audience, however, must be profoundly affected by the 
danger to the referent object.  
As discussed above, the leader evaluates or employs a threat calculus, including 
imminence, temporality, and nature of the danger in order to craft a narrative detailing 
a threat to the referent object. The result is that the individual or collective listener will 
perceive a significant danger to physical being or the capacity to exercise determination. 
The latter can range from a disruption of daily routine to the inability to exercise 
sovereignty over territorial space.  
The identification of the referent object has important political consequences. As 
we will see, Israeli leaders not only cast its state as the target of Iran’s alleged nuclear 
weapons development program, they sought to include Europe among the referent 
objects. For example, Benjamin Netanyahu claimed that if Iran acquired nuclear 
weapons, it might aim a bomb at Europe. If Europeans were inclined to perceive such a 
                                                        
97 The last of these, identity, is especially relevant for this discussion. It is the most fluid 
of the concepts and is therefore the hardest to define in terms of what constitutes an 
“existential” threat. This has a secondary implication, as well, in that it is also the most 
easily exploited or manipulated by resourceful leaders to create or intensify a conflict. 
“They are threatening our way of life” is a common political refrain that captures the 
obscure limits of the threat to identity while imbuing it with a degree of urgency similar 
to a more tangible object. Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, 33. 
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threat, a fear-driven demand for a response might obscure the technological and 
political realities, which made this an unlikely scenario. 
2. The Speech Act98 
 
Buzan and his Copenhagen School colleagues Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde 
explain that the process for transforming the ordinary into the extraordinary begins with 
what they call a “speech act.”99 Taken literally, it is a public declaration made by a leader 
or agent identifying a significant, potentially life-altering, security threat. This rhetorical 
moment has a purpose: it aims to create in the listener a sense of insecurity and fear for 
one’s wellbeing. As discussed above, the speech act need not be accompanied by 
tangible documentation of the accuracy of the claims or by actual performance. To 
initiate the securitization process, however, it must contain the “grammar of security,” 
meaning that the speaker’s chosen language presents a scenario in which the threat is 
or may become existential such that a conventional response will prove inadequate to 
ensure security.100 By creating the impression that normal options are foreclosed, the 
actor leads the public toward acquiescence in extraordinary actions.  
In addition to identifying the threat, the securitizing agent uses the speech act to 
propose, issue, or seek approval for an exemption from the normal rules that should 
govern behavior or action in a less threatening environment. The “ticking time bomb” 
scenario provides the extreme example of the operation of securitization. A credible 
                                                        
98 The securitization theorists use the speech act to refer to the particular rhetoric 
associated with providing the content of the threat’s characteristics. This section 
examines the speech act as they define it. In this project, my use of threat narrative 
includes the speech act but also refers more broadly to the content of the account of 
the danger including its history, the actors, its tropes, and other details that serve the 
narrator’s political objectives. See also discussion above in section IV.C.i. discussing the 
theory’s requirement that the threat must be existential. 
99 Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, Security, 26. 
100 Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, 33. 
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assertion that some number of people face imminent death arguably justifies 
extraordinary actions to locate the bomb and prevent it from exploding. Uncertainty 
suspends concern for whether or not the threat actually exists. What is important for 
the securitization process is that those to whom the speech act is directed believe that 
such a threat is credibly probable.101 Similarly, whether the threat is capable of causing 
the ascribed harm is also marginally significant in the moment.102 The ticking time bomb 
scenario, however, is not the paradigmatic threat since it has limited value for long term 
engagement in the political contestation process. Unless it is a repeated motif, such as 
terrorism, it will not long serve as the basis for formulating policy under continuing 
conditions of uncertainty.  
Since rhetoric is an art and the speech act is a persuasive tool, securitization is 
often a creative process. The construction of a threat can be part of an overt or subtle 
political strategy. For example, a speech act favored by demagogues involves the threat 
of immigrants as the dangerous other. The agent may picture a direct threat, such as 
linking aliens to criminal or dangerous acts, including terrorism or the carrying of 
diseases, and seek to elevate the risk to a crisis. A leader may use the presence of 
immigrants to exploit feelings of racism or nationalism to promote his leadership and his 
policies. Even if the claimed linkage proves inaccurate or the danger nonexistent, the 
perception may linger.103 A securitization initiative may also subtly aim to prioritize a 
shared concern as a diversion of attention from other social or political issues, such as 
                                                        
101 This, as Mercer points out, often depends on one’s selection and interpretation of 
evidence and an assessment of risk, both of which rely on emotional considerations. 
Mercer, ‘Emotional Beliefs’, 240. 
102 It may, for example, affect the actor’s credibility to sustain the support of a base 
willing to accede to proposed response measures.  
103 Emily M. Farris and Heather Silber Mohamed, ‘Picturing Immigration: How the Media 
Criminalizes Immigrants’, Politics, Groups, and Identities 6, no. 4 (2 October 2018): 814–
24, https://doi.org/10.1080/21565503.2018.1484375. 
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economic woes, which defy easy solution. Whereas a leader’s base may hold differing 
opinions regarding solutions to economic challenges, they may share the sense of 
insecurity posed by an external foe.104 The message may not be totally negative: in 
addition to engendering fear and insecurity, the agent may promote feelings of 
patriotism and nationalism as well as hope for a more secure future.  
When the presence of one or more of the threat characteristics is debatable, 
including its existence, its imminence, or its probability of actualization, the speech act 
exhorting action is often directed to a polity willing to accept the speaker’s claims rather 
than to state officials who must approve the speaker’s proposed action. This strategy 
has two benefits. First, the collective is more susceptible to emotional appeal and thus 
can be an effectively mobilized to press officials for action. Second, securing the public’s 
emotional investment reduces opposition either by discouraging skeptics from 
questioning the threat characterization or diminishing the receptivity of the listener to 
disputants. These benefits are co-dependent but examining each will help in 
understanding how a threat narrative may be constructed and deployed as a speech 
act.105  
The Copenhagen School posits that when a leader appeals to emotion to achieve 
securitization, the speech act is critical. A skillful politician with powerful oratorical skills 
addressing a receptive audience can manipulate legitimate situational concerns 
associated with present developments and future uncertainty to craft a narrative that 
initiates the securitization process.106 To succeed, the agent must recognize the 
                                                        
104 Kenneth Prewitt, ‘The Politics of Fear after 9/11’, Social Research: An International 
Quarterly, no. 4 (2004): 1129; Gus Martin, ed., The New Era of Terrorism: Selected 
Readings (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2004). 
105 Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, Security, 24–25. 
106 The receptiveness of the audience is relevant in this discussion since there would 
likely be a limit on what people would take seriously. A far-fetched claim risks rejection. 
Abstraction can, however, help a politician use “national security interests” or 
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subjectivity of the enterprise, selecting messages that will resonate with his target 
audiences as both credible and disturbing. The securitizing agent can seize upon a 
singular disruptive incident,107 or he can marshal a series of events around which he will 
craft his narrative.  
A speech act must contain essential elements that effectively detail the threat. 
As discussed above, these include identifying the source of the threat and its 
characteristics: the real or imagined evidence of its existence, its imminence, and the 
expectation of harm.108 In an uncertain environment where the characteristics are not 
evident, the securitizing actor will seek to engage his audience by prioritizing emotion 
over critical analysis.109 He may even disguise his objectives in initiating the 
securitization process. For example, he may be less interested in taking the proposed 
actions than in using the proposal to bolster public support for his image as a fearless 
leader. Similarly, the vilification of the threat source as an implacable enemy may be a 
leader’s strategy for building a collective based upon a shared foe.  
As we will see in this project, the Iran threat narrative masterfully combined plot 
elements of a morally corrupt, apocalyptical clerical regime; clerics acquiring nuclear 
                                                        
“protection of the homeland” as a pretext for action against an entity that is not an 
obvious threat.  
107 The bombings on September 11, 2001 provide an example of a leader using a singular 
event to initiate a sustained existential threat narrative. President George W. Bush 
claimed that the bombings necessitated an enlargement of executive powers in a “war 
on terror,” including those that would arguably be considered illegal in normal times. His 
narrative included rhetoric aimed at altering Americans’ perception of their national 
identity and security. See e.g.  
George W. Bush, ‘Transcript of President Bush’s Address to a Joint Session of Congress’, 
20 September 2001, http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/. 
(“These terrorists kill not merely to end lives, but to disrupt and end a way of life.”) 
108 See section IV.C.i. 
109 According to Buzan and colleagues, if military capability was the principal basis 
affecting a nation’s sense of security, “Western Europe would have been as concerned, 
if not more concerned, with the United States as they were with the Soviet Union after 
the end of World War II.” Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, Security, 58–59. 
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weapons; a nation intent on annihilation of Israel; and an Israeli leader who is singularly 
willing to confront the world and tell the “truth.” Each of these propositions is 
sufficiently credible but largely unverifiable. Together they picture a potential disaster, 
which inhibits opposition from those unwilling to risk being wrong. Thus, Israeli leaders 
refused to believe intelligence reports that Iran was not building a bomb, but instead 
continually predicted imminent acquisition of the lethal weapon. That their predictions 
might prove inaccurate was inconsequential.  
3. Securitizing Actors  
 
The identity of the speaker and his methodology of delivery are critical 
contributors to the securitization process. A person shouting from atop a box on a street 
corner is unlikely to gain as much political traction as an opinion leader, such as a high-
ranking government official or a nationally syndicated columnist. Thus, the Copenhagen 
School stresses that public support for the “securitizing actor” is a necessary component 
of the securitization process. The securitizing actor, who engages in the speech act, must 
possess sufficient social and political capital to have the means and capability to 
convince the public of both the existence and nature of the threat. 110  
 Three factors are necessary for an actor’s success: perceived access to 
information, a significant platform for dissemination, and credibility. For listeners to 
perceive that the speaker is worthy of trust, they must see him as knowledgeable about 
the subject matter he is addressing. He will enhance his standing and increase the 
salience of his arguments if listeners believe he has access to information unavailable to 
                                                        
110 While the securitizing actor is generally the source of the speech act, there are others 
who may influence the securitization process. Buzan calls these “functional actors,” or 
“actors who affect the dynamics of a sector.” They can act directly or indirectly, 
intentionally or not, to influence perceptions of security-related issues. They may also 
facilitate or enhance the capability of a securitizing actor to deliver a resonant message. 
Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, 36. 
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them. The more he can monopolize the information sources relevant to his themes, the 
better he can control the threat content. The speaker’s institutional position or 
affiliation can augment the perception of his knowledge and credibility.111  
The actor must also have the ability to deliver the message. Here, both the 
delivery platform and the “significance” of the audience influence the impact of his 
speech.112 The place of delivery can enhance the dissemination of the message and the 
respect it earns. Speeches before official bodies, in prominent forums, or at respected 
public functions foster a presumption of credible content. Hence, the delivery platform 
can facilitate the diffusion of the message. An important address might garner media 
attention, reproduction and dissemination, and public discussion and analysis. In the age 
of the Internet, social media, and 24/7 news coverage, dissemination is less challenging, 
and the physical delivery platform may be less consequential. Still, the fact that an 
identifiable audience invited a particular individual to speak can raise the profile of a 
would-be securitizing actor. In addition to the value of the invitation, the listeners can 
validate the speaker’s message, especially if the organization or its members 
disseminate the speech or discuss its content with others of similar stature.  
The third criterion is both the predicate to and consequence of the knowledge 
and location conditions. To be considered credible, the actor should appear to be 
knowledgeable about her topic. For her message to be received, absorbed, and adopted 
by her listeners, it must resonate with them. It is not enough for the speaker to be 
heard; the listeners must believe the speaker is worth their time and attention. To be 
sure, a speaker’s credibility is no longer determinable by objective criteria. In today’s 
                                                        
111 Institutional reputation is not necessarily transferred to the speaker. Depending upon 
the audience, an institutional affiliation can undermine credibility, particularly when the 
institution has a known political agenda. 
112 Williams, ‘Words, Images, Enemies’, 527. 
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world, the ideological compatibility of the speaker and listener might, without more, 
make the former credible.113 In an age of “truthiness” and cognitive dissonance, 
factually inaccurate messages may still be received as credible.114  
Ironically, a speaker lacking a reputation for credibility may have an easier time 
disseminating a message of questionable veracity than an actor with a reputation for 
honesty.115 For example, a conspiracy theorist who concocts a message resonant with a 
niche audience may see his message amplified and inserted into the public discourse. It 
may then be adopted and repeated by a successor securitizing actor with access to a 
more prominent platform and a larger audience.116 By contrast, an actor who cultivates 
a reputation for honesty can undermine his credibility by proffering information that 
turns out to be false or misleading. General Colin Powell’s advocacy for war with Iraq, 
which used false intelligence reports that the country possessed weapons of mass 
destruction, stained his reputation and provided grounds for critics to question his 
continuing credibility as United States Secretary of State. In a situation where the issues 
                                                        
113 Charles G Lord, Lee Ross, and Mark R Lepper, ‘Biased Assimilation and Attitude 
Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence’, 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 37, no. 11 (1979): 2098–2109. 
114 Colbert, ‘The Word - Truthiness’. 
115 Leaders’ ability to shape these narratives has increased as a result of the information 
age, which has made it easier to propagate and disseminate information that fits with 
their preexisting worldview. In extreme cases, leaders may be able to alter the contours 
of “truth” through the repeated use of falsehoods, eventually convincing the public to 
accept their version of events. Scientific studies have shown that listeners who hear 
false statements are predisposed toward believing them since they must first mentally 
accept these statements in order to process and understand them. Likewise, the sheer 
repetition of these claims makes them harder to mentally dismiss, creating a situation 
known as “illusory truth.” Daniel Gilbert, ‘How Mental Systems Behave’, American 
Psychologist 46, no. 2 (February 1991): 107–19; Lynn Hasher and David Goldstein, 
‘Frequency and the Conference of Referential Validity’, Journal of Verbal Learning and 
Verbal Behavior 16, no. 1 (1977): 107–12. 
116 During the 2016 presidential campaign, candidate Donald Trump drew several of his 
claims about his opponent and the consequences of American policies from conspiracy 
theorists, who are widely considered to be fringe political commentators. Despite the 
absence of verifiable fact (or, in some cases, proof that they were lies) the claims were 
treated as credible by many of the candidate’s supporters. 
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are complex, emotional, and frequently opaque, a leader’s false assertion may not as 
readily undermine his credibility among his followers. 
A securitizing actor’s access, platform, and perceived trust does not guarantee 
that she will act credibly. Unique competence may even enable a leader to manipulate a 
situation for professional self-promotion. In this project, we will see how those with 
expertise were not immune from overstating a threat assessment or embellishing a 
threat narrative. This is not necessarily an abuse of trust if the actor believes the results 
to be in the best interests of his constituents. The practice becomes perverse when this 
belief is grounded neither in facts nor data but rather in the conviction that one’s 
leadership is critical for the wellbeing of the nation. Similarly, experts may validate a 
threat narrative based upon questionable motives. For example, military leaders may 
secure additional investment in military readiness due to the perception of imminent 
danger. The image of a sword of Damocles looming over an ill-defined but serious threat 
is often a powerful message when delivered by a respected member of a nation’s armed 
forces.  
In this project, I will explore how Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu 
constructed a threat narrative based upon the disputed existence of an Iranian nuclear 
weapons program and the unverifiable claims that Iranian officials would imminently 
attack Israel using such weapons. Relying upon his access to supposedly restricted 
information and multiple public forums, he aimed emotionally-charged messages at 
both a domestic constituency and an international audience. Netanyahu succeeded in 
crafting a message that met the criteria for securitization, but he failed to attain the 
support of world leaders for preemptive military action against Iran.117 After initial 
                                                        
117 The major world powers including the five permanent members of the U.N. Security 
Council and Germany rejected Netanyahu’s entreaties not to negotiate with Iran. After 
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challenges to his message at home, he succeeded in effectively solidifying the 
securitization of the Iran threat. I submit that he both overcame the opposition of 
Israelis who questioned whether their country faced nuclear annihilation, and enhanced 
his position as the leader who would protect them by employing an additional strategy. I 
now turn to how populism enhances securitization efforts, which will serve as the 
theoretical lens for this project.  
V. A Proposed Modification to Securitization Theory 
 
A. Introduction: Adding Populism 
 
The Copenhagen school makes a compelling case for extending securitization 
theory beyond its original application to situations involving dangers posed by military-
based threats. Enlarging the scope of what can be classified as a threat in securitization 
analysis, however, risks overgeneralization.118 The requisite “existential” modifier that 
elevates security threats is rhetorically and operationally malleable, and different types 
of threats may involve unique variables in the danger calculus. While it is beyond the 
scope of this project to explore the extent and consequences of the theory’s extension, 
it is useful to identify the challenge of doing so since it will assist in explaining the 
modification I am proposing for this project. I suggest that extending the theory to 
situations involving a threat, the existence and characteristics of which are uncertain, 
raises the question of whether to focus only on the requisite elements of the 
securitization process. Such a narrow inquiry will likely not provide a sufficiently 
complete understanding of how an actor succeeds in constructing a threat to effect 
fundamental political change.  
                                                        
reaching and implementing an agreement, newly elected President Donald Trump 
withdrew the United States from the deal. See Epilogue.  
118 Ole Wæver, ‘Securitization and Desecuritization’, in On Security, ed. Ronnie D. 
Lipschutz (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1995), 47. 
 69 
One danger associated with expanding the reach of a theory developed in one 
context to materially different situations is that it can erode the relevance of context-
specific detail. In concentrating on finding and analyzing the criteria shared across 
varying circumstances, we might overlook or deemphasize the role that idiosyncratic 
factors play in influencing the actor’s choice of securitization tropes and the resonance 
of the speech act with his intended audience. We risk diminishing our capability to 
understand the power of the actor and his narrative.  
When an actor manipulates the public’s perception of security to produce 
political change, context matters. Political context refers to the environment, events, 
and infrastructure in which the action is occurring, and also to the personal qualities of 
the securitizing agent and the publics she is addressing.119 The physical elements are 
generally observable and thus are more easily categorized than is the personal. The 
latter includes the beliefs, ambitions, personality traits, and other individual qualities of 
the leader as well as the emotions and conceptions of collective identity held by his 
listeners.120 These may be matters involving subjective judgments or preferences, which 
are difficult to account for objectively or to include in an assessment of criticality in 
understanding the outcome of a securitization process.121  
                                                        
119 Williams, ‘Words, Images, Enemies’, 527. 
120 Rousseau, Identifying Threats and Threatening Identities. 
121 This project will identify several historic moments in which context helps explain 
Israeli leaders’ actions and decisions. The contextual elements include both domestic 
considerations and international developments. As I will discuss infra, two of the most 
salient moments depended upon the political environment and the characteristics of the 
individuals acting in that space. These were the 2005 election of Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad as Iranian President, which enabled Benjamin Netanyahu to refine the 
populist tropes that he would eventually deploy as Prime Minister, and the 2006 Israeli 
invasion of Lebanon, which enabled Israeli leaders to tangibly associate the Iran threat 
with physical violence and thereby promote it to the Israeli public. See discussion infra 
at Chapter 4, Section IV, Part A and Chapter 4, Section V, Parts A-B. 
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Theorists are understandably reluctant to incorporate elements that defy 
categorization. It is difficult to account for the influence of humans’ emotions in both 
the decisions of the actors and the impact upon the listeners. While securitization 
theorists acknowledge that the actor makes an emotional appeal for support, analysts 
examine the message content, evidence of public acceptance, and subsequent 
government conduct to assess the power of that appeal. Securitization is achieved when 
the public appears to believe that an existential threat merits a response that may 
require a change in accepted norms for national action.122 Working backwards from the 
change, we might examine how the actor initiated and justified the actual or proposed 
disruption, especially the characteristics he ascribed to the threat and the expectations 
he created by proposing a particular response. Securitization theory, however, elides 
over consideration of how and why the securitizing agent succeeded in achieving public 
acceptance of his claims, focusing instead on the threat calculus without inquiring into 
the broader context.123 These inquiries involve considerations of emotion and 
motivation, which admittedly are subject to manipulation and misunderstanding when 
examined ex post facto as part of an effort to explain an outcome. The analysis is 
complicated by the potential for audience bias. For example, the tendency toward 
confirmation bias – prioritizing information that agrees with preexisting viewpoints – 
increases the likelihood that individuals who are already sympathetic to a false belief 
will fully embrace falsehood even at the expense of contradictory facts.124  
                                                        
122 Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, Security, 21. 
123 Weldes, Cultures of Insecurity. 
124 Citing the work of social psychologist Jonathan Haidt, Tom Nichols notes that when 
people are confronted with facts that contradict their values, the common response is 
for people to reject the facts and try to justify their beliefs. Tom Nichols, The Death of 
Expertise: The Campaign Against Established Knowledge and Why It Matters (New York, 
NY: OUP USA, 2017). 
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In an inter-nation conflict, it does not always follow that a case for extra-ordinary 
action against an enemy based primarily on the threat calculus will succeed in winning 
public support. When analyzing a nation’s response to the danger posed by its foe 
through the lens of a securitization process, it may also prove helpful to widen the 
inquiry to examine the political and social context in which it is occurring. I thus suggest 
a refinement of securitization theory applicable to circumstances in which a political 
leader initiates a securitization process under conditions of uncertainty – especially 
when there are questions about the existence of the threat and the assessment of its 
characteristics – and in which the threat narrative indicates that the leader is seeking 
support for an extra-ordinary response while engaging in self-promotion of his position 
and power. In such instances, I submit that we should examine the leader’s strategies 
for securing public acquiescence as well as the domestic political context in which he is 
promoting his foreign policies. Specifically, I am proposing that we determine whether 
populism is influencing the securitization process, and if so, how it is contributing to our 
understanding of the conflict and its potential or actual outcomes. 
 “Populist securitization” provides a more detailed analytical frame for examining 
a leader’s invocation of an existential threat in pursuit of his foreign policy and his 
domestic leadership. At first glance, this may appear an odd coupling of concepts. 
Securitization as a theory is an academic enterprise. I do not maintain that an actor is 
consciously guided by the components of the theoretical process, but rather that the 
theory provides researchers with a method for analyzing a situation in which a crisis of 
public insecurity may result in transformative change. Populism, by contrast, is a political 
philosophy, which can guide a would-be leader in strategic decision-making as he seeks 
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to secure or enhance his political power.125 Securitization and populism fit together 
because policies and actions directed at a threat response require a leader to make 
rhetorical appeals to the polity designed to mobilize support for power-enhancing 
actions and, by extension, for his leadership. When populism is used as a modifier of 
securitization, it refers to the use of populist-inspired strategies for building political 
power that facilitates the leader’s capacity to elicit collective fear and insecurity in 
support of a response likely to involve extraordinary measures.  
Populist securitization is thus both an expansion and cabining of the applicability 
of securitization theory. While it assumes that securitization can be expanded beyond 
military engagement, it does not lead us into the debate over how far it may extend. I 
suggest populist securitization applies to a particular category of perceived existential 
threats ascribed to a nation’s exogenous enemy. Populist securitization arises in two 
situations. In one, a leader uses populist messaging to secure public acceptance of the 
threat narrative and his proposed response.126 Although the promotion of an existential 
threat may become a dominant element of the leader’s governing strategy, the populist 
tropes are primarily reserved for accruing political support for new and potentially 
disruptive policies in response. The situation is usually occasioned by an unexpected 
disruptive event, and the official leading the response need not otherwise qualify as a 
                                                        
125 Angelos-Stylianos Chryssogelos, ‘Undermining the West from Within: European 
Populists, the US and Russia’, European View 9, no. 2 (December 2010): 267–77. 
126 The U.S. Congress hastily enacted the 342-page USA Patriot Act giving the 
government vast new powers to abrogate constitutional liberties to protect the nation’s 
security from terrorism. Few legislators admitted to reading the entire act, and even 
fewer opposed passage. No elected official wanted to be accused of failing to keep 
America safe by questioning whether the delegation of such broad and unchecked 
power was necessary. F. James Sensenbrenner Jr., ‘Uniting and Strengthening America 
by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA 
PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001’, H.R.3162 § (2001), https://www.congress.gov/bill/107th-
congress/house-bill/3162; Michael Moore, Fahrenheit 9/11, Documentary, Drama, War, 
2004. 
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populist. Following the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, 
President George W. Bush echoed the populist “us-against-them message” both 
domestically and internationally in seeking support for enlarging his executive power in 
the new “war on terror.” He famously launched his counterterrorism campaign by 
warning, "Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with 
us, or you are with the terrorists."127 On the home front, Bush minimized opposition to 
his arrogation of new powers by replacing debate with ridicule of those raising 
objections to the government’s interference with constitutionally protected liberties.128  
 The second scenario for populist securitization occurs when a populist leader 
engages in a securitization process by constructing an actual or manufactured existential 
threat and invoking populist strategies to promote public acceptance of his proposals 
and his leadership. Analysis of the securitizing actor’s narrative and conduct reveals that 
the process is a vehicle for enlarging and maintaining the leader’s base of political 
support and hence, his power. In some cases, a leader can echo populist tropes in 
employing his narrative to enlist the international community in supporting a proposed 
extraordinary initiative. As I will show, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu 
embraced populism in the construction, promotion, and maintenance of the Iran threat 
narrative. In so doing, he engaged in a securitization process that positioned him to 
launch a “crusade” domestically and internationally to disable Iran’s nuclear program. 
This included leading the opposition to his allies’ engagement in conventional diplomatic 
negotiations to reduce the threat. 
                                                        
127 George W. Bush, ‘Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People’ 
(20 September 2001). 
128 Leslie E. Gerwin, ‘Planning for Pandemic: A New Model for Governing Public Health 
Emergencies’, American Journal of Law & Medicine 37, no. 1 (1 January 2011): 154–56. 
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 Bearing in mind the applications of this modified theory, in the remainder of this 
section I briefly examine populism as a strategy of political leadership and then discuss 
the value populism adds to securitization theory. In the concluding section, I explain 
how populist securitization informs this project. 
B. Populist Leadership 
 
In recent years, populism has arguably evolved into a strategy masquerading as 
an ideology, which is employed and embraced by certain national political power-
seekers.129 Commentators speak of a global “wave of populism” sweeping away the old 
political order. As with all political movements, debates abound over the origin, 
meaning, impact, and consequences of this modern political development.130 In some 
versions of its history, the modern iteration grew out of nineteenth century America and 
the formation of the “People’s Party.” Born in 1892 out of a frustration with the existing 
two-party structure, small farmers rallied against the tyranny of large industrialists and 
moneyed interests whom they viewed as the opposition establishment or self-centered 
                                                        
129 We have witnessed several highly visible political victories described as populist 
inspired, while commentators have noted the danger that populism poses to 
constitutionalism. In 2016 two unexpected electoral victories that generated attention – 
the decision of a majority of United Kingdom voters to leave the European Union 
(known as “Brexit”) and election by a majority of the Electoral College of Donald Trump 
as President of the United States – illustrated the power of populist mobilization. 
Populist candidates in the style of Trump and Brexit stood for election in France (Marine 
Le Pen), the Netherlands (Geert Wilders), Austria (Heinz-Christian Strache), and 
Germany (Alexander Gauland and Alice Weidel), among others. Victor Orban in Hungary 
is another example of a successful populist politician. 
130 A search of the EBSCO academic database reveals how this debate has expanded in 
recent years. A search for the term “populism” returns 912 academic articles for 2017. 
The average for the previous four years was 600 articles per year, an increase of over 
50%. The results for news articles were even more striking. From 2012-2015, the 
average annual count for articles containing the term populism was 348 per year. In 
2016 and 2017, the average jumped to 1299 articles per year. Academics, particularly 
comparative law scholars, are concerned that the emergent populist leaders represent a 
threat to constitutionalism. See, for example, Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, How 
Democracies Die (New York: Crown, 2018). 
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elitists.131 Some claim that the term originated in the 1824 United States presidential 
campaign of Andrew Jackson, who defined a “populist style” of politics by running as an 
outsider against Washington elites.132 Whatever its precise history, populism developed 
worldwide as a mobilization of “ordinary folk” against powerful actors.133 A political 
leader, or would-be leader, frames the contestation by positioning himself as the 
protector of the interests of common people from the tyranny of the elite members of 
the established order. Such appeals often arise in electoral contests, but they are also 
increasingly emerging as themes in rallying support for disruptive policy changes.  
 Princeton University political philosopher Jan-Werner Müller offers an analytical 
framework useful for identifying and evaluating the impact of current populist 
movements. In a 2016 book entitled What is Populism? Müller examines the methods 
and messages employed by populist politicians, both during their campaigns for office 
and, more importantly, in their methods of governing. Müller challenges the proposition 
that candidates run as “outsiders” only to become “insiders” upon winning political 
office. Rather, he defines the current version of populism as a deeper and more robust 
philosophy. Populist leaders are not simply developing a mass appeal to harness the 
anger, frustration, or resentment of their followers against a common enemy to win 
elections.134 He claims that leaders have a broader purpose.  
                                                        
131 Sergiu Gherghina, Contemporary Populism: A Controversial Concept and Its Diverse 
Forms, ed. Sergiu Miscoiu and Sorina Soare, 1st Unabridged edition (Newcastle upon 
Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013), 105. 
132 Harry Watson, ‘Andrew Jackson, America’s Original Anti-Establishment Candidate’, 
Smithsonian, 31 March 2016, http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/andrew-
jackson-americas-original-anti-establishment-candidate-180958621/. 
133 Jan-Werner Müller, What Is Populism? (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016), 2. 
134 As Müller notes, this last definition is uniquely useless, since appealing to the masses 
and gaining the largest share possible of popular support is what all politicians in 
democratic systems seek to achieve. Müller, 3.  
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 According to Müller, populism is a “particular moralistic imagination of politics, a 
way of perceiving the political world that sets a morally pure and fully unified – 
but…ultimately fictional – people against elites who are deemed corrupt or in some 
other way morally inferior.”135 In his conception, populist movements arise by claiming 
to represent a cohort of what they call the “real people” against “everyone else,” 
including those in the political establishment. The defining characteristic of the 
movement is that it includes only those who are alike in form or philosophy, or both, 
and excludes all who are different.136 This makes the movement anti-pluralist since its 
members recognize only those like themselves as the totality of the population.137 The 
morally tested inclusion of likeness and the exclusion of difference is the distinctive 
premise of Müller’s definition of populism. One qualifies for movement membership, 
and in autocratic societies for citizenship, based upon one’s political views. The “people” 
tolerate no loyal opposition or informed dissent.138  
                                                        
135 Müller, 19. 
136 This echoes the constructivist and securitization theorists who emphasize that 
identity involves identifying the “other” by which a polity defines itself. The initial 
objectives of the populist strategist and securitization theorists differ, however. 
Whereas the latter seek to understand identity as a description of the inclusive 
collective, the populists seek to exclude those who differ from or disagree with them. In 
both cases, the leader seeks to craft a message that will appeal to his identifiable base. 
137 Müller refers to the concept of “holism” defined by Nancy Rosenblum: it is “the 
notion that the polity should no longer be split and the idea that it’s possible for the 
people to be one and – all of them – to have one true representative. Nancy L. 
Rosenblum, On the Side of the Angels: An Appreciation of Parties and Partisanship 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010); Müller, What Is Populism?, 20. 
138 Müller’s conception of populism borrows heavily from the writings of the German 
political theorist Carl Schmitt. Schmitt’s writings’ preference for authoritarian 
declaration of will over the democratic expression of popular sentiment help explain 
populists’ rejection of liberal democracy as a legitimate system of government. As 
Schmitt writes (and Müller quotes): “The unanimous opinion of one hundred million 
private persons is neither the will of the people nor public opinion. The will of the 
people can be expressed just as well and perhaps better through acclamation, through 
something taken for granted, an obvious unchallenged presence, than through the 
statistical apparatus...[P]arliament appears an artificial machinery, produced by liberal 
reasoning, while dictatorial and Caesaristic methods not only can produce the 
acclamation of the people but can also be a direct expression of democratic substance 
 77 
 Müller applies his vision of populism to the act of governing, demonstrating how 
it is not merely a campaign strategy that disappears after an election. He describes three 
features of populist governance. First, populists hijack the state apparatus in 
furtherance of their acquiring and maintaining power. Second, populists are willing to 
engage in corruption and mass clientelism – to exchange government favors for political 
support. Finally, populists seek systematically to restrict civil society and suppress any 
form of meaningful dissent.139 Populist leaders use these methods to accrue and sustain 
power and to maintain the “will of the people.” 
 One consequence of populist governance is that it fosters and magnifies natural 
suspicions of entities that exist beyond the leader’s control. Examining the domestic 
operations of populism, Müller shows how a populist leader creates distrust of 
democratic processes that allow dissent and enable political opponents to thwart 
populist policy proposals. A populist can turn a defeat into an opportunity to undermine 
democratic legitimacy. For example, he may claim that an electoral defeat or a failure to 
achieve a governing objective was due to his opponents’ conspiratorial maneuvering 
“behind the scenes” to prevent the populist-desired outcome.140 Populism need not 
effect legal change to succeed in threatening democratic governance and 
constitutionalism. Sowing the seeds of doubt, while creating an environment in which 
                                                        
and power.” Carl Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, trans. Ellen Kennedy, 
New Edition (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1988), 16–17. 
139 Müller, What Is Populism?, 4. 
140 Blaming identifiable opponents for failure justifies denouncing them as “enemies of 
the people.” Recently, populist leaders and autocrats have adopted the attack “fake 
news” to undermine media credibility. Josef Stalin was the first to use the label 
“enemies of the people” in the show trials of the 1930s. The deliberate confusion of fact 
and fiction by leaders means that the population is unable to easily determine the 
leader’s veracity. Müller, 32; Timothy Snyder, On Tyranny: Twenty Lessons from the 
Twentieth Century (Tim Duggan Books, 2017), 125.  
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citizens are intimidated from voicing opposition, may succeed in restricting the public 
discourse and participation in organizations promoting a pluralist civil society.141  
In addition to distinctive message content, a populist leader employs certain 
strategies for promoting his positions. For message delivery, the populist leader eschews 
use of a hierarchical communications structure in favor of direct engagement with 
followers. This preference distinguishes populism from purely authoritarian rule. 
Whereas an autocratic leader cultivates an image of imperiousness and encircles himself 
with a coterie of political, military, and security elites whom he often sends to do his 
bidding, the populist presents himself to the people as one of them. He personally 
speaks with, rather than to, them in a manner that promotes his desired optics.142 His 
goal is to position himself within his followers, to share their emotions, and thus to 
emphasize the unity of the “us” against the “other.” 
It is possible that technology, notably social media, will challenge the populist’s 
capability to control his message content by excluding opposing voices from the public 
discourse. On the one hand, Internet platforms make it easier for critics to air opposing 
views. On the other hand, it is equally, if not more, likely that the democratization of 
information production will have a detrimental effect on identifying truth.143 At present, 
social media offers a populist the opportunity to continuously reinforce his messages 
                                                        
141 There is a similarity here with totalitarian political philosophy in that both seek to 
obscure objective truth as a way to stifle debate. As Hannah Arendt wrote in her seminal 
work, The Origins of Totalitarianism, “Before mass leaders seize the power to fit reality 
to their lies, their propaganda is marked by its extreme contempt for facts as such, for in 
their opinion fact depends entirely on the power of man who can fabricate it.” Müller’s 
version of populism, as such, represents a kind of early stage of this seizure of power 
and a nascent effort to actively try to define what is true and what isn’t based on the 
leader’s philosophy. Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, First edition (New 
York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1973), 350. 
142 Müller, What Is Populism?, 35. 
143 Michela Del Vicario et al., ‘The Spreading of Misinformation Online’, Proceedings of 
the National Academy of Sciences 113, no. 3 (19 January 2016): 554, 
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1517441113. 
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while appearing to be engaged in a conversation with those who follow him, and to 
respond rapidly to critics via Twitter or Facebook messages with no restrictions on the 
fabrication of false claims. Moreover, most social media is not suited for serious 
discourse. Some worry that the popularity of these communication methods, which 
tend to be nonintellectual and superficial, may become the preferred method of 
political discourse.144 Such a development would foster populism, which is well served 
by anti-intellectualism. 
Related to the populist’s preference for direct communication and anti-
intellectualism is his need to diminish the role of experts having the knowledge and 
credibility to contradict the veracity of the populist’s claims. Recently, this has included 
efforts to discredit unfavorable news reporting. Populists call factual reporting “fake” 
and often offer their own versions of the facts, which may be demonstrably untrue.145 
Through direct communication and salient messaging, an effective populist leader can 
convince his base to suspend their critical thinking and discount the information offered 
by elites.146 A populist leader who is trusted by a sufficiently large base can thus succeed 
in marginalizing his critics and muting the questions of skeptics. American historian 
Richard Hofstadter described the process by which citizens become actively 
contemptuous of expert advice: “The citizen cannot cease to need or to be at the mercy 
of experts, but he can achieve a kind of revenge by ridiculing the wild-eyed professor, 
the irresponsible brain-truster, or the mad scientist, and by applauding the politicians as 
                                                        
144 Adam Clark Estes, ‘Facebook Slowly Realizing It Might Be Ruining Democracy’, 
Gizmodo, 22 January 2018, https://gizmodo.com/facebook-slowly-realizing-it-might-be-
ruining-democracy-1822293524; Mostafa El-Bermawy, ‘Your Filter Bubble Is Destroying 
Democracy’, WIRED, 18 November 2016, https://www.wired.com/2016/11/filter-
bubble-destroying-democracy/. 
145 Jason Schwartz, ‘Trump’s “fake News” Mantra a Hit with Despots’, Politico, 8 
December 2017, http://politi.co/2yOHp2N. 
146 Interview with Jan-Werner Müller, interview by Jonathan Leslie, Princeton, NJ, 9 
August 2017. 
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they pursue the subversive teacher, the suspect scientist, or the allegedly treacherous 
foreign-policy adviser.”147  
Although populism is generally examined as a movement to secure domestic 
power, its strategies and message themes can prove useful in promoting foreign policy 
objectives. For example, a populist leader invoking national security as the basis for a 
policy decision can minimize transparency that would allow for meaningful debate. In a 
situation with a high degree of uncertainty, which necessitates decisions based upon 
incomplete information, a populist’s willingness to prevaricate concerning the 
justification for his proposals, to devalue experts, to strategically use opacity, and to 
mobilize his followers to discourage opposition may position himself to construct a 
threat narrative virtually unchallenged.  
 C. The Populist Refinement of Securitization 
 
In a political environment in which issues compete for priority on the policy 
agenda, securitization rests on creating compelling content for the threat narrative as 
well as on getting the polity to internalize the message of insecurity such that they 
support, if not demand, a government response. The more debatable the question of 
the threat’s existence, and the less evident its characteristics of obviousness, 
imminence, and destructive capability, the more the strategic deployment of populism 
can assist in amassing public support. The populist appeal is distinct from the narrative’s 
substantive content that details the threat characteristics. Its message is to 
communicate the populist ideal of a collective identity that must be safeguarded by 
acting against the enemy. In the populist’s version, the outsiders are not only the 
                                                        
147 Although Hofstadter, writing in the 1960s, believed his observation to be a uniquely 
American phenomenon, the global explosion of populism has extended the applicability 
of his reflection. Richard Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism in American Life (Vintage, 
2012).  
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domestic power elite, but also the exogenous foe against whom the collective is 
exhorted to unite. Thus, the warning to potential dissenters holds that that they must 
choose to join with the collective “us” or they too will be targeted as “enemies of the 
people” and accused of being allied with the source of the threat.148 A national leader 
can extend the populist message to challenge an international audience to support his 
cause. He need not be as provocative as President Bush in challenging world leaders to 
ally with the United States in its war on terror.149 Standing tough on the international 
stage may also enhance the leader’s image at home.150 He need not achieve his 
international objectives to mobilize domestic support for his foreign policy agenda. 
Rather he may succeed in rallying his people with the exhortation that they must stand 
united in opposition to all who fail to support the justness of their cause.  
Populist messaging can heighten the promotion of insecurity inherent in the 
threat narrative. In general, the absence of transparency and knowledge of the 
complexities and nuances associated with the conduct of foreign affairs reduces the 
ability of the listener to challenge the populist’s claims. The vilification of elites seeks to 
discredit experts who may offer contradictory evidence. Even in democracies, a leader 
can resist calls for transparency by asserting his special access to classified material 
associated with national security. A populist leader, particularly one untroubled by 
                                                        
148 This also is a distillation of the Schmidt “friend-enemy” distinction, in which every 
supporter, or real person, is a friend and every opponent is a non-person or enemy. Carl 
Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (University of Chicago Press, 1996). 
149 See discussion of President Bush’s post-9/11 address to Congress, supra. 
150 Michael Tomz, ‘Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental 
Approach’, International Organization 61, no. 4 (October 2007): 821–40, 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818307070282; Richard C Eichenberg and Richard J Stoll, 
‘The Political Fortunes of War: Iraq and the Domestic Standing of President George W. 
Bush’ (The Foreign Policy Centre, July 2004); Nate Silver, ‘Second Thoughts About 
Obama and Bin Laden: It’s Not Just the Economy, Stupid’, FiveThirtyEight (blog), 2 May 
2011, https://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/05/02/second-thoughts-about-
obama-and-bin-laden-its-not-just-the-economy-stupid/. 
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truth, is positioned to manipulate his access to information and thus to emphasize the 
superiority of his knowledge. Such a leader may prefer to invoke imagination to 
construct a threat rather than resort to marshalling facts that may or may not support 
the message he wishes to deliver. When the threat narrative is based upon claims about 
a foreign power, which can neither be challenged nor verified, the narrator controls the 
threat profile. 
Even when the threat narrative is fact-based, the securitization process 
necessarily includes an appeal for the polity’s emotional investment. The narrator seeks 
to get the collective to internalize the message of fear and insecurity, which will 
manifest in their support of his proposed extraordinary response. Populism’s focus on 
emotion in its appeal is often used to convince the listener to suspend her insistence on 
veracity of a leader’s claims in favor of supporting his personal leadership. Populist 
appeals may be especially useful in a securitization process where a leader seeks to 
replace a factual predicate with an emotion-based perception.151  
 Securitization and populism may operate symbiotically in other instances to 
reinforce the conditions for each. For example, Müller points out that populists “thrive 
on conflict and encourage polarization.”152 Securitization, by definition, relies upon the 
existence of a conflict, while polarization promotes awareness of a collective’s identity 
that can serve as the threat target. Similarly, by promoting the threat as existential, the 
securitization process seeks to foster an ongoing crisis, a condition that can empower 
populists. Invoking populist tropes allows a leader to elevate a threat narrative into a 
                                                        
151 Populist securitization can be self-sustaining. The populist leader creates the threat 
simply by deign of being a populist but is also promising to protect the people from the 
threat that he represents.  
152 Müller, What Is Populism?, 4. 
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moral crusade,153 in which he seeks both to establish the actionable insecurity required 
for securitization and to promote himself as the crisis manager and the people’s savior.  
The addition of populism to securitization theory can supplement the analysis of 
a leader’s decisions associated with a conflict between his nation and another. In a 
dynamic and uncertain environment, we need to understand how a leader calculates 
the threat posed by his country’s adversary as well as how he promotes it to the publics 
whose support he seeks. By examining the content of his narrative, we may identify the 
actor’s justification for his policies. Moreover, by identifying the tropes that infuse his 
efforts to achieve domestic and international support for proposed norm-challenging 
action, we may learn how and why the threat narrative resonated with the public. It 
may help us discern the leader’s motivation underlying his pursuit of the securitization 
process. Through this analytical frame we can acquire a clearer understanding of a 
conflict’s many dimensions, including what happened, or is happening, and why. 
VI. Populist Securitization in this Project 
 
 In examining the modern conflict between Iran and Israel, especially after Israeli 
officials advocated responding to Iran’s nuclear development program, a populist 
securitization framework offers three avenues of inquiry. First, it focuses our attention 
on how Israeli leaders constructed a threat narrative based upon the prospect of Iran 
acquiring a nuclear weapon, and how Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu transformed 
the securitization process into a moral pursuit. Second, it facilitates our investigation of 
how Israeli leaders generated fear and then sustained the perception of Iran as an 
existential threat, even after evidence emerged contradicting key elements of the 
                                                        
153 A morality-based message may assert that the enemy does not subscribe to our 
values and threatens the continued existence of our way of life. To eliminate the 
exogenous threat requires joining in a shared enterprise to avert the apocalypse.  
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narrative. This inquiry yields an explanation for why Israeli securitization agents argued 
that Iran’s conduct was generating an unprecedented crisis that justified responding 
with extraordinary measures. Third, as the narrative became a part of the political 
discourse, we can see how Israeli leaders justified decisions that challenged accepted 
norms of government conduct. This examination includes communications addressed 
both to domestic publics and to international audiences in an effort to win their 
allegiance to Israel’s leadership in the conflict. We see how Netanyahu strategically 
prioritized Iran on Israel’s foreign policy agenda, using it both to promote his domestic 
political leadership and to divert international attention from Israel’s conduct toward 
the Palestinians. The findings yielded by this approach reveal the synergies resulting 
from combining populism and securitization.  
If we accept Müller’s characterization of populism as involving a moral pursuit, 
then a populist may derive significant political benefit from initiating a securitization 
process. A narrative that transforms a potential threat into an existential danger creates 
an opportunity for a populist to manipulate the disruption to promote himself. While 
Israeli leaders sought to securitize the Iran threat for a variety of reasons, including a 
sincere belief in the danger, Netanyahu elevated the threat response into a moral 
crusade. Presenting the threat as a Manichean struggle between good and evil, he 
positioned himself as the protector of the public good. Congruent with this approach, he 
effectively delivered two distinct, but strategically convergent messages: his critics were 
wrong, and the enemy could not be trusted. In his version of the conflict, Israel, as the 
morally superior nation, is the victim of Iran’s perfidy. Anyone critical of Netanyahu’s 
threat calculation or claiming that the danger can be reduced through conventional 
diplomatic means is either naïve or uninformed. His opposition to Iran as well as to risk-
reduction achieved through negotiations with Iran’s leaders positioned him to lead the 
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crusade for the long term. Negotiations, in his telling, are not only fruitless but 
potentially counterproductive since the enemy will not engage in good faith.  
Ascribing evil intent and untrustworthiness to one’s adversary is an effective 
trope in inducing fear and insecurity.154 In a populist’s telling, diplomacy and 
cooperation are tools of deception. In the uncertainty pervading an inter-nation conflict, 
accusations of enemy misconduct may gain traction even among optimists. Those who 
fear an enemy are generally more outspoken and motivated to organize than are 
skeptics with questions or idealists without effective counterarguments.155 The 
populist’s version of distrust is more pernicious than the usual suspicions held by parties 
refusing to engage in negotiations that they believe will be unproductive due to 
irreconcilable differences. Rather, populists reject negotiations because peaceful 
engagement acknowledges the opponent’s humanity, and thus they see the agreement 
to engage as conferring legitimacy upon the other’s claim. Many Israeli leaders cast Iran 
and its leaders as undeserving of inclusion in global discourse and international 
transactions. They sought to isolate the country, and they succeeded in their advocacy 
of tough sanctions. Netanyahu was particularly vocal in casting aspersions on his 
enemy’s intentions and motivations. Ironically, his infusion of populist rhetoric into his 
narrative intensified as world leaders engaged in negotiations with Iran to suspend its 
nuclear program. He persisted even as the global perception of the danger posed by Iran 
weakened.  
The conduct of Israel also reveals the caution associated with belligerent 
rhetoric. Effective populist leaders must maneuver carefully to avoid causing a 
                                                        
154 David Campbell, Writing Security : United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of 
Identity /, Rev. ed. (Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 88. 
155 Bar-Tal, ‘Why Does Fear Override Hope in Societies Engulfed by Intractable Conflict, 
as It Does in the Israeli Society?’, 601. 
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confrontation that cannot be controlled. Thus, in most cases, a populist will not be 
served by starting a war or even in motivating his followers to press for war.156 The 
calculus shifts when the leader directs his message to an international audience seeking 
to build a coalition that he believes will overwhelm his enemy’s resources such that the 
outcome is predictable. He may, however, still press for a military intervention as a 
means of highlighting the threat as posing an existential crisis and promoting 
securitization. Although Israel’s leaders had long publicly hinted about taking pre-
emptive military action against Iran’s nuclear enrichment facilities, they also implied 
that they were aware of potential unintended and unexpected consequences of such 
actions.157 Netanyahu reportedly came very close to launching a military intervention, 
but he too abandoned the plan when he could not convince the United States to stand 
behind Israel’s action.158 Notably, his decision not to act did not markedly diminish his 
rhetoric advocating such action. 
                                                        
156 Modern warfare introduces a variety of variables that the leader cannot control, 
including messaging at odds with reporting of facts. When the costs borne by the 
population engaged in warfighting, notably the death of soldiers and the required 
sacrifices, reach a “tipping point,” support for the endeavor and its leader is likely to 
erode. 
157 Whereas in 1981 and 2006, Israel had opted for preemptive military action against 
Iraqi and Syrian nuclear reactors, respectively, the decision to use a cyber weapon 
reflected an awareness of the relative sophistication of the Iranian program, as well as 
the potential consequences direct military action could engender. Ari Shavit, ‘Israel’s 
Former National Security Adviser Warns Against Wasting Time on Iran’, Haaretz, 5 July 
2012, https://www.haaretz.com/ari-shavit-don-t-waste-time-on-iran-1.5201369; Ari 
Shavit, ‘Israel Air Force Veteran Says That on Iran Issue, Leaders Are Playing With Our 
Lives’, Haaretz, 20 July 2012, https://www.haaretz.com/ari-shavit-bombing-iran-will-
ruin-us-says-iaf-vet-1.5268484; Yossi Alpher, ‘When Would Israel Attack Iran?’, The 
Forward, 1 September 2010, http://forward.com/opinion/130937/when-would-israel-
attack-iran/. 
158 Obama never outright refused to rule out a “military option” against Iran, even as 
Israeli anti-Iran rhetoric reached its zenith in 2012, but he refused to commit beyond 
generalities. The U.S. also began withholding critical intelligence from Israel on the basis 
that the information might help Israel plan a strike. Netanyahu interpreted these actions 
as a signal that the United States was not prepared to commit to backing up Israel 
should he decide to take unilateral action. Anshel Pfeffer, Bibi: The Turbulent Life and 
Times of Benjamin Netanyahu, 1 edition (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2018). 
 87 
As this study notes, it took considerable time and effort for Israeli leaders to 
convince the public that Iran posed an existential threat. For years after Iran had 
obviously restarted its nuclear development program, discussion in Israel of Iran’s threat 
was an elite enterprise. Public opinion polls did not include questions about Iran, and 
the issue rarely found its way into public speeches or political discourse. My analysis 
shows that the surprise election and belligerent rhetoric of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as 
Iran’s president in 2005 followed by the shock associated with Israel’s disastrous 
conduct in the 2006 Second Lebanon War inspired an Iran narrative that finally 
resonated with the Israeli public. Ahmadinejad rhetorically went to war with Israel with 
his anti-Semitic and Israel-threatening language. His messianic posturing helped 
convince Israelis that Iran’s leaders might act on their threats, even if that meant 
bringing harm upon themselves. A year later, following Israel’s failure to defeat 
Hezbollah in Lebanon, Israeli officials blamed Iran. The reputational injury to the country 
and its military together with the war casualties reified the threat for many Israelis. 
Netanyahu and others raised the stakes by reminding the public of Iran’s nuclear 
ambitions. Seizing upon the intensified crisis-induced insecurity, Netanyahu sought once 
again to lead Israel as its prime minister by promising to restore the country’s sense of 
security. He succeeded in becoming Israel’s longest serving prime minister. As Müller 
notes, “A ‘crisis’ is not an objective state of affairs but a matter of interpretation.”159 
Benjamin Moffitt adds, “Crisis does not just act as a trigger for populism, but…populism 
also triggers crisis.”160  
                                                        
159 Müller, What Is Populism?, 42. 
160 Benjamin Moffitt, ‘How to Perform Crisis: A Model for Understanding the Key Role of 
Crisis in Contemporary Populism’, Government and Opposition 50, no. 2 (April 2015): 
189–217, https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2014.13. 
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In diffusing his message beyond his political base, Netanyahu was particularly 
effective in leveraging the Iran threat assessment of elite Israeli hawks. For a populist, 
the promotion of fear is the currency for crisis creation, but it is perception that drives 
the fear and optics.161 A populist who amasses a committed base of supporters willing to 
publicly embrace his warning and support his leadership can seed a wider mobilization. 
Netanyahu could count on the agreement of politicians who shared his view of Iran as 
well as a vociferous right-wing media and popular culture. Thus, even if his followers did 
not fully internalize the fear of Iran, their loyalty to his leadership, together with official 
and media affirmation of Iran’s danger, enabled them to ignore or dismiss evidence that 
contradicted Netanyahu’s threat assessment. Moreover, while Netanyahu had a fair 
share of political opponents, no one wanted to risk being wrong about the Iran threat by 
openly disputing the level of danger. Doubters could not organize with the same 
intensity as believers, and academics, experts, and opposition media were dismissed as 
elitist with an agenda that did not serve “our people’s” interest.  
Netanyahu also embellished his narrative by enthusiastically embracing the 
populist practice of using, or more accurately misusing, history to ground his narrative in 
the illusion of long-standing enmity between Persians and Jews. Populists, like many 
politicians, recognize that their claims need not be accurate, but the details must sound 
plausible to listeners.162 The willingness of populists to challenge the norms of 
governance facilitates the reimagining of history to situate a current conflict within a 
tale of national survival. The narrator can unfold the story so as to legitimate the 
                                                        
161 Glassner, ‘Narrative Techniques of Fear Mongering’. 
162 It no doubt helps if the historical events are sufficiently long ago that few people 
remember the exact details, or they are obscure to the point where there will not be a 
chorus of historians seeking to contradict the claims made by the leader; but neither of 
these are prerequisites for using history as a rhetorical tool for creating populist 
securitization. 
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“people’s role” in furthering the leader’s objectives.163 Using a historic trope implies that 
the enmity, and by extension the current crisis, is irresolvable as well as long-standing. 
Historian Timothy Snyder calls this abuse of history the “politics of eternity,” which he 
describes as a “masquerade of history…It is concerned with the past, but in a self-
absorbed way, free of any real concern with facts.”164 Snyder argues that the vision of 
the future is irrelevant in populist politics, because in looping back continuously to the 
past, populists displace policy as a means toward creating a better future. The present 
slowly morphs into a continuous but unobtainable struggle for this idealized version of 
the past, deepening divisiveness and enmity between the populists’ supporters and 
their enemies.165 For many Israelis, particularly the religious conservatives comprising 
Netanyahu’s base, the past is the promise of the realization of the biblical vision of the 
idealized Jewish state. At the same time, for Jews all over the world, Israel represents a 
commitment to prevent another attempt to annihilate the Jewish people. Netanyahu 
exploited these themes in propagating his Iran narrative.  
To retain control of his narrative while promoting it to the widest possible 
audience, Netanyahu uniquely adapted the populist practice of direct engagement with 
followers to reach all those who might be receptive to his message. Israel is a small 
country and politics is a participatory enterprise, such that direct communication 
                                                        
163 Interview with Jan-Werner Müller. 
164 In his recent book, On Tyranny, Snyder describes the process by which politics of 
eternity replaces the politics of inevitability. The politics of inevitability describes the 
general sense of apathy that develops in society when there is a feeling that “nothing 
can really change, that the chaos that excites us will eventually be absorbed by a self-
regulating system.” It refers to the idea that history has ended, à la Francis Fukuyama. 
Snyder points out how national populists take advantage of this general malaise to turn 
the system on its head using the politics of eternity. In effect, they use the imagined past 
to break the present. Snyder, On Tyranny. 
165 Timothy Snyder, Timothy Snyder Speaks, Ep. 4: Sadopopulism, 2017, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oOjJtEkKMX4. 
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between officials and constituents is not a distinctly populist leadership practice.166 
When operating in the international arena, however, Netanyahu on several occasions 
took his message directly to those he sought to mobilize in support of his cause. In a 
remarkable move, Netanyahu bypassed the American president and addressed a joint 
session of the United States Congress, implicitly criticizing the administration’s policy.167 
Moreover, Netanyahu frequently spoke to American Jewish groups in the evident hope 
that he could enlist them in delivering his message to their elected representatives and 
to those policymakers with whom they had a relationship.168 He did not keep secret 
from American voters his opinion that the 2012 Republican opponent of President Barak 
Obama’s reelection bid, Mitt Romney, would be a better “friend” of Israel.169 Netanyahu 
also arranged to deliver some of his most important attacks on Iran in English.170 His 
objective in taking such extraordinary action was to enlist influential foreigners’ support 
for taking unconventional action against Iran. 
* * *  
                                                        
166 Still, earlier in his career, Netanyahu was a pioneer in terms of bringing “American 
style” political campaigning to Israel, targeting his message directly to voters to gain 
support rather than building up coalitions of party elites. Pfeffer, Bibi. 
167 Benjamin Netanyahu, ‘The Complete Transcript of Netanyahu’s Address to Congress’, 
(3 March 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-
politics/wp/2015/03/03/full-text-netanyahus-address-to-congress/. 
168 On several occasions Netanyahu traveled to Washington, DC to address the American 
Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) annual conference ahead of critical junctures in 
the negotiation of the Iran Deal. AIPAC was a major lobbying force opposing the 
agreement, encouraging delegates to urge their Congressional representatives to vote 
to reject the final text. 
169 Harriet Sherwood, ‘Binyamin Netanyahu Gambles on Mitt Romney Victory’, The 
Guardian, 20 September 2012, sec. US news, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/sep/20/binyamin-netanyahu-gambles-on-
mitt-romney. 
170 In addition to speeches to major American Jewish groups, Netanyahu frequently used 
his appearances on the world stage, including diplomatic meetings with other global 
leaders, to criticize Iran.  
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I submit that populist securitization provides a useful framework for examining 
how the relations between Iran and Israel devolved into an enmity, created a crisis 
mentality, appropriated Israel’s foreign policy agenda, and produced little public 
disagreement in Israel over possible responses to the threat. Despite the drastic change 
in the relationship between the two states wrought by the 1979 Islamic Revolution and 
the assumption of power by a theocratic regime, it was far from inevitable that Israelis 
would view Iran as an existential threat meriting construction of a narrative filled with 
hyperbolic rhetoric and moral suasion. When one looks past the rhetoric, there are few 
fact-based reasons why the polity of a democratic nation with serious domestic security 
challenges and multiple hostile neighbors would accept that Iran was its most pressing 
foreign policy challenge. To be sure, there are reasons for enmity and mutual distrust 
between the ruling officials in both countries. But the fact that the Islamic Republic 
engaged in developing a nuclear capability – which so concerned Israeli leaders that 
they constructed a political strategy and crafted a narrative aimed at positioning Iran 
atop Israel’s national security agenda – offers an incomplete explanation for the 
obsession with Iran as an existential threat. We need also to examine how Benjamin 
Netanyahu invoked populist themes and methodologies to construct and communicate 
an Iran threat narrative and his strategic objectives in doing so. Although this project 
ends before the events and actions it examines will have concluded, populist 
securitization enables us to understand the development of the current Israeli-Iranian 
conflict, its escalation, and its possible future directions.  
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Chapter Two: History – From Friendship to Enmity 
 
I. Introduction 
 
This chapter reviews the shared history of two nations in a volatile region who 
interacted with one another for more than two millennia. The modern leaders of Israel 
and Iran draw upon their peoples’ long and rich heritages as the basis for generating 
hostility toward the other. The presence of historical themes in modern political 
narratives and how they are used to achieve specific policy aims will assist our analysis 
of these actors’ motivations and decisions. 
 The interaction between Iran and Israel is not a linear story. It includes accounts 
of peoples living within the same geographic space, of one people being ruled by 
another, and of two sovereign nations cooperating in pursuit of shared interests. Given 
the historic timespan of their interaction, the enmity that is the subject of this study is 
only a very recent development. Yet if one omits this history and turns to the remaining 
chapters, one could be forgiven for forming a very different impression of this 
relationship. It is curious to consider how Jews, who pride themselves on their learning 
and knowledge of their people’s ancient heritage, allow Israeli leaders to construct 
narratives containing dubious historical claims. Perhaps they consider such alternative 
interpretations inconsequential to modern-day realities. But when the narratives serve 
as policy justifications, the historical inaccuracy cannot be dismissed as inconsequential. 
Ironically, perhaps the best known “historic” interaction between Persians and 
Jews never happened. The story of a Persian king and his Jewish queen is told in the 
Book of Esther (Megillat Esther), which is included in the canon of the Hebrew Bible and 
ensured at least an annual public reading by Jews worldwide. As we shall see, although 
it comes down to us in writing, its retelling by an Israeli politician changes the story to 
offer a different message than the one traditionally told. This chapter begins with a look 
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at the ancient history between Jews and Persians and its salience for today’s leaders. It 
then briefly reviews the experience of the Jews who lived in Persia and later Iran. The 
modern relationship begins shortly after the establishment of the State of Israel, and I 
discuss the little-known strategy of cooperation between the Shah and the new Jewish 
State. I conclude with an examination of the early years of the Islamic Republic and the 
events that set the stage for the present conflict between Israel and Iran. 
II. Jews in Persia and Iran 
 
A. Biblical Accounts 
 
The history of what may be considered the relationship of Iran and Israel begins as 
one of friendship between Persians and Jews. Scholars believe that Jews dwelt within 
the boundaries of what is today modern Iran as far back as two centuries before the 
founding of the Persian Empire.171 Significantly, the history of interactions between 
these two nationalities does not accord with modern narratives explaining the current 
conflict.  
Two biblical accounts are particularly material to an understanding of the 
Persian-Jewish relationship both in antiquity and modernity. One, rooted in history, tells 
of how Cyrus the Great, the founder of the Achaemenid Empire, liberated the Jewish 
people from their exile in Babylon in 539 B.C.E. A believer in religious freedom, Cyrus 
allowed Jews to practice their religion openly within his kingdom. He also allowed those 
who so desired to return to their homes in Jerusalem. There he helped finance the 
reconstruction of the second temple.172 The authors of the Hebrew Bible lauded the 
                                                        
171 Mehrdad Amanat, Jewish Identities in Iran: Resistance and Conversion to Islam and 
the Baha’i Faith, Reprint edition (London; New York: I.B.Tauris, 2013), 18. 
172 Temple construction would not actually begin until after Cyrus’s death under the 
reign of his successor Darius I, but Cyrus is still widely credited with having set the 
precedent for religious tolerance under the Achaemenid Empire. Amanat, 18.  
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benevolence of Cyrus, while the Temple demonstrated the religious tolerance extended 
to Jews in the Persian Empire. In the Hebrew Bible text, God is said to refer to Cyrus as 
His mashiach, one of only five people so designated and the only gentile to receive the 
honorific.173 While the Hebrew Bible’s 23 mentions of Cyrus are all positive, not all 
scholars agree that Cyrus merited the credit.174 Whatever the actual facts, however, the 
status of the Persian king in the Jewish canon testifies to a historic friendship that is 
obscured in the modern accounts of historic enmity.  
The second biblical “historical” account is better known than the deeds of Cyrus, 
but it is also most likely a fairytale.175 Megillat Esther tells of a Persian king who spared 
the Jews from annihilation when his Jewish queen revealed the perfidious plot of his 
chief minister. The tale is set in the Sassanid Empire during the reign of King Ahasuerus. 
The young maiden named Esther, who hides her Jewish identity, becomes queen by 
winning a beauty contest. Meanwhile, the King’s minister, Haman the Aggagite, angered 
by the refusal of Jews to bow down to human royalty, convinces the King to order the 
                                                        
173 This passage appears in the latter half the book of Isaiah, known as “Deutero-Isiah.” 
Scholars attribute it to an author who lived after Cyrus the Great. Deutero-Isaiah (45:1) 
Moshe Reiss, ‘Cyrus as Messiah’, Jewish Bible Quarterly 40, no. 3 (1 July 2012): 160. 
174 See, for example, Diana Edelman, who argues that the historic chronology does not 
fit the account of Jews returning under the reign of Cyrus. Lester Grabbe questions the 
historicity of a decree that enabled the Jews to return to their homelands. He admits 
that they could do so but suggests that the return was a “trickle” over an extensive 
period of time. By contrast, the first century CE historian Flavius Josephus provides the 
text of a letter written by Cyrus to the Jews of his kingdom. Diana Vikander Edelman, 
The Origins of the Second Temple: Persion Imperial Policy and the Rebuilding of 
Jerusalem, 1 edition (Routledge, 2014); Lester L. Grabbe, The History of the Jews and 
Judaism in the Second Temple Period, Volume 1: Yehud, the Persian Province of Judah 
(Bloomsbury Academic, 2004), 355; Flavius Josephus, The Complete Works of Flavius 
Josephus, trans. William Whiston, 1st Edition (Attic Books, 2008). 
175 There is no historical evidence independent of the Bible that any of the events 
depicted in the Book of Esther took place, nor is there any evidence of a Persian plot to 
murder Jews en masse. Daniel Estrin, ‘Iranians and Israelis Are in a Battle over History — 
and the Holiday of Purim’, The World (Public Radio International, 25 March 2016), 
https://www.pri.org/stories/2016-03-25/iranians-and-israelis-are-battle-over-history-
and-holiday-purim. 
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killing of all the Jews in the kingdom. Esther is charged by her Uncle Mordechai to reveal 
her identity to the King and to implore him to save her people. According to the story, 
she hatches a scheme that includes risking death to approach the king without invitation 
and then inviting the king and his minister Haman to a private dinner party. There she 
reveals Haman’s plot against her and her people and pleads with the king to spare the 
Jews. The story has a happy ending: the horrified king accedes to his Queen’s plea, he 
orders the death of the wicked Haman, and he names Uncle Mordechai to a high 
government post. Today, Jews continue to celebrate this deliverance as the annual 
festival of Purim during which they re-tell the story.  
Some accounts, both written and oral, omit certain details of the story’s end. The 
final chapters recount how the king, unable to rescind his royal edict, allowed 
Mordechai to issue a second royal edict permitting  
The Jews in every city to assemble and fight for their lives; if any people or 
province attacks them, they may destroy, massacre, and exterminate its armed 
force together with women and children, and to plunder their possessions.176  
 
The story then details how the Jews both celebrated their reprieve and “got their 
enemies in their power.”177 It even includes the body count associated with the Jews’ 
attack on “those who sought their hurt,”178 which numbered upwards of 75,000 
deaths.179 That some choose to omit or obscure this part of the story illustrates the 
power of different story tellers to use historical narrative to craft their particular 
messages. 
                                                        
176 Esther 8:10-11 
177 Esther 8:17-9:1. 
178 Esther 9:2 
179 According to the story, the Jews killed 500 men and the ten sons of Haman in the 
fortress of Shushan, the capital; and in the king’s provinces “they disposed of their 
enemies, killing seventy-five thousand of their foes.” (Esther 9:6, 16). They reportedly 
did not take any spoils. 
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The Cyrus and Esther stories retain a place in the history and customs of two 
distinct and accomplished peoples of the Middle East. The majority of books or articles 
analyzing the relationship between the nations of Iran and Israel mention these stories 
as reference points for a historic friendship that contrasts with the modern hostility. Not 
all scholars agree, however, that these stories have any relevance to modernity. R.K. 
Ramazani, who wrote an influential history of Israeli-Iranian ties during the twilight of 
the Pahlavi rule, challenges their explanatory value. He writes of the Cyrus anecdote, 
“Such basically cultural perspectives seem less useful as a means of policy explication by 
way of scholars than as a vehicle of policy rationalization by statesmen.”180 The 
weakness in his argument rests on his unwillingness to consider how these 
rationalizations not only animate policy decisions but impact their acceptance among 
the polity.  
It is often difficult to determine whether policy decisions result from situational 
evaluation or from reasoning backwards from the justification. Whether stemming from 
analysis or rationalization, historical memory influenced the decisions of Israeli and 
Iranian leaders in many instances. For example, when Israel’s first Prime Minister, David 
Ben Gurion, sought an alliance with Iran shortly after the state’s founding, the Shah 
invoked Cyrus in his letter of acceptance. The Shah, who was notable for his emphasis 
on Persian nationalism and history, wrote, “The memory of Cyrus’s policy regarding your 
people is precious to me, and I strive to continue in the path set by this ancient 
tradition.”181  
                                                        
180 R. K. Ramazani, ‘Iran and the Arab-Israeli Conflict’, Middle East Journal 32, no. 4 (1 
October 1978): 413–14. 
181 Sohrab Sobhani, The Pragmatic Entente: Israeli-Iranian Relations, 1948-1988 (New 
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The influence need not be positive nor the memory entirely accurate. Modern 
Israeli and Iranian leaders have invoked the Esther story as a propaganda weapon in 
their rhetorical condemnation of one another’s nation. To Israelis, the story cautions 
distrust of an Iranian enemy bent upon destruction of the Jewish people. In their re-
telling, Persian anti-Semitism is rooted in the pre-Islamic Persian Empire, suggesting that 
the story demonstrates a national or ethnic character intent on genocide. Prime 
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu went so far as to change the narrative to eliminate the 
role of King Achashverosh (the Hebrew pronunciation of Ahasuerus) in rescinding the 
edict of annihilation. In his controversial 2015 address before a joint session of the 
United States Congress on the eve of the Purim holiday, Netanyahu cited the story’s 
significance to that current moment and declared, “Today the Jewish people face 
another attempt by yet another Persian potentate to destroy us.”182 This was not an 
isolated comment. Netanyahu repeated his version before the 2017 Purim holiday when 
he suggested to Russian President Vladimir Putin that the story of Purim illustrates the 
Persian desire to destroy the Jewish people. When this moment became public, the 
Iranian Foreign Minister, Javad Zarif, took to Twitter to rebuke Netanyahu and to correct 
his depiction of the Persian people as ancient anti-Semites.183  
Israeli religious leaders echoed their prime minister by drawing attention to the 
bombastic rhetoric of hardliner politicians in Iran, accusing former president Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad of being the “new Haman,” who, like the ancient villain, was threatening 
the destruction of Israel, this time with Iran’s nuclear warheads. One rabbi predicted 
that “Like Haman and his henchmen before, Ahmadinejad and his supporters would find 
                                                        
182 Netanyahu, ‘The Complete Transcript of Netanyahu’s Address to Congress’. 
183 Arash Karami, ‘Zarif Gives Netanyahu Lesson in Jewish Scripture’, Al-Monitor, 13 
March 2017, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/03/iran-purim-
netanyahu-zarif-larijani-esther-persia-history.html. 
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their bows destroyed and their swords turned against them to strike their own 
hearts.”184 Supposedly, a cyber weapon unleashed by Israel and the United States in the 
late-2000s, which sought to cripple Iran’s nuclear program, referenced Queen Esther 
and Haman in its code.185  
The mythologizing was not one-sided. Iranian hardliners have also reinterpreted 
the Esther story to support their contention that the Jewish state threatens Iran and to 
justify their anti-Semitism. In their version of events, they challenge the notion that Jews 
took up arms to defend themselves and speak instead of the Jews conducting an 
“Iranian Holocaust.”186 Notably, the story has a different impact in the two countries. In 
Israel, everyone knows the Purim story whether or not they accept the modern 
interpretation. In Iran, the story has little traction beyond the religious elite. For both 
countries, however, the story and its differing interpretations illustrate that factual 
accuracy has little to do with the power of historical narrative.  
B. The Jews of Persia and Iran: 405 BCE to 1979 CE 
 
 History records that the descendants of the Jews who followed Cyrus the Great 
back to Persia after the liberation of Babylon continued to enjoy good relations with 
Cyrus’s successors. The Achaemenid King Artaxerxes II, who ruled Persia from 405 to 
358 BCE, helped encourage a second wave of Jewish migration back to ancient Palestine 
beginning with the dispatching of a royal emissary, Ezra, to help reestablish the law of 
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the Torah in the territory of Judah.187 Still, as with Cyrus before him, many Jews opted to 
remain in Persia. Later, monarchs of the Parthian Empire shielded the Jews from the 
harsh treatment they suffered at the hands of the neighboring Roman authorities. They 
allowed Jews to establish a self-governing territory within Persian lands, which included 
independent political, administrative, and judicial authorities. Jewish texts from this 
period reflect the goodwill that Persian authorities showed to Jews. Unlike the Greeks, 
Babylonians, and Romans, there are no negative descriptions of the Persian people or 
their rulers in ancient Jewish texts. Instead, they depict the Persians mainly as liberators 
and allies of the Jewish people.188 
 This dynamic changed following the Muslim conquest of Persia in the seventh 
century CE. At the end of the Sassanid Empire and the beginning of the Islamic period, 
the Persian monarchs adopted a less tolerant position on religious freedom than their 
predecessors. Forced conversion to homogenize the religious makeup of the kingdom 
was not uncommon, although this policy objective met with limited success. In the early 
sixteenth century, following the expulsion of the Mongols from Persia, monarchs of the 
Safavid dynasty again pursued this strategy. This sparked a wave of Jewish emigration 
from the kingdom, but some Jews remained and avoided conversion. Thus, despite the 
efforts of rulers and official policies of intolerance toward non-Muslims, Jews 
maintained a continuous presence in Iran. 189  
It is difficult to discern accurate numbers for the Jewish population throughout 
the ages. The earliest non-biblical written report on the Jewish population in Persia is 
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from the twelfth century CE in which Benjamin of Tudela reports the population to be 
around 600,000. This number decreased to about 100,000 by the Safavid era, between 
the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. It then remained stable into the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries under the reigns of the Qajjar and Pahlavi dynasties. Estimates of 
the Jewish population in pre-Islamic Revolution Iran place the population between 
50,000 and 100,000 Jewish Iranians.190 
 By most accounts, the Pahlavi dynasty, the last Persian monarchy prior to the 
Islamic Revolution, did not mistreat its Jewish population. One commentator even 
described this period as a “golden age” for Iran’s Jews.191 Such a description may be 
overlooking the fact that the first Pahlavi ruler, Reza Shah, was a well-known admirer of 
the Nazis and Adolf Hitler. Apparently, he did not subscribe to the latter’s racial views. 
After the British forced the abdication of Reza Shah following World War II, the son, 
Mohammad Reza, reportedly was seen as friendly to Jews. According to rumor, he once 
prayed to a Torah during a ceremonial visit to a Jewish cemetery in Isfahan, where some 
of the earliest Iranian Jews had settled several millennia before.192 In reality, the extent 
to which Jews were accepted within the predominantly Shiite Muslim society is unclear. 
Ronen Cohen, an Israeli scholar, paints a much darker picture of the pre-Revolutionary 
treatment of Iranian Jews, writing that the Jews of Iran suffered due to the Shia belief 
that a person who touches a Jew becomes najes or impure.193 
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 What we do know is that a relatively small insular Jewish community called Iran 
home. They survived for millennia amidst a dominant culture that did not accept them 
as part of their Persian society but also did not physically threaten their existence. 
Ironically, while the Jewish community was characterized by insularity and refusal to 
bow down to the Persian King and his courtiers – an act which had provoked Haman to 
seek their annihilation – the Jews not only survived in the Persian Empire, they refused 
to leave.  
III. Israel and Iran: From Indifference to Collaboration 
 
A. The Founding of the Jewish State 
 
 Prior to the twentieth century, Cyrus the Great was the last foreign ruler to 
encourage Jewish resettlement in the biblically ordained homeland of Israel. In 70 CE, 
the Romans invaded Jerusalem, destroyed the Second Temple, the building of which 
Cyrus had facilitated, and sent the Jewish population into exile. With the declaration of 
the State of Israel on May 14, 1948, that exile officially ended. It also provoked Israel’s 
Arab neighbors, Egypt, Syria and Jordan, with support from Iraq, to invade. 
The declaration followed a vote of the United Nations the previous November in 
which the British territory of Palestine was partitioned into two independent states, one 
Jewish and one Arab. Britain, which had administered the territory under a League of 
Nations mandate following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I, withdrew 
its forces and administrators.194 The mandate had been marked by violence between the 
resident Palestinian population and Jewish emigres displaced by the Nazi Holocaust. 
British officials, who had sided with the Arabs to prevent the influx of Jews to their 
idealized homeland, also became the target of attacks from radical Jewish militants. The 
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1948 invasion by the Arab nations signaled their rejection of the partition plan. The 
Israeli State survived the “War of Independence.” The Palestinians have a different 
narrative of the event: they did not get their state and instead mark the “Nakba” 
(catastrophe) in which 700,000 of them were expelled or exiled from Israeli territory. 
Both peoples acknowledge that the 1948 conflict has yet to be resolved. 
 The war also represented a humiliating defeat for Israel’s Arab neighbors. They 
did not want a political and religious anomaly in their midst.195 They believed British 
authorities had betrayed them by reneging on promises of Arab autonomy in the 
region.196 Moreover, the Arabs lost the fight despite superior troop numbers and natural 
resource advantages. Their story would feature an account of Palestinian oppression, 
but the fate of the latter was marginal to their war objectives.  
B. The Impact of the Cold War 
 
The establishment of the State of Israel complicated the Shah’s already difficult 
reign. In the UN partition vote, Iran joined with other majority-Muslim countries in 
voting against the proposal, but it refrained from joining the Arab war effort following 
Israel’s declaration of its new state. Mohammad Reza Pahlavi had occupied the Peacock 
Throne since 1941, beginning his reign with the assent of the British, who had forced his 
father from office.  
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The early years were turbulent for the 22-year-old shah. After the end of World 
War II, he had to navigate between the competing East-West superpowers engaged in 
the Cold War. At the same time, he faced competing demands from his own population, 
which included a powerful clerical establishment in a nation with a 99% Shiite Muslim 
majority.197 For the Shah, the Israel issue held no benefit for his reign. 
It is understandable that the Shah’s Israel policy in the initial years of the state 
was, according to Ramazani, one of “calculated ambivalence,” in which the Shah avoided 
making any commitment either for or against the fledgling state.198 The wait-and-see 
approach enabled him to maintain the neutrality of his foreign policy in the Cold War 
between the superpowers. It also allowed him to avoid taking either a losing position or 
one that would anger his Muslim population, which was sympathetic to the Palestinians’ 
land claims. Moreover, Ramazani notes that the strategy was “in keeping in the basic 
tenets and thrust of Iranian nationalism” favored by the Shah.199  
As the Cold War intensified, it became increasingly difficult for smaller countries 
to maintain a façade of detached neutrality. Especially in the Middle East, East and West 
sought roles in the political and economic lives of the strategically vital and resource-rich 
nations. The competition for influence challenged the Shah. He owed his throne to the 
British, and Iran hosted extensive foreign investors, which were positioned to influence 
the country’s domestic politics. The largest investment came from the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company (AIOC), the predecessor to British Petroleum, which at the time was one of the 
largest oil companies in the world. Granted the exclusive right to develop the Iranian oil 
fields in 1933 by the Shah’s father, the company generated tremendous wealth for the 
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Shah, for the company, and for Great Britain.200 As a consequence of the generous terms 
of the concession, the company repatriated significant revenue to Great Britain, while 
still providing substantial payments to the Shah, thereby reducing his need to develop 
indigenous technologies for the extraction of wealth. The Shah paid a price for this 
arrangement: not only was he effectively surrendering some of Iran’s economic 
sovereignty, he was also susceptible to British pressure over his governmental 
decisions.201 This arrangement challenged his ability to remain neutral. 
Three years into Israel’s statehood, in 1951, a power struggle in Iran pitted the 
Shah against the country’s new Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh. The latter 
assumed office determined to end British economic domination and did so by 
nationalizing the AIOC and expelling its British employees from the country. The Shah 
lost the struggle and fled the country. In 1953 an American-engineered – and British-
supported – coup d’état restored the Shah to the throne.202 While the details of this 
consequential event are beyond the scope of this project, it is relevant to note that the 
eventual narrative ascribes responsibility to the United States for the overthrow of Iran’s 
democratically elected leader in favor of a dictatorial ruler. The Shah would not only 
allow the West to exploit Iran’s wealth, but he would also accept its foreign policy 
directives. Whereas Mossadegh’s government closed the Iranian consulate in Israel, 
albeit allegedly for budgetary reasons, the Shah’s return meant that the move had little 
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impact on relations between Iran and Israel. His actions initiated the popular 
dissatisfaction that would end with his overthrow and a rejection of his policies. 
Israel, too, tried to maintain neutrality in the early years of the Cold War. Both 
the United States and the Soviet Union voted in favor of the partition, and Israel relied 
on both for crucial support, financial from the Americans and military from the 
Soviets.203 Rather than ally with one ideology over the other, Israel tried to align itself 
with the United Nations as a global organization. The outbreak of the Korean War made 
neutrality untenable: The United Nations backed American forces and forced Israel into 
the Western camp.204 
Thus, both Israel and Iran were aligned with the United States when, in 1955, the 
Soviet Union sought actively to exert its influence in the Middle East. Following an 
Egyptian army coup that toppled the government of King Faruq, the Soviets backed the 
presidency of a young charismatic revolutionary named Gamal Abdel Nasser. To the 
Egyptian people who saw the old regime as corrupt, incompetent, and obsequious to 
British interests, and who bemoaned their defeat in the 1948 war, Nasser preached pan-
Arabism and Arab nationalism. He urged Arabs to unite against their enemies, most 
notably, Israel. The Soviets saw Nasser and his message as an opportunity to gain a 
Middle East foothold. They began supplying him with equipment and funding to rebuild 
the depleted and outdated Egyptian military.205  
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The first test of the new alliance occurred a year later when Nasser attempted to 
nationalize the Suez Canal, a key passageway for maritime trade. Although located 
within Egyptian territory, western powers had built and now operated the canal. France 
and Britain joined Israel in invading Egypt. Fearing the destabilizing effect of a regional 
war, the United States joined the Soviet Union in a United Nations vote condemning the 
attack. This was not only an odd moment of superpower agreement, but a surprise to 
the invading armies who assumed that the United States would support their action. In 
the end, United States President Dwight D. Eisenhower pressured the invaders to 
withdraw and to surrender the canal to Egyptian forces. In doing so, they handed Nasser 
both a public relations and a military victory. As the Arab leader willing to stand up to 
the Israelis and the West, his status rose. He was thus more than willing to accept the 
Soviets’ offer of dramatically increased aid, including advanced military equipment and 
advisors from Eastern bloc countries.206  
Israel and Iran, although not allied with one another, now found themselves with 
a common enemy as both opposed the Soviet-backed Arab bloc.  
C. Becoming Allies: The Periphery Doctrine 
 
i. Different Perspectives 
 
If it is true that the enemy of my enemy is my friend, one would expect that 
Israel and Iran would seek some kind of alliance. Indeed, although rarely discussed 
beyond academic circles, the two nations developed a relationship, which came to be 
known as the Periphery Alliance. One of the challenges associated with examining that 
alliance is the absence of public documentation associated with its origins. Israel’s 
leaders directed little public attention to Iran, while the academic community 
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considered Iran’s relationship with Israel to be of marginal value. Israel and Iran’s shared 
alignment with the West, at a minimum, suggested that neither nation posed a 
sufficiently serious threat to the other to merit serious strategic consideration.  
 It is also notable that few Israeli researchers had a personal attachment to or 
knowledge of Iran apart from their familiarity with the story of Esther. In his 2015 book 
examining the alliance years, Yossi Alpher explains that ignorance of Iranian history 
among Israeli Middle East experts persists to the present such that most have little to no 
knowledge that the countries had ever been allies.207 Whatever the exact reasons, 
Israeli leaders never fully recounted or left behind public documentation of their work 
with Iran.208 It is, however, fair to surmise that both Israel and Iran sought a relationship 
that would be mutually beneficial and did not anticipate the attendant consequences.  
Israel was not yet ten years old when the 1956 Suez Crisis highlighted its 
precarious strategic position. It enjoyed some support from the United States, which 
under the Eisenhower Doctrine opposed communist expansionism in the Middle East. 
Thus, it was surprising when this nominal ally handed a victory to Egypt. As a result, 
Israel faced an emboldened Nasser leading a pan-Arab movement sponsored by the 
Soviet Union. Israel, however, was not alone; other non-Arab countries in the region 
also faced this new threat. According to Shimon Peres, who was serving in the Israeli 
Parliament (the Knesset) during this period, Israel viewed Nasser as a “new, ambitious 
Arab ‘caliph’, supported by the might of a suspect power, [which] could hardly fail to 
rouse unhappy memories among the Turks and Iranians of dark periods in their 
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history.”209 Following the Suez debacle, Israel’s founding Prime Minister, David Ben 
Gurion, then in his second term, pursued an alliance with these nations.  
The idea had originated years earlier shortly after Israel’s founding. Ben Gurion, 
together with the chiefs of Israel’s foreign and domestic intelligence services,210 
recognized that Israel would need strategic partners in the region.211 They reasoned that 
Israel could enhance its prospects for long-term survival if it found partners with whom 
it at least shared the fear of a common threat. A coalition of non-Arab Middle Eastern 
nations could serve as a counterweight to the threat of Arab aggression.  
Initially, Israel recruited three nations to join its new alliance: Turkey, Iran, and 
Ethiopia,212 each of which served a strategic purpose. Turkey confronted Iraq and Syria 
on Israel’s northern border, while in the south, Ethiopia provided Israel with remote 
access to the Northern African plateau south of Sudan and Egypt. Israel viewed Iran as 
the crown jewel of the alliance: it brought geographic, diplomatic, and economic 
advantages key to the success of the enterprise. Geographically, its long border with 
Iraq positioned it to counter potential threats from one of the largest and most militarily 
developed Arab states. Diplomatically, the Shah’s close relationship with the United 
States following the 1953 coup made him an invaluable resource for fostering better 
relations with American government officials. Economically, Iran provided access to an 
energy supply critically necessary for Israel’s economic development. With the influx of 
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new immigrants from the Jewish diaspora, who brought with them an entrepreneurial 
spirit and technical expertise, Israel could develop rapidly with access to the region’s 
abundant natural resources, which Israel did not have within its tiny piece of real estate. 
The three nations approximated a geographic ring around almost all the Arab world; 
thus, Israel named the strategy the Torat HaPeripheria, or “Periphery Doctrine.”  
 For his part, the Shah recognized that a pan-Arab alliance would interfere with 
his designs on extending Iran’s regional influence and power. Having consolidated his 
authority following the CIA’s engineering of his return to the throne, the Shah sought to 
pursue an aggressive foreign policy that would enhance Iran’s stature.213 Since Nasser’s 
maneuvering encroached on the Shah’s ability to reach out to Arab leaders, the Shah 
sought other opportunities. Israel’s alliance with the United States and the West 
presented one possibility.  
 Initially, Iran, unlike Israel, did not consider the Arab states a significant military 
threat. Rather, Arab unification threatened the Shah’s self-image and his cultivated 
position within the Islamic world. In his vision, he would reign over a new Persian 
Empire, building his image upon the prominence of Iran’s Shia clerical tradition. Pan-
Arabism elevated the significance of ethnic ties over those of religion, and thus 
interfered with the Shah’s plans to influence Shia-majority countries. Worse, an alliance 
based upon ethnicity threatened to isolate Iran in the Middle East. The Shah needed 
both allies and a plan to reverse this trend. His concern deepened in 1958 when the Iraqi 
military overthrew the Hashemite Kingdom of Iraq, Iran’s immediate neighbor and 
historic rival. The new ruling junta, which included future Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, 
quickly entered into a series of agreements with the Soviet Union. This brought the tide 
of Soviet expansionism to Iran’s doorstep. 
                                                        
213 Sobhani, The Pragmatic Entente: Israeli-Iranian Relations, 1948-1988, 23. 
 110 
 Israel’s proposal for the Periphery Alliance thus arrived at a propitious moment 
for the Shah. Although the Iranian monarch had little interest in ensuring Israel’s 
survival, the arrangement provided him with support for countering the Soviet threat. 
As Ramazani put it, the Shah’s decision was a “conscious and deliberate policy [to] 
remain aloof from the quagmire and age-old conflict between the Arabs and the Israelis 
and to maintain a balancing posture between the two sides while pursuing Iran’s larger 
foreign policy objectives.”214  
ii. Operational Cooperation 
 
 For Israel, the Periphery Alliance represented a limited partnership for 
cooperative security and intelligence purposes, the efficacy of which depended on 
secrecy. Thus, Israel charged its foreign intelligence service, the Mossad, with 
coordinating and implementing the new doctrine.  
Secrecy was vital to both countries as neither leader wanted the clergy, 
politicians, or public to object. Israelis would be suspicious of Iran’s motives and 
trustworthiness given that Iran continued to maintain active diplomatic relations with 
Arab countries that vowed Israel’s destruction. Both Israeli leaders and the Shah 
recognized the risk to the latter of public revelation of their cooperation.215 The Shah 
ruled a predominantly Muslim society guided by a clergy whose rhetoric was fiercely 
anti-Zionist and anti-Semitic. The clergy would not countenance political considerations 
superseding religious faith. Moreover, the Shah owed a political debt to the principal 
clerical antagonist of Israel, Ayatollah Abol-Ghasem Kashani. In 1952, Kashani had 
publicly defected from supporting Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh thus helping 
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to bolster public support for the Shah’s restoration to the throne.216 Earlier, in January 
1984, Kashani had issued a communiqué calling for jihad against Israel. This call would 
be repeated by Kashani’s followers for years to come, including the future founder of 
the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.217  
Although motivated by a strategy to enhance his regional standing, the Shah also 
recognized that public revelation would not only damage his leadership aspiration but 
also risk his condemnation as a traitor to Islam. Even as he sought to benefit from the 
relationship, he needed to project an image of a ruler committed both to the Iranian 
nation and to the Islamic world. Thus, the Shah continued his public rhetoric 
condemning Israel while privately seeking to benefit from cooperation.  
With the Shah having much to lose and Israel having much to gain, not 
surprisingly they saw the secret relationship differently. For the Shah, it was a 
convenient arrangement. While the alliance belied his “calculated ambivalence,” 
according to Alpher, the Shah displayed a notable “lack of emotional attachment” to the 
Israelis. By contrast, Israel’s leaders imbued the relationship with biblical significance. 
They saw it as the continuation of the legacy of Cyrus the Great’s liberation, which had 
enabled them to return to the land that was now their independent nation. The 
Periphery Alliance was more than a strategic security-enhancing arrangement, it was a 
“fulfillment of destiny,” a modern addendum to the biblical narrative.218  
Despite different perspectives, Iran and Israel agreed on the purpose. Initially, 
they sought to share intelligence by convening meetings of a “Trident” group, which also 
included Turkey. Each country’s Intelligence officials got to know one another as they 
met regularly every six months. Through these interactions, Iran and Israel identified 
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avenues of assistance beyond information exchange. The Shah, having been impressed 
by the Israeli intelligence apparatus, requested assistance from the Mossad in 
developing his own domestic intelligence service. Israel helped train the members of 
SAVAK, the Shah’s secret police force, which spied on and terrified his subjects.219 As oil 
prices rose, increasing Iran’s financial resources, the Shah went on a spending spree for 
military equipment, much of which he purchased from Israeli weapons manufacturers. 
Weapons sales accounted for a large segment of the Israeli economy.220 Eventually, in 
the mid-1970s the relationship expanded to include military personnel exchanges.221 
The Iranian military, impressed by Israel’s success in fighting Arab armies, sought to 
observe the Israeli Defense Force’s operation and learn from its experience.222 The 
Iranian officers had reason to anticipate the possibility of a military conflict between Iran 
and Arab forces. The Iranians paid Israel for the consulting and training services, and the 
personal interaction gradually reduced Israel’s suspicions of Iranians. As Uzi Arad, a 
former national security advisor and Mossad official, explained it, “We started to 
identify with their struggles.”223 
Officials in each country also recognized that the benefits could expand beyond 
the military and intelligence sectors. Israel lacked energy resources to fuel the industrial 
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development promised by the influx of human capital in the form of Jewish immigrants 
from the Diaspora. While the Arab oil-producing countries refused to sell oil to Israel 
because they opposed its existence, Iran, having been excluded from the pan-Arab 
movement, had no such constraints. The Shah could realize the revenue from the Israeli 
market and, of equal importance, access Israeli technical expertise for modernizing his 
economy and Westernizing Iranian society.  
 Modernization was an imperative for the Shah. By the early 1960s, thousands of 
young people of the post-war generation, who had spent time traveling, studying, and 
living abroad, began to assert themselves in Iranian politics. They demanded 
liberalization and transformative changes.224 In response, the Shah had launched what 
he called the “White Revolution,” which initially centered on land reforms. Eventually, 
the initiative expanded to encompass a broad array of economic and social measures, 
including industrial privatization, infrastructure development, and the right of women to 
vote.225 Among the international advisors consulted by the Shah were many Israelis. As 
an admirer of Israel’s rapid development, particularly in the agricultural sector, the Shah 
sought Israeli guidance in advancing Iran’s farming industry and national infrastructure 
projects. Israelis assisted in developing a variety of high-profile projects, ranging from 
construction of the Darius Khabir Dam in Shiraz, to a naval base along the Persian Gulf 
coast, to luxury apartment complexes in downtown Tehran.226 The Shah reportedly 
expressed his admiration to Uri Lubrani, the top Israeli diplomatic official in Iran, by 
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telling him, “Israel is a country that has the developed technology we need. Its know-
how is complementary to ours.”227 The Israeli contributions inspired many Iranians to 
visit Israel to see its progress and learn its methods. Iranian farmers and engineers 
traveled to receive training, while businessmen sought to establish ties with Israeli 
firms.228  
 As Israelis developed a new understanding of Iranians, so too did those in Iran 
with knowledge of the alliance come to appreciate the Israelis. Former Iranian Prime 
Minister Ali Amini characterized the still-secret relationship as being “like the true love 
that exists between two people out of wedlock.”229 Although the circle of 
knowledgeable people grew as interaction expanded, everyone sharing in the benefits, 
both government officials and private entrepreneurs, had an incentive to refrain from 
informing the general public. When the exchanges necessitated increased consular 
services, the operation was disguised. The Israeli embassy in Tehran did not fly the 
Israeli flag or display perceptible identifying insignia.  
 An exception to the secrecy occurred in 1962 when Israel openly responded with 
assistance after Iran experienced a severe earthquake. Israel sent a team of experts to 
assist with recovery and reconstruction in the Qazvin region of northwest Iran. Israel 
used the event to demonstrate to the world the proficiency of its technical expertise, of 
which Iranian officials were already aware. The Shah could use the opportunity to 
combine the overt and covert Israeli assistance for advancing his plans to modernize the 
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country by upgrading infrastructure, introducing advanced technology, and reforming 
the Iranian economy. 230  
 Despite the strategic and economic benefits each country was realizing, all was 
not copacetic. Beginning in the early 1970s, Israelis working in Iran witnessed public 
expressions of dissatisfaction with the Shah’s regime. As demonstrations against the 
Shah’s rule intensified, Israelis realized that the civil unrest could eventually force the 
Shah from power. They began planning for a post-Shah Iran by instructing individuals 
and companies conducting business there to protect themselves from future political 
instability. They recommended that Israelis with economic interests in Iran try to divest 
those holdings. At a minimum, they suggested maintaining a negative balance of 
payments with Iran, so that money owed to Iranian concerns would be greater than the 
amount owed to Israel.231  
D. The Shah’s Retreat 
 
While the Shah and Israeli leaders were pursuing a mutually beneficial secret 
relationship, Gamal Nasser continued his pro-Arab saber rattling against Israel. 
Throughout the 1960s, his inflammatory anti-Israel public statements included warnings 
of impending war.232 In May 1967, reports of an Egyptian military buildup in the Sinai 
Peninsula reached Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, causing the Israeli military to 
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mobilize in preparation for a potential conflict. On June 5, 1967, the Israeli military 
launched a preemptive attack that routed the Arab forces. Within the first hours, Israeli 
bombs destroyed nearly the entire Egyptian air force, hitting their planes on the runway. 
In the ground war, the Arab militaries, and especially that of Nasser’s Egyptian force, 
proved inept. Throughout the conflict, Nasser, who had surrounded himself with 
sycophants and yes-men, appeared to be unaware of the dire situation confronting his 
troops and the futility of Egypt’s military operations. The humiliating defeat tainted his 
credibility on strategic matters among Arab leaders and weakened his claim to 
leadership of the Arab world. For the moment, the pan-Arab threat eased.  
 Given his aspirations as well as his alliance with Israel, the Shah undoubtedly was 
pleased with the outcome of the war. Nasser resigned as President of Egypt, which 
curtailed the strategic influence of the Soviet Union. The Shah thus had more latitude to 
pursue his domestic and foreign agendas. His optimism did not last long. The Egyptian 
people reportedly demanded Nasser’s reinstatement as President of Egypt. Although 
Nasser died of a heart attack three years later, his successor, Anwar Sadat, continued 
the cause of reversing the 1967 losses. Moreover, the Soviets redoubled their efforts to 
resupply and rearm the Arab forces. 
 In 1973, Sadat joined with Syria in launching a surprise attack against the Israeli-
captured territory on the Sinai Peninsula. Initiated on the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur, 
the holiest day of the year for Jews, the invading Arab army caused Israel to cede some 
of the territory it held. The conflict was now as much a regional action as a face-off 
between the Cold War superpowers, with the Soviets backing the Arabs and the United 
States supporting Israel. Thus, with a critical resupply from the United States, Israel 
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regrouped and counterattacked.233 Although the Soviet Union entreated Sadat to accept 
a ceasefire, he refused in the mistaken belief that he had the capability to defeat Israel. 
Eventually, hostilities ended; neither side could objectively claim a convincing victory, 
but neither had they provoked a larger confrontation.  
 Although the Shah could not appear to be pleased with the outcome, he believed 
himself in a stronger position than after the first conflict. He had been busy in the 
intervening six years between the two wars. He had clamped down on domestic dissent 
using his powerful state security apparatus. He had also received considerable American 
military aid such that he possessed one of the most powerful militaries in the region.234 
Following Nasser’s death and the subsequent dissolution of the pan-Arabism movement, 
he saw an opportunity to fill the power void in regional leadership.  
 During the war, the Shah had sought to profit by playing both sides while 
remaining officially neutral. He reasoned that an extended conflict with no decisive 
victor would be most beneficial to Iranian interests. Publicly, he signaled favoritism to 
the Arab cause by sending medical supplies to its armies, providing pilots to Saudi Arabia 
for training purposes and allowing the Soviet air force to use Iranian airspace to ferry 
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supplies to the Arab forces. 235 At the same time, he assisted the United States efforts to 
funnel weapons to the Israelis, including small arms and heavy mortars.236  
 To the Israelis, this duplicity was a betrayal. His defiance of the Arab oil embargo 
or his assistance of the United States’ weapons supply to Israel meant little if the Shah 
was also supplying oil to the Arab armies. The Shah, who had been the beneficiary of 
Israeli knowledge and expertise for over a decade, had abandoned them in their 
moment of need by assisting their enemies. At best, the Shah was a war profiteer. At 
worst, he was selling out Israel to enhance his claim to regional leadership. To assume 
his coveted role as a regional power broker, the Shah appeared willing to abandon the 
alliance.237 Years later, a former Iranian ambassador summed up the country’s position, 
“We didn’t have Israel as a friend to have the Arabs as enemies.”238 Unlike the Israelis, 
the Shah had never embraced the idea of a shared Jewish-Persian heritage. Rather, the 
1973 war demonstrated that the alliance was an expendable expediency dependent 
upon fluctuating geopolitics.  
 In March 1975, eighteen months after the end of the war, the Shah publicly 
revealed his intentions when he suddenly announced Iran’s willingness to engage in 
diplomatic talks with Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. The two countries were not friends. 
They had a long-running territorial dispute between the Shatt Al Arab and Khuzestan, 
which the Shah feared might become a justification for an Iraqi invasion of Iran. More 
importantly, Iran and Israel had been supporting an ongoing Kurdish rebellion in 
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southern Iraq to destabilize Saddam’s regime. The effort was particularly imperative for 
Israel, which had used the rebellion to connect its operatives seeking to extract Iraqi 
Jews facing increased danger from Saddam.239  
The Shah again sold out Israeli interests when, in December 1975, he and 
Saddam signed the Algiers Accord resolving their territorial dispute and ending Iranian 
support of the Kurdish rebellion.240 This was a betrayal of Israel since the country was in 
no position to assist the Kurds on their own. On behalf of his alarmed nation, the Israeli 
Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin flew to Iran to seek a personal explanation from the 
Shah.241 Iran’s reasons had merit: If the Shah wanted to avoid what he believed would 
be an inevitable war with Iraq, he had to improve relations with his neighbor. To resolve 
their territorial disputes, he had to stop supporting regime opponents. The strategy was 
not without risk, which included losing the benefits of his alliance with Israel. The Shah 
effectively chose to announce his priorities by never consulting Israel before deciding to 
court Iraq. Eliezer Tsafrir, the head of the Mossad in Iran, described the Shah’s 
abandonment of the Kurds and the Israelis in favor of Saddam Hussein as akin to that of 
Chamberlain’s appeasement of Hitler.242 
 From the Shah’s perspective at that moment, the potential benefits appeared to 
outweigh the risks. He saw himself as domestically and regionally secure, and thus in a 
position to pursue his larger ambitions. Not only did he have military might, he was 
expanding Iran’s nuclear program. Two and a half years earlier, Iran had issued its fifth 
five-year national development plan, in which it called for the construction of several 
nuclear power stations, including one on the naval base at Bandar Abbas. The Shah 
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hinted that the production of nuclear power might contribute to the eventual 
development of nuclear weapons in Iran.243 Without Arab intimidation or the threat of 
Soviet-inspired mischief, and with military and potential nuclear capability, the Shah 
believed he had little to lose by abandoning his relationship with the Israelis.  
 He evinced his new bravado in a 1975 interview with Egyptian journalist 
Mohammad Hasanein Haykal. The Shah answered a wide range of questions on 
numerous topics relating to Iran’s foreign policy, including, for the first time, responding 
directly to questions about Iran’s relationship with Israel. He justified sharing military 
and intelligence information with Israel as a strategic necessity for balancing the threat 
of Arab aggression led by Nasser. He then added, “Now the situation has changed,”244 
implying that without Nasser’s destructive influence threatening the stability of the 
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region, Iran could reengage with its Arab neighbors based on their common religion. 
There was even speculation about the formation of a new regional pact in which Iran 
joined with Egypt and Algeria.245 By ending its ties with Israel and seeking an accord with 
Iraq, the Shah led Iran from its isolation, and cast himself as a powerful arbiter of 
stability and balance in a region that had little of either.  
IV. The Islamic Republic and Israel 
 
A. On the Eve of Revolution 
 
i. Iran 
 
 The Shah’s preoccupation with his international reputation either obscured or 
lulled him into complacency about potential domestic threats, notably the challenge 
posed by the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Khomeini’s antagonism dated from 1953 
when the CIA-backed coup d’état re-installed the Shah as the ruler of Iran. Breaking with 
the tradition of clerical quietism, Khomeini became an outspoken and fiery opponent of 
the Shah and his policies of Westernization and imperialism. He was particularly 
incensed by what he believed was a subversive Western infiltration of Iran’s Islamic 
culture.  
 The Islam preached by Khomeini included anti-Zionist rhetoric, which implied a 
departure from the general tolerance accorded to Jews by Iran’s population.246 Iran’s 
traditional merchant class, known as the bazaris, had opposed creation of a Jewish 
homeland in the region. They had invoked anti-Jewish stereotypes out of fear that a 
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Jewish nation might challenge Iran’s economic power.247 As strong supporters of the 
clerics, each may have inspired the other’s anti-Israel sentiments.  
 Khomeini used anti-Zionist messages as rhetorical devices for denouncing the 
Shah. Exiled for his repeated anti-Shah agitations, Khomeini cited the Shah’s lack of 
opposition to Israel – and later, his cooperation with the country – to cast him as an 
ineffective and un-Islamic leader, subservient to Western and Jewish interests. 
Khomeini’s narrative conjuring up the image of a mythical Israeli-Baha’i fifth column 
operating in Iran fomented fear among Iranians. Shiite clerics had long disdained the 
Baha’i religion, a nineteenth century offshoot of Shia Islam, which they considered a 
heretical faith.248 In a 1963 communiqué, Khomeini conflated the threat from Baha’is 
and Jews: “I must warn all the Moslems of the world and the nation of Iran that the 
Koran and Islam are in danger, and the independence of the country and its economy 
have fallen into the hands of the Zionists in the form of the Baha’i party. It would not 
take too long for them to take over the entire country and rapidly impoverish the 
Muslim people. Iranian television is the spy center of the Jews.”249  
 Khomeini’s narrative also saw the Shah’s ties to America and America’s support 
of Israel as part of an external plot against Iran. According to his account, the creation of 
a Jewish State in the Middle East was part of a larger American plot to partition the 
Islamic world. Khomeini had lots of history to work with in crafting his charges. With the 
Shah’s popularity diminishing, the reminder of the 1953 CIA-backed coup cast America 
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as an enemy. Moreover, in Khomeini’s telling, the 1975 disclosure of the ties between 
Iran and Israel returned to haunt the Shah. Khomeini accused Israel of founding and 
training SAVAK, the Shah’s hated and feared secret police, who were engaged in spying 
on, imprisoning, and torturing Iranians who opposed the Shah.250 In an interview on the 
eve of the Islamic Revolution, Khomeini told the French newspaper Le Monde that the 
Shah’s alliance with Israel made him guilty of crimes against Islam.251  
ii. Israel 
 
 The Israelis were less complacent than the Shah about threats to his regime. 
Israeli Foreign Ministry documents from the early years of the alliance reveal concern 
about Khomeini’s emergence as a potentially powerful opponent of the Shah. A 1962 
telegram from Israeli officials in Iran noted that Khomeini’s attacks against the Shah’s 
reforms frequently claimed that they allowed Zionist infiltration.252 A year later, Israeli 
authorities again expressed alarm when Khomeini led a public protest calling for Israel’s 
destruction during the Shia holiday of Ashura.253 After the Shah exiled Khomeini in 1964 
and ties between Israel and Iran grew stronger, the cleric disappeared from Israeli radar. 
For more than a decade Israel stopped reporting on Khomeini’s whereabouts and 
activities. He did not reemerge as a prominent opposition leader in exile until shortly 
before the 1979 revolution.  
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Even without taking note of Khomeini, Israel’s pessimism about the Shah’s 
reliability and his future continued to increase. In addition to his support for the Arabs in 
the 1973 war and his 1975 accord with Saddam Hussein, Israeli officials noted the 
popular dissatisfaction with his authoritarian rule. Khomeini’s reemergence in official 
Israeli documents coincided with reports of the Shah’s deteriorating physical and mental 
health.254 The top Israeli diplomat in Iran, Uri Lubrani, wrote in a report to the Foreign 
Ministry that, “[The Shah] is not the same man that we once knew, remote, sometimes 
astray. There’s no doubt that the man is undergoing a nightmare…and what’s most 
worrying is the feeling that he is resigned to his fate.”255  
 As popular protests against the Shah reached a fever pitch in December 1978, 
Israelis in Iran went into full lockdown. They feared for their safety as Khomeini’s 
rhetoric fostered intense anti-Israeli sentiment. One senior foreign ministry official 
described the dire state of relations, writing, “The extreme religious leader Khomeini’s 
remarks in regards to [sic] the Israeli issue have turned scathing as of late. His view that 
Israeli soldiers are helping the Shah is well known, and that Israelis are coming to Iran to 
replace the striking oil industry workers, and therefore their blood is permissible [to 
shed].”256 Israelis scrambled to plan for the evacuation of their facilities in Iran and the 
exfiltration of their nationals.  
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B. Becoming Enemies 
 
Unquestionably, the Islamic Revolution marked a fundamental change in Iranian-
Israeli relations, although at the time, many questions remained. While Khomeini’s 
rhetoric signaled an abrupt end to formal ties, officials had no clear picture of 
Khomeini’s intentions. His avowed support for the Palestinians could translate into 
military action,257 or he might realize some need for covert contacts with Israel. In the 
immediate aftermath, it was even unclear whether Khomeini and his religious 
fundamentalist supporters could form a stable government. Whatever the future reality, 
Iran publicly considered Israel an enemy. 
Israelis also viewed an Iran ruled by Islamic fundamentalists as an enemy. To 
most Israelis, who had little knowledge of pre-revolutionary Iran or familiarity with the 
secret alliance, the consequential change for Israel was the new regime’s militant 
support of the Palestinian cause. The absence of historical perspective undermined 
Israel’s predictive capacity.258 Israeli leaders and analysts had considerable leeway in 
interpreting events and ascribing motives to Iranian leaders. They offered different 
narratives. One version held that the Revolution revealed the “true” Iranian identity: 
Islamists driven by hatred of Jews and Israel. Others maintained that it was too early to 
form expectations. The initial narrative had important implications for interpreting 
subsequent Iranian actions. For example, some would later assert that Iran’s nuclear 
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development program was an inevitable extension of the fervor unleashed by the 
Islamic Revolution.259 
In fact, far from creating solidarity, the Revolution initiated considerable turmoil 
in Iran and disrupted relationships with other countries. Not surprisingly, the 
revolutionary coalition that had ousted the Shah quickly fell apart, and rival political 
factions vied for power. As they debated the provisions and ratification of a new 
constitution, they fought over the structure of the government and the power of the 
clerics.260 Eventually, Khomeini and his religious allies gained the upper hand and moved 
to consolidate control over the most powerful political institutions. They also hastily 
convened revolutionary courts and paraded their political opponents through show 
trials.261 By executing or imprisoning officials from the Shah’s reign, they purged their 
political enemies from their new government and from the country.  
The chaos left in limbo the fate of the Jews who had resisted Israeli entreaties to 
flee and American offers of assistance. While many left, those remaining hoped that 
Khomeini might temper his conspiracy accusations directed at Iranian Jews as 
distinguished from Israelis.262 When he secured his leadership, however, Khomeini did 
not abandon his attacks on Iranian Jews. Revolutionary authorities arrested several 
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Jewish leaders during their initial purges. The most infamous case involved Habib 
Elghanian, who was sentenced to death in 1979 for “treason by maintaining a 
connection with Israel and Zionism.”263 Israel issued only a terse statement of 
condemnation. It sounded both nostalgic and a bit hopeful in stating “there has never 
been a conflict of interest between the State of Israel and Iran, irrespective of the 
regime in various periods.”264 Remarkably, despite some notable exceptions, Khomeini 
moved to assure Iran’s Jews that he would not harm them based upon their religion. He 
indicated that he did not wish to interfere with the community’s practice of Judaism.265 
Ironically, the Islamic Revolution occurred two years after Israelis had elected the 
first non-Labor government in its history. The victory of the right-wing Likud party not 
only represented a dramatic political change, it brought to power a former terrorist 
when Menachem Begin became Prime Minister. Begin, who had been a member of the 
underground Irgun movement that fought the British and Palestinians to secure Israel’s 
independence, was considerably more hawkish than his predecessors. He believed that 
military conflict with Israel’s neighbors was the inevitable result of centuries of tension 
between Muslims and Jews. This made him less inclined to negotiate with the 
Palestinians and skeptical about peace initiatives with the surrounding Arab states.266 
Begin was thus unwilling to give the new Islamic Republic the benefit of the doubt 
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regarding its intentions. When Khomeini, in his initial diplomatic act, offered the vacated 
Israeli embassy building in Iran to the Palestine Liberation Organization, Begin was not 
shy in his critique. Acknowledging the provocation, he called the offer an “alliance 
between two phenomena of blind, deep hate,” and urged Israelis to “grasp and 
appreciate what it is we face, what kind of enemy we confront.”267 He took to referring 
to the revolutionaries as “Khomeini’s mob,” even using the epithet in a toast at an April 
1980 White House dinner hosted by President Jimmy Carter.268  
Begin’s toast that evening was more than a critique of the Iranians; it was an 
implicit criticism of what he considered the United States’ passivity to Iran’s holding 
American citizens as hostages. After the United States admitted the deposed Shah for 
medical treatment at an American hospital, Iranian students stormed the embassy, 
taking the remaining staff as hostages. In his toast offered five months into the crisis, 
Begin noted that the United States, unlike Russia, was trying “every avenue, accepting 
patience and pain” to free the hostages. Later, in an interview with ABC television, Begin 
elaborated on his disapproval by imagining what would be a preferable Russian 
response. He opined, “They would have marched on Tehran and captured it.” He 
claimed that the military intervention would succeed “because the Khomeini army is no 
match to any other army at all. It’s a mob, an armed mob, but still a mob.” To avoid any 
misinterpretation, Begin then mocked the United States, “As for Iran – the Americans 
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are humiliated. This great nation, with all the massive power at its disposal, feels itself to 
be humiliated and does not know what to do.”269 
Israeli officials, taking their cue from Begin, continued to direct an aggressive war 
of words war at Iran even as Khomeini secured his grip on power. Notably, the speakers 
often directed personal insults at the Iranians as if engaged in a playground dare against 
former friends. For example, Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, who would two decades 
later become Israel’s Prime Minister, told the Wall Street Journal in 1982 that Iran’s 
approach to warfare was “naïve,” and he spoke of Iranians as “all these Mongols riding 
horses.”270 Two years later, Sharon’s successor as Defense Minister, Moshe Arens, 
labeled Iran as one of the Middle East’s four “mad” regimes,” the others being Libya, 
Syria, and Iraq.271 As the American hostage crisis dragged on, however, some Israeli 
officials expressed sympathy for the United States. In a January 1981 speech to the 
World Jewish Congress, Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir took a more understanding 
approach by noting that “Israelis understood the pain and fear of hostages being held by 
inhuman beings.”272  
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C. The Enemy of My Enemy May (Not) Be My Friend  
 
On September 22, 1980, Iraq invaded Iran. In a serious miscalculation, Iraqi 
President Saddam Hussein believed that the leadership struggle in the new Islamic 
Republic rendered Iran vulnerable to Iraqi expansionism. 273 Rather than securing a quick 
victory, Saddam’s troops met fierce Iranian opposition. For a second time, Iranians 
rallied around Khomeini as their leader and repelled the Iraqi invasion.  
Next it was Khomeini’s turn for miscalculation. Sensing strength and momentum 
and employing his charisma, Khomeini crafted a historical narrative justifying an 
invasion of Iraq. His counterattack initiated an eight-year struggle that cost nearly a 
million lives and ended in a stalemate. 
For Israel, the war was an unsettlingly positive development. Two Islamic 
countries fighting one another distracted them from attacking the Jewish State. The 
looming threat of a victory by one side creating instability by upending the regional 
power structure led Menachem Begin publicly to describe the conflict as a “very 
dangerous event” that “concerns Israel because it is in the periphery of the Middle 
East.” Years into the war, when the Labor Party resumed a role in Israel’s government,274 
Defense Minister Yitzhk Rabin was more open about the advantages of a prolonged war. 
He observed, “Iraq is tied down in its war with Iran, and there is no doubt that the 
lengthy war, which is now entering its seventh year, has exacted a high price in human 
lives, and in terms of Iraq’s national morale and its economy, and its end is not yet in 
                                                        
273 Ra’ad al-Hamdani, one of Saddam’s generals during the war, cites two political 
motives for war. Iraq sought to redraw the Iran-Iraq border more favorably than in the 
1975 Algiers Accord. Second, Saddam wanted a decisive victory over the Iranians to 
solidify his claim to leadership of the Pan-Arab movement, a position unoccupied 
Nasser’s death and Sadat’s peace treaty with the Israelis. Cited in Kevin M. Woods et al., 
Saddam’s War: An Iraqi Military Perspective of the Iran-Iraq War (Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, 2009), 5. 
274 Israel has a multi-party system in which political alliances are continually shifting, 
frequently based upon disagreements over foreign policy strategies. 
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sight. Even if it ends, tension will remain. It’s hard for me to see Iraq being anxious for 
an additional military adventure against Israel after such a long and wearing war.”275 
Even as the war continued, Israel needed to calculate its strategic interests in 
different outcomes. An Iraqi victory was likely to provide Saddam with additional 
territory and more access to natural resources while increasing his regional power. It 
could also validate the military prowess of the Iraqi army, emboldening the leadership to 
pursue other military objectives. On the other side, the consequences of an Iranian 
victory were less clear, but also risky for Israel. Khomeini’s vitriolic rhetoric and the idea 
that the extremist elements of his government might seek to extend their victory 
unnerved Israeli leadership. In particular, they worried about Iran’s support for the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization and other anti-Israel organizations, as well as 
Khomeini’s vow to “export” Iran’s Islamic Revolution abroad. Israel feared that its 
regional presence would become even more uncomfortable if other majority Muslim 
states followed Iran’s path toward theocratic governance. Hence, Israel faced the 
proverbial conundrum: One outcome would embolden a known historical enemy state 
while victory for Iran would subject Israel to an emerging enemy state with uncertain 
motives.  
Israel’s calculations eventually led it to side with Iran for several reasons. Despite 
the Iranian rhetoric, Israeli officials viewed Iran as the lesser of the two evils. They 
reasoned that If Iran was fighting for survival, it might not have the luxury to engage in 
more than a rhetorical war. There might even be space to explore a back-channel 
relationship. By contrast, Iraq was, according to Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, the 
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foremost “extremist” state in the region. Sharon explained that this assessment did not 
mean Israel was comfortable with Iran, but rather that while Iran posed the larger 
strategic challenge, the Iraqis were the greater threat.276  
Inherent in Sharon’s assessment was another influential factor, namely 
uncertainty regarding the future of post-Revolutionary Iran. Few Israeli senior defense 
and security officials had much knowledge of Iran, and Israeli scholarship focusing on 
the modern nation was sparse. Both the number of participants and the depth of the 
debate in the decision-making process were limited. According to Ronen Cohen, a 
professor at Ariel University who has written several books on Iran, there was some 
academic debate about the logic of supporting Iran, but the future of Israel’s 
relationship with Iran was never discussed in government forums.277 Yossi Alpher, a 
young officer in the Mossad at the time, confirms the dearth of knowledge. In the 
introduction to his book on the history of the Periphery Alliance, he describes how 
following the Revolution he was assigned Mossad’s Iran Desk despite having no prior 
experience with the country.278  
The Israeli public similarly had little understanding of Iran’s internal dynamics 
and its future position vis-à-vis Israel. In his study of Israeli “Iranophobia,” Haggai Ram 
posited that Israelis were confused by the Revolution’s aftermath.279 As a people who 
had thrown off colonial rule, they were sympathetic to a revolutionary ouster of an 
oppressive monarchy, believing that such change could be progressive. Filtering the 
uprising through their own independence narrative that achieved modernization and 
democratic governance, they could hope that Iran’s “popular” movement would create 
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space for democratic development.280 Ironically, Ram speculates that Israelis were 
slower to recognize the negative consequences associated with the clerics’ consolidation 
of power since they had just elected a conservative Likud government, which would be 
more beholden to policy demands from Israel’s religious establishment.281  
Whether because of or despite the absence of knowledge about present-day Iran 
and its future, once they realized the danger, Israelis hoped that the Khomeini 
government would be temporary. While wishful thinking is human nature, in the Israeli 
case it was grounded in experience. Since the founding of the state, Israelis faced a 
continuing struggle between those who would impose theocratic governance and those 
who maintained a secular Judaism. Israel had muddled through the tensions while 
maintaining fealty to democratic values and international alliances. So too, they 
believed, would Iranians reject theocratic dictates that disrupted their lives and belied 
the nation’s advantageous international ties. Yossi Alpher coined the term “Periphery 
nostalgia” to describe Israelis’ wishful thinking. He explained that the term referred to 
“the presumption that because Iran has historic tensions with the Arab world and 
because one Iranian regime, that of the Shah, seemingly aligned itself strategically with 
Israel over the course of two decades, this pattern of alliance and shared strategic 
interests must through some form of historical determination or strategic norm, 
continue to manifest itself in Israel’s relations with Iran.”282 Such nostalgia, however, 
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created a cognitive bias of false understanding, which prevented Israelis from 
recognizing their own ignorance.  
Understandably, those Israelis with the closest ties to the Shah’s regime 
experienced the strongest cognitive dissonance. This included intelligence officials, 
military officers, and Israeli businesspersons who, based upon their experience, opined 
that the new theocratic dictator did not represent the feelings or interests of the “true” 
Iran. They argued that Israel should somehow seek to maintain the Periphery Doctrine, 
including information exchange and economic development assistance, despite the 
temporary regime change. Ariel Sharon even put forth a plan to reinstall the Shah with 
the help of the Israeli military.283 The Iran-Iraq War kept alive the hopes of a continued 
Israel-Iran relationship. Thus, Israel provided arms to Iran, and as late as 1986, Israeli 
Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin justified the continued shipments by claiming that Iran 
was “Israel’s best friend.”284 Of course, it helped that some Israelis were realizing 
considerable profits from the arms sales. Israeli investigative reporter Ronan Bergman 
explained that “More than anything else, the weapons industry wanted to make 
money.” 285 According to Bergman, when Israel commenced secret sales to Iran, one 
military official told him that there was never a discussion of the ethics of these 
weapons sales, or what they would mean politically for Israel if the deals became public.  
D. Iran-Contra 
 Israel’s role in transferring weapons to the Islamic Republic eventually came to 
light as part of what became known as the Iran-Contra Affair. A full exploration of this 
scandal goes beyond the scope of this project, but Israel’s role in creating the plan and 
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facilitating the process is worthy of consideration in light of what it reveals about Israel’s 
relationship with Iran after the Revolution.  
The scandal, which involved the sale of American arms to Iran in exchange for 
the release of American hostages held in Lebanon, as well as the use of the proceeds by 
the United States to fund an anti-communist guerilla insurgency in Nicaragua, was the 
biggest foreign policy crisis of President Ronald Reagan’s administration. The Israeli 
government did not participate extensively in the public hearings in the United States 
that followed the disclosure of the program, nor did they hold any of their own. In his 
autobiography published after he left office, Reagan wrote that the original idea for the 
weapons transfers came from the Israelis. He called Israel the “prime mover,” and said 
that the Israelis promised that the weapons would only be supplied to Iranian 
“moderates” and not to Khomeini hardliners.286 Reagan’s personal account is likely self-
serving, but the Congressional report on the affair at least partially corroborates his 
claim. In addition to the release of American hostages, the Israelis suggested that 
providing arms to the Iranians held out the prospect of improved American relations 
with Iran.287  
Ultimately, the initiative proved unsuccessful at either securing the release of the 
hostages or improving relations with Iran.288 Nevertheless, the Israelis sought to 
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continue the transfers. Israeli officials were so eager to sell arms to the Iranians that 
they offered to accept full-responsibility as well as absorb all financial and material 
losses should the plan not succeed. They were effectively indemnifying the United 
States against any negative repercussions. U.S. Secretary of State George Schultz 
pointed out to National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane that Israel, unlike the United 
States, had no policy against selling arms to Iran, and that given the hostility of most of 
its neighbors, Israel might be more willing to gamble on the prospect of future changes 
in the Iranian government.289  
At the same time, Israel’s motivations included a desire to maintain the conflict 
for as long as possible. The United States and Israel were eager to avoid a decisive 
victory by either side, and the Israelis further hoped that the fighting would drain the 
resources of both countries, thereby reducing the possibility that they would redirect 
their hostility toward Israel once hostilities ceased.290 
E. The End of Options 
 
The protracted war between Iraq and Iran ended 1988 when the United Nations 
brokered a ceasefire and sent peacekeepers to enforce it. After eight years of fighting 
the combatants had achieved little except for sustaining millions of casualties. Each side 
retreated to their pre-war borders. Ironically, while Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Iran 
sought to exploit the instability of the new regime, he actually contributed to saving it. 
 Khomeini’s capacity to rally the Iranian people to repel the Iraqi invasion 
solidified his power. His subsequent ill-fated invasion of Iraq, which prolonged the 
conflict, did not undermine his leadership. Instead, fueled by memories of Iraqi 
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atrocities, including chemical weapons attacks, and angered by United States support of 
their enemy, the people supported government efforts to secure the nation from future 
threats. They approved efforts to rebuild the Iranian military and strengthen defense 
capabilities. At the same time, they feared that Iraq might develop nuclear weapons.291  
For Israel the war did not last long enough. Although the war initially helped 
Khomeini secure his leadership, the Israelis calculated that a long and costly conflict 
would eventually destabilize the government and lead to an internal revolt. Not only did 
this not happen, but both Khomeini and Saddam Hussein remained in power. Moreover, 
Saddam appeared to have the capacity to rebuild Iraq’s nuclear capacity, as well as to 
expand its chemical and biological weapons program.292  
Unexpectedly, Iran soon proved even more challenging than Iraq. The country 
had developed a new military corps, known as the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps 
(IRGC), whose members committed to enforcing the fundamentalist religious principles 
of the Islamic Revolution. The IRGC assumed both the principal police and military 
functions. It supplanted the traditional army, which had included the formerly Israeli-
friendly officer corps from the days of imperial Iran. Most of those men, who had 
engaged in personal or professional contacts and exchanges with Israel, had died or 
been killed in battle or purges. For members of the IRGC, opposing Israel and exporting 
the Islamic revolution were core values.  
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As an initial target, Iran focused on Lebanon, in particular the Israeli-occupied 
south. Israel invaded south Lebanon in 1982 during the Lebanese civil war in order to 
expel the PLO forces operating in the area. Allied with Christian militia forces, they 
established a buffer zone between Lebanese and Israeli territory.293 The predominately 
Shiite region provided fertile recruiting ground for Iranian agents looking to support co-
religionist opposition groups. Iran exploited residents’ discontent with an oppressive 
occupation. It gradually extended its influence over the Hezbollah and Amal 
organizations by providing them with weapons, training, and logistical support for their 
fight against the Israelis. Meanwhile, Israel appeared to underestimate this developing 
threat on its northern border as it struggled to maintain control over the local 
population.294 
For Israel to acknowledge Iran as a “real,” not merely a rhetorical enemy meant 
that many of its government officials and analysts had miscalculated. Its support of Iran 
during its war with Iraq had not produced the hoped-for moderation in Iran’s opposition 
to Israel’s existence. On the contrary, with the war over, Iran engaged in arming terrorist 
groups to attack Israel while it openly embraced the Palestinian cause. Iran’s active 
opposition to Israel created a shared interest with countries in the region, with which it 
otherwise had little in common. Clearly, Israel and the Islamic Republic had begun a new 
chapter of their history. 
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V. Conclusion 
 
The history of the erratic relationship between Persians and Jews and Israel and 
Iran is as much a story about the actions of external forces as it is about choices made by 
the nation’s rulers and leaders. From ancient times through the founding of the Islamic 
Republic, there was no consistent narrative that made the next development obvious or 
inevitable. Not even the geopolitical and religious conflicts between the two nations and 
peoples fit within conventional historical understanding. The Persians did not oppress 
the Jews; the Iranians were not Arabs or part of the pan-Arabist Soviet supported orbit. 
Both peoples had a long, proud, and distinct heritage that did not include a legacy of 
enmity toward one another.  
Some key parts of the history of Israeli-Iranian interaction are not well known. 
The mythical story of the Persian King and his Jewish Queen is a book of the Hebrew 
Bible. Similarly, the chronicles of Cyrus’s patronage on behalf of his Jewish subjects is 
detailed in Jewish historical accounts, meriting only passing mentions in general 
histories of the period. Iran and Israel conducted their twentieth century Periphery 
Alliance, by which the new state of Israel and the re-enthroned Shah helped one 
another enhance their nation’s security and economy, in secret. Their cooperation is a 
testament both to how states engage in mutually beneficial cooperation and to how 
officials’ public rhetoric may contradict private relations.  
History is always important as a descriptive record of events that contributed to 
our present. It aids our understanding of why events happened and produced particular 
consequences. When historical accounts are incomplete or inaccurate, their value is not 
only diminished but they can also be misused. Such is the challenge presented by the 
history of Israel’s relationship with Iran. History suggested that the new Israeli state 
might develop a working relationship with a non-Arab state on the periphery of a hostile 
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region. Israeli officials endowed the alliance with historical significance and 
miscalculated the strength of Iran’s commitment. Few had studied Iran’s own history or 
uncovered the nuances that would influence its future development and inform its 
international relations.  
The following chapters detail how Israeli officials revised their understanding of 
the historical relationship as Israel and Iran became enemies. Eventually, the new 
version would serve as the backdrop for a narrative that cast Iran as an existential threat 
to Israel. The power of the narrative detailing this threat obscured Israeli officials’ 
absence of knowledge, mistakes in foresight, and misreading of Iranian intentions. In 
this version of history, the Islamic Republic is the incarnation of Israel’s historic enemy. 
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Chapter Three: Securitization, Part I 
 
I. Introduction 
 
It is notable that Israel and the Islamic Republic have not engaged in a hot war.295 
Their leaders hurled murderous insults at one another; their officials engaged in a war of 
words; they recruited and trained effective military forces; and they inflicted damage on 
one another using proxies. While this does not make their enmity unique, it necessitates 
a deeper look into their hostility toward one another so as to understand how their 
conflict shaped each other’s perspectives and policies.  
There are some similarities to the Cold War, in which the United States and the 
Soviet Union cast each other as an existential threat that justified the investment of 
massive resources into continuous war readiness, as well as engagement in nuclear 
brinkmanship. Unlike the superpowers’ stand-off, however, the origins of the Israeli-
Iranian conflict are not as evident. Theirs is not a competition to extend their territorial 
and ideological hegemony to the same geographical space.296 In fact, as many 
commentators have noted, the two countries have no significant overlapping strategic 
interests.297 Moreover, they share an animosity to Sunni terrorist organizations, 
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including Al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which could have, at 
least theoretically, provided a basis for strategic coordination. 
It is notable too that their enmity has been largely asymmetrical. Each country 
has engaged in vilifying the other, but this has rarely occurred with the same intensity. 
The same is true for their leaderships’ policy focus. Israel’s fear of Iran penetrates 
deeper into its policymaking than Iran’s concern with Israel, even though only Israel 
possesses nuclear weapons capability.  
This chapter examines how Israel’s foreign policy evolved from viewing Iran as a 
peripheral threat to treating it as a primary strategic challenge. Building upon the history 
examined in Chapter 2, I analyze how the conduct and messages of Israel’s political 
leaders and intellectual elites framed Iran as an existential threat to Israel’s nationhood. 
The basis for this study is the public record, in particular the words and media reports 
that comprise the narrative defining Iran’s threat to Israel. I submit that analysis of this 
material, composed for Israel’s domestic public and for Western international 
audiences, reveals how leaders generated the support for an Iranian threat narrative 
built in larger part upon a social and political construct than upon a realistic threat of 
annihilation. 
As a preliminary matter, it is curious that there is no consensus on the origins of 
the Israeli-Iranian “cold war.” Some Israeli experts have sought to identify an event that 
marked the beginning.298 This effort may stem from the reluctance of Israelis to 
recognize that all cooperative ventures between the two countries had ended. Thus, 
they sought to identify a transformative moment. The obvious choice was the Islamic 
                                                        
298 In formal and informal discussions over the course of this project, answers varied. 
Many cited the 1979 Revolution, while others listed the resurgence of the nuclear 
program in the 1990s. Others declined to give dates, noting instead that Iran’s 
“ideology” made conflict with Israel inevitable. 
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Revolution’s installation of a theocracy avowedly dedicated to the destruction of Israel. 
Although belied by the arms sales during the Iran-Iraq war, this explanation has gained 
acceptance over time as the hostility of Israel toward Iran has intensified and memories 
have faded. As a transformative explanation, however, it relies upon words and excludes 
behavior. As the previous chapter details, although the Islamic Republic’s first Supreme 
Leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, excoriated Israel for supporting the Shah and oppressing 
the Palestinians, he also readily accepted its military assistance in his war against Iraq.299 
While the Ayatollah considered the Jewish State to be a foe, he did not see it as much of 
a threat as the hostile Sunni-led Arab nation equipped with a powerful military situated 
along Iran’s western border. Moreover, Israeli leaders also calculated that Iran was less 
threatening than Iraq in their decision to provide assistance to a country led by a ruler 
publicly calling for its destruction. To be sure, the Islamic Revolution signaled a dramatic 
change in the status quo and created uncertainty about the future, but arguably the 
strategic concerns that had brought the two nations together still existed.  
 It is questionable whether there is value in finding the historical moment,300 but 
it is notable that the candidates involve an action or threat against Israel attributed to 
Iran. For example, some experts point to bombings perpetrated by Iran-supported 
surrogates, singling out such high-profile attacks as the 1992 bombing of the Israeli 
Embassy in Argentina or the 1994 bombing of the Asociacion Mutual Israelita Argentina 
building. Others offer a vaguer explanation, suggesting a gradual deterioration in 
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relations following the Islamic Revolution.301 One influential actor cited Iran’s decision to 
train and supply Hezbollah and Amal forces in Lebanon beginning in the 1980s.302 Others 
argue that the permanent severance of a relationship came with Iran’s resurrection of 
its nuclear program in the early 1990s.303 One Israeli investigative journalist argues that 
the enmity predates the nuclear revelations. Still others claim that the 2006 Lebanon 
War and subsequent events served as a “wake up call” for Israelis to the secret long war 
Israel had been fighting with Iran over the course of several decades. 304 This would 
require a rethinking of the modern history of Iran and the State of Israel.  
Iran’s post-Revolutionary words and deeds indisputably represent a break with 
its past policies regardless of the particular moment. More significant to understanding 
the future course of their confrontational posture are the reasons for the hostility. There 
are two notable extant academic theories that identify the forces instigating the 
antagonism. One advanced by Trita Parsi holds that the convergence in 1991 of the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union and the American-led defeat of Saddam Hussein caused 
Israel to restructure its threat perception.305 The second is Haggai Ram’s psychology-
based argument that fear of Iran emerged when Israel’s Ashkenazi Jewish majority 
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perceived a threat to their power from the non-European Mizrachi Jews. Ram maintains 
that the Ashkenazi establishment projected their fear of losing power onto Iran.306 For 
our purposes, his reasoning is less important than the idea that the conflict originated 
within Israelis’ collective psyche rather than with specific actions taken by Iran.  
 I believe that while both scholars contribute to our understanding, neither 
provides a full explanation. Parsi correctly identifies that the early 1990s were a key 
turning point for Israel’s framing of its security concerns both regionally and specifically 
vis-à-vis Iran. Ram’s argument that fear, rather than rational strategic thinking, was a 
principal driver of Israelis’ decision to identify Iran as a top security threat also has 
merit. The missing element in the discussion is how each nation’s leader operating 
within his internal political and cultural frameworks constructed a narrative of the 
“other” as a potential combatant. This characterization then drove each leader’s 
development of national foreign policy.  
II. The Emergence of the Threat Narrative 
 
A. Emergence of the Threat Narrative  
 
 Despite Israeli leadership’s disappointment that the Iran-Iraq War had ended, 
the end of hostilities received little attention among Israelis, although it raised 
considerable uncertainty about the future. Remarkably, a war that had lasted eight 
years and caused millions of casualties had little effect on Israelis’ daily lives. The 
disclosure of Israeli weapons sales to Iran in the middle of the war caused a minor stir 
but no public debate over the wisdom of the decision. Defense Minister Rabin had called 
the conflict between Iran and Iraq “a balance of threat,” in which the best outcome for 
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Israel would be a “no win situation.”307 Although neither side won, the end of fighting 
could mean the end of the distraction that kept them from targeting Israel.  
 One reason the war’s end was peripheral to Israeli concerns was that Israelis 
were far more preoccupied with the security challenges within and along their borders. 
The initiation of the first Palestinian Intifada in December 1987, a year before the end of 
the Iran-Iraq War, surprised most Israelis. Beginning as a leaderless and disorganized 
uprising, it grew into a sustained campaign of civil disobedience, public protest, and, 
eventually, acts of violence. It disrupted Israeli life for four years. Importantly, it created 
an immediate and imminent sense of personal insecurity among Israelis who felt they 
could at any moment be a victim of a random terrorist attack. 
At the same time, the Israeli army was still engaged in military operations in 
South Lebanon. Israel had inserted itself into the Lebanese Civil War in 1982 when it 
invaded and occupied southern Lebanon seeking to root out Palestinian Liberation 
Organization (PLO) operations there. It continued its advance northward, stopping just 
short of the capital Beirut. Although by the late 1980s the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) 
had withdrawn to a small strip of land along Israel’s northern border, it was still an 
occupying force.308 Together with its ally the South Lebanese Army, a Christian militia, 
the IDF had control over nearly 100,000 Lebanese civilians, who were predominantly 
Shiite Muslims.309 Although the IDF had been originally welcomed as liberators upon 
arrival in 1982, their sustained presence and apparent disregard for religious customs 
sparked resistance. This opened a new front of confrontation with armed organizations 
                                                        
307 Sobhani, The Pragmatic Entente: Israeli-Iranian Relations, 1948-1988, 149. 
308 This occupation served two purposes: to root out Palestinian resistance that might 
threaten Israel and to provide a buffer zone between Israel and the continuing civil war 
in northern Lebanon.  
309 Gal Luft, ‘Israel’s Security Zone in Lebanon - A Tragedy?’, Middle East Quarterly, 1 
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such as Amal and Hezbollah.310 In November 1988, amidst this turmoil, Israel held 
national elections in which Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and his Likud Party narrowly 
held on to power by winning a razor-thin plurality.311  
Israel was thus not paying much attention to developments in Iran at this time. 
On June 3, 1989, less than a year after the end of the war with Iraq, the Islamic 
Republic’s Supreme Leader and founder Ayatollah Khomeini died. Knowing that 
Khomeini was in declining health, officials had prepared a succession plan that called for 
the elevation of President Ali Khamenei to the position of Supreme Leader.312 In 
elections held the following month, voters chose Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani to replace 
Khamenei as president.313 Initially, Israelis had no reason to see the change in the 
leaders’ identities as a significant shift in Iran’s policies or attitudes toward Israel. They 
knew Khamenei to be a fiercely hardline cleric, who shared the conservatism of 
Khomeini.314  
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This changed when they learned of Iran’s plans to convene a “terror summit,” to 
which it would invite representatives of Fatah, Hezbollah, Amal, and the Popular Front 
for the Liberation of Palestine. Israeli officials feared that the Tehran gathering with the 
new Supreme Leader aimed to formulate a strategy for confronting Israel. The gathering 
prompted predictions in the press of a coming “terror wave” against Israel.315  
Iran, however, was sending confusing signals. While the Supreme Leader planned 
to convene a terror summit, President Rafsanjani called for improved relations with the 
West. What did it mean for the religious leader to strategize on the use of terrorism 
while the elected leader signaled an interest in improving the nation’s international 
standing? Israeli officials chose to explore the potential for reestablishing cooperation 
with Iran based upon a mutual enemy strategy. Iran still feared Iraq, believing that 
Saddam Hussein was continuing to stockpile chemical and biological weapons. Israeli 
officials, too, suspected Saddam’s hostile intentions, believing that he might someday 
decide to attack their country. Thus, according to Israel’s security and political 
establishment, including elements of the country’s political right, Israel would benefit 
from Iran’s normalization of relations with the West. Such a development would provide 
Israel with a modicum of protection from Iraq while providing Israel’s allies with 
leverage to restrain Iranian aggression. As the Jerusalem Post, a reliable indicator of 
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right-wing sentiment in Israel, editorialized, “A strong, stable Iran is the best available 
antidote to Iraqi threats.”316 
Israel’s decision made more sense once it emerged that Israel had not actually 
severed all ties with Iran. In December 1989, the U.S. State Department revealed that 
Israel had quietly resumed purchasing oil from Iran. The deal, arranged by Uri Lubrani, 
an Israeli Defense Ministry official who had been head of mission in Tehran during the 
last days of the Shah, meant that the two countries were continuing the tacit economic 
cooperation they had developed during the war. The strategy also enabled Israelis to 
hope that they could secure Iran’s help in facilitating the release of IDF hostages being 
held in Lebanon by Hezbollah and Amal.  
 The disclosure of the oil sale produced different public narratives for different 
audiences. Iranian elites wanted the world to know of its enduring enmity toward Israel. 
The Tehran Times, Iran’s English daily, ran an inflammatory story decrying the sale of oil 
to the Zionists and pledging that “enmity will continue as long as this cancer exists in the 
heartland of the Islamic Land.”317 By contrast, Israeli leaders cited the sales as evidence 
of a difference between Iran’s public rhetoric and strategic interests. Defense Minister 
Rabin implied that the only barrier to economic cooperation with Iran was the latter’s 
attitude, which could be surmounted. He did not think that Iran’s boycott of Israeli 
products would mean that they would refuse to use Israeli weapons.318 Significantly, he 
did not voice concern that Iran might someday use these weapons against Israel. 
 As the twentieth century entered its final decade, the public enmity between 
Israel and Iran was asymmetrical. Iran’s rhetoric was far more belligerent, but its 
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strategic interests did not appear to include initiating active confrontation with Israel. 
For Israel, engaged with other foes, Iran did not merit a narrative. Rather, there 
remained the hope that, despite Iran’s rhetoric, there might be avenues of cooperation 
for the mutual benefit of the two nations. 
B. Defining Iran as the Enemy 
 
i. Launching the Narrative 
 
 The Iranian threat narrative entered a new phase on January 20, 1993.319 On that 
day, a tendentious public exchange by Israel’s highest officials indicated that all hope of 
cooperation between Israel and Iran was over. The drama began when Labor Minister 
Ephraim Sneh320 rose in the Knesset to pose a parliamentary question about Iran to 
Prime Minister Rabin. This question designated Iran as a concern separate and apart 
from the other states of the region, implying that Iran had become one of Israel’s most 
disconcerting adversaries, which deserved prioritization among the nation’s security 
threats.  
Notably, Sneh became the first Israeli government official to use the phrase 
“existential threat” ( איום קיומי ) to describe the magnitude of the danger posed by Iran. 
Sneh methodically outlined a case against Iran as an enemy that Israel “can’t ignore.” He 
identified three characteristics that made the country a danger to Israel: its ideology, its 
efforts to spread its influence regionally and globally, and its desire to acquire weapons 
of mass destruction. In support of the latter, he cited statements made by CIA director 
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Robert Gates. Finally, Sneh raised the issue of Israel’s newly discovered vulnerability by 
invoking the memory of Saddam’s cruise missile attacks as evidence of what a remote 
but dangerous tyrant with a “lack of inhibition” can do to Israel. Addressing the Iran 
threat, he maintained, went beyond economic concerns: “To us, this is not a matter of 
oil, it is a matter of blood.”321 
The Prime Minister’s response did not challenge Sneh’s claims, although he 
sounded a more cautious note. He too believed that Iran was both pursuing purchase of 
nuclear weapons and beginning to develop its own nuclear industry. He characterized 
the danger as representing a medium-to-long-term threat. While he acknowledged that 
Iran held the potential to be more dangerous than Iraq, he added a caveat. He noted 
that while Israel was right to be concerned about these developments, it should not 
allow Iran to inhibit Israel’s ultimate foreign policy goal of advancing the cause of 
regional peace.322 
Rabin’s Knesset speech represented a change in his public position as an 
advocate for engagement with Iran. In 1987, Rabin had portrayed Iran as a natural 
geopolitical ally of Israel.323 Two years later, he defended Israel’s decision to do business 
with Iran following disclosure of Israel’s secret oil purchases.324 While recent 
developments suggested that present interaction between the two countries was 
politically inadvisable, Rabin also appeared to be foreclosing future engagement. 
                                                        
321 ‘54th Meeting of the 13th Knesset’, 20 January 1993, Knesset Transcripts. 
322 ‘54th Meeting of the 13th Knesset’. 
323 Sobhani, The Pragmatic Entente: Israeli-Iranian Relations, 1948-1988; Victor 
Ostrovsky, By Way of Deception: The Making of a Mossad Officer (Scottsdale, AZ: 
Wilshire Press Inc., 2002); Segev, The Iranian Triangle; Trita Parsi, ‘Israel-Iranian 
Relations Assessed: Strategic Competition from the Power Cycle Perspective’, Iranian 
Studies 38, no. 2 (1 June 2005): 247–69. 
324 Not only did Rabin confirm the sale of oil to Iran, he went further by suggesting that 
the only thing preventing further sales to the Iranians, including weaponry, was Iran’s 
ideological opposition to using Israeli materials unless absolutely necessary. Makovsky, 
‘Rabin: Arms Sales Hurt by Global Peace’. 
 152 
Although he admitted the threat from Iran was not imminent, he nonetheless prioritized 
it in Israel’s security matrix.325 Iran was no longer peripheral to Israel’s existence. Yossi 
Alpher later observed that Rabin’s shift in tone signaled an abandonment of what Alpher 
called Israel’s “Periphery nostalgia.”326 
The policy change implied a different depiction of Iranian society. Israelis should 
no longer picture Iran as a multi-polar society in which not all elements of its 
government shared the religious fervor of the clerical elite. According to Trita Parsi, after 
1992 the foreign policy of Israel’s ruling Labor Party rejected the presence of a 
“moderate” Iranian political faction.327 Moreover, the party line associated Iran’s pursuit 
of weapons of mass destruction with its Islamic ideology. This portrait of a theocracy 
with nuclear ambitions was incompatible with the possibility of pursuing diplomatic 
solutions. From this followed the non-debatable proposition that Israel was the 
intended target of Iran’s nuclear weapons. As Rabin later explained, “Iraq tried to 
develop nuclear weapons. Iran is trying to do this. Against whom, if not against 
Israel?”328  
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While Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons made news, the pivot from Iraq to Iran 
as a major threat to Israel did not garner significant public concern. Sneh and Rabin 
clearly identified a threat, but otherwise offered confusing details as to why that threat 
mattered. Moreover, their reasons for advancing the new narrative remained opaque. 
Even a decade later, Sneh offered no further clarification. In his 2004 book, Navigating 
Perilous Waters: An Israeli Strategy for Peace and Security, he characterized his Knesset 
speech as the moment that first “placed this danger on Israel’s national agenda” and 
argued that the Iran of 1993 was the “most salient strategic threat to Israel’s 
existence.”329 Yet he failed to explain what prompted his action.  
When asked again in 2015 for such an explanation, Sneh claimed that he had felt 
a duty to bring the issue to the attention of the Israeli public. He elaborated by recalling 
how, as a field commander in South Lebanon in the early 1980s, he had witnessed the 
influence of Iran in supporting Shiite resistance against the Israeli occupation. He 
explained how in 1982 he was particularly disturbed to witness Iran’s role in helping 
terrorists establish a base for guerilla attacks against Israel.330 After becoming a member 
of the Knesset and serving on the Intelligence Subcommittee of the Defense and Foreign 
Affairs Committee, he read intelligence reports that led him to conclude that Iran was an 
unrecognized growing threat to Israel. By January 1993, he felt compelled to issue a 
warning.331 Sneh indicated that he believed that Rabin’s presence in the Knesset that 
day and his decision to validate Sneh’s concerns contributed to raising the profile of the 
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Iran threat.332 This, then, was the moment that the Prime Minister, who was serving as 
his own Defense Minister, adopted the alarmist position from which he did not retreat 
during the remainder of his time in office.  
Although few noticed, Rabin differed from Sneh in his understanding of the 
primary danger. For Rabin, the threat lay primarily in Iran’s insidious support of 
terrorism. While he agreed that Iran was targeting Israel, its actions also represented a 
direct threat to the international community. Thus, following the reelection of Akbar 
Hashemi Rafsanjani as Iran’s president, Rabin declared that Iran was a global danger.333 
In a meeting of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense subcommittee, he added that 
Iran’s ideologically driven expansionist aims included establishing a “terrorist 
infrastructure in Europe.” This, he claimed, made Iran a unique foe since “even the 
Palestinian organizations never possessed such a ramified international infrastructure of 
terror.”334  
For Rabin, the terrorism threat went beyond targeting Israel. He claimed that 
Iran harbored “imperialist aspirations” and thus it sought to export its “Khomeinist 
ideology.” This ascribed to Iranian leaders an ambitiously subversive agenda. According 
to Rabin, Iran would not seek to overthrow governments, but to “adapt its message to 
the local conditions and character of the society.”335 It could thereby strategically extend 
its influence without investing in armed opposition. It could avoid being faulted for 
disrespecting a nation’s sovereignty while working to undermine it.  
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While Rabin and Sneh identified the same enemy, which they agreed could 
become an existential threat to Israel, they appeared to disagree on the means, and 
likely the timetable, for achieving the intended harm. 
ii. The Debate 
 
 The 1993 Knesset colloquy raised an issue it did not settle. Fifteen months later, 
Rabin responded to a similar question about the relative danger posed by Iraq and Iran 
with the same answer but slightly different reasoning. He asserted, “No doubt I place 
more importance on Iran because it is the source of spreading extremist fundamentalist 
movements all over. They endanger all the moderate regimes in the Arab world.”336 As a 
consequence of directing attention to Iran, Rabin and his military establishment 
concluded that one method by which Iran was targeting Israel was by using its influence 
to disrupt Israeli efforts to establish a dialogue with Arab states.337 In voicing his 
concern, Rabin did not mention Iran’s nuclear program.  
Rabin did not advance a specific Iran policy, but rather used Iran’s threat to 
justify his overall foreign policy objectives. By seeking to make peace with Israel’s Arab 
neighbors, Rabin reasoned that Israel would neutralize the Iranian threat. The peace 
imagined by Rabin would reduce the appeal of Iran’s revolutionary ideology in Arab 
states; it would weaken the connections between Iran, a non-Arab nation, and Arab 
terrorist organizations. If Israel could defuse the tension with those living within and 
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along its borders, Iran would not have a receptive audience for its belligerent, anti-Israel 
rhetoric. 
Sneh, who had positioned himself as the most hawkish of Iran hawks, did not 
entirely agree with this assessment. While he concurred that the Iranian threat gave 
urgency to the Arab issue, he did not believe that an Israeli-Arab peace accord would 
fully resolve the Iranian threat. Sneh saw the advantage of a quick peace with the Arabs 
as enabling Israel to redirect its full attention to Iran, where a future nuclear conflict 
loomed.338 Whereas Rabin saw Iran as engaged in spreading its revolution through 
rhetoric and strategic assistance that included a threat to Israel, Sneh saw Iran as 
targeting Israel. For Sneh, resolving the Arab threat was essential for preventing Iran 
from arming its Arab allies and non-state terrorists with non-conventional weapons.  
Rabin pursued his version of policy by working quietly with his Foreign Minister 
Shimon Peres in 1994 to set up what they called the “Peace in the Middle East 
Department.”339 They tasked it with leading an international diplomatic campaign 
against Iran by portraying the country as a globally destabilizing force driven by fanatical 
Shiite fundamentalism. Their goal was to isolate Iran from the international 
community.340 They reportedly attached great significance to the new initiative. Typical 
of the new narrative was a newspaper account describing Iran as “the greatest risk Israel 
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has ever faced,” and explaining how Iran was a global menace and a destabilizing force 
for the entire region.341  
 This narrative did not meet with universal acceptance. Skeptics took issue with 
both the rhetoric and the portrayal of the Iranian threat. Rabin’s concern for Iran 
generated extensive debate in the military and intelligence establishments, as well as in 
the academic community. Since analysts had up to that point largely ignored or 
overlooked Iran as a priority threat, they were entering new policy territory. They 
recognized that the Iranian military buildup, which was no longer currently preoccupied 
with waging war, raised troubling questions regarding the regime’s intent.342 Still, not 
everyone viewed this development as representing a significant threat to Israel.  
 In particular, military and intelligence officials worried that the increase in the 
rhetorical intensity portraying Iran as a danger could become a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
Chief among the skeptics was Ehud Barak, who had become IDF Chief of Staff in 1991. 
He sought to scale back public discussion of the Iranian issue,343 reportedly instructing 
his generals to refrain from publicly discussing Iran’s nuclear effort. He feared that 
speculation about the nature of the program would fuel perceptions of potential risk 
unsupported by military or intelligence assessments. The annual intelligence assessment 
for 1993-1994 submitted to the chief of the general staff did not list Iran among the 
direct threats facing Israel.344  
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Independent analysts and commentators also expressed doubts about Rabin’s 
Iran rhetoric. One important voice at the time, Ephraim Kam, then a researcher at Tel 
Aviv University’s Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies,345 contradicted many of the 
assertions of the Labor government based upon a close inspection of Iran’s economy 
and society. Writing in a 1993-94 report, Kam characterized the threat as “of very 
limited scope and nature.” 346 He explained that Iran’s military had limited technological 
capability and that without surface-to-surface missiles capable of reaching Israel, Iran 
could not pose a direct military theat. Importantly, he challenged claims about Iranian 
intentions. He maintained that Iran perceived itself as facing danger from its immediate 
neighbors and thus was not concerned with Israel. Moreover, Iran was “a decade away, 
if at all, from obtaining [nuclear] capabilities.”347  
 Kam’s analysis was significant because it examined conditions in Iran rather than 
simply ascribing motives to its leaders. He saw Iran’s serious economic problems and 
social unrest as motivating Iran’s leaders to moderate the nation’s foreign policy. He 
distinguished Iran’s nuclear ambitions from those of Iraq, implying that Iran would not 
be driven to join the nuclear club at any cost. He pointed out that Tehran’s investment 
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in nuclear development was still far below what it had been under the Shah in the 1970s 
and 40 percent below Iraq’s spending on its nuclear development program.348  
 Political analysts also challenged Rabin’s threat narrative. Dore Gold, who would 
later become a top advisor to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu,349 penned an 
editorial in the Jerusalem Post challenging the “virtual left-right consensus targeting Iran 
as one of the major Israeli strategic challenges in the 1990s.”350 In his column, entitled 
“Putting the Iranian Threat in Perspective,” he argued that a “military clash between the 
two countries is not inevitable.” Like Ehud Barak, he saw a threat narrative as dangerous 
because “the talk of the Iranian threat might become a self-fulfilling prophecy.” Iran, he 
reminded readers, takes note of Israeli media, and that a “recent spate of articles in the 
local press has been filled with lists of Iranian weapons acquisitions.” He also agreed 
with Barak’s assessment that, while Tehran’s support of terrorism threatens Israel, it 
“does not at this stage constitute a threat to Israel’s civilian rear.”351  
iii. Toward Securitization 
 
Ultimately, the Rabin-Sneh narrative proved salient, most likely because it 
appeared to win over the skeptics. One prominent public change came from Ehud Barak. 
Speaking to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee in August 1994, Barak 
described Iran as Israel’s “key threat right now,” stressing that it was continuing to 
pursue a nuclear capability that included developing missiles with sufficient range to 
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349 At the time, Gold was serving as director of the U.S. Foreign and Defense Policy 
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reach Israel. He also echoed the Sneh argument that concluding a separate peace with 
Israel’s neighboring Arab states would not mitigate the threat from the periphery.352  
 A second official reversal came from former skeptic Uri Saguy, Chief of Israeli 
Military Intelligence.353 An October 1994 Jerusalem Post profile of Saguy and Ya’acov 
Ami-Dror, the right-wing head of the research division of military intelligence, described 
the two men as agreeing on Iran as a serious threat to Israel. The story noted that while 
the two men opposed one another on most threat assessments and responses, they 
totally agreed that Iran was a key security concern and a primary driver of the spread of 
Islamic fundamentalism across the region.354  
Together, Barak and Saguy offered a compelling picture of the Iran threat. By 
juxtaposing Iran’s “nuclear capability” with its missile development program, Barak 
highlighted Israel’s vulnerability. By indicating that the threat narrative transcended 
partisan ideology, Saguy cast the narrative as a significant policy rather than a mere 
political concern. Moreover, since both messengers were members of the military 
establishment, they commanded public and media attention. The military is considered 
one of, if not the most, trustworthy and revered institutions in Israel.  
Israel’s political leaders now had a fully formed narrative casting Iran as an 
existential threat. While most Israeli citizens focused on recent Palestinian terrorist 
attacks and the loud public protests seeking to undermine the Israeli-Arab peace 
process,355 the Iran threat also secured a place on the political agenda.  
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Israel’s narrative both echoed new American concerns and contributed to the 
emerging United States policy regarding Iran and Iraq. The United States had abandoned 
balance of power politics in which Iran and Iraq countered one another in favor of a 
more confrontational approach that relied upon sanctions and threats of force. The 
Clinton administration called this policy “dual containment.” Under pressure from a 
Republican Congress to take a tougher approach to Iran, President Clinton signed 
Executive Order 12959 in 1995, which prohibited all U.S. trade with Iran.356 Congress 
went further and passed the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act dictating harsh penalties for 
foreign companies doing business in Iran.357 The coincidence of Israel’s intensified 
rhetoric and the United States’ sanctions led the Iranian leadership to accuse Israel of 
pressuring Washington to adopt sanctions.358  
Whether Israel had enlisted or joined the United States in a new Iran policy was 
less important than that the two countries shared a common narrative. 359 The threat 
narrative had several themes, although various interests disagreed on the details. These 
included: (1) Iran could not be trusted to tell the truth about its development of nuclear 
capacity, which was not limited to peaceful energy purposes; (2) the timetable for the 
development of nuclear weaponry was relatively short; (3) Israel would be the target of 
Iran’s deployment of a bomb; and (4) a response against Iran was imperative. 
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Iran’s insistence that its nuclear program was for civilian purposes enabled the 
narrators to portray Iran’s officials as dishonest. It set the stage for the two countries to 
argue that Iran would be technologically capable of covertly upgrading its facilities for 
bomb production. Iran could not credibly contradict a claim regarding its production 
timetable. The time by which Iran would produce its nuclear weapon would, in 
subsequent years, be the subject of numerous alarming predictions. Ironically, few 
would note that all of the prior predictions had proved incorrect.360 A January 1995 
article in The New York Times headlined “Iran May be Able to Build an Atomic Bomb in 5 
years” was one such example.361 Prior to its publication, most experts believed that Iran 
was at least a decade away from weapons production. In offering the accelerated 
prediction, the story omitted the fact that although Iran had acquired “dual use” 
technology, it had conducted no tests or taken any overt actions that could confirm it 
was building a bomb.  
While not all experts agreed that Iran would target Israel with its bomb, the 
importance of this claim to the narrative was that it ascribed indisputable intention to 
Iran’s leaders. Whether or not true, the idea of Israel as the target of Iran’s nuclear 
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ambitions added a sense of urgency. At a minimum, it implied that Iran intended to go 
to war with Israel. Although this trope would be repeated continuously over the years by 
politicians and “experts,” it had the least evidentiary support.362 Nearly two decades 
after the narrative’s introduction, during one of the innumerable debates in which Israel 
supporters questioned Iran’s willingness to suspend its nuclear program, Dr. Daniel 
Kurtzer, the S. Daniel Abraham Professor of Middle Eastern Policy Studies at Princeton 
University and former U.S. Ambassador to Israel and Egypt, summed up the skeptics 
position: “If Iran developed a bomb, it would not waste it on Israel.”363 
The least defined but most emphatic narrative theme was the imperative for 
action. What should something more than talk but less than war look like? Hawkish 
politicians in Israel publicly speculated about the feasibility of a pre-emptive strike on 
Iran similar to the 1981 Israeli bombing of the Iraqi Osirak reactor.364 To those invested 
in the threat narrative, nuclear deterrence offered no strategic value since Iran could 
not be trusted to act rationally, and Israel would not admit to having a nuclear weapon. 
The imposition of economic sanctions on Iran offered the optics of an immediate 
response, as well as the opportunity to keep the Iran threat on the policy agenda. 
American politicians could demonstrate their support for Israel and curry favor with 
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Jewish constituents by proposing to toughen sanctions. The United States could exploit 
consideration of a United Nations resolution to enlist new supporters, indirectly 
providing Israel with new allies. The problem for Israeli hawks, however, was that the 
sanctions would not reduce the threat as they described it. They needed to eliminate 
the threat. 
 For Israeli officials, crafting a complete narrative to justify putting Iran’s nuclear 
bomb at the top of the list of its security priorities was easier than gaining public 
traction. The debate over Rabin’s Arab peace initiative had turned ugly, with his enemies 
resorting to inflammatory personal attacks. With the public’s attention focused on 
immediate concerns, it was difficult for the Iran narrative to be heard or to be 
considered anything other than a distractive ploy. Rabin’s assassination by a far-right 
Jewish extremist on November 4, 1995 did not materially change the narrative.365 When 
Foreign Minister Shimon Peres succeeded Rabin, he added hawkish flourishes and made 
more frequent use of the international stage to draw attention to Iran.366  
In early 1996, Peres doubled down on the threat narrative by expanding the 
danger to include Iran’s support of “terrorism, fundamentalism, and subversion.”367 
Calling upon European leaders to stop “flirting” with Iran, he became the first Israeli 
prime minister publicly to compare Iran to Nazi Germany.368 Significantly, he issued 
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these denunciations at a joint anti-terror conference in Egypt, which was officially called 
the Peacemakers’ Summit. Peres’ emphasis on Iran’s connection with terrorism 
increased the immediacy of the security threat to Israel. It also added a justification for 
an active Israeli response. Shortly after the summit, Peres warned the Iranians that 
Israel would retaliate with air strikes for any terrorist attacks in Israel or against Jewish 
targets abroad. The Iran threat had now become concrete. 
III. The Entrenchment of the Threat Narrative 
 
One indication that the Iran threat narrative had not penetrated public 
consciousness was its absence from public discourse in the 1996 Israeli national 
elections between Shimon Peres and Likud challenger Benjamin Netanyahu. There are 
several explanations for this. To be sure, their disagreement over Labor’s pursuit of a 
peace process with the Palestinians and the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993 
dominated the election, while they did not materially disagree over the threat posed by 
Iran. Yet the failure to mention the issue indicated that it remained a concern of the 
elites. Both men were hawks, but Netanyahu had taken slightly longer to convert. 
In his first book, A Place Among the Nations, published in 1993, Netanyahu 
barely mentioned Iran in his rundown of Israel’s adversaries. Despite Saddam’s defeat in 
the First Gulf War, he continued to insist that Iraq was the primary nuclear threat in the 
region. Netanyahu argued that “Saddam’s Iraq was, and still is, a menace of the sort that 
has previously only been the stuff of suspense novels: a terrorist state with a leader 
seeking to graduate from car bombs to nuclear bombs.”369 By 1995, however, 
Netanyahu had changed his position and adopted Prime Minister Rabin’s narrative. He 
took to the floor of the Knesset to deliver a lengthy speech indicating his agreement 
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with Rabin’s assessment of the Iran threat. Netanyahu colorfully warned of a coming 
“Islamic wave” that will flow over the Middle East if outside forces do not act swiftly to 
prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons capability.370 The speech was not partisan, 
and it received validation from Labor member Raanan Cohen, who added that World 
War II will look like “child’s play” in comparison to the “new world war that Iran will 
lead.”371  
In his second book, published in 1995, Netanyahu devoted a chapter to the 
looming nuclear crisis.372 While in full agreement with the government’s assessment, 
Netanyahu’s discussion raised two notable points. First, he effectively admitted publicly 
that Israel possessed nuclear weapons when he argued that Iran had become the 
primary threat to Israel’s nuclear monopoly in the Middle East. The admission was also 
inherent in Netanyahu’s questioning the value of relying upon a strategy of deterrence 
rather than a preemptive strike. He claimed that, “There is no way of knowing whether 
Iran can be deterred from using its nuclear arsenal, as the Soviet Union was for more 
than four decades, or whether it would actually be willing one day to plunge the world 
into the abyss.”373 Additionally, Netanyahu skillfully conflated the issue of terrorism and 
nuclear weapons. In what he called a catastrophic ”best-case scenario,” Netanyahu 
described a situation in which Israel would experience a significant increase in 
conventional terrorism perpetrated by Iranian-supported groups, who would be 
protected from Israeli reprisals by Iran’s nuclear arsenal. 374 In other respects, 
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Netanyahu echoed more familiar themes: Iranian leaders could not be trusted; the 
intended target of their nuclear weapons program was Israel; and Iran’s acquisition of a 
bomb was imminent. Looking toward the future, he gave Israel less time to deal with the 
looming Iranian threat than most previous assessments, offering an accelerated 
timetable claiming that a weapon was only three to five years from completion.375 
Notwithstanding their agreement, it is notable that neither candidate in the 1996 
elections saw fit to discuss Iran as a looming security threat.376 It is unlikely that their 
silence was an oversight but rather a reflection of public disinterest. There was no 
evidence that the public saw the Iran threat as a priority. While a pre-election poll 
registered voters’ concern for terrorism, pollsters did not inquire about voters’ attitudes 
toward Iran, its nuclear program, or their perception of the threat posed by the country. 
377 Unsurprisingly, Iran did not see the election outcome, in which Netanyahu narrowly 
defeated Peres, as consequential.378 Iranian media called the two men “two sides of the 
same coin.”379 
 After his victory Netanyahu revived his Iran narrative. He raised the issue in a 
visit to the United States seeking to reaffirm the strong Israeli-American partnership. 
This appeared to be a strategic move with dual purpose. It highlighted the two 
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countries’ shared concern regarding Iran while overshadowing the United States’ 
opposition to Netanyahu’s abandonment of his predecessors’ peace initiatives. In a 
speech to a joint session of Congress, Netanyahu employed remarkably strong language 
in describing the Iranian regime as “the most dangerous” of the “unreconstructed 
dictatorships whose governmental creed is based on tyranny and intimidation.” Iran, he 
maintained, is a country that had “wed a cruel despotism to a fanatic militancy,” and 
warned “if this regime, or its despotic neighbor Iraq, were to acquire nuclear weapons, 
this could presage catastrophic consequences, not only for my country, and not only for 
the Middle East, but for all mankind.”380 Netanyahu’s audience extended beyond 
American politicians. Instilling Israel’s fear of Iran in American Jewry enabled him to seek 
their support for his leadership even among those who disagreed with him on the peace 
process.  
 Upon his return from the United States, Netanyahu did not prioritize continued 
engagement in peace process negotiations.381 Instead, he focused his foreign policy 
pronouncements on Iran by repeating the message he had delivered to American 
politicians and world Jewry. Curiously, however, as he publicly promoted the idea of a 
preemptive strike, his allies were exploring a message change toward the Iranians. This 
new approach held that the Labor government had been too aggressive toward Iran and 
too soft on Syria.382 As a strategic matter, the focus on Syria enabled Netanyahu to 
oppose Rabin’s peace initiative. Rabin had linked the pursuit of an Arab peace to the 
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Iran threat. By decoupling Iran from peace negotiations with the Arabs, Netanyahu was 
indicating that his opposition to the peace process was stronger than his conviction 
about the immediacy of the Iran threat.  
 It is questionable whether Netanyahu’s policy modification was more than a 
tactical move. The Labor hardliners both noted and attacked his reticence to criticize 
Iran, pressing him to take a more confrontational approach.383 Developments in Iran had 
provided Netanyahu with the opportunity to modify the narrative if he chose to do so. In 
May 1997, the victory of Mohammad Khatami, an avowed reformer, in Iran’s 
presidential elections surprised the world. A few Israeli officials floated the idea of 
revising the narrative. For example, days after the election, Minister of Foreign Affairs 
David Levy claimed in a speech to the Israeli Parliament that “Israel has never 
determined that Iran is our enemy.” He expressed hope for a changed relationship, “We 
would be very happy to see Iran joining the regional efforts to lesson tension, stop 
terrorism, and search for ways of cooperation and peace.”384 Reports also surfaced that 
Netanyahu had authorized contacts with the Iranians to investigate the possibility of 
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starting a dialogue.385 Israel failed to seize this initiative, however, and in the end 
ignored the opportunity to modify the narrative of Iran as an Islamic theocracy in the 
grip of religious clerics committed to the destruction of Israel. Mirroring Iran’s response 
to Israel’s election the previous year, Israeli officials concluded that Khatami’s victory did 
not change anything.  
In contrast to Netanyahu, the hawks never wavered in their conviction that 
reconciliation with Iran would be dangerous for Israel. In advance of Khatami’s first 
major international interview on CNN in January 1998, Ephraim Sneh warned Israelis not 
to put too much stock in what the new president said since it would have no impact on 
decisions of either Iran’s ruling regime or its Supreme Leader.386 Following the interview, 
Foreign Ministry spokesman Aviv Shir-On added, “We did not find signs of conciliation or 
a desire for compromise in the Iranian president’s words…It does not appear from them 
that Iran’s position has changed.” 387 Netanyahu used the interview to rebut rumors 
about pursuing a policy reset. In a speech shortly afterwards, he amplified the nature of 
Iran’s threat to Israel by claiming that since the founding of the state, Israel had never 
faced a more concrete threat to its existence.388 The speech not only represented a stark 
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departure from the carefully phrased diplomatic language of his government ministers, 
it was also a full-throated return to the rhetoric of the Rabin government. 
The vehemence of Netanyahu’s rhetoric contrasted sharply with the 
international optimism that followed Khatami’s surprise election. While suspicion of 
Khatami’s ability to effect change was understandable, Netanyahu’s decision to adopt 
the hawks’ message about the new Iranian president signaled an unwillingness to 
explore new possibilities. Israel’s right-wing media reinforced this posture by running 
old news footage of hardline mullahs addressing crowds chanting “Death to Israel.” 
Israel’s actions gave Iran no room to change the narrative. Iran continued its nuclear 
development program, but there was no evidence to suggest that Iran was preparing to 
attack Israel.389  
IV. Lingering Uncertainty 
 
If anyone was watching the entrenchment process of the threat narrative, the 
election of Khatami would have highlighted the asymmetry in the rhetorical posture of 
each nation’s leaders toward the other. An observer might also wonder how far the fear 
of Iran’s potential nuclear capability had permeated into the consciousness of the Israeli 
public.  
Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran’s clerical leaders had included Israel 
among Iran’s enemies, charging it with oppressing Palestinians, illegally occupying 
Lebanon, and aligning itself with the United States, among other sins. By contrast, since 
1993 Israeli leaders had been crafting a narrative focused on instilling fear in Israelis that 
they were the intended victims of Iran’s nuclear weapons development program. The 
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continuous repetition of this narrative obscured its inherent problems: did Iran in fact 
have a weapons program; would it actually use such a weapon; and, as noted by Israeli 
skeptics when the narrative was first advanced, might it prove to be a self-fulfilling 
prophecy? 
Israelis were entitled to be the most incredulous of Iran’s denial that it was 
pursuing nuclear weapons since Israel never admitted to the open secret that it 
possessed such weapons. Moreover, there could be no proof or disproof of the 
ascription of intention to Iran’s leaders; and since few Israelis followed Iranian internal 
affairs, there was no educated debate regarding the claim. Most problematic, however, 
was whether calls for action against Iran would prompt the latter to escalate a conflict 
confined predominately to words.  
In the final two years of the twentieth century, three developments moved the 
hostilities beyond the rhetorical, increasing the stakes for both nations. By the century’s 
end, the nature of the Iran threat and Israelis’ perception of it remained surprisingly 
unsettled. The first development was a January 1998 story in the Jerusalem Post that 
claimed the paper had obtained documents definitively proving Iran had successfully 
acquired several nuclear warheads from Kazakhstan shortly after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union.390 The second was Iran’s testing of its first ballistic missile. Finally, political 
developments in Israel, including the 1999 ouster of Netanyahu as prime minister and 
the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon the following year, demonstrated the 
country’s vulnerability. 
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The story in the Jerusalem Post appeared credible. It included numerous specifics 
about the sale, including the price – $25 million – as well as the details of the smuggling 
operation through which the warheads reached Iran.391 Readers were not informed that 
the facts largely came from a 1992 Report by the American House of Representatives’ 
Republican Research Committee, which had by then been debunked by various 
experts.392 Israeli politicians also ignored the veracity of the claims as they insisted, using 
hyperbolic and fatalistic rhetoric, that the “evidence” validated Israeli fears and justified 
taking immediate action. Netanyahu castigated the international community for its 
indifference and suggested that it may already be too late to thwart Iran’s nuclear 
weapons and ballistic missile development.393 
Whether or not intended as provocation, Iran conducted a test of its first ballistic 
missile on July 22, 1998. It exploded 100 seconds into flight.394 Faced with a proverbial 
choice between reporting a glass as half-empty or half-full, the Israeli press interpreted 
the test as largely successful and a harbinger of a dark future. Barry Rubin, a prominent 
                                                        
391 The story of the weapons smuggling operation included references to Russian 
organized crime and Argentinian technicians. Steve Rodan, ‘Documents Obtained by 
“Jerusalem Post” Show: Iran Has Four Nuclear Bombs’, Jerusalem Post, 9 April 1998; 
Steve Rodan and Hillel Kuttler, ‘Iran Paid $25m. for Nuclear Weapons, Documents 
Show’, Jerusalem Post, 10 April 1998. 
392 See discussion of Republican House Research Committee Report, infra, Chapter 4. 
393 In a report to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee Netanyahu claimed 
that Israel was doing everything it could to stop Iran without specifying what this meant. 
Jay Bushinsky and Liat Collins, ‘PM: It May Be Too Late to Stop Iran, Iraq Nuclear Plans’, 
Jerusalem Post, 9 June 1998.  
394 There was some uncertainty at the time about whether the test of the Shahab-3 
missile, which was based on the North Korean No Dong missile, was a success or failure. 
U.S. government officials were unsure if the missile had exploded on its own – an 
indication of failure – or whether the Iranians had deliberately detonated the missile 
during its flight. Later assessments pointed toward the former. Iran attempted another 
test two years later, which again ended in failure. It took nearly five years for Iran to 
conduct a successful test of the Shahab-3 in June 2003. Gary Samore, Iran’s Strategic 
Weapons Programmes: A Net Assessment (Routledge, 2013); Steven Erlanger, 
‘Washington Casts Wary Eye at Missile Test’, The New York Times, 24 July 1998, sec. 
World, https://www.nytimes.com/1998/07/24/world/washington-casts-wary-eye-at-
missile-test.html. 
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Israeli academic and researcher, wrote in an opinion piece that “Iran’s successful launch 
of a medium-range missile last week makes assessing the Iran issue much more 
urgent.”395  
Although Iran never provided official reasons for the missile test, statements by 
government officials implied that one motivation was Iran’s fear of a potential Israeli 
attack. From Iran’s perspective, the test was part of an initiative to enhance its domestic 
military deterrence capability. Iran, too, could picture itself as a victim of foreign 
aggression. Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani voiced such concern in an interview 
with the Saudi Arabian daily al-Wasat, pointing out, “You would notice that no other 
country has been as bullied or threatened as Iran.” He continued, “Israel, for instance, 
menaces Iran more than it menaces any other country.” Mohammad Khatami 
emphasized Iranians’ concern for their safety by noting the salient fact that had largely 
gone unmentioned, namely that Israel possessed a stockpile of nuclear weapons. This, 
he claimed, made Israel the foremost threat to regional stability.396  
Predictably, Iran’s actions intensified the public rhetoric of Israeli officials, 
precipitating a war of words. Once again, Ephraim Sneh fired the first verbal salvo by 
declaring that it was time for Israel to consider a preemptive strike against Iran.397 As a 
member of the political minority, Sneh was not speaking for the government, which had 
thus far resisted such a specific proposal. Nevertheless, Sneh intended to elicit a 
response from Iran that would support his characterization of the country’s leaders as 
                                                        
395 Barry Rubin, ‘Iran’s Threat’, Jerusalem Post, 30 July 1998. 
396 Douglas Davis, ‘Iran: Military Buildup Is Needed to Counter Israel’, Jerusalem Post, 2 
August 1998. 
397 Jerusalem Post Staff and AP, ‘Iran Unveils Shihab-3 Missile. Has Plans for Longer-
Range Model’, Jerusalem Post, 27 September 1998.  
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dangerous. 398 He succeeded, but he also provoked significant pushback from Israeli 
critics.  
In response to Sneh, Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani promised Iran 
would respond in a “stunning way” if Israel attacked the Iranian nuclear reactor.399 
Additionally, however, officials in Netanyahu’s government, who were critical of Iran’s 
nuclear program, criticized Sneh’s rhetoric as one step too far. For example, Israeli 
Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai called them “redundant and harmful.”400 Ephraim 
Kam resurrected his concern that ill-conceived policies built upon rhetorical rather than 
evidentiary claims could become a self-fulfilling prophecy.401 He authored a report 
explaining how the perception of Iran in Israel was gradually overtaking the reality of the 
danger it actually posed. As he had in an earlier report, Kam disputed the hawks’ 
characterization of the threat by arguing that “Iran was a cause for concern, not alarm.” 
He also criticized Israeli leadership and its willingness to contribute – “not always with 
excessive wisdom” – to the perception that Iran is a significant enemy. This perception, 
he warned, will prove difficult to change, especially when so many Israeli leaders have 
publicly embraced a goal of trying to halt Iran’s weapons’ development efforts. Kam 
urged Israeli leaders to moderate their tone on Iran to demonstrate that Israel does not 
regard Iran as a primary enemy.402 
Kam’s arguments should have engendered debate among politicians who 
appeared largely to agree on the Iranian threat, but as he predicted, too many Israeli 
                                                        
398 Recalling this period, Sneh explained that his frustration at Israel’s failure to counter 
Iranian activities prompted his provocation. Interview with Ephraim Sneh. 
399 Liat Collins and Steve Rodan, ‘Mordechai: We Can Protect Our Citizens from Iran 
Threat’, Jerusalem Post, 28 September 1998. 
400 Collins and Rodan. 
401 See discussion of Ephraim Kam’s previous analysis infra. 
402 Ephraim Kam, ‘The Iranian Threat Cause for Concern, Not Alarm’, Strategic 
Assessment (Institute for National Security Studies, October 1998). 
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politicians from different parties had already invested in supporting the narrative. 
Despite many policy differences and mounting criticism of Netanyahu, few leaders were 
willing to risk the political price of disputing the existence of a threat resting on their 
constituents’ fears.  
Netanyahu, having collected too many critics, could no longer survive a vote of 
no confidence, and he was forced to call for elections.403 The Iran nuclear threat did not 
figure prominently in the issues that caused his downfall and made only cameo 
appearances in the election campaign. 404 Once again, the elections evinced that Iran 
was primarily a concern of Israel’s elites. Most citizens focused on the issues closer to 
home and their daily lives.  
Netanyahu lost the election to former IDF Chief of Staff Ehud Barak, who 
signaled that he did not share his predecessor’s fixation on Iran.405 Although he did not 
take the initiative to address the issue, shortly after his victory he responded to a direct 
question about Israel’s Iran policy by stating, “We are for a kind of a very cautious and 
careful approach to the Iranians.”406 He then equivocated in responding to a follow up 
question about what he considered the “main threats” to the existence of Israel. He 
notably omitted reference to Iran in his reply that Israel lives in a “very tough 
                                                        
403 Opponents disparaged his handling of the economy and the budget. Both proponents 
and opponents of Palestinian peace talks objected to his handling of negotiations. Many 
criticized the mounting death toll and Israel’s failure to achieve victory in southern 
Lebanon. 
404 One such mention concerned Iran’s sponsorship of terrorism, particularly its support 
of Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon. The cost and consequences of Israel’s continued 
occupation was a campaign issue. 
405 One of Barak’s major foreign policy initiatives involved overseeing Israel’s hasty 
withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000, ending eighteen years of Israeli presence in the 
country. 
406 As IDF Chief of Staff, Ehud Barak had converted to the hawkish perception of Iran, 
but he was not an outspoken advocate of greater confrontation. See discussion of 
Barak’s evolving views of Iran infra. 
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neighborhood.” He then pivoted to argue that Israel’s most urgent problem was 
renewing a stagnant economy.407 
The Barak government demonstrated its decision not to embrace the 
Netanyahu-Sneh Iran narrative by its muted reaction to Iran’s second ballistic missile 
test in July 2000. In a marked contrast to earlier claims that Iran intended to attack 
Israel, Director General of the Defense Ministry Amos Yaron maintained that Iran’s 
military development was understandable given their recent history. Choosing empathy 
over belligerence, he explained that “Iran developed these capabilities as a result of the 
lessons they had learned from the wars of the past, which is to say from its big war 
against Iraq. Iran didn’t develop this missile against the State of Israel.”408  
 After barely two years in office, Israeli politics unrelated to Iran brought down 
the government, forcing Barak to call for new elections.409 That year, both Israel and Iran 
held elections with sharply contrasting outcomes. Barak lost decisively to his Likud 
challenger, Ariel Sharon, signaling a rightward shift away from Barak’s pragmatism. 410 
Iranians re-elected President Mohammad Khatami in a landslide victory, giving him 77% 
                                                        
407 ‘Selected Press Statements by PM Barak during His Visit to London’, 23 November 
1999, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs Documents, 
http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/1999/Pages/Selected%20Press%20Statements%20by
%20PM%20Barak%20during%20his%20V.aspx. 
408 David Rudge, ‘Officials: Israel Not Iran’ Immediate Target’, Jerusalem Post, 17 July 
2000. 
409 Public dissatisfaction focused on immediate security concerns associated with Israel’s 
hasty retreat from Lebanon and the outbreak of the Second Intifada. Suzanne 
Goldenberg, ‘Barak Calls Early Election’, The Guardian, 29 November 2000, sec. World 
news, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/nov/29/israel. 
410 Sharon, a former military commander and Minister of Defense, had stirred 
controversy on numerous occasions. His provocative visit to the Temple Mount in 
Jerusalem reportedly provoked the second Palestinian Intifada. World leaders and Arab 
neighbors suspected his strategic judgment. As defense minister from 1981-1983 under 
Prime Minister Menachem Begin, Sharon directed Israel’s military operations in 
Lebanon, which included the massacres at Sabra and Shatila refugee camps. A 
commission convened to investigate the causes forced Sharon’s resignation by holding 
him responsible for not taking appropriate measures to prevent violence.  
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of the vote with 67% voter turnout.411 Sharon had shown little regard for world opinion, 
while Khatami’s reelection suggested Iranians wanted more global reengagement, 
including the possibility of negotiation and reconciliation with the West. Israelis again 
refused to acknowledge a change in Iran that might warrant a rethinking of their 
narrative.412  
V. Aftermath of September 11, 2001  
 
It is a trite understatement to say that the security profile of the world changed 
on September 11, 2001, when Sunni Muslim terrorists commandeered airplanes to 
attack targets in the United States. While the terrorists accorded Israel a relatively minor 
role in their justification for the attacks – and did not mention Iran – Israel used the 
occasion to highlight its own insecurity. 
 The attacks thrust terrorism to the top of the world’s threat agenda with the 
U.S. President’s declaration of a “Global War on Terror.” If non-state actors could inflict 
death and destruction in a surprise attack on the United States, no country could feel 
safe. If the previously unimaginable spectacle of flying airplanes into iconic American 
buildings could now be imagined, so too could a rogue nation providing nuclear 
weapons to terrorists willing to use them. 413 What was a catastrophic event in a large 
nation could be the cataclysmic destruction of a small state such as Israel. What might 
Muslim extremists do with a nuclear weapon? 
                                                        
411 ‘Iran Data Portal’, Iran Data Portal - Syracuse University, n.d., 
http://irandataportal.syr.edu/. 
412 Editorial Board, ‘No Win for Democracy in Iran’, Jerusalem Post, 10 June 2001. 
413 The United States used questionable intelligence to charge that Saddam Hussein’s 
program for developing weapons of mass destruction justified an invasion of the 
country. Evidence suggesting development or acquisition of nuclear material 
subsequently proved false. 
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In declaring common cause with the United States, Israel sought to enlist 
American assistance in a more aggressive policy toward Iran. To emphasize the danger 
of Muslim extremism in a singular concept, Israel had to ignore the distinction between 
Sunnis and Shias. It also needed the U.S. to recognize Iran as a greater threat than Iraq. 
To Israel’s disappointment, in the aftermath of the attacks, the Americans chose to 
focus on Afghanistan and Iraq.414 Moreover, Iran’s leaders quietly reached out to the 
United States to offer assistance in its fight against the Taliban in Afghanistan.415  
Notwithstanding the absence of evidence linking Iran with any of the 9/11 
events, Israeli leaders persevered in intensifying the Iran threat narrative.416 The newly 
revealed sense of insecurity introduced reasons for fear.417 It also presented 
opportunities to capitalize on the strain of anti-Muslim sentiment that was taking root in 
response to the terrorist attacks amongst listeners who were not yet acquainted with 
distinctions between Sunnis and Shiites or Arabs and Persians. Former Prime Minister 
Benjamin Netanyahu undertook a busy schedule of writing and speaking to reinvigorate 
the Iran nuclear threat narrative, in which he both offered familiar tropes and tried out 
new ones. He re-imagined the clash of civilizations in which Iran and its allies would 
“devour the West,”418 and he warned that a nuclear bomb was far more devastating 
                                                        
414 Later evidence would show Iraq had nothing to do with the 9/11 attacks. 
415 Iran funded the opposition of the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan to the Taliban 
government. 
416 Some Israeli officials worried that the attacks would distract the United States from 
more meaningful fights in the region. Defense Minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer criticized 
the U.S. for ignoring threats from Iran and Syria to build a wide coalition against Bin 
Laden. Gil Hoffman and AP, ‘Ben-Eliezer: United States Too Soft on Iran, Syria’, 
Jerusalem Post, 16 October 2001. 
417 Politicians from all parties participated in the threat intensification. For example, a 
leader of Shinui, a centrist liberal Zionist party, penned an opinion piece warning of the 
start of a new world war noting that “history is repeating itself.” Yosef (Tommy) Lapid, 
‘The Warning’, Jerusalem Post, 14 September 2001.  
418 Gil Hoffman, ‘Netanyahu: World Must Join to Crush Terror’, Jerusalem Post, 12 
September 2001. 
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than “300 tons of jet fuel.”419 Depending upon his audience, he compared Iran, Iranian 
ideology, or its revolutionary movement to Nazism420 or Communism.421 
 Prime Minister Sharon did not leave the narrative formation to Netanyahu, 
although he focused on Iran as “a center of terror.” Speaking at a press conference 
alongside British Prime Minister Tony Blair in November, Sharon emphasized the terror 
threat from Iran and Syria, while expressing support for the new American and British-
led campaign to combat global terrorism. He left the criticism of the Western powers to 
his Defense Minister, Binyamin Ben-Eliezer, who accused the United States and its 
partners of ignoring the threats from Iran and Syria in building its coalition against Bin-
Laden.422  
 It is difficult to know whether Netanyahu and Sharon would have succeeded in 
securitizing the post-9/11 Iran narrative without two unintended contributions by the 
Iranians. In December 2001, former Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani 
delivered the annual Al Quds Day423 lecture at Tehran University. The address largely 
focused on the traditional themes associated with the formation of the State of Israel 
and the suffering it caused the Palestinians. He added a single musing about what the 
Islamic world might do with a nuclear bomb: “If one day, the Islamic world is also 
equipped with weapons like those that Israel possesses now, then the imperialists’ 
                                                        
419 Benjamin Netanyahu, ‘Dismantle Terror-Supporting Regimes’, Jerusalem Post, 14 
September 2001. 
420 Netanyahu. 
421 Benjamin Netanyahu, ‘Address to US House Government Reform Committee’ (24 
September 2001). 
422 In a speech to the Labor Knesset faction, Ben-Eliezer declared that the “message 
from the Americans isn’t aggressive enough,” since it failed to target Iran, “the greatest 
threat to the free world today” because of “their potential for obtaining nuclear 
capability by 2005.”Hoffman and AP, ‘Ben-Eliezer’. 
423 Al Quds (Jerusalem) Day is held annually on the last Friday of the month of Ramadan 
to express Iranian solidarity with the Palestinian people. It features public events and 
speeches by prominent political and religious leaders, who denounce the “Zionist 
Regime” and call for the liberation of Palestine.  
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strategy will reach a standstill because the use of even one nuclear bomb inside Israel 
will destroy everything.”424  
Not surprisingly, this line caught the attention of Israeli leaders. Although 
Rafsanjani was no longer a government official and despite the current efforts of elected 
Iranian government officials to improve relations with the United States and the West, 
Israelis heard an Iranian admit that a purpose for developing nuclear capability was to 
target Israel.425 In Israel’s repetition of this admission, Rafsanjani, who had been a 
founding father of the Islamic Republic, would become a “moderate,” whose thinking 
was indicative of the “Ayatollahs’” worldview. The Israeli reaction again overlooked 
salient facts that might have enabled a more accurate interpretation. Rafsanjani was not 
only out of favor with some members of the clerical establishment,426 but he had also 
sought to delegitimize Iran’s political and spiritual leadership. One could have seen his 
provocation as directed at Iran’s rulers rather than Israelis. 
 A month after the Al Quds Day speech, Iran arguably supplied a second 
opportunity for Israel to dramatize its narrative when the Israelis seized a cargo ship off 
its coast, which they alleged was carrying Iranian military equipment to the Palestinian 
                                                        
424 Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, ‘Rafsanjani Qods Day Speech’, 14 December 2001, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iran/2001/011214-text.html. 
425 Foreign Minister Peres’ response was typical. Calling the remarks “bone-chilling,” he 
claimed that “they leave no room for doubt as to Iran’s inherent hatred for Israel and its 
declared goal to destroy her.” Jack Katzenell, ‘Peres Protests Iranian Threat to Destroy 
Israel’, Jerusalem Post, 26 December 2001. 
426 Rafsanjani’s clashes with the religious conservative establishment dated back to the 
formation of the Islamic Republic. He had advocated for a system of direct popular 
voting to ratify the decisions made by the Constituent Assembly, fearing that the cleric-
dominated assembly would be too reactionary. Similarly, as President of Iran, Rafsanjani 
pursued policies of economic liberalization that were opposed by radical religious 
elements. Likewise, his cabinet with only four of 22 positions filled by clerics, was, 
according to Daniel Brumberg, “hardly revolutionary.” Ali Rahnema, ‘Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s Rule of the Guardian Jurist: From Theory to Practice’, in A Critical 
Introduction to Khomeini, ed. Arshin Adib-Moghaddam (Cambridge ; New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014); Daniel Brumberg, Reinventing Khomeini: The 
Struggle for Reform in Iran (University of Chicago Press, 2001), 155. 
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Authority. In Israeli media accounts, Prime Minister Sharon stood before the seized ship, 
the Karine A, to demonstrate how Iran was an enabler of terrorism working with the 
Palestinians to “sow…death and destruction throughout the entire world.”427  
While most of the West focused on going to war against the perpetrators and 
alleged sponsors of the 9/11 attacks, the two incidents enabled Israel’s leaders to 
remind its population, as well as the world, of the danger posed by Iran. By linking 
nuclear weapons, terrorism, and Israeli victimhood with Iranian words and deeds, Israel 
made its case for taking action against Iran rather than seeking resolutions of the 
Palestinian “issue.” Israel was working hard to keep Iran in the public’s consciousness. 
 Israeli efforts met with success when President George W. Bush included Iran 
among the members of the “Axis of Evil” in his January 2002428 State of the Union 
Address to the American Congress. The utterance of this phrase, which would become a 
defining moment of his presidency and a seminal moment in United States foreign 
policy, linked Iran with Iraq and North Korea as global threats. President Bush reportedly 
inserted the reference to Iran at the last minute for strategic reasons, rejecting his 
advisors’ suggestion that it be removed. 429 Whatever his reasons, he had offered Israelis 
validation of their narrative and leverage in arguing for action.430 
                                                        
427 Arieh O’Sullivan, ‘Sharon: Arafat Is Our “bitter Enemy.” Calls Iran “Spearhead of 
International Terror.”’, Jerusalem Post, 7 January 2002. 
428 George W. Bush, ‘State of the Union’ (29 January 2002), 
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VI. Conclusion: Image or Imagination 
 
 This chapter’s examination of the intensifying enmity between Israel and Iran 
reveals two features of the process by which one nation, Israel, invested in a foreign 
policy based upon the characterization of the other, Iran, as an existential threat. On 
one hand, the hostile relationship seemingly had all the elements to achieve 
securitization, including historic religious enmity, comparisons to a Nazi regime that had 
committed the greatest crimes against humanity in recent memory, and location in a 
geographic region beset by chaos and intrigue. Its principal arguments invoked 
emotional themes ascribing destructive intentions to leaders, who would imminently 
possess nuclear weapons. Yet the issue failed to penetrate public discourse beyond elite 
discussion. In other words, it did not achieve full securitization as an existential threat 
that dictated policy decisions during the first decade of narrative development from 
1993 to 2002. On the other hand, this study illustrates that it is often events beyond the 
control of the parties involved in the narrative which can ultimately affect the “success” 
of the securitization process.  
Although the securitization process in this study concerns the conduct of nations 
toward one another and the impact of world events, we learn two lessons about the 
role of human behavior. First, in addition to the role of emotion, a concomitant feature 
of securitization is ignorance. For a threat that is evidently apparent and lacks 
immediacy, narrative resonance depends upon the inability to verify the factual 
predicate of the claimed danger and the credulousness of the listeners. Second, where 
the securitization process unfolds amidst global uncertainty, the narrative arc is never 
inevitable. The securitizing actor plays a critical role. His motives, credibility, and political 
acumen, among other human characteristics, will affect the interpretation of 
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information and the manner of presentation to his audience. Securitization is a process 
directed by humans to other humans.  
Thus, acceptance by Israelis and world leaders of Iran as an existential threat was 
neither a foregone conclusion nor an inconsequential myth. The narrative did not 
emerge from a linear development process in which Israeli leaders consistently 
constructed a case for acting to eliminate Iran’s danger. Most often the accusations 
were not coordinated with specific action strategies. The nature of the confrontation 
between the foes was also asymmetrical: Israeli leaders were far more threatened by 
Iran than Iranians were concerned about Israeli actions. In the early years, some Israelis 
even worried that Israel’s accusatory rhetoric could produce a self-fulfilling prophecy 
that might compel Iran to engage in threatening actions.  
The examination of the consequential historical events in this chapter shows 
how at key inflection points Israeli officials interpreted facts and addressed the 
uncertainties to fashion an image of Iran intent on ending Israel’s existence. They 
brought to their narrative their imagination – informed by personal experience, bias, 
and ambition – thereby creating an image that relied less on fact-based scenarios than 
on the narrators’ interpretations of their chosen facts.  
The identity of the narrators, their positions in society, and how they located 
Israel in the Middle East, as well as their view of global politics, affected their capacity to 
secure widespread concern over Iranian actions and intentions. Significantly, in the 
public discourse about Iran, expertise on Iran’s politics, governance, or military strategy 
was in short supply and frequently took a back seat to political considerations. In most 
cases, even if Iran’s actions could arguably be interpreted as weapons development, 
there was no definitive evidence that Iranian leaders intended to target Israel. 
Interestingly, few Israelis noticed when their leaders’ dire predictions that the 
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completion of Iran’s bomb building was imminent proved wrong. The predicted 
timetable kept shifting, but the fear of Iran’s imminent deployment of a nuclear weapon 
did not. There is no evidence that Iran’s effort to build a bomb ever moved beyond the 
basic planning stages. 
While there were occasional mentions of preemptive attacks and efforts to enlist 
countries in sanctioning Iran, the confrontation between Israel and Iran was largely 
rhetorical. Few spoke publicly about regime change or destruction of the nuclear 
infrastructure, and even fewer believed such efforts would succeed. Yet, if Israel’s 
narrative was to be believed, the threat would only end with the destruction of Iran’s 
nuclear capability and the elimination from government of those intent on destroying 
Israel.431  
It is ironic that the attacks on September 11, 2001 contributed so substantially to 
the securitization of the Iran threat narrative since Iran had no part in those events. 
Whether the continuous repetition of the Iran threat narrative by Israeli officials to a 
primarily domestic constituency would have, without the increased volume created by 
the attacks, achieved acceptance among the polity is a counterfactual that need not be 
considered. The post 9/11 climate of fear enabled Israeli officials to adapt their 
narrative, and thus, to raise the profile and immediacy of the Iranian threat both at 
home and abroad. Portraying Iran as a “center of terrorism” cast it as an enemy in the 
new Global War on Terror. The U.S. President conferred membership on the country in 
his Axis of Evil. With Israelis and the world fearing Iran’s support of terrorism, all that 
remained to was to imagine Iran as a nuclear-armed global menace, one that no country 
                                                        
431 This was Israel’s implicit objective in seeking securitization. To take such 
extraordinary action required acceptance of the Iran threat by both Israel’s polity and 
the global powers.  
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in the world could ignore. And yet, as we will see, the acceptance of such a narrative 
was not inevitable. 
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Chapter Four: Securitization, Part II 
 
I. Introduction: The Threat of Diplomacy 
 
 When Benjamin Netanyahu arrived to address the United Nations General 
Assembly in October 2015, he had a specific agenda. Three months earlier, after years of 
negotiations, the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus 
Germany (P5+1) 432 reached an agreement with Iran. The latter agreed to limit its 
nuclear program in exchange for relief from economic sanctions. Netanyahu had 
vociferously opposed the idea of negotiations and now came to denounce the 
agreement. He believed that Iran was misleading the world and that the P5+1 were 
naively being led into a disastrous deal negotiated in bad faith with an immoral partner. 
 Netanyahu was incensed by the details of the deal, known formally as the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or, more commonly, as the “Iran deal” or the 
“nuclear deal.” It placed strict limits on Iran’s nuclear enrichment capabilities, restricted 
the number of centrifuges, and imposed a threshold on the amount of enriched uranium 
present in the country at any one time.433 It provided for enforcement through rigorous 
inspection and oversight by international watchdog authorities, led by the IAEA. In 
exchange, Iran would receive relief from harsh economic sanctions that had crippled its 
economy.434 Although not written into the agreement but perhaps more importantly, 
the deal would afford Iran an opportunity after decades of isolation to rejoin the world 
community as an active economic and diplomatic participant.  
                                                        
432 The Permanent Five members of the United Nations Security Council are the United 
States, Russia, China, France, and Great Britain. 
433 ‘Full Text of the Iran Nuclear Deal’, 14 July 2015, 
https://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/documents/world/full-text-of-the-iran-nuclear-
deal/1651/. 
434 Sanctions relief covered only nuclear-related sanctions; it excluded those relating to 
human rights or terrorism-related conduct. 
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 Netanyahu’s opposition predated the agreement. He had opposed exploring the 
possibility of negotiations with Iran. He had preferred a preemptive military strike to 
halt Iran’s development and reportedly had been on the brink of ordering such an action 
three years earlier.435 He settled for rhetorically attacking his allies, including the United 
States, while joining with Israel’s historic enemies to oppose a diplomatic solution. 
Based upon their shared distrust of Iran, Israel and Sunni Arab states opened new 
channels of communication. They shared the view that any deal with Iran would only 
embolden the Islamic Republic in its quest for regional hegemony and create a new 
global menace.  
 In his speech, Netanyahu spared no aspect of the deal and nobody involved in it 
from his criticism. He employed inflammatory imagery and rhetorical flourishes in 
methodically attacking the terms, the negotiators, the signatories, and those who 
credulously celebrated the accord as a triumph of international diplomacy. He claimed 
that the Iranian character precluded their acting in good faith and adhering to the terms 
of the agreement. According to Netanyahu, Iran was as methodical as it was maniacal; 
its goals were simultaneously chaotic and focused; it posed an existential threat to 
Israel; and it endangered global peace and prosperity.436 
 Netanyahu began his address by warning his audience to “check your enthusiasm 
at the door,” which set the stage for his dark remarks. He employed familiar tropes and 
added some new ones. As he had in many previous speeches, he invoked the memory of 
the Holocaust as an overarching theme, telling the world leaders, “And now, another 
                                                        
435 Ben Brumfield and Oren Liebermann, ‘Israeli Leaders Planned Attack on Iran Military’, 
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436 Benjamin Netanyahu, ‘PM Netanyahu’s Speech at the United Nations General 
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regime has arisen, swearing to destroy Israel.”437 Netanyahu warned the Assembly that 
the missiles Iran is building are not only for Israel, but for Europe and America as well. 
Iran was engaged in a war of civilizations and developing a nuclear program “for raining 
down mass destruction – anytime, anywhere.”438 
 The most unconventional element of his speech came half-way into his address 
when Netanyahu unexpectedly paused for forty-four seconds. He stood at the podium 
staring out at the audience, which sat in total silence. Apparently, he intended this 
moment to be symbolic of the lack of objections to Iran’s promises to murder the Jewish 
people, another reference to the Holocaust. Netanyahu also employed a form of plain 
speaking, which was unusual for such a formal address. Invoking cultural stereotypes, he 
used “mullahs” as a pejorative catch-all for Iran’s leadership and indicated that they 
were intent on deception. Iran, he insisted, must not be allowed to sweep its violations 
“under the Persian rug.”439 He ended with a breathtaking flourish in which he positioned 
Israel as the world’s last line of defense against Iran, and the world’s savior: “Ten miles 
from ISIS, a few hundred yards from Iran’s murderous proxies, Israel stands in the 
breach – proudly and courageously defending freedom and progress. Israel is 
civilization’s front line in the battle against barbarism…Ladies and Gentlemen, stand 
with Israel because Israel is not just defending itself. More than ever, Israel is defending 
you.” In the 42-minute speech, he had mentioned Iran 67 times.  
 The tropes invoked in the New York speech had been years in development, but 
the position in which Netanyahu found himself was new. He had crafted his narrative 
during his first term as prime minister and polished the tropes in the preceding six years 
of his second term of service. Yet Netanyahu’s address highlighted the divergence of the 
                                                        
437 Netanyahu. 
438 Netanyahu. 
439 Netanyahu. 
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goals he had pursued in promoting his narrative. When initially crafting his narrative, he 
sought to convince Israelis to fear Iran. While he wavered on solutions, he sought to 
capitalize on their sense of insecurity by urging support for his leadership and foreign 
policies. At the same time, he sought to convince world leaders that they should support 
his case against Iran. By the time of the 2015 speech, he could emphasize that he had 
the support of the Israeli public, but he stood in opposition to the member nations of 
the Security Council and Germany. 
 In Israel, Netanyahu had succeeded in convincing the “vast majority” of Israelis 
to oppose the deal. An August 2015 poll showed that 72.7% of Israelis agreed with 
Netanyahu that Iran posed an “existential threat” to Israel.440 In that same survey, a 
substantial majority of respondents expressed doubt that Iran would abide by the terms 
of the accord. A mere 16.8% had expressed confidence that Iran would uphold its end of 
the bargain. That worked out to five out of six Israelis distrusting Iran. At the same time, 
the major world powers, many of them Israel’s allies, did not subscribe to his narrative. 
 An objective analyst could be excused for being confused by the vehemence and 
intemperance of Netanyahu’s opposition. The overwhelming majority of nuclear experts 
agreed that the terms of the deal effectively made it impossible for Iran to produce a 
nuclear weapon for at least the next decade.441 Moreover, it imposed the most 
sophisticated monitoring mechanisms devised to date, thus minimizing Iran’s ability to 
cheat. Finally, Iran would face severe sanctions for violating the agreement’s terms, 
                                                        
440 42.5% said they “strongly agreed” with the Prime Minister. Ephraim Yaar and Tamar 
Hermann, ‘The Peace Index’ (The Israel Democracy Institute, August 2015), 
http://www.peaceindex.org/files/Peace_Index_Data_August_2015-Eng.pdf. 
441 Additionally, experts agreed the agreement extended Iran’s “break-out time,” the 
minimum amount of time needed by Iran to gather the materials necessary to build one 
nuclear weapon, from several months to at least a year. Richard Stone, ‘Technical 
Elements of Iran Deal Put the Brakes on Nuclear Breakout’, Science, 3 April 2015, 
http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2015/04/technical-elements-iran-deal-put-brakes-
nuclear-breakout.  
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including the “snap back” of the harsh economic sanctions that had helped bring Iran to 
the negotiating table.442 There was also an implied threat of military action if Iran 
abrogated the deal. The agreement thus insured that, at least for the foreseeable future, 
Israel would remain the sole nuclear-armed power in the region.443 
 To be sure, Iran would still be Israel’s enemy. The country was not a benign 
neighbor, but a strategic threat to nations in the region. It possessed a large military 
force and units operating efficiently and effectively to facilitate attacks on foreign soil.444 
Israel was a target of terrorist groups funded and supplied by Iran, including the 
Lebanese Hezbollah, which controlled the territory along Israel’s northern border. Iran 
still had hardline leaders in its government and prominent politicians espousing anti-
Israel messages, including the Supreme Leader.  
By any objective criteria, the nuclear deal did nothing to increase the Iranian 
threat to Israel. Using conventional measures, Iran could not match Israel’s military 
                                                        
442 The impact of economic sanctions on Iran’s willingness to negotiate is unclear. 
Skeptics note that Iran began negotiating about the fate of its nuclear program before 
imposition of additional harsh sanctions. Others argue that the sanctions merely 
exacerbated Iran’s structural economic problems due to mismanagement, corruption, 
and lack of transparency. Proponents of sanctions, including the Israelis, believed that 
sanctions had effectively crippled the Iranian economy and forced nuclear concessions. 
They maintain that removing sanctions prematurely reduced pressure on a regime that 
might have been nearing collapse. Academic and policy centers continue to debate the 
efficacy of sanctions. See, for example, Hossein Mousavian, ‘It Was Not Sanctions That 
Brought Iran to the Table’, Financial Times, 19 November 2013, 
https://www.ft.com/content/8d9631f4-510c-11e3-b499-00144feabdc0; Mark Dubowitz 
and Reuel Marc Gerecht, ‘Economic Regime-Change Can Stop Iran Bomb’, Bloomberg, 
17 January 2012, https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2012-01-17/economic-
regime-change-can-stop-iran-commentary-by-gerecht-and-dubowitz. 
443 Israel has never acknowledged the production of nuclear weapons, although it is 
widely assumed to possess several hundred such weapons. The U.S. Secretary of State 
put the number at 200 in a 2015 leaked email, adding they were “all targeted on 
Tehran.” Colin Powell, ‘Re: Re’:, 3 March 2015, 
https://www.scribd.com/document/324033115/00002715-002. 
444 In particular, the Quds Force – a special division of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards 
Corps (IRGC) – operated abroad in conjunction with terrorist organizations. The combat 
exploits attributed to its commander, Major General Qassem Suleimani, symbolized 
both the competence and mystery of Iranian military operations in the region. 
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advantages. Iran’s military budget paled in comparison to Israel, as well as all its regional 
rivals, including Saudi Arabia.445 Both the Saudis and Israelis enjoyed close relations with 
the Americans, with their nations being among the top global recipients of military funds 
and equipment from the United States. Historical precedent suggested that such 
support would increase as compensation or inducement for allowing Iranian sanctions 
relief. Moreover, for the present and foreseeable future, Iran would be unable to focus 
much attention on Israel. It was effectively tied up in Syria’s bloody civil war, where its 
Quds Force and its Lebanese client Hezbollah were engaged in maintaining the reign of 
Syrian president Bashar Al Assad. Iran could do little more to challenge Israel than 
occasionally conduct a missile test or issue a provocative statement.446 These realities, 
combined with the terms of the nuclear agreement, threatened to seriously challenge 
the Iranian threat narrative that Netanyahu had so assiduously crafted and advanced 
over the years.  
This chapter and the next examine how Netanyahu arrived at the moment in 
2015 where he attacked his international allies for supporting a deal that by any 
objective measure blocked Iran’s capacity to produce a nuclear weapon. At the same 
time, he convinced a majority of the Israeli people to fear Iran as an existential threat. 
This chapter details how two post-September 11 events, namely the election of 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as Iran’s president and the 2006 Lebanon War, contributed to 
                                                        
445 In 2015, Iran’s military spending was less than Israel’s both in terms of dollar value 
and in percentage of GDP. Iran spent approximately $10.6bn (2.98% of GDP) while Israel 
spent $16.9bn (5.66% of GDP). Compared to Saudi Arabia, the difference was even 
larger. The Saudis spent $87.2bn (9.85% of GDP). ‘SIPRI Military Expenditure Database’, 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2015, 
https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex. 
446 For example, in 2016 Iran reportedly tested a missile with “Israel must be destroyed” 
written on it in Hebrew. This test itself can be interpreted in a variety of ways, including 
as a hardliner attempt to undermine Rouhani’s implementation of the nuclear deal, or 
to deter Israel from attacking Iran’s military installations. 
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the popularization, and thus, the full securitization, of the Iran threat narrative. It is 
counterfactual speculation as to whether without these two developments there would 
have been sufficient support to sustain Iran as a securitized issue on the Israeli agenda. 
Admittedly, Iran’s nuclear development program and the prospect that the country 
could acquire the capacity to produce a nuclear weapon was cause for deep concern. 
Nevertheless, as discussed in the previous chapter, there is evidence that the initial fear 
expressed by Israeli leaders, with media support, did not induce the same fear in the 
public. Ahmadinejad’s rhetorical threats to Israel and the Second Lebanon War events 
intensified the power and durability of the threat narrative. Consequently, these events 
profoundly affected public perception. Eventually, they would also occasion a change in 
the public’s political understanding, notably leading Israelis to question the capability of 
their leaders to respond to their fears. Benjamin Netanyahu would recognize this breach 
and, using a populist strategy, offered his leadership as a response to the looming 
dissatisfaction. 
To set the stage for this discussion, I begin with a look back at the development 
of Iran’s nuclear program, beginning with its origins under the Shah’s regime. I then 
examine the impact of the 2003 United States invasion of Iraq. From there, I turn to an 
in-depth analysis of how the election of Ahmadinejad contributed to the salience of the 
Iran threat narrative.447 Finally, I look at how the second Lebanese War strengthened 
the narrative while eventually weakening the Israeli government. In the end, the Israeli 
public accepted Iran as an existential threat and embraced the return of Netanyahu to 
the leadership of their country.  
                                                        
447 The following chapter continues the discussion by examining how the concurrence of 
Netanyahu’s election as prime minister and Ahmadinejad’s re-election enhanced the 
resonance of Netanyahu’s populist messaging. 
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II. Iran’s Nuclear History  
 
A. The Dawn of the Nuclear Age 
 
The world witnessed the destructive force of nuclear weapons when the United 
States dropped bombs on Japan to end World War II.448 Since that time, select countries 
sought to increase the deadly capability of such weapons while most of the world 
searched for ways to deter their development and use. Even as scientists developed 
their nuclear weapons’ technology during World War II, they worried about the 
destructive impact of their invention. After the war, political movements and civic 
activists publicized and politicized the fears, and public culture reflected the concerns. 
449 A paradigmatic 1964 film, Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and 
Love the Bomb, imagined a rogue bomber crew triggering a nuclear apocalypse that the 
world’s bumbling leadership was powerless to prevent.450 
As world leaders negotiated agreements to limit and destroy nuclear weapons, 
the public discourse and imagination concerning their threat abated. The dissolution of 
the Soviet Union ended the superpowers’ nuclear standoff policy of mutually assured 
destruction but raised concerns about the fate of the Russian nuclear arsenal, as well as 
the employment opportunities for scientists. Officials and analysts worried about a 
                                                        
448 The United States’ dropping of two atomic bombs on the cities of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki in 1945 remains the only wartime deployment of such weapons. They killed 
approximately 130,000 people, mostly civilians, while many more eventually succumbed 
to cancer. The decision remains controversial. 
449 Concerns over the destructive force of nuclear weapons eventually led to the 
creation of various agencies and treaties designed to limit the proliferation of such 
weapons, including the International Atomic Energy Agency in 1957 and the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968.  
450 Popular culture heightened the public’s fear of nuclear weapons. For example, over 
100 million people and President Ronald Reagan watched a 1983 made-for-TV film, The 
Day After, which portrayed a fictional nuclear war between NATO and the Soviet Union. 
Simon Braund, ‘How Ronald Reagan Learned to Start Worrying and Stop Loving the 
Bomb’, Empire, 1 November 2010, https://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P3-
2307407461.html.  
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market for nuclear material, technology, and weapons experts, which could allow rogue 
national leaders, terrorist organizations, and nations to acquire nuclear capacity.451  
The development of nuclear technology as an energy source complicated non-
proliferation efforts. In addition to the risk of catastrophic accidents, a state could 
disguise a weapons program by appearing to build a nuclear power plant. This also 
provided cover to the leader of a poor nation who sought to enhance his standing by 
acquiring a nuclear weapon. He could justify the commitment of scarce resources to the 
costly venture by claiming that it would provide vital energy. Leaders might also 
convince their citizens that nuclear capability is a source of national pride as well as a 
deterrent of enemy hostile actions.452 
B. Nuclear Technology in the Middle East 
 
Just in case Saddam Hussein had not raised enough controversy, he posed 
additional problems when he decided to invest in a nuclear program and to brag about 
it. In doing so, he demonstrated the risk associated with his strategy. In 1981, in a 
surprise bombing attack, Israel destroyed Iraq’s nearly completed nuclear reactor at 
Osirak. Israeli leaders reasoned that Saddam Hussein with nuclear weapons posed an 
existential threat to their nation.453 Although world powers, including the United States, 
                                                        
451 Andrew Rosenthal, ‘SOVIET DISARRAY; U.S. Fears Spread of Soviet Nuclear Weapons’, 
The New York Times, 16 December 1991, sec. World, 
https://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/16/world/soviet-disarray-us-fears-spread-of-soviet-
nuclear-weapons.html. 
452 See, for example, North Korea state propaganda in which the development of nuclear 
weapons is portrayed as a source of national pride and strength.  
453 Subsequent studies question the accuracy of Israel’s assessment of the Iraq danger as 
well as its claim of success. See Dan Reiter, ‘Preventive Attacks Against Nuclear 
Programs and the “Success” at Osiraq’, The Nonproliferation Review 12, no. 2 (1 July 
2005): 355–71; Colin H. Kahl, ‘An Israeli Attack against Iran Would Backfire — Just like 
Israel’s 1981 Strike on Iraq’, Washington Post, 2 March 2012, sec. Opinions, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/an-israeli-attack-against-iran-would-
backfire--just-like-israels-1981-strike-on-iraq/2012/02/28/gIQATOMFnR_story.html.  
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publicly condemned the action, many nations benefitted from the setback to Saddam’s 
nuclear ambitions. They understood that Saddam would continue to defy international 
behavioral and legal norms governing use of unconventional weapons. During the Iran-
Iraq War he had used poison gas against civilian populations. When the war ended, he 
still retained a powerful military. No one familiar with the Middle East believed he could 
be counted on to act rationally in his own or his country’s best interest. 
Israel’s development of nuclear weapons provides a contrasting example. It has 
never admitted to possessing such weapons although it is widely believed to have 
them.454 Notably, the nation is not among the 190 signatories to the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that took effect in 1970.455 Moreover, it eschews the Cold War 
strategic doctrine of mutually assured destruction, and thus pursues a policy of keeping 
all other nations in its neighborhood from obtaining nuclear weapons.  
C. Iran’s Nuclear Program: Ego, Ambivalence, and Ascription 
 
  Despite Israel’s desire for a nuclear monopoly in the Middle East, Iran’s initial 
development of nuclear power did not register in Israel as a threat. Iran had launched its 
program with the assistance of the United States in 1957. Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi 
signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with the Eisenhower Administration, under 
                                                        
454 Israel disguised its weapons development. According to Walter Pincus, Israeli officials 
told U.S. Embassy personnel in June 1960 that the nuclear reactor it was building with 
French help was a “textile plant,” later revising that to a “metallurgical research 
installation.” Israel’s accusations of Iranian activity reflects Israel’s prevarications about 
its weapons program. Walter Pincus, ‘Another Nation Blazed the Trail for Iran in 
Developing a Nuclear Program’, Washington Post, 9 March 2015, sec. National Security, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/another-nation-blazed-the-
trail-for-iran-in-developing-a-nuclear-program/2015/03/09/0222ec28-c41c-11e4-ad5c-
3b8ce89f1b89_story.html. 
455 Non-nuclear armed signatories to the NPT commit to refraining from acquiring 
nuclear weapons while nations possessing weapons agree to move toward 
disarmament. It allows signatory nations to develop and operate a peaceful nuclear 
program within guidelines for non-proliferation. Along with Israel, other non-signatories 
to the NPT include nuclear-armed India, Pakistan, and North Korea. 
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which the U.S. assisted Iran in constructing a five-megawatt nuclear reactor in Tehran.456 
Later, the Shah sought to enhance Iran’s nuclear capacity with the construction of a 
second, much larger reactor near the town of Bushehr, although this project would not 
be completed before his downfall.457  
The Shah maintained his nuclear ambitions throughout the 1960s and 1970s. He 
made no secret of his desire to build more capacity and to obtain a membership in the 
exclusive nuclear-nations club. Significantly, he met domestic resistance from opponents 
who strongly criticized his misplaced priorities in diverting resources from the country’s 
other needs, particularly since he already possessed a large, well-trained, and well-
equipped military. 458 Nevertheless, the Shah continued to press the American 
government for more nuclear technology and expert assistance while sending dozens of 
Iranian students to the United States to study nuclear engineering. Although Iran had 
signed the NPT in 1970, under which it agreed to restrictions on its nuclear 
development, including forswearing acquiring nuclear weapons, American intelligence 
officials questioned the Shah’s intentions. One major skeptic was President Jimmy 
Carter, who, after assuming office in 1977, voiced his concern that the Shah aimed to 
                                                        
456 The Tehran reactor project was part of Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” program, 
which aimed to provide countries with civilian nuclear technology to prevent them from 
pursuing military nuclear development. Steve Inskeep, ‘Born In The USA: How America 
Created Iran’s Nuclear Program’, Parallels (National Public Radio, 18 September 2005), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2015/09/18/440567960/born-in-the-u-s-a-how-
america-created-irans-nuclear-program. 
457 Construction on the Bushehr reactor began in 1975 but halted shortly after the 1979 
Islamic Revolution. The vacant site was bombed by Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War. 
Reconstruction of the plant began in 1995 with help from Russia. The plant went online 
in September 2011. Ali Vaez, ‘Waiting for Bushehr’, Foreign Policy, 12 September 2011, 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/09/12/waiting-for-bushehr/. 
458 The Shah’s proclivity for military might was well-known among American and Israeli 
officials. He spent considerable sums on arms purchases and military training from the 
United States and Israel, much of it unnecessary from a strategic point of view. 
According to rumor, he built the largest fleet of hovercrafts in the world. Andrew Scott 
Cooper, The Oil Kings: How the U.S., Iran, and Saudi Arabia Changed the Balance of 
Power in the Middle East (Simon and Schuster, 2011), 141. 
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build an atomic bomb.459 A nuclear weapons program fit the Shah’s self-image: It would 
both secure Iran’s place in the top tier of the global power structure while drastically 
altering the balance of power in the region. 
When Ayatollah Khomeini assumed the leadership of Iran following the 1979 
Islamic Revolution, he suspended Iran’s nuclear program.460 He claimed that it was a 
waste of resources and an immoral pursuit of the excesses of the West. He allowed the 
Bushehr reactor to sit empty. Even after the Iraqi invasion of Iran, Khomeini resisted the 
pleas from officers in the IRGC to reconsider his position on nuclear development. Iran’s 
enemies suspected, however, that the ban would not last, and Iraqi forces went so far as 
to bomb the empty Bushehr site as a precautionary measure.  
Khomeini did reverse his prohibitory edict eventually, but his reasons for doing 
so remain unclear. Facing power shortages occasioned by the war with Iraq, Khomeini 
allowed work on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure to restart, but he reportedly resisted his 
advisors’ urging to adapt the nuclear program for possible military applications. Despite 
the presence of Iraqi soldiers in Iranian territory and the use by Saddam of non-
conventional chemical weapons against Iranians, including civilians, Khomeini 
maintained that nuclear weapons violated Islamic jurisprudence.461  
                                                        
459 ‘The Nuclear Vault: The Iranian Nuclear Program, 1974-1978’, National Security 
Archive Electronic Briefing Book (George Washington University, 12 January 2009), 
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb268/. e 
460 According to Mohsen Rafighdoost, a close confidant of Khomeini during the early 
years of the Islamic Republic, the Supreme Leader explicitly rejected his advisors’ 
recommendations to develop chemical and nuclear weapons. Gareth Porter, 
Manufactured Crisis: The Untold Story of the Iran Nuclear Scare (Charlottesville, Virginia: 
Just World Books, 2014); Gareth Porter, ‘When the Ayatollah Said No to Nukes’, Foreign 
Policy (blog), 16 October 2014, https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/10/16/when-the-
ayatollah-said-no-to-nukes/. 
461 Khomeini’s successor as Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, reportedly issued a more 
explicit fatwa in the 1990s continuing the ban on weapons of mass destruction. Since 
Iran did not disclose its existence until 2004 it could not influence the perceptions of 
Iran’s nuclear weapons intentions. Even after its disclosure, which did not include 
producing the document, critics remained skeptical about its legitimacy. They 
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To be sure, there were reasons for skepticism about Iran’s intentions. Its work on 
developing the nuclear fuel cycle and expanding capacity allowed for “dual use” as both 
energy and weapons production. Moreover, by creating the perception of technological 
advancement in nuclear proficiency, Iran could develop the intellectual capability to 
build a weapon should it choose to do so. Still, throughout the 1980s Israeli leadership 
appeared largely unconcerned about Iran’s nuclear activities. Only once did someone 
refer to Iran’s nuclear program in public debate.462 A transcript of a Knesset discussion 
about French arms sales to Saudi Arabia mentions that France had sold nuclear 
materials to Iran.463 Review of the Israeli Foreign Ministry Historical Documents archive 
between 1984 and 1992 reveals that Israeli politicians had two primary concerns about 
Iran: the plight of Iranian Jewry and the strategic value of arms sales during the Iran-Iraq 
War.464 The specter of a nuclear-armed Iran was not part of Israel’s public discourse. 
Israelis, however, did believe that Iraq and its unpredictable leader posed a 
threat to Israel’s security. This fear proved warranted when Iraq launched ballistic 
missiles at Israeli targets to expand its 1990 invasion of Kuwait into a regional conflict.465 
                                                        
questioned whether Iran would sincerely resist acquiring nuclear weapons based on 
Islamic principles, or whether the announcement was a tactical ploy designed to deceive 
Western negotiators. Porter, ‘When the Ayatollah Said No to Nukes’. 
462 This is not to say that the Israeli media did not discuss the issue, or that Iran was 
never mentioned by Israeli officials, only that Iran’s nuclear policy was not discussed 
publicly in an official government capacity in the Israeli Knesset during this period.  
463 A December 24, 1986 Knesset transcript mentioned the sale of French materials to 
Iran, but discussion quickly turned to concern about French arms sales to Saudi Arabia. 
‘272nd Meeting of the 11th Knesset’, 24 December 1986, Knesset Transcripts. 
464. ‘Israel’s Foreign Policy - Historical Documents’, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d., 
http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/FOREIGNPOLICY/MFADOCUMENTS/Pages/Documents_Foreign_P
olicy_Israel.aspx. 
465 Israel had been asked by the United States to stay out of the conflict in order to 
maximize Arab participation in coalition forces. Saddam sought to provoke Israel’s entry 
to create a broader Arab-Israeli conflict that would reduce Arab support for the war 
effort against Iraq. Avi Shlaim, ‘Israel and the Conflict’, in International Perspectives on 
the Gulf Conflict, 1990-91, ed. Alex Danchev and Dan Keohane (United Kingdom: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 1994), 59. 
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Although the action caused few casualties, it had a powerful psychological impact on 
Israeli society.466 The Iraqi attacks highlighted a new type of Israeli vulnerability. Saddam 
had used long-range missiles to attack Israeli territory, which Israelis feared could carry 
chemical weapons. The issuance of gas masks to all residents forced Israelis to realize 
the uncomfortable fact that warfare had moved beyond conventional military 
confrontation.  
Israel’s recognition of its increased vulnerability coincided with the disintegration 
of the Soviet Union and the uncertainties associated with both the fate of Russia’s 
nuclear stockpile and the world’s nonproliferation regime.467 Israel’s neighbors, 
including Syria, Algeria, Libya, and Iraq, reportedly had indicated an interest in 
purchasing nuclear material and employing displaced scientists from the former Soviet 
Union, and they had the financial resources to do so. The specter of a nuclear armed 
enemy now appeared to be a real threat. For example, a 1991 report on Algeria 
suggested that the country could be only a “very few years” away from building a 
nuclear bomb. 468 A Jerusalem Post editorial entitled “The Real Middle East Problem” 
noted that Iraq, Libya, and Iran were all in a “scramble for nuclear capability.”469  
With Saddam’s defeat in 1991 by the United States and its allies following his 
invasion of Kuwait, Iraq could no longer compete in this post-Soviet market. At least for 
                                                        
466 It produced fear that had tangible consequences. The government issued gas masks 
to all Israeli to carry with them at all times given the unpredictability of a chemical-
carrying missile attack. The anxiety produced a significant increase in cardiac arrests and 
hundreds of emergency room visits for acute anxiety and panic attacks. E. Karsenty et 
al., ‘Medical Aspects of the Iraqi Missile Attacks on Israel’, Israel Journal of Medical 
Sciences 27, no. 11–12 (December 1991): 603–7. 
467 See discussion supra at beginning of chapter. Rosenthal, ‘SOVIET DISARRAY; U.S. 
Fears Spread of Soviet Nuclear Weapons’. 
468 ‘The Nuclear Vault: The Algerian Nuclear Problem’, National Security Archive 
Electronic Briefing Book (George Washington University, 10 September 2007), 
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb228/index.htm. 
469 The article also cited developments in other Arab weapons programs in Syria, Libya, 
Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. Editorial Board, ‘The Real Middle East Problem’.  
 201 
the foreseeable future, Saddam would be preoccupied with maintaining control over his 
own country rather than planning invasions of others.470 Over the next ten years, 
Saddam would seek to make a comeback, and, eventually, his weapons development 
activities would again come under suspicion. For reasons that remain unclear, however, 
Saddam refused to dispel suspicions that he was attempting to rebuild his nuclear 
program or developing other weapons of mass destruction. His refusal to do so provided 
the United States with a justification for leading an invasion of Iraq in 2003, which 
resulted in Saddam’s downfall.471 
Although Saddam remained in power after the first Gulf War, Israel nevertheless 
recognized that the threat he posed to their country had significantly diminished. This 
necessitated reprioritizing the remaining threats it faced. Such decisions involved more 
than debating classified military assessments and contingency plans. Given Israel’s 
political culture, it would need to include making a case to the public and rallying 
popular support for new policies targeting identifiable enemies. One obvious candidate 
for filling the threat vacuum left by Iraq was Iran.  
In the beginning, the Israeli media promoted the increase in Iran awareness, 
although it is unclear whether this was done on its own initiative or due to prodding 
from government officials. Stories not only frequently mentioned Iran as a potential 
black-market customer for Soviet nuclear material, but also ascribed motives to Iran’s 
                                                        
470 Saddam also increasingly focused on internal security and his personal protection. 
During the First Gulf War, President George H. W. Bush had implied that the U.S. would 
assist Iraqi Shiites to overthrow Saddam. When the war ended without regime change, 
the Iraqi military violently suppressed the revolt. Kevin M. Woods et al., The Iraqi 
Perspectives Report: Saddam’s Senior Leadership on Operation Iraqi Freedom From the 
Official U.S. Joint Forces Command Report (Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute Press, 2006), 
31–32, 51–52. 
471 This was not the only false premise of the 2003 U.S. invasion. The Bush 
administration maintained that Iraq had supported the September 11 terrorist attacks, 
which was categorically untrue.  
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quest. While reports of Arab buyers generally focused on factual accounts, discussion of 
Iran included analyses of how the country’s acquisition of nuclear “know-how” would 
change the region’s balance of power and complicate the security picture. Narratives 
began increasingly calling into question the motives and intentions behind Iranian 
nuclear development efforts. The stories echoed earlier descriptions of Saddam. They 
spoke of Iran’s leaders as irrational and lacking in self-restraint. Adding the new 
dimension of religious fanaticism, they implied that Iran’s leaders would not be inhibited 
from using a nuclear weapon as a means of achieving their goals of destroying the 
Jewish State.472  
In early 1992, the Jerusalem Post ran a series of stories focusing on Iran. This was 
noteworthy because the messages were evidently targeting Israeli elites, the immigrant 
communities, and an international audience. The content of the stories and their 
placement on page one emphasized to readers the need to address the threat posed by 
Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Significantly, the stories offered few new factual details. The 
“news” element was the previously reported fact that Iran was in the market for Soviet 
leftovers.473 The first story spoke of how the Iranians were buying Soviet weaponry at a 
“breakneck pace.” It then added a variety of speculative items, including the location of 
ex-Soviet scientists and the intention of Iran’s leaders to fill the void left by Iraq 
following its defeat in the First Gulf War with an Islamic hegemony dominated by the 
Iranians. 474 A subsequent story reported that Iran was on a “single-minded campaign to 
become a regional power,” before adding new accusations that the country was pouring 
money into ex-Soviet Muslim republics, including Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan, 
                                                        
472 Alon Pinkas, ‘Thinking the Unthinkable About Iran’, Jerusalem Post, 23 April 1992. 
473 The page one headline of the first story claimed that “Cheap Soviet Arms Make 
Iranians a Major Threat.” Alon Pinkas, ‘Cheap Soviet Arms Make Iranians a Major 
Threat’, Jerusalem Post, 9 January 1992. 
474 Pinkas.  
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and that Iran had “made no secret of its intention to become a nuclear power.” It 
concluded by warning, “It is a mistake to assume that post-Khomeini Iran is more 
moderate. The present leadership in Teheran is simply more sophisticated.”475  
Ironically, if read carefully, the stories highlighted how changes outside of Iran, 
namely those in Iraq and the Soviet Union, were affecting Iran and, by extension, Israel. 
The news was not that either country had changed: Iran was known to have a nuclear 
development program, and Israel still had lots of enemies. Rather, it was that the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union reportedly provided Iran with new opportunities for 
influence and weapons acquisition, while the defeat of Saddam reduced Iraq’s threat to 
Israel. What these developments actually portended, however, was speculative; but 
there was no shortage of speculation from many quarters.  
Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin shared Israel’s concern about Iran’s nuclear 
program with U.S. President Bill Clinton during a 1992 meeting. Shortly afterwards, the 
United States House of Representatives Republican Research Committee claimed that 
Iran had already acquired “all or virtually all of the components required for the 
construction of two to three nuclear weapons.” In its report, the committee concluded 
that it believed “with 98% certainty” that Iran already had all (or virtually all) of the 
components necessary for two to three operational nuclear weapons.476 In what would 
become a predictive ritual over the next 25 years, the committee claimed that “it was 
likely that these [Soviet-supplied nuclear] weapons would be operational by February to 
April 1992.”477 Similarly, a U.S. News and World Report story reported that three nuclear 
                                                        
475 Yedidya Atlas, ‘Iranian Threat Never Went Away’, Jerusalem Post, 16 February 1992. 
476 Hedges, ‘Iran May Be Able to Build an Atomic Bomb in 5 Years, U.S. and Israeli 
Officials Fear’. 
477 Pinkas, ‘Thinking the Unthinkable About Iran’. 
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warheads, which had gone missing from Kazakhstan, had been sold to Iran.478 These 
claims could not be verified. 479  
It did not matter to Israel whether claims highlighting Iran’s dangerousness were 
verifiable so long as they were difficult to refute. Israel was seeking to construct a 
compelling threat narrative featuring Iran’s leaders as determined to harm Israel. Only 
Iranians could dispute the intentions attributed to them, and they could not be trusted 
to tell the truth.  
D. Exposing Iran’s “Secret” Program 
 
On August 14, 2002, a spokesperson for the National Council of Resistance of 
Iran (NCRI),480 an anti-Iranian government opposition group based in France, held a 
press conference in Washington, DC to announce it had discovered two undeclared 
nuclear sites inside Iran. According to the NCRI, Iran was secretly constructing these 
facilities unbeknownst to the IAEA and international inspectors. Their spokesman, 
Alireza Jafarzadeh, claimed that the revelations resulted from “extensive research and 
investigation” conducted by the NCRI. Few familiar with the organization, however, 
                                                        
478 The sources of the claims reportedly were the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and 
other intelligence sources. Inspectors from the IAEA were never able to verify them 
during inspection trips to Iran. Hedges, ‘Iran May Be Able to Build an Atomic Bomb in 5 
Years, U.S. and Israeli Officials Fear’.  
479 The Kazakhstan missile purchase was dismissed by Uri Saguy, head of Israeli military 
intelligence, as having “no factual basis.” Yossi Melman, ‘IRAN’S LETHAL SECRET’, 
Washington Post, 18 October 1992, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1992/10/18/irans-lethal-
secret/2994e63c-b341-41ae-b87b-0141a68f9a27/. 
480 Originally designed as a loose coalition of exiled Iranian dissident groups, two leaders 
of the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) organization founded the NCRI in Paris in 1981. The 
NCRI served as the public-facing political wing controlled by the MEK. Like the MEK, the 
U.S. Treasury Department designated the NCRI as a terrorist organization, calling it an 
“alias of the MEK.” United States Treasury Department Office of Public Affairs, 
‘Designation of National Council of Resistance in Iran, National Council of Resistance and 
Peoples Mujahedin of Iran under Executive Order 13224’, 15 August 2003, 
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/js664.aspx.  
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believed that it had the resources to develop this intelligence; they suspected that the 
NCRI was itself failing to disclose its source of secret help.  
 The announcement, which was impressively specific about Iran and its nuclear 
activities, appeared designed to raise suspicion along with public awareness about Iran’s 
intentions. The heretofore secret sites at Natanz and Arak appeared to have been 
chosen for their strategic defensive position. The Natanz facility was located deep 
underground inside a bunker ringed by a thick concrete wall, while the heavy water 
reactor at Arak could arguably be used to produce material for building nuclear 
weapons. The NCRI message was clear: the clandestine construction of nuclear facilities 
fortified to withstand attack coupled with Iran’s lack of candor about its nuclear 
activities proved that Iran was hiding something: Iran was building a bomb. 
Although the NCRI intended its report to generate intense concern, the 
revelations were not particularly surprising to United States intelligence, nor was the 
evidence conclusive. Throughout the 1980s, the CIA had not found evidence of a military 
component in Iran’s nuclear pursuits. It changed this assessment shortly before the NCRI 
announcement. By the time of the press conference, it had already compiled the 
information and submitted it to the IAEA.481 Many suspected that it was the U.S. 
evidence leaked by the Israelis which provided the basis for the NCRI’s polished 
presentation of the revelations. These suspicions explained the otherwise surprising and 
uncharacteristically muted reaction in Israel. The revelations did not trigger a major 
                                                        
481 Jeffrey Lewis, ‘NCRI Did Not Discover Natanz’, Arms Control Wonk (blog), 28 October 
2006, https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/201274/ncri-did-not-discover-
natanz/. 
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outcry by either public officials, intellectuals, or the media.482 No Israeli leader used the 
occasion to offer a new threat narrative.483 
Either unknown or unacknowledged as part of the discourse surrounding the 
NCRI revelations was the fact that Iran was nearing the decision to end its consideration 
of weapons development. In 2003, months after the public revelation of the new Nantez 
and Arak facilities, Iran ended all activities associated with military applications of its 
nuclear program.484 It maintained, however, that it would continue its development of 
nuclear energy, including its efforts to master the nuclear fuel cycle and advance its 
uranium enrichment capabilities.  
Iran undoubtedly knew that this decision would not end the debate renewed by 
the 2002 revelations. That it could unequivocally assert its compliance with the NPT and 
direct its limited resources to economic and human development programs would not 
undermine its status as a potential nuclear power. It was still enriching fuel and its 
scientists had acquired knowledge that could be utilized should the country’s leaders 
again change their minds. 
                                                        
482 The Jerusalem Post made no mention of the NCRI disclosure in either its reporting or 
editorials.  
483 Prime Minister Ariel Sharon offered no official statement following the NCRI press 
conference. In a November 2012 interview he claimed that Iran was the “center of world 
terror” and that it merited U.S. attention after the war in Iraq was completed. Jack 
Caravelli, Nuclear Insecurity: Understanding the Threat from Rogue Nations and 
Terrorists (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2008), 108. 
484 In its December 2015 report, the IAEA noted that the “activities to be undertaken in 
support of a possible military dimension to [Iran’s] nuclear program” began in the late 
1980s and continued into the early 2000s. These activities were “brought to a halt in late 
2003 and the work was fully recorded, equipment and work places were either cleaned 
or disposed of.” This was the same information that Prime Minister Benjamin 
Netanyahu dramatically “disclosed” in a highly-publicized speech on April 30, 2018. 
Board of Directors, ‘Final Assessment on Past and Present Outstanding Issues Regarding 
Iran’s Nuclear Programme’ (International Atomic Energy Agency, December 2015); 
Benjamin Netanyahu, ‘PM Netanyahu Reveals the Iranian Secret Nuclear Program’, (30 
April 2018), 
http://www.pmo.gov.il/English/MediaCenter/Events/Pages/event_iran300418.aspx.  
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By creating ambiguity and fostering uncertainty, Iran was allowing its enemies to seek 
what they wanted to conclude regarding Iran’s nuclear capacity, its leaders’ intentions 
for its program, and the risk it posed. In sum, it provided a foundation upon which an 
enemy could construct a narrative featuring Iran as an existential threat.  
III. Phase I: Going to War with the Axis of Evil  
 
A. Invading Iraq 
 
The United States’ invasion of Iraq in 2003, although not obvious at the time, was 
a transformative moment for Israel’s relationship with Iran. The administration of 
American president George W. Bush had pivoted from its military invasion of 
Afghanistan, the country supposedly harboring the terrorists responsible for the 
September 11 attacks, to invade Iraq, seeking regime change. Facts subsequently 
contradicted several of the president’s explanations for his attack on Iraq, including that 
its leader, Saddam Hussein, had aided the attacks on 9/11.485 Other justifications 
included that Saddam had a weapons of mass destruction program that threatened the 
security of the United States, or that his ouster promised a democratic transformation of 
the Middle East. Whatever the “real” reason, Israel fully supported the U.S. decision 
because it represented the operationalizing of a regime change policy in the Middle 
East. In making the case for war, Bush had characterized Iraq as part of an “Axis of Evil,” 
comprised of dangerous enemies of the United States due to their development of 
nuclear weapons and sponsorship of terrorism.  
                                                        
485 Neither the 9/11 Commission Report nor the Senate Intelligence Committee’s 
investigation found evidence of Saddam’s responsibility for the attacks. The 9/11 
Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon 
the United States (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004), 11; Senate Committee 
on Intelligence, ‘Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence 
Assessments on Iraq’ (Washington, DC: United States Senate, 7 July 2004). 
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Israel had lobbied hard in favor of war against Saddam. Many Israelis hoped that 
a quick military victory against the Iraqis would pave the way for future military action 
against neighboring Iran, also part of the Axis of Evil. At the very least, the American 
invasion warned Iran to reconsider its ambition of advancing its nuclear program. 
Netanyahu, then a private citizen, echoed the idealistic reasoning that the toppling of 
Saddam could initiate a process of creating a more democratic, stable, and safe Middle 
East.486 Ephraim Inbar, head of the Bar-Ilan BESA Center, advanced the economic case 
for invasion, arguing that Israel would save “billions of shekels” in defense costs.487  
For most Israelis, as well as for President Bush, the ultimate fate of Iraq was less 
important than removing Saddam and dismantling his presumptive weapons program. 
Neither the Americans nor the Israelis gave much thought to the feasibility of Iraq 
becoming a Western-style democracy, or whether future leaders of that country would 
be any more sympathetic to Israel than its current one. The Israelis assumed the 
message would be clear: the same fate could await any Middle East leader seeking to 
produce weapons of mass destruction. 
  The ease with which the United States initially dispatched the Iraqi conventional 
forces and toppled Saddam’s government added to Israeli optimism. Debate about the 
logic of military action against Iran gave way to discussion of timing. After all, if Iraq’s 
weapons program threatened global peace and stability, so too did Iran’s alleged 
development of nuclear weapons.488 The renewed discussion included speculation 
                                                        
486 A Haaretz journalist subsequently noted the similarities between Netanyahu’s case 
for war with Iraq in 2002 and his calls for military action against Iran a decade later. 
Barak Ravid, ‘Iraq 2002, Iran 2012: Compare and Contrast Netanyahu’s Speeches’, 
Haaretz, 4 October 2012, https://www.haaretz.com/blogs/diplomania/iraq-2002-iran-
2012-compare-and-contrast-netanyahu-s-speeches-1.468213. 
487 Herb Keinon, ‘Saddam’s Fall Alters Israel’s Strategic Situation - Experts’, Jerusalem 
Post, 11 April 2003. 
488 Israeli officials reiterated earlier claims that Iran, if given the chance, would not 
hesitate to use a nuclear device against Israel and might even consider using it to 
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about the ease with which regime change in Iran could be effected.489 In a column 
entitled, “It’s Mullah Time!” Mark Steyn claimed that this would be easy since 90% of 
Iranians desired change.490 
 Needless to say, subsequent events in Iraq dampened Israeli optimism for 
achieving successful regime change in Iran. For advocates of such action, however, the 
genie was out of the bottle: they had committed to a strategy involving the use of force. 
Having dismissed less dramatic options, they had no other plan. Given that the United 
States had created chaos in Iraq, however, military and political leaders privately 
debated the capability of carrying out the strategy they were publicly advocating.  
B. Israel’s Case for Iran 
 
The remarkable feature of the Iran nuclear threat narrative initiated by Ephraim 
Sneh and amplified by Netanyahu is that it was grounded in speculation. During the 
1990s, no one knew with certainty the nature of Iran’s nuclear program or its strategic 
intentions. As mentioned earlier, few had much knowledge about Iran at all.491 As the 
United States got bogged down in the Iraq quagmire, it became harder to make the case 
for war with Iran. That is not to say that some did not try. Developments in Iran 
                                                        
support Hezbollah forces in a war against Israel. Matthew Gutman, ‘US Confirms Israeli 
Suspicions about Iranian Nuclear Program’, Jerusalem Post, 12 June 2003. 
489 This sense that Israelis knew what the Iranian people wanted for themselves and 
their future was a common theme of Israeli media coverage during this period. Many 
commentators predicted that the lack of popular support for the Iranian regime would 
make its overthrow a relatively simple task. Steyn estimated that 90% of Iranians desired 
regime change, while Rosenblum cited a “secret poll by the mullahs” that allegedly 
found that only four percent of the populace believe the government is legitimate. In 
June 2003, the Jerusalem Post editorialized that Israel should declare itself the 
“advocate for the [Iranian] people – what they truly want is to be rid of the regime.” 
Mark Steyn, ‘It’s Mullah Time!’, Jerusalem Post, 24 June 2003; Editorial Board, ‘Iran’s 
People Power’, Jerusalem Post, 17 June 2003; Jonathan Rosenblum, ‘A Silver Lining for 
Dark Clouds’, Jerusalem Post, 13 December 2002. 
490 Steyn, ‘It’s Mullah Time!’ 
491 See supra, Chapter 2, Part IV, Section C. 
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contributed to a robust debate in Israel that focused on four main issues: what was 
happening at Iran’s nuclear facilities;492 how long will it take Iran to build and test a 
nuclear weapon; what are Iran’s intentions vis-à-vis Israel; and why is Israel cutting its 
defense budget at this time?  
 Many Israelis had believed that toppling Saddam would enable Israel to reduce 
its defense expenditures. Facing budget problems, Israel decided to cut its defense 
spending after the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Ironically, Israel’s finance minister at the time, 
Benjamin Netanyahu, advanced that recommendation.493 Not surprisingly, Iran hawks 
sharply condemned the decision. Ephraim Sneh, now a Labor Knesset Member (MK) led 
the opposition accusing Ariel Sharon’s government of complacency in the face of what 
he claimed was the real – and growing – threat to Israel’s security.494  
 The alarmists received new ammunition in August 2003 when the IAEA reported 
finding trace amounts of highly enriched uranium at the Natanz nuclear facility. The 
revelation drew very different responses from Israeli and Iranian leaders. The latter 
dismissed the significance of the finding, claiming that the traces were left on used 
components that had been obtained from overseas.495 For many Israelis, this was the 
first hard evidence that proved Iran was secretly producing a bomb. The hawks 
dismissed or ignored Iran’s negotiation offer, which they considered untrustworthy,496 
                                                        
492 See supra, Chapter 4, Part II, Section D. 
493 Gideon Alon, ‘Concerned About Syria and Iran’, Haaretz, 4 August 2003, 
http://www.haaretz.com/concerned-about-syria-and-iran-1.96152. 
494 Alon. 
495 A month later, Iran agreed to enter negotiations over suspending its nuclear 
enrichment and processing. It also considered opening its nuclear sites to unannounced 
inspections and signing the Additional Protocol of the NPT. ‘Timeline of Iran’s 
Controversial Nuclear Program’, CNN.com, 19 March 2012, 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/06/world/meast/iran-timeline/index.html.  
496 Iran’s nuclear program had become a battleground between the elected reformist 
and the conservative hardline factions. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei fought back 
against Khatami’s popularity by marginalizing him and working to block his reformist 
initiatives. Thus, while Khatami sought a nuclear accord with the West, Khamenei and 
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and they renewed calls for Israeli action sooner rather than later. When, three months 
later, the IAEA issued another report claiming that there was no evidence of a secret 
nuclear weapons program in Iran,497 it made no apparent difference in their position.498 
 Meanwhile, “knowledgeable” Israelis offered a variety of timetables for Iran’s 
successful completion of a bomb. Notable among them were military leaders, who in the 
past had been hesitant to assign concrete dates to Iran’s nuclear progress. Israeli 
military intelligence chief Major General Aharon Ze’evi, despite having refused to discuss 
the possibility of Israeli military action against Iran, said that he estimated that Iran was 
just two years away from building its bomb.499 The day after the November IAEA report 
came out, Israel’s Defense Minister, Shaul Mofaz, reduced this estimate of production to 
less than a year.500 Although officials offered their predictions without much evidence to 
support their accuracy, the predictions had an important effect on Israeli perceptions of 
the imminence of the Iranian threat.  
Precision was less important than the idea that the time for completion was 
getting closer. The timetables represented a deadline by which Israel would need to act 
                                                        
the IRGC made belligerent statements punctuated by the occasional missile test. The 
disagreement provided ammunition to both skeptics and optimists evaluating Iran’s 
future intentions. Israeli hawks cited Iran’s hardliners to challenge those willing to 
pursue diplomatic solutions. 
497 ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran’ 
(Vienna, Austria: International Atomic Energy Agency, 10 November 2003), 
https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2003-75.pdf.  
498 The Israeli military could not ignore the growing sense of urgency and uncertainty 
among the politicians. A brigadier general speaking anonymously to the Israeli press, 
claimed, “It would not be an exaggeration to say that the [Israeli Air Force] has devoted 
the bulk of its procurement funds in the past decade to strike at Iran’s nuclear and 
ballistic missile facilities.” By contrast, on the record comments were more measured. 
Ze’evi said that it would be inappropriate to discuss details in public, but notably did not 
deny that the military was considering preemptive attack. Arieh O’Sullivan et al., 
‘Ya’alon: Terror Not Sole Threat’, Jerusalem Post, 24 October 2003. 
499 O’Sullivan et al. 
500 Janine Zacharia, ‘Iran Will Have Nukes in a Year - Mofaz’, Jerusalem Post, 13 
November 2003. 
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if it was to retard or destroy Iran’s nuclear capabilities. Failure to act within the time 
frame would leave Israel facing annihilation. Raising alarms about timing ignored the 
fact that previous predicted deadlines had come and gone, and Iran had yet to produce 
a bomb or indicate that it planned to attack Israel. No officials had faced public 
questioning over their inaccurate predictions, and few had questioned the wisdom of 
continuing such speculation without evidentiary support. Instead, officials revised and 
reissued warnings of imminent or short-term bomb completion, each time seeking to 
emphasize the sense of urgency.501  
  The warnings of the consequences for Israel if Iran realized its nuclear ambitions 
also continued as part of the political discourse. Speakers offered rhetorical pictures of 
the destruction that would be inflicted by the irrational acts of Iran’s ideology-driven 
leaders. Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee Chair, Yuval Steinitz, provided a 
characteristic example, claiming that Iran was a “totally irresponsible and unpredictable 
totalitarian regime that is ready to sacrifice millions of people for its crazy ideology.”502 
Israeli officials directed this message to the global community as well. At the United 
Nations in 2004, Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom asserted, “Iran has replaced Saddam 
Hussein as the world’s number one exporter of terror, hate, and instability,” and 
                                                        
501 By trying to clarify Iran’s progress toward bomb production, Israeli officials likely 
muddied the analysis. Their constantly shifting assessments, often appearing in reaction 
to events, created more uncertainty about Iran’s nuclear activities. This may have been 
the intended purpose since by frequently accelerating their estimates they engendered 
a sense of urgency among those who might otherwise be apathetic to the Iran threat. In 
an interview, one proliferation analyst expressed displeasure with longer timelines 
because they offered too much comfort to those who believed that Iran did not require 
urgent action. Interview with Emily Landau. 
502 Herb Keinon, ‘Shalom Toughens Stance on Iran’, Jerusalem Post, 24 September 2004. 
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reminded the assembled leaders that Iran’s missiles could now reach London, Paris, 
Berlin, and Russia.503 
Khatami’s government officials generally refrained from engaging with Israel 
over its incendiary accusations. But conservative hardliners, including the Supreme 
Leader, who opposed Khatami’s popularity and reform initiatives, often provided 
sufficient provocative comments to validate Israel’s threat narrative.504 With few 
exceptions, however, Iran’s leaders did not exhibit the same fear of Israel as Israelis 
exhibited toward Iran. As noted earlier, securitization efforts in this conflict were 
asymmetrical: Israeli officials maintained that Iran posed an existential threat, while 
Iran’s elected government pursued improved relations with the West.  
One of the exceptions to Iran’s practice of not responding to Israeli accusations 
came in 2005 when Israel threatened military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities.505 
That year, an explosion at a government facility in Iran prompted speculation that Israel 
had carried out its threatened raid. Iranian officials insisted that the explosion had been 
a controlled demolition at an Iranian dam construction site, although doubts 
remained.506  
                                                        
503 Silvan Shalom, ‘United Nations General Assembly Presentation’, (23 September 
2004), https://www.c-span.org/video/?183637-2/united-nations-general-assembly-
meeting.  
504 See footnote 461 supra  
505 Associated Press, ‘Iran Warns Israel against Attacking Nuke Facilities’, Jerusalem Post, 
12 May 2004. 
506 In a Knesset debate on the Iran issue a week after the incident, Foreign Minister 
Silvan Shalom called Iran “the most dangerous country in the world” before offering yet 
another, accelerated timetable for Iran’s completion of a nuclear bomb. He said that 
Iran might achieve nuclear weapons in the coming months. This contradicted the longer 
assessments of Defense Minister Mofaz and Major General Ze’evi from late 2003 and 
represented the shortest prediction by any government official. A month later, in 
another Knesset session, MKs from right-wing parties, including Nissan Slomianksy of 
NRP and Shmuel Halpert of Agudat Israel wondered aloud what could be done in 
response to this threat since Iran was a country that was not “normal” in the traditional 
sense. Slomiansky even questioned whether there would be any centralized command 
and control of future nuclear weapons systems in Iran, implying that the decision to 
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Yet for all the discussion of Iran – including the potential for military action – 
within the Israeli government, military, and media, in early 2005 it remained unclear 
whether the Israeli public was significantly fearful – or even aware – of their leaders’ 
concerns over Iran.507 Polls gauging public opinion on national security did not ask 
respondents their opinions of Iran’s nuclear program, whether they believed that Iran 
posed a threat (existential or otherwise), or whether they favored using military force to 
halt Iran’s nuclear progress. Polls continued to reflect the public’s concern with the 
traditional security threats, including Palestinian unrest and the activities of neighboring 
Arab states.508  
Israeli public ambivalence would soon change, however, when a controversial 
new Iranian leader emerged and brought Iran to the forefront of Israeli political 
consciousness.  
IV. Phase II: Confronting the Villain  
 
A. The Rise of Ahmadinejad  
 
Ahmadinejad’s surprise victory in the Iranian presidential election in 2005 was a 
gift to Israeli hawks. His predecessor, Mohammad Khatami, had engaged in negotiations 
that, at a minimum, belied the charges that the country was singularly focused on 
                                                        
launch a nuclear strike could be left to a motivated ideologue. The “easiest” solution to 
this problem, he said, was regime change. ‘236th Meeting of the 16th Knesset’, 21 
March 2005, Knesset Transcripts. 
507 There are several reasons why the Israeli public may not have shared the fears voiced 
by the political establishment. Evidence of Iran’s weapons program was highly technical, 
and speculation about Iran’s intentions was largely hypothetical. If Iran was directing 
terrorism against Israel, it was doing so through proxies without conclusive evidence of a 
direct linkage to the Iranian regime. Even if Israelis were not aware of the power 
struggle in Iran, they were hearing conflicting reports about Iran’s intentions.  
508 The most consistent resource for national security polling in Israel is the Peace Index 
produced by the Israel Democracy Institute. The survey began regularly tracking public 
opinion on “the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel, 
and current events of a political or diplomatic nature” in 1994. It asked its first question 
on Iran in 2006.  
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building a bomb to destroy Israel. The situation in Iran, however, was far from clear. 
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei grew suspicious of the popular Khatami during the 
latter’s second term in office and precipitated a conflict between the reformists and the 
conservatives, with the nuclear program as its battleground. Thus, while Khatami’s 
government explored possible diplomatic solutions with the West, Khamenei and the 
IRGC issued belligerent public statements punctuated by an occasional missile test to 
disrupt discussions. Although the Second Intifada and its attendant security problems 
commanded Israel’s immediate attention, the remarks of the Iranian hardliners were 
sufficient to support Israeli hawks’ warnings of the dangers of Iran and keep the issue in 
the news.509 
By 2005, as Iran prepared for a presidential leadership change, Israel could not 
be optimistic about prospects for international action against Iran. It was clear that the 
overthrow of Saddam Hussein was not going to transform the Middle East into the 
envisioned democratic utopia. If anything, the United States’ war in Iraq appeared to be 
worsening.510 In June elections in neighboring Lebanon, Hezbollah, an insurgent 
organization that was one of Israel’s sworn enemies, won fourteen seats in the national 
parliament, as well as all 23 seats in southern Lebanon.511 The July 7, 2005 terrorist 
attacks in London and the November 2005 hotel bombings in Jordan highlighted the 
spread of terrorism and the vulnerability of civilians anywhere in the world. The 
                                                        
509 The Second Intifada began in 2000 following a controversial visit by Ariel Sharon to 
the Temple Mount/Al Aqsa Mosque facility in Jerusalem. It lasted roughly through early 
2005, but there is no agreed upon date for its end.  
510 ‘“Quagmire” Analogy Gets Much Use | Fox News’, Fox News, 28 June 2005, 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/2005/06/28/quagmire-analogy-gets-much-use.html. 
511 In alliance with Amal, another Shiite resistance organization turned political party, 
Hezbollah secured 35 seats in the Lebanese parliament. With their election results, the 
Hezbollah/Amal alliance became the largest Shiite party in Lebanon. Esther Pan, 
‘LEBANON: Election Results’, Council on Foreign Relations (blog), 21 June 2005, 
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/lebanon-election-results. 
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optimism that Western determination could reshape the Middle East was, if not gone, at 
least fading quickly.  
In the midst of this turmoil, Iranians elected a new leader. Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad’s victory in a run-off election on June 24, 2005, represented a significant 
change of leadership. His mix of hardline conservative politics, bombastic style, and 
virulent anti-Semitism made him the perfect villain for Israelis who sought to portray 
Iran in monolithic terms. That he came to power through ostensibly democratic 
elections reinforced many of the stereotypical characteristics that Israelis leaders had 
attributed to Iran.512  
 Ahmadinejad surprised observers by making the run-off.513 At the time, he was a 
relative newcomer to electoral politics in Iran, having served only two years as Mayor of 
Tehran.514 His subsequent defeat of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a two-term former 
president and one of the most powerful politicians in Iran, came as a bigger surprise.515 
As Mayor, Ahmadinejad had rolled back many of the liberalizing measures of his more 
moderate mayoral predecessors and, in his presidential campaign, sharply criticized the 
                                                        
512 Iranian elections are, at best, partially democratic. While candidates are directly 
elected by popular vote, they are first vetted by the Guardian Council to ensure their 
commitment to the Islamic Republic and revolutionary ideals. The criteria for approval 
are vague and the non-public process is opaque. Presidential voting takes place in two 
rounds. All candidates compete in a first-round general election. If no candidate receives 
a majority of the votes cast, the two top vote-getters compete in a runoff election.  
513 Ahmadinejad narrowly made the runoff in a crowded first round field. In the first 
round, Ahmadinejad had placed a narrow second, winning 20% of the vote to 
Rafsanjani’s 21%. Given Rafsanjani’s prominence and power in Iranian politics relative to 
Ahmadinejad, most outside observers assumed that the former president would easily 
defeat the political newcomer in the second round. ‘2005 Presidential Election’, Iran 
Data Portal - Syracuse University, accessed 16 July 2018, 
http://irandataportal.syr.edu/2005-presidential-election. 
514 The presidential victory was his first electoral victory, since the Tehran mayor is 
appointed by a committee. 
515 Rafsanjani played a pivotal role in installing Ali Khamenei as Supreme Leader in 1989 
following the death of Ayatollah Khomeini. Rafsanjani then assumed the presidency 
vacated by Khamenei and served two terms from 1989-1997. In the run-off, 
Ahmadinejad won with 61.7% of the vote. ‘2005 Presidential Election’. 
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reforms instituted by the Khatami government. Backed by conservative and hardline 
factions, Ahmadinejad promised a more confrontational approach to the West, and in 
particular, the United States. 516 
Israel, or in Iranian political parlance the “Zionist Regime,” did not figure 
prominently in the campaign. With the focus primarily on the shortcomings of the 
Khatami presidency, the election did not garner much attention in Israel until 
Ahmadinejad’s unexpected victory. Initial reactions in Israel were quick to associate 
Ahmadinejad with Iran’s nuclear threat. In a cabinet meeting two days after the 
election, Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom claimed that Ahmadinejad’s victory proved that 
Iran was not actually interested in reform or conciliation, but rather valued only 
conservatism and extremism. He said Israel viewed with great concern Ahmadinejad’s 
promises to increase nuclear development, which, he argued, had “one purpose in 
mind: to obtain nuclear weapons.” He continued by saying it was now “more probable 
than ever” that Iran would arm terrorist organizations with nuclear weapons and bring 
the nuclear threat to the world’s doorstep. Shalom suggested that Israel seek to have 
the United Nations Security Council take up the issue of Iran’s nuclear program.517  
Those weighing in on the meaning of Ahmadinejad’s election offered two related 
messages, one primarily for domestic audiences and the other for the international 
community. First, Israelis who had propagated the Iran threat narrative claimed that 
their domestic critics had been proven wrong. Second, Israeli leaders challenged the 
complacency of the Western nations. They criticized the West’s willingness to engage 
                                                        
516 ‘Profile: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’, BBC News, 4 August 2010, sec. Middle East, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-10866448. 
517 ‘Cabinet Meeting Minutes’, 26 June 2005, Israeli Prime Minister’s Office.  
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with Iran, particularly because doing so accorded the Islamic Republic international 
legitimacy.518 
The Israeli hawks claimed that the election results vindicated their warnings. 
They claimed that the elections were “clearly rigged,” and that the Islamic Republic was 
finally beginning to abandon the pretense of electoral legitimacy.519 In a stinging opinion 
piece entitled “The mask is off and no one cares,” columnist Caroline Glick wrote that 
the elections were a “democratic farce.” She called Ahmadinejad a “global terrorist who 
was actively seeking nuclear weapons.”520 One Israeli hardliner sarcastically noted the 
weakness of claiming democratic legitimacy, saying, “Even Hitler was democratically 
elected.”521 Some who had been previously skeptical of Iranian intentions adopted 
revisionist claims about their previous views.522 For those who had long been 
denouncing Iran, Ahmadinejad’s election did not represent a significant change. To the 
contrary, it was just the latest chapter in their Iran threat narrative. To the extent they 
                                                        
518 Upon return from a trip to the United Nations in New York, Prime Minister Ariel 
Sharon stressed the need to prevent any agreement or compromise with Iran, especially 
over the issue of its nuclear program. He advocated transferring the handling of the 
issue from the International Atomic Energy Agency to the United Nations Security 
Council. ‘Cabinet Meeting Minutes’, 2 October 2005, Israeli Prime Minister’s Office. 
519 In addition to claiming the elections were rigged, Timmerman wrote in the Jerusalem 
Post that his interviews with defectors from the Islamic Republic over the past two years 
revealed that the “Islamic Republic has assembled 15 nuclear warheads.” Kenneth 
Timmerman, ‘The Coming Nuclear Showdown with Iran’, Jerusalem Post, 1 July 2005. 
520 Caroline Glick, ‘The Mask Is off and No One Cares’, Jerusalem Post, 5 July 2005. 
521 Nissem Zeev of the Shas Party, from Knesset Transcripts ‘264th Meeting of the 16th 
Knesset’, 29 June 2005, Knesset Transcripts. 
522 In one example, at a conference on Iran, Amos Gilad claimed that the dire 
estimations of Israel’s military establishment in the late 1990s were “repeatedly 
dismissed by government officials.” Gilad appeared to be engaging in revisionist history, 
as the majority of 1990’s military assessments about Iran were less alarmist than those 
voiced by many government officials. It is possible that he was referring to the 
Netanyahu-led Likud government of 1996-1999, which initially indicated a willingness 
for engagement with Iran. Yaakov Katz, ‘Ex-MI Chief: Jihad Tsunami on the Way. Three 
Gaza Terrorists Wounded in IAF Missile Strike’, Jerusalem Post, 16 May 2006.  
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added new material in this installment, it was that they believed they could prove their 
former critics wrong. 
Israeli leaders also used the election to castigate nations, especially in the West, 
for their willingness to treat the Islamic Republic as a legitimate state. They argued that 
Iran deserved confrontation not engagement. Through their criticism of Ahmadinejad as 
undeserving of respect as a head of state, they implied that Iran should be ostracized as 
a member of the international community. Undoubtedly, some Israelis hoped that the 
United States would find Ahmadinejad so objectionable as to warrant drastic action 
against Iran. No one, however, expressed optimism that this would happen.523 
Ahmadinejad’s election initially did not materially change the content of Israel’s 
public narrative regarding Iran’s nuclear threat. Thus, Ariel Sharon chose not to repeat 
this part of the narrative in his fall 2005 address to the United Nations General 
Assembly. In his speech, he included only a single reference to Iran as a threat to the 
world while refusing to mention the country by name. 524 Believing that he could secure 
broad international opposition to Iran’s nuclear activities and prevent compromise, he 
pursued his Iran agenda primarily out of the public’s view.525 Upon his return from New 
York, Sharon reported to the cabinet that he had discussed the need for transferring the 
                                                        
523 Some openly admitted pessimism, predicting that Ahmadinejad would, like his 
predecessors, continue to enjoy international legitimacy, however undeserving.  
524 Sharon noted the threats of both nuclear weapons acquisition and support for 
terrorism given Iran’s “murky fundamentalism.” Ariel Sharon, ‘PM Sharon Addresses the 
United Nations General Assembly’ (15 September 2005), 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/pm%20sharon%20addres
ses%20the%20un%20general%20assembly%2015-sep-2005.aspx. 
525 Notably, Israel eschewed diplomacy for engagement with Ahmadinejad’s reformist 
predecessor, but now embraced it as a means for internationally isolating Iran. Ze’evi, 
Head of Israeli Military Intelligence, lauded these efforts, claiming that their success 
proved the utility of international diplomacy. Other Israeli officials, however, pushed for 
unilateral action against Iran. Herb Keinon, ‘Key Israeli Officials Declare Support for 
More Unilateral Steps’, Jerusalem Post, 29 September 2005. 
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Iranian nuclear issue from the IAEA to the United Nations Security Council, and that he 
had stressed the need to “prevent any agreement or compromise with Iran.”526 
Soon thereafter, Ahmadinejad did not disappoint those who expected him to 
manifest the danger they claimed he represented. In an effort to provoke Israel – and by 
extension, the rest of the Western world – the Iranian government sponsored a 
conference in October 2005 entitled “A World Without Zionism.” Ahmadinejad used the 
occasion to refer to Israel as the “occupying regime” and to declare that it should be 
“wiped off the map.”527 Matching Sharon’s resistance to any compromise concerning 
Iran, Ahmadinejad stated, “We cannot compromise over the issue of Palestine.”  
While it is difficult to say with certainty to what extent Ahmadinejad intended to 
create a global controversy with his remarks, once they were picked up by international 
media outlets, Israelis helped to disseminate them. Israeli officials found multiple 
reasons for citing the escalation in rhetoric. Former Israeli President Shimon Peres called 
for Iran to be expelled from the United Nations for committing a crime against 
humanity.528 Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom reminded the French Foreign Minister that 
Europe should remember that their cities are within range of Iranian missiles, and that it 
                                                        
526 ‘Cabinet Meeting Minutes’, 2 October 2005. 
527 There is some controversy surrounding the exact translation of Ahmadinejad’s words. 
Most English translations of the Persian transcript posted on the Interior Ministry’s 
website use the phrase “wipe off the map” for the relevant section of the speech. Some, 
however, claim that Ahmadinejad’s actual words were closer to “must vanish from the 
arena of time,” and implied that Israel would instead collapse. The New York Times 
posted a full English translation on its website three days after the speech. It included 
the “wiped off the map” language. ‘Text of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s Speech’, The New 
York Times, 30 October 2005, sec. Week In Review, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/30/weekinreview/text-of-mahmoud-ahmadinejads-
speech.html; Glenn Kessler, ‘Did Ahmadinejad Really Say Israel Should Be “Wiped off the 
Map”?’, Washington Post, 5 October 2011, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/post/did-ahmadinejad-really-say-
israel-should-be-wiped-off-the-map/2011/10/04/gIQABJIKML_blog.html. 
528 Orly Halpern and Herb Keinon, ‘Iranian President: “Wipe Israel off Map”’, Jerusalem 
Post, 27 October 2005. 
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was important for the “whole Western world to stand united in its position” against the 
Iranian threat.529 He also reminded Israelis that Ahmadinejad’s threat was a 
reaffirmation of the long-held Iranian desire to destroy Israel.530  
Ahmadinejad’s intemperate remarks and the anti-Semitic tone of the conference 
facilitated the amplification of the Iran threat narrative. Israeli media seized the 
opportunity to cast Ahmadinejad as Israel’s primary adversary. The average number of 
articles mentioning Iran more than tripled during the Ahmadinejad era, rising from 43.1 
articles per month in the 180 months (fifteen years, ten months) before his election in 
May 2005 to 154.1 per month in the 128 months after (ten years, eight months). (See 
Figure 1, next page.) The percent change was even larger when limited only to the 
opinion section, where the number of pieces mentioning Iran increased by more than 
500%, going from 10.4 per month in the period before his election to 53.1 after.531 (See 
Figure 2, next page.)  
 
 
                                                        
529 In an open letter to world foreign ministers around the world, Shalom called on them 
to “act, both bilaterally and within the framework of the United Nations to bring such 
Iranian behaviour to an end.” Michel Zlotowski, ‘Shalom Urges Annan to Condemn Iran. 
Foreign Minister Enjoys a Well-Timed Visit to France’, Jerusalem Post, 28 October 2005; 
Silvan Shalom, ‘FM Shalom Appeals to Fellow Foreign Ministers on Iranian Threat’, 30 
October 2005, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs Documents, 
http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2005/Pages/FM%20Shalom%20appeals%20to%20fell
ow%20foreign%20ministers%20on%20Iranian%20threat%2030-Oct-2005.aspx. 
530 He referred to Rafsanjani’s 2001 Al Quds day speech that he had delivered as former 
president. Halpern and Keinon, ‘Iranian President’. See discussion supra. Chapter 3, Sec. 
V. 
531 Text analysis is a useful tool but comes with some limitations. This average was 
determined from a simple word search of the Jerusalem Post on the archive site 
Newsbank. As Jockers notes, raw numbers in corpus analysis can be misleading and 
require contextual examination to certify findings as meaningful. This was done using 
the Jockers-developed KWIC analysis, which enables the researcher to search large text 
databases to identify key words within their linguistic context. This was used as a 
general check to ensure that the majority of references were valid. Jockers, Text Analysis 
with R for Students of Literature. 
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Figure 1532 
 
Source: Jerusalem Post Archives (via Newsbank) 
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Source: Jerusalem Post Archives (via Newsbank) 
                                                        
532 Explanatory note on methodology: The corpus analysis employed in this thesis offer a 
visual representation of Iran messaging employed by a newspaper, as representative of 
the conservative-leaning media, and conservative Israeli political leader Benjamin 
Netanyahu (see Chapter 5, Part V, Section C.i.). It uses both Microsoft Excel and the R 
Programming software program to present graphically the messaging analyzed in this 
project. 
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Ahmadinejad’s bombastic style made for easy comparisons to Hitler, Haman, or 
other would-be destroyers of the Jewish people. Those invoking history also claimed 
that the current threat of annihilation would be even greater if Iran could use nuclear 
weapons to achieve its genocidal goal.533 As Figure 3 shows, the frequency of distinct 
articles mentioning both “Iran” and “Holocaust” spiked following Ahmadinejad’s 
ascendancy to Iranian national politics, as did various other combinations of “Iran” and 
Holocaust-related lexicon, including “Hitler,” “Nazi,” and “genocide.”534 (See Figure 3, 
next page.) A significant proportion of these articles – nearly half, on average –
mentioned Iran’s nuclear program. Between 2005 and 2008, there were more than 200 
articles per year using the words “Iran” and “Holocaust” in the same text. Many drew 
direct comparisons between modern-day Iran and the Final Solution in Nazi Germany. 
Prior to 2005, articles with both of these words had not exceeded 50 in any single year 
since 1989.  
 Security experts and ex-officials built upon this shift in public attention to 
advance the case for action. Avi Dichter,535 a former director of Israel’s domestic 
intelligence agency, the Shin Bet, declared to a pro-Israel American audience that if Iran 
reaches an “irreversible point” in its nuclear program, America will have to do to Iran  
 
 
 
                                                        
533 A Knesset session following the conference revealed the anxiety it provoked. Many 
MKs took to the floor to decry Ahmadinejad’s speech and compare him to past enemies 
of the Jewish people. ‘284th Meeting of the 16th Knesset’, 2 November 2005, Knesset 
Transcripts. 
534 It is worth noting that the first major spike in this language took place in 2006 rather 
than 2005, despite the fact that Ahmadinejad was first elected in the middle of 2005. 
This is likely because Ahmadinejad’s infamous Holocaust denial press conference did not 
take place until December 2005. This event reinforced Ahmadinejad’s international 
image as a Holocaust denier and anti-Semite in the eyes of many observers. 
535 Dichter had recently left Israeli public service to become a research fellow at the 
Brookings Institution. He analyzed the situation in a speech to a U.S. pro-Israel 
organization. 
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what Israel did at Osirak in Iraq.536 Lieutenant General Dan Halutz, Chief of Staff of the 
Israeli Armed Forces, declared that sanctions alone would not be sufficient to deter Iran. 
“In general,” he said, “for people who are used to eating olives and pita bread, sanctions 
which won’t let them have cream with their caviar is not something that is too 
bothersome.”537 
 Halutz’s comments were notable for two reasons. First, that a senior military 
officer was willing to speculate openly about the potential necessity of military action 
against Iran emphasized to the public the seriousness of the threat. Second, his 
evocation of cultural stereotypes about Iranians – their simplicity, poverty, and general 
orientalism – expressed an implicit feature of the Israeli political discourse on Iran. In 
this view, Iranians were either fanatics or simpletons who did not value life as much as 
Israelis. Iranians would readily make personal sacrifices in furtherance of aggressive 
military ambitions. Another Israeli general, Amos Yadlin, articulated a similar sentiment 
when he described the Iranian threat as “ideological in origin,” which created an “arc of 
evil that stretches between Teheran and Damascus.”538 
 It is difficult to know whether Israel’s leaders had orchestrated and coordinated 
the response to Ahmadinejad or whether individual leaders seized the opportunity to 
offer dire messages about Iran’s future. In either case, these messages created an 
argument for unilateral preemptive action by Israel if the international community failed 
to mount a collective response. Reflecting years later on the Ahmadinejad era, Israeli 
                                                        
536 Dichter reentered politics not long after this appearance, first in 2006 as Minister of 
Internal Security for Kadima, and then in 2009 as part of Netanyahu’s Likud government. 
Jerusalem Post correspondent, ‘Dichter: US May Have to Bomb Iran’, Jerusalem Post, 31 
October 2005.  
537 Arieh O’Sullivan, ‘Halutz: Sanctions Won’t Deter Iran’, Jerusalem Post, 21 November 
2005. 
538 Gil Hoffman and Sheera Claire Frenkel, ‘“I Prefer Fewer Declarations and More 
Deeds”’, Jerusalem Post, 10 November 2006. 
 226 
journalist and political advisor Yaakov Katz observed that Ahmadinejad was a significant 
public relations victory for the Israelis because he embodied and articulated the threat 
characteristics that Israeli politicians had attributed to Iran.539 That he was an elected 
official – as opposed to an appointed religious cleric – added to his utility in Israeli 
portrayals of Iran, making the entire country seem willing to commit, and perhaps 
sacrifice, in the name of a divine mission.  
 Despite Ahmadinejad’s provocations, the challenge for Israel remained to 
convince world leaders of the need for dramatic action. There was little appetite for 
expanding the current regional conflict beyond Iraq’s borders, even among the most 
hawkish members of the Bush administration in the United States. Regime change in 
Iraq had gone so badly as to be a warning to anyone paying attention to beware of 
unintended consequences. Israeli leaders had no response, as they gave no indication 
that they had considered the repercussions of Iranian retaliatory action.540 Military 
officials, as noted above, expressed contempt for the idea that softer measures, such as 
economic sanctions, would work, while other prominent public figures doubled down on 
imagining the consequences of Israeli inaction. One such alarmist, Israeli television 
presenter Chanan Azran, published a book in March 2006 entitled To Die of Fear: The 
“Dirty Bomb” – Nightmare Scenarios.541 In an interview with the Jerusalem Post, Azran 
explained that the comments of IDF Chief of Staff Halutz concerning how Iran might 
provide Al Qaeda with radioactive material for a dirty bomb was one of his main sources 
                                                        
539 Interview with Yaakov Katz. 
540 It is likely that Israelis understood that Iran would not fail to respond to Israeli action, 
as had Iraq in 1980. Iranian leaders had consistently matched Israeli threats with their 
own promises of retaliation, and Iran’s military was far more capable than Iraq’s at the 
time of the Osirak strike. 
541 The Jerusalem Post described it as “a book filled with photographs of mushroom 
clouds, bio-chemical treatment exercises, the bubonic plague and unguarded Soviet-era 
military bases.” Erik Schechter, ‘Our Own 9/11?’, Jerusalem Post, 3 March 2006. 
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of information about the seriousness of the threat. He called it “the first time a senior 
military person has called a spade a spade – or in this case, a dirty bomb.”542 He added 
that it was only a matter of time before Israel was the victim of a non-conventional 
weapon attack on its soil.543 Chief of Israeli military intelligence Ze’evi Farkash also 
offered a particularly vivid image of the pending danger. He professed that “The Middle 
East is currently standing before a global jihad tsunami.” 
  The diffusion of the Iran narrative to and its impact on the Israeli public 
remained matters of speculation until April 2006. If a tenet of war theory is the 
requirement of public support – which in Israel is particularly essential due to the 
mandatory military service requirement – it is notable that the first public opinion poll 
regarding public attitudes toward Iran was so long in coming. Shortly after Israel’s 
national elections,544 the monthly Peace Index poll asked Israelis about their perceptions 
of the threat posed by Iran. The responses revealed that an impressive 78% of the Israeli 
public believed that Iran constituted a real strategic danger to Israel; only 16% 
disagreed. Significantly, however, the majority did not favor a unilateral military 
response by Israel against Iran’s nuclear facilities as the solution to this problem. Only 
37% answered favorably while nearly half, 47%, opposed such action.545 That Israelis did 
                                                        
542 Schechter. 
543 Numbers of sales and readership of Azran’s book are unknown. It nonetheless 
received media attention. Schechter. 
544 The newly formed Kadima Party, led by Ehud Olmert, won a plurality in March 2006 
elections. It received 22% of the vote and secured 29 seats. Amir Peretz’s Labor party 
came in second with 15% of the vote and 19 seats, followed by the ultra-orthodox Shas 
party and Likud, now led by Netanyahu, each with 12 seats. Kadima joined with Labor, 
Shas, and Yisrael Beiteinu to form a government with Olmert as Prime Minister. 
Netanyahu, as the head of the largest party not in the government, became leader of 
the opposition. Although Iran was increasingly recognized as a security threat, issues 
related to Iran did not play a large role in the election that year. Shmuel Sandler, 
Manfred Gerstenfeld, and Jonathan Rynhold, Israel at the Polls 2006, Israeli History, 
Politics and Society (London: Routledge, 2008).  
545 Ephraim Yaar and Tamar Hermann, ‘The Peace Index’, April 2006, 
http://www.peaceindex.org/indexMonthEng.aspx?mark1=&mark2=&num=30. 
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not support military intervention advocated by political and military leaders suggested 
that they did not share their assessment of the threat. As the poll did not drill down, we 
do not know the reasons for this lack of support. Still, for Israeli leaders, it was notable 
that at least one in three respondents favored a military response, which represented a 
solid base upon which to build a campaign for future offensive action. 
B. Debating Strategy 
 
The absence of public enthusiasm for extraordinary action against Iran did not 
deter those who believed it was the proper course of action. The internal debates 
between those wanting to pursue a diplomatic solution and those advocating stronger 
measures became public in May 2006 following Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s speech to 
the U.S. Congress. Although he invoked the familiar threat themes in condemning Iran’s 
nuclear program and support for terrorism, many on the Israeli right attacked his 
strategy as insufficient. Caroline Glick of the Jerusalem Post called the speech “weak,” 
and declared that Israel was well beyond the point where words alone will sway Iran.546 
A column entitled “Religious Fanatic at a Persian Bazaar,” exemplified the attacks. In it, 
Amir Taheri argued that the time for diplomacy with Iran was over. The real problem 
with Iran, he claimed, was that the Ahmadinejad government believed in its messianic 
vision backed by the hidden imam. With divine authority on its side, concessions in the 
international arena were unnecessary and illogical. Negotiating with such an individual, 
Taheri wrote, would be akin to appeasement with Adolf Hitler.547 
Even as the United Nations Security Council imposed new sanctions against Iran, 
the Israeli right continued to argue that Iran could neither be engaged nor deterred. The 
embrace of Holocaust rhetoric signaled a shift in the argumentation from strategic 
                                                        
546 Caroline Glick, ‘Hitler Is Still Dead’, Jerusalem Post, 26 May 2006. 
547 Amir Taheri, ‘Religious Fanatic at a Persian Bazaar’, Jerusalem Post, 28 May 2006. 
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assessment based upon facts to a case grounded in moral considerations. The 
proponents of action replaced rational security calculation with warnings of existential 
danger. In addition to hardline politicians, some of Israel’s leading moral authorities 
weighed in with concerns for the continued survival of the Israeli – and by extension, 
Jewish – people. In May 2008, Elie Wiesel, a Holocaust survivor and one of Israel’s moral 
leaders, said in reference to Iran that it was mandatory for Israelis to “act against evil.” 
He added that it was the duty of “everyone who has a heart” to stand in opposition to 
Iran.548 Israel’s right-wing religious leaders, having been initially reticent to reject 
diplomacy, joined in making the moral case.549 Notably, this chorus grew louder as Israel 
confronted what would be the second transformative event of this time period: its 
second war in Lebanon.  
V. Phase III: Fighting Iran in Lebanon  
 
A. The Second Lebanon War 
 
 In 2006 Israel invaded Lebanon, launching the Second Lebanon War, due to or in 
spite of its growing obsession with Iran. Tensions between Israel and Hezbollah had 
slowly simmered along Israel’s northern border in the six years since Israel’s abrupt 
withdrawal from south Lebanon. Israeli strategists were well aware of the role Iran had 
played in developing and supporting the Shiite militia forces, including Hezbollah, which 
had developed during Israel’s 18-year occupation. Still, for those preoccupied with the 
Iran threat, there was a delay in connecting the violence that erupted in June 2006 with 
                                                        
548 Shlomo Cesana, ‘ אני נאבק באחמדינג’אד ’, Israel Hayom, 18 May 2008. 
549 Not everyone attending agreed. David Menashri, an Iranian-born professor of Iran 
studies at Tel Aviv University, told a reporter, “The Israeli response to the Iranian 
nuclear issue plays into Iran’s hands,” adding that Israel and its allies had more to gain 
from talking to Ahmadinejad than they did from threatening Iran. Orly Halpern, ‘“Israel 
Should Stay Quiet about Iran” MKs Causing More Harm than Good, Says TA Professor’, 
Jerusalem Post, 7 June 2006.  
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their threat narrative and action plan. The invasion followed abduction of two Israeli 
soldiers who had been patrolling along Israel’s norther border. Israeli forces re-occupied 
southern Lebanon with the intent of rooting out the Hezbollah forces by eliminating 
their bases of operations. 
 By most accounts, the conflict proved complicated and confusing.550 Israeli 
troops were uncharacteristically disorganized and struggled to identify and engage an 
enemy whose members had integrated into the societal structure of south Lebanon.551 
The population was deeply hostile to the Israeli military, making it difficult for the IDF to 
gain any actionable intelligence on enemy operations. Israeli intelligence proved 
unprepared to counter Hezbollah’s bunker-based defensive tactics and insurgency-style 
operations, and IDF ground troops struggled to coordinate their movements with air 
support.552 
 The fighting ended just over a month later with both sides declaring victory. 
Israeli leaders touted the damage they had inflicted on southern Lebanon – including a 
superior body count – as evidence that they had dealt a severe blow to Hezbollah. 
Meanwhile, Hezbollah claimed a strategic victory, noting that not only had they repelled 
the Israeli invaders, but they had survived the full force of the Israeli military’s power, 
thereby disproving the invincibility of the IDF.  
In retrospect, the Lebanon war changed the political landscape, not because of 
what happened or did not happen during the brief encounter, but because it produced a 
                                                        
550 Several soldiers present during the operation gave similar accounts to the author. 
While they asked not to be quoted, media and other reports echoed their assessment.  
551 Israel had to know Hezbollah’s strategy since its leader Hassan Nasrallah had 
effectively announced it before the war. “[Hezbollah fighters] live in their houses, in 
their schools, in their churches, in their fields, in their farms, and in their factories.” 
Marvin Kalb and Carol Saivetz, ‘The Israeli-Hezbollah War of 2006: The Media as a 
Weapon in Asymmetrical Conflict’ (Brookings Institution, 18 February 2007), 8.  
552 Blanford, Warriors of God. 
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new chapter of the Iran narrative. Ultimately, the agent for that narrative, Benjamin 
Netanyahu, would use it to secure his political agenda and restore himself to a position 
of power. 
B. Toward a New War with Iran 
 
Ultimately, the significance of the war would not be determined on the 
battlefield but revealed in the post-mortem that followed. This began with the military 
and strategic reviews of Israel’s conduct. Both internal and third-party appraisals 
concluded that Israel had actually accomplished very little of what it had intended to 
achieve during the fighting. One scathing internal review called the war “a serious 
missed opportunity” in which several thousand men resisted the region’s most powerful 
and technologically advanced military force. It cited Israeli political and military leaders 
for “grave failings.”553 Many in the IDF agreed. They had sought to quickly dispatch 
Hezbollah forces, whom Israelis regarded as a second-rate terrorist organization capable 
of fighting only low-level guerrilla battles. Instead, like many militaries of history, they 
were unexpectedly defeated by an enemy whose quality they deemed far inferior to 
their own. Israeli forces returned home surprised by the competence of their foe, the 
quality of their weapons, and the sophistication of their tactical operations.554  
While it took some time before public discussion of the conflict in Lebanon 
recognized an Iran connection, eventually opponents of the Olmert government raised 
the issue of linkage. Benjamin Netanyahu, then the leader of the Likud opposition, was 
among the first to condemn Iran’s role in the conflict. He claimed that enemy forces had 
been “conceived, organized, trained and equipped by Iran, with Iran’s goal of destroying 
                                                        
553 Steven Erlanger, ‘Israeli Inquiry Finds “Grave Failings” in ’06 War’, The New York 
Times, 31 January 2008, sec. Middle East, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/31/world/middleeast/31mideast.html. 
554 Blanford, Warriors of God. 
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Israel and its fantasy ideology of building a once-glorious Muslim empire in which we are 
the first pit stop.” He went on to declare Iran, “The source of everything that is 
happening here now.” Invoking the Nazi analogy, he said, “These people [the Iranians] 
are stark-raving mad, but there is a method to their madness, just like Hitler.” According 
to Netanyahu, Iran could be found lurking behind nearly all of Israel’s enemies.555 
 Netanyahu’s accusations not only initiated discussion of Iranian involvement in, if 
not responsibility for, the war with Hezbollah, but it also transformed Iran from a 
passive threat into an active belligerent. It was now directly responsible for Israeli 
casualties. The Jerusalem Post captured the new development days after the end of 
fighting by entitling its editorial “A wake-up call.” The Post wrote, 
“This struggle, in the end, has little to do with Lebanon, and even with 
Hezbollah, but with the true existential threats facing Israel, first and 
foremost from Iran…Our job now is to better prepare ourselves at every 
level: societal, diplomatic, governmental, and military; and, as the nation 
on the front line, do our utmost to mobilize the free world to collectively 
and effectively defend itself."556  
 
Interestingly, while Ahmadinejad and other Iranian officials celebrated Hezbollah’s 
victory over the Israelis, they disclaimed responsibility for helping them in the fighting. 
In Ahmadinejad’s narrative, the Israelis had been defeated by a “unified, patient, and 
stable people.” In an ironic turn-about, Iranian MP Hussein Najat called on UN Secretary 
General Kofi Annan to seek a war crimes indictment against Israel for its conduct during 
the fighting.557 
 The claim that Iran bore responsibility for Israel’s inability to root out Hezbollah 
in Lebanon gained traction as Israel struggled to explain the failure of its mission there. 
One explanation held that Israel had not understood its enemy in the conflict. Israel had 
                                                        
555 Gil Hoffman, ‘Netanyahu: Don’t Boycott the BBC’, Jerusalem Post, 11 August 2006. 
556 Editorial Board, ‘A Wake-up Call’, Jerusalem Post, 13 August 2006. 
557 ‘ رßàﺲ ﺟﻤﻬﻮري: ﺗﺠﺎوز رژßﻢ ﺻﻬﻴﻮﻧàﺴå§ ¤ﻪ ﻟﺒﻨﺎن ﺗﻌﺪي ¤ﻪ ﻣﻠﺖ ﻫﺎي ﻣﻨﻄﻘﻪ اﺳﺖ ’, Jamejam Online, 
14 July 2006. 
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not just fought Hezbollah, it had engaged in a war against Iran. Defeat of the former 
could not come without engaging the latter. Eventually those seeking to rationalize 
Israel’s performance during the war settled on a consensus that enabled them to pivot 
attention away from Lebanon in favor of an explanation that centered on Iran. 
Accordingly, the enemy had not been a simple terrorist organization operating along 
Israel’s northern border, but a country with a large, well-equipped army and aspirations 
of becoming a nuclear power. The threat narrative had a new chapter. 
In the new account, this type of conflict could not be resolved by a month-long 
skirmish in a third country against a few thousand members of a terrorist organization 
acting as a proxy on behalf of the real enemy. Moreover, the fact that Israel had 
engaged in a hot war, which involved Iran, changed the nature of the threat calculus. It 
also allowed Israel to counter international criticism of its aggression by recasting itself 
as a victim. The rest of the world was insufficiently sympathetic to Israel’s plight.558 The 
new narrative proved appealing. It penetrated popular literature, both fiction and non-
fiction.  
A novel authored by a former Israeli intelligence officer responsible for devising 
and gaming hypothetical nightmare scenarios for Israeli security is one such example. 
Originally published in 2003, The Chosen One: The Mossad in Iran by Shabtai Shoval 
gained attention in the immediate aftermath of the Lebanon War. He wrote of a coup 
d’état that forces Iran’s religious leadership to abandon Tehran and take refuge in a 
secret bunker near the city of Qom.559 Faced with imminent defeat and certain death, 
                                                        
558 Israeli commentators bemoaned the bias against the Jewish State, particularly among 
international institutions like the UN. A common refrain was that anti-Israel bias 
prevented the world from seeing Iran’s support of its proxy Hezbollah. See e.g. Robert 
Rozett, ‘Recognizing Evil’, Jerusalem Post, 22 August 2006. 
559 Qom is the most religious city in Iran and an important center of Shiite religious 
scholarship and clerical training.  
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the Iranian clergy, led by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei,560 decide to launch a 
nuclear attack against Israel, fulfilling their murderous destiny. A long-shot clandestine 
Mossad operation is the only hope for Israeli redemption.  
The book is filled with Islamophobic and racist stereotypes portraying Iranians as 
bloodthirsty and untrustworthy. In one of the book’s climactic moments, Khamenei 
gives a sermon to his “possessed” followers. As he announces the decision to launch the 
nuclear strike, he preaches, “The events at hand will open the eyes of those countrymen 
of ours who have resigned to the path of treason. I believe that once we unleash the fire 
bolts of Salah al-Dīn upon the Zionists, these traitors will cease their imbecilic war on 
God’s messengers and return to the patronage of the Qur’an and the holy Ayatollahs.” 
The author graphically pictures the crowd’s response:  
The bunker’s personnel chanted after him, their throats parched, as they 
stamped their feet in an ever-growing rhythm. A hypnotic power 
permeated the space, like a rolling thunder washing over the packed 
crowd in overwhelming and dense waves of resolve, crushing all 
resistance. Masses clamored for their foreseen death, driven by sheer 
faith.561  
 
After the Lebanese war, Shoval, who had become a prominent counterterrorism 
authority at an Israeli university, explained in an interview that he had written the book 
hoping that it would “bring the looming danger [of Iran] to the forefront of public 
consciousness.”562 Despite the book not making the best seller list, it contributed to the 
vilification of Iran as a security threat in a way that fired the imagination of those 
familiar with its story.  
 A year later, another book purporting to tell the real story behind the Lebanon 
war met with much greater commercial success. Ronen Bergman’s The Point of No 
                                                        
560 Khamenei is the only real-life figure named in the book.  
561 Shabtai Shoval, The Chosen One - The Mossad in Iran, ed. Phil Weinstock, trans. Asaf 
Epstien, Second edition (Scientific Driven Systems LTD, 2003). 
562 Sam Ser, ‘Tangling with Teheran’, Jerusalem Post, 29 September 2006. 
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Return sold nearly 100,000 copies, which, by Israeli standards, was an impressive 
number.563 It was subsequently published in English under the more revealing title, The 
Secret War with Iran: The 30-Year Clandestine Struggle Against the World’s Most 
Dangerous Terrorist Power. The book offers a grim portrait of Israeli military and 
intelligence efforts to counter and contain Iran. Going beyond its primary focus on the 
failures of the 2006 Lebanon campaign, Bergman delves into Israel’s military past to 
construct a history of conflict with a heretofore unrecognized Iranian enemy.564 In the 
book’s introduction, Bergman explains the challenge this poses:  
The problem is that after three decades of trying to meet the Iranian challenge 
with a variety of strategies, covert negotiations, arms deals, critical dialogue, 
containment, direct political confrontation, and indirect action against its 
proxies, we still do not understand Iran. We do not know what its leaders want 
to do, and we do not know how to stop them from doing it, or at least, we do not 
know enough.565  
 
Despite this absence of knowledge regarding Iranian intent, Bergman was 
sharply critical of Israeli complacency in facing the Iranian threat. According to Bergman, 
the conflict involved “a titanic struggle between an aggressive, ideology-driven Islamic 
revolutionary regime, assisted by a no less brutal ideological ally that is willing to do its 
bidding, and a complacent, satisfied society that thought it had put its existential fears 
behind it.”566 For Bergman, Israel’s ignorance of Iran was a critical shortcoming. Thus, it 
is significant that Bergman, an investigative journalist for the Israeli newspaper Yediot 
Aharonot, who is considered the reporter with the best connections to Israel’s 
                                                        
563 Interview with Ronen Bergman, interview by Jonathan Leslie, Tel Aviv, Israel, 25 
January 2016. 
564 Bergman, The Secret War with Iran. 
565 Bergman. 
566 Bergman. 
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intelligence community,567 lamented in a subsequent interview that the Israeli 
establishment has failed to understand virtually every aspect of its conflict with Iran.568 
In 2007 two additional publications made notable contributions to the public 
discourse. The publication of an influential essay noted that “For over two decades, 
since the era of former Prime Minister Menachem Begin, the Holocaust was rarely 
invoked, except on the extremes, in Israeli politics. In recent months, though, the Iranian 
threat has returned the Final Solution to the heart of Israeli discourse.”569 Authors Yossi 
Klein Halevi and Michael Oren, a future Israeli ambassador to the U.S, captured the 
growing fear represented by Ahmadinejad’s anti-Semitic rhetoric and Israel’s 
vulnerability to a nuclear Iran. At the same time, the article crystalized the transition of 
concern from Ahmadinejad’s view of history to a narrative in which the Holocaust 
served as a model for understanding Iranian behavior.570 The article, which received 
                                                        
567 Israelis consider Bergman to be the best-connected reporter to the Israeli intelligence 
community. As one seasoned political analyst put it in an off-the-record interview: “He is 
the Mossad’s leak guy.” His work can therefore read in part as public version of the 
Mossad’s state of knowledge about Iran and the Iranian threat. The lack of knowledge 
about Iran within the Israeli intelligence community also squares with the general 
description about Iran strategic planning given by Yossi Alpher in an interview with the 
author. Interview with Yossi Alpher, interview by Jonathan Leslie, Tel Aviv, Israel, 9 
December 2015. 
568 Interview with Ronen Bergman. 
569 Yossi Klein Halevi and Michael B. Oren, ‘Israel’s Worst Nightmare’, The New Republic, 
5 February 2007. 
570 A year earlier a study conducted by the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs 
highlighted the new linkage of Iran and Ahmadinejad to the threat of genocide. The 
published report, picturing a mushroom cloud on the cover, compared the 1990’s 
Rwandan genocide to modern Iran. The authors, who included prominent public 
intellectuals and moral leaders such as Dr. Dore Gold and Elie Wiesel, wrote, “The 
critical difference is that while the huts in Rwanda were equipped with the most basic of 
weapons, such as machetes, Iran, should the international community do nothing to 
prevent it, will soon acquire nuclear weapons. This would increase the risk of instant 
genocide, allowing no time or possibility for defensive efforts.” They authors 
recommended that, in addition to sanctions and international monitoring by the IAEA, 
Ahmadinejad should face charges for incitement to genocide before the International 
Criminal Court. Justus Reid Weiner et al., ‘Referral of Iranian President Ahmadinejad on 
the Charge of Incitement to Commit Genocide’ (Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 
2006). 
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considerable attention, mentioned a poll in which “27 percent of Israelis said they would 
consider leaving if Iran went nuclear.”571 It contributed to normalizing Holocaust 
discourse in the public debate572 paving the way for Netanyahu’s morality-based 
messaging.573  
 Also in 2007, a new Israeli newspaper appeared, which took advantage of the 
information void on Iran and the growing emotional tenor of the public discourse. 
Known as Yisrael Hayom (or “Israel Today”), the publication quickly became one of the 
most widely-read newspapers in the country.574 Financed by a staunchly conservative 
American billionaire, Sheldon Adelson, who derived his fortune from the Las Vegas 
casino industry, the enterprise promoted right-wing policy proposals and championed 
the causes of conservative Israeli politicians, including Benjamin Netanyahu and Avigdor 
Lieberman.575 It was free to the public, a first for an Israel newspaper. Whether the 
                                                        
571 They did not cite the source of the poll, but the figure has been repeated when 
speaking of Iran’s threat to Zionism. 
572 Not surprisingly, Ephraim Sneh adopted such rhetoric. In his penultimate month as a 
Knesset Minister, he told the Jerusalem Post that Iran “can’t be allowed to repeat 
Auschwitz.” Gil Hoffman, ‘Sneh: Iran Can’t Be Allowed to Repeat Auschwitz’, Jerusalem 
Post, 30 April 2008. That Sneh was not alone led Jonathan Tobin to pen an impassioned 
rebuttal to those criticizing the Holocaust rhetoric, writing: “Just as today many laugh at 
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, they dismissed the murderous threats of 
Adolf Hitler as clownish bombast, and considered the brainwashing of a generation of 
German children by the Nazis unimportant. They denounced those who refused to be 
silent as prejudiced warmongers. Those truth-tellers were proved right, but too late to 
avert a world war, as well as a genocide.” 
Jonathan S. Tobin, ‘Who’s Obsessed About Obsession’, Jerusalem Post, 22 October 2008. 
573 See infra Chapter 5. 
574 It achieved this through the use of extremely aggressive marketing tactics. The paper 
was offered en masse by an army of distributers across Israel each morning, given out at 
bus stops and various points of transit during busy commute times. Within three years, 
it would have the highest circulation of any paper in Israel. Hayom’s popularity was 
credited with diminishing readership of some of Israel’s other newspapers, leading to 
the bankruptcy and closing of several of them, including Ma’ariv. Noam Sheizaf, ‘Wither 
The Israeli Press?’, The Daily Beast, 3 October 2012, 
https://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/10/03/wither-the-israeli-press. 
575 Adelson’s goals in launching the paper were so blatant that they spawned an 
opposition movement in the Knesset in which members proposed a bill prohibiting the 
distribution of a free, full-sized newspaper. They feared that the paper would skew the 
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paper reflected a political shift in the Israeli public or influenced them in that direction is 
unclear and less important than its reporting and commentary on the security threats 
facing Israel. It accorded prominence to Iran in both its reporting and opinion pieces.  
The sharp increase in the paper’s readership share that followed its release 
allowed the paper to frame the debate of ideological issues and set its tone. In 
particular, security issues reflected the paper’s right-wing, hawkish ideological bias. It 
evinced this bias on Iranian issues shortly after its debut by publishing critical and 
alarmist articles on Iran’s nuclear program. In November, Hayom quoted Yossi Baidatz, 
the head of the Israeli military’s research division in the intelligence branch, as claiming 
that international pressure had failed to stop Iran, and that in the worst-case scenario, 
Iran would have the capability to produce a bomb in under two years.576  
 The paper’s focus on the Iran narrative followed the United Nations’ imposition 
of a series of new sanctions against Iran earlier that year.577 Prime Minister Olmert 
hailed these measures as an “important, encouraging step by the international 
community.”578 He added that Israel would “continue to act to the best of our ability…in 
order to strengthen this international front.”579 While sanctions fit within Israel’s Iran 
                                                        
media landscape in favor of Netanyahu and the Israeli right. The bill passed a first 
reading but later failed. Anshel Pfeffer, ‘Everything You Need to Know About the Israel 
Hayom (Or Anti-Sheldon Adelson) Law’, Haaretz, 12 November 2014, 
https://www.haaretz.com/.premium-a-primer-on-the-israel-hayom-law-1.5327699.  
576 The statement was notable both because it was a public prediction by a serving 
military and because it appeared in a new newspaper impacting the Israeli media 
landscape. Gideon Allon, ‘2009 איראן עם יכולת גרעינית ’, Israel Hayom, 7 November 2007, 
http://digital-
edition.israelhayom.co.il/Olive/ODE/Israel/Default.aspx?href=ITD%2F2007%2F11%2F07. 
577 United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1747 imposed a ban on arms sales 
and expanded freezes on Iranian assets. Iran rejected the sanctions as illegitimate and 
restated its claim that its nuclear program was solely for peaceful purposes. ‘Security 
Council Tightens Sanctions against Iran over Uranium Enrichment’, UN News, 24 March 
2007, https://news.un.org/en/story/2007/03/213372-security-council-tightens-
sanctions-against-iran-over-uranium-enrichment. 
578 ‘Cabinet Meeting Minutes’, 25 March 2007, Israeli Prime Minister’s Office. 
579 ‘Cabinet Meeting Minutes’. 
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containment strategy, for the hawks they were merely necessary but not sufficient. 
Thus, when evidence emerged that the sanctions may have had an impact, the hawks 
used their new ally Hayom to refute the conclusion.580 
C. Challenges to the Narrative 
 
In December 2007, the United States released its National Intelligence Estimate 
(NIE) for the past year, which reported that since 2003 Iran had suspended its military 
nuclear program and that, despite its ongoing nuclear development projects, it was no 
longer actively seeking to build a nuclear weapon.581 The NIE, which is released annually 
both in classified and in unclassified versions, offers a rundown of all the national 
security threats facing the United States and the intelligence community’s assessment of 
each.582 For years, Israel had relied heavily on American intelligence reporting to bolster 
their claims about Iran’s nuclear activities. Consequently, the revelation that belied its 
Iran threat narrative and the justification for its war in Lebanon had an outsize impact in 
Israel.  
The following day, Israel Hayom carried several pieces about the NIE with a 
featured piece on the front page headlined, “In Tehran they died laughing at 
Jerusalem.”583 The newspaper also juxtaposed pictures of the air defenses located 
around Iran’s Natanz nuclear facility with pictures of the building itself implying 
                                                        
580 Allon, ‘2009 איראן עם יכולת גרעינית ’. 
581 The report stated, “We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its 
nuclear weapons program.” This halt had “lasted at least several years,” according to the 
report. The report concluded that the decision to suspend the program “suggests [Iran] 
is less determined to develop nuclear weapons than we have been judging since 2005.” 
‘Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities’, National Intelligence Estimate (Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence, November 2007), 
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Press%20Releases/2007%20Press%2
0Releases/20071203_release.pdf. 
582 An unclassified version is available to the public; a classified version is reserved for 
members of the intelligence and political communities.  
583 Shlomo Cesana and Eitan Livne, ‘ בטהראן מתו מצחוק ’, Israel Hayom, 5 December 2007. 
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nefarious activity. Another headline highlighted the joy of the Iranian President at seeing 
the report, claiming that Ahmadinejad hailed the NIE as “the nation’s victory.”584 The 
paper ran an editorial written by Yaakov Amidror, a former Major General (who would 
become National Security Advisor to Benjamin Netanyahu), asking why Iran would even 
need to produce their own uranium if not for a bomb. “Why should the Iranians have to 
hide and risk the threat of sanctions, if they do not mean evil?” Amidror wrote.585 This, 
he claimed, was a reason to redouble Israel’s efforts to stop the activities Iran was 
hiding. Hayom argued that the NIE’s failure to find evidence of a weapons program was 
not proof of absence. It meant only that Iran had succeeded in hiding the evidence that 
the paper insisted was there.586 Through employing uncertainty in this unusual logic, the 
hawks effectively used the NIE’s conclusion that Iran had ended its weapons program to 
maintain that it proved the opposite. The press reports also indicated that some of 
Israel’s most prominent military figures and security advisors were prepared to distrust 
American intelligence and factual assessments in favor of relying upon their moral 
judgment of Iran’s dishonesty.  
Others voiced similarly skeptical views about the report’s findings. Some cast 
doubts on the accuracy of the report’s conclusions. They pointed out that American 
intelligence agencies had been wrong in the past, most notably when they claimed the 
existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.587 Amos Regev, Israel Hayom’s editor 
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586 There appeared a hint of doubt when Amidror wrote that if the U.S. is right about 
Iran’s abandonment of its nuclear military program, then Israel is the “Ze’ev Ze’ev,” or 
“The Boy Who Cried Wolf.” Amidror. 
587 Few Israeli leaders mentioned that they had supported the Iraq invasion relying upon 
intelligence reports of WMD despite reasons to question its accuracy. They overlooked 
the irony of equating a false claim of a weapons program in one country with a finding 
that no program existed in another. 
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in chief, penned an op-ed entitled, “American Intelligence – A Tradition of Mistakes.”588 
Defense Minister Ehud Barak also dismissed the NIE, saying that Israelis “cannot allow 
ourselves to rest just because of an intel report from the other side of the earth.” 
Avigdor Lieberman, the Strategic Affairs Minister, was equally dismissive, invoking the 
uncertainty theme by claiming that “No one knows when Iran will have the bomb.”589 
The manipulation of uncertainty contrasted with the certitude of those who had 
invested significant personal capital and credibility in the existence of the Iran threat. 
They were unwilling to be proven wrong.  
D. Prelude to Populism 
 
The NIE came out at a particularly awkward time for Israeli leaders. The 
politicians had appeared to succeed in carving out a space for rare political agreement 
over the outlines of the Iran threat narrative. In addition, Israel’s academic and policy 
community had recently joined the conversation in support of this endeavor. For 
example, in 2007 The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) published 19 reports 
on Iran, a new high.590 In the Knesset, speeches by Labor members had become nearly 
indistinguishable from those of more conservative party members.591 There was general 
                                                        
588 Amos Regev, ‘ מסורת של טעויות  - המודיעין האמריקני ’, Israel Hayom, 5 December 2007. 
589 Prime Minister Olmert was more diplomatic in his response, stopping short of 
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‘Publications Archive’, Institute for National Security Studies, accessed 17 July 2018, 
http://www.inss.org.il/publication/. 
591 In a session in July, Labor MK Danny Yatom and Strategic Affairs Minister Avigdor 
Lieberman of Yisrael Beiteinu exchanged ideas about the dangers posed by Iran; both 
agreed that Iran was a menace to Israel and the entire world. 44th Meeting of the 17th 
Knesset’, 11 July 2007, Knesset Transcripts. 
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agreement that Iran was an increasingly dangerous opponent and that the next conflict 
was right around the corner. Most thought, although not all admitted publicly, that the 
government’s containment policy of working to build an international consensus for the 
imposition of economic sanctions would prove inadequate in reducing the threat.  
Meanwhile, although it had been brief, the Lebanon war nonetheless provided 
the catalyst for new ideas and additional actions from politicians. Everyone wanted to 
be part of the solution, even if it meant offering symbolic proposals. For example, a 
Kadima MK proposed adding Iran to an anti-infiltration statute that barred illegal entry 
into Israel from countries hostile to the national interest, a list that included Syria, 
Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. The amendment, adopted with only one dissenting 
vote,592 was largely meaningless as illegal entry into Israel by Iranian citizens was not a 
real concern. Likud opposition leader Netanyahu advanced a more ambitious idea, 
demanding that the United States, among other countries, prevent the transfer of funds 
to companies that operate and invest in the Iranian private sector.593 According to 
Netanyahu, such companies, which were primarily located in Europe, deserved to be 
shunned by Israel and the United States to ensure that money does not indirectly reach 
“the Iranian death machine.”594 Netanyahu and his colleagues knew it was highly 
unlikely the United States would boycott European companies doing business with 
Iranian firms not connected to the government. Nevertheless, these and similar moves 
demonstrated that most Israeli politicians wanted to be seen as doing something to 
counter the Iranian threat.  
There were also curious indications that Israel was open to broader engagement 
with countries in the region based upon a shared opposition to Iran. Kadima Party leader 
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Tzipi Livni floated a reference to “moderate countries of the region” with whom Israel 
might work to counter Iran. She did not clarify her meaning: was Israel seeking some 
commitment from the enemies of its enemy for joint action or was she simply 
highlighting Iran’s comparative extremism and its challenge to the region.595 
The plethora of attention succeeded in demonstrably affecting the Israeli public’s 
perception of the Iran threat. An April 2008 poll showed that a plurality of Israelis (38%) 
chose the Iran nuclear program as the largest threat facing Israel.596 They ranked it 
ahead of concerns about a possible Arab-Israeli rebellion (17%) or ongoing struggles 
against the Palestinian population (12%).597 In one sense, the results were hardly 
surprising given the steady stream of fear-producing speeches and reports coming from 
many different sources. It is understandable that the threat of imminent mass 
destruction would capture the public’s imagination more than would intermittent 
terrorist attacks. On the other hand, the response was remarkable given that the factual 
predicate for the fear had been seriously challenged by United States intelligence 
analysts’ claims that Iran had ended its weapons production program.  
 Significantly, the NIE had also contradicted Washington’s Iran narrative.598 A 
month after the report’s release, President Bush travelled to Israel to reaffirm the 
                                                        
595 Though Livni did not specify which countries she meant, she was likely referring to 
Saudi Arabia and other Sunni Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations. The idea of 
“moderate” Arab countries opposing Iran eventually became a common theme of Israeli 
discourse. ‘Cabinet Meeting Minutes’, 14 January 2007, Israeli Prime Minister’s Office. 
596 Demographically, threat perception of Iran was higher among older respondents as 
well as among the less religious. Men tended to view Iran as a greater threat to Israel’s 
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598 U.S. President George W. Bush called the report “eye popping,” and said that the 
report “had a big impact – and not a good one.” Gregory Treverton, ‘Support to 
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American commitment to protect Israel from Iran. With the Iranian issue topping the 
agenda, Bush and Olmert both sought to portray Iran as a continuing threat. In their 
joint press conference, Olmert explained, “The President of the largest power in the 
world, the most important power in the world, is standing right here, and he has said in 
no uncertain terms that Iran was a threat and remains a threat.”599  
 Notwithstanding their rhetoric, all world leaders had been put on notice that 
there were serious doubts about the key components of the Iran threat narrative. At a 
minimum, the NIE challenged the warning that Iran’s production of a deadly bomb 
intended for Israel was imminent. Thus, if Iran was to remain atop Israel’s foreign policy 
and military concerns, the nature of this threat needed to expand beyond the scope of 
weapons of mass destruction. The obvious choice was to enlarge the narrative.  
 The debate spawned by the NIE over the imminence of the Iran threat provided 
the hardliners with a wedge issue to separate their position from those who were 
inclined to turn their security concerns elsewhere. Thus, Netanyahu, as a leader of the 
opposition interested in returning to power, seized the opportunity to construct a 
version of the Iran threat narrative that would enhance its appeal to a conservative 
base. As he prepared his run for Prime Minister, he creatively linked the present 
government’s pursuit of a comprehensive peace plan with the prospect that a divided 
Jerusalem would invite Iran to fill the vacuum left by Israeli withdrawal. He suggested 
that a weak Palestinian government would allow Hamas, under the direction of Iran, to 
                                                        
Policymakers: The 2007 NIE on Iran’s Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities’ (Central 
Intelligence Agency Center for the Study of Intelligence, May 2013), 
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599 ‘Cabinet Meeting Minutes’, 13 January 2008, Israeli Prime Minister’s Office. 
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operate freely within Israel’s borders.600 This injection of Iran into domestic politics hit 
many of the resonant proverbial buttons that provoked Israeli fears. It spoke to Israelis’ 
concerns for their immediate personal safety from unpredictable terrorist attacks. It also 
invoked the emotional issue of the fate of Jerusalem, which spoke to Jews worldwide. 
Finally, it raised disturbing visions of Israel’s future. Netanyahu insisted that Iran was the 
enemy behind every foreign policy of concern to the political movement he sought to 
build. 
VI. Conclusion 
 
The election of Barak Obama as the 44th President of the United States on 
November 4, 2008 marked the beginning of a new era of Israeli-U.S. relations. For the 
previous eight years, Israel had worked closely with the George W. Bush administration 
to reshape the Middle East. Israeli leaders had encouraged the U.S. invasion of Iraq and 
the removal of Saddam Hussein from power. They had also pressed for increased action 
against Iran, but on that front, Israel could only claim partial victory. Although the U.S. 
supported imposing increasingly stricter economic sanctions against Iran, it had stopped 
short of endorsing military action against the other Middle Eastern member of the “Axis 
of Evil.” 
Iran had changed in important ways during this era as well. The invasion of Iraq 
had strengthened Iran’s strategic position in the region. The toppling of Saddam Hussein 
effectively eliminated a principal enemy that had checked Iran’s activity along its 
western border, and it enabled Iran to exert influence on Iraq’s newly empowered Shia 
                                                        
600 As Israeli forces bombarded Gaza City during Operation Cast Lead, Netanyahu 
stressed that Hamas must be removed from the Gaza strip. “Israel cannot tolerate an 
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majority. Domestic politics in Iran had taken a hard turn to the right with the election of 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as president in 2005, the consequences of which did not 
benefit Iranians at home or abroad. In Ahmadinejad’s anti-Semitic and threatening 
rhetoric, Israeli leaders found an avatar for the Iran they pictured and propagated in 
their threat narrative.  
Israel’s case for taking extraordinary action against Iran to reduce or eliminate 
the threat, however, met with mixed success. Some national leaders amplified their 
condemnation of the nation or its leaders, and the international community imposed 
economic sanctions; but Israel did not succeed in excluding Iran from the United Nations 
or barring Ahmadinejad’s recognition as a head of state. The West was not only 
reluctant to consider military action, but also world leaders would not rule out seeking a 
diplomatic solution to reduce the threat of a nuclear armed Iran. 
The agents promoting the Iran threat narrative met with more success at home, 
meaning that it permeated Israeli political discourse and resonated with large segments 
of Israel society. Politicians, opinion leaders, the media, and popular culture sources 
fueled the public’s imagination, offering doomsday scenarios that incited feelings of fear 
and insecurity. Experts, military officials, and other respected establishment figures 
added details, such as the imminence of Iran’s bomb production, the dishonesty of the 
Iranian regime, the justification for taking active measures against Iran, and importantly, 
the options for action.  
Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 2006 demonstrated the power and adaptability of 
the Iran narrative. Israeli political and military leaders turned an ill-conducted military 
campaign with an unsatisfying outcome into a validation and escalation of the threat 
posed by Iran. In the aftermath of the war, many Israeli leaders skillfully modified the 
narrative. By identifying Iran rather than Hezbollah as the enemy, Israel concretized for 
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its public the danger of Iran as something more than a probable bomb producer whose 
anti-Semitic leader espouses bombastic threats. The war also served as a precedent for 
holding Iran responsible for any belligerent action perpetrated against Israel. Hence, 
when Israel went to war in Gaza two years later, a chorus of Israeli leaders joined in 
blaming Iran.601 This not only reaffirmed and expanded the narrative, it highlighted for 
the public the consequences of inaction against Iran.602 
The narrative manifested its durability when the Israeli public continued to 
identify Iran as the top security threat despite the fact that the United States’ NIE 
concluded that Iran was no longer developing nuclear weapons. While many, if not 
most, Israelis dismissed the NIE as incorrect, sustaining the public’s fear of imminent 
existential danger nevertheless required reshaping the narrative. Given the challenges 
associated with new developments in a continually changing social, political, and 
international environment, a skillful politician who succeeded in crafting a salient 
narrative could also succeed in promoting himself and his agenda. Such a politician 
would need both a compelling narrative and a political strategy. The following chapter 
examines how Benjamin Netanyahu, operating as a populist, sought to securitize Iran’s 
place on Israel’s policy agenda.  
 
                                                        
601 Prime Minister Olmert told his cabinet that Hamas was “acting as the arm of Iran” in 
Gaza. Cabinet Meeting Notes, May 11, 2008. Israeli media followed Olmert’s lead and 
assigned Iran the blame for the violence. Columnist Caroline Glick wrote, “Here it is 
important to note that the war today, like the war in 2006, is a war between Israel and 
Iran.” ‘Cabinet Meeting Minutes’, 11 May 2008, Israeli Prime Minister’s Office; Caroline 
Glick, ‘Iran’s Gazan Diversion?’, Jerusalem Post, 6 January 2009. 
602 Years later a RAND Corporation study on the Israeli-Iranian conflict observed “Israelis 
have developed a siege mentality in the wake of the rocket attacks following the 
Lebanon and then Gaza withdrawals.” It predicted, “Because Israelis believed that they 
will be blamed no matter what they do, more defiant positions are likely, even toward 
the United States.” Dalia Dassa Kaye, Israel and Iran: A Dangerous Rivalry, Rand 
Corporation Monograph Series (Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research 
Institute, 2011). 
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Chapter Five: Populist Securitization 
 
I. Introduction: Reimagining the Threat 
 
In 2009 Benjamin Netanyahu took his recrafted Iran narrative to the voters 
wrapped in a promise that he would restore Israelis’ perception of safety, which, he 
claimed, had been compromised by his predecessors. In his run for this second term as 
prime minister, his banner claimed “Netanyahu: strong on security, strong on 
economy.”603 Although his Likud Party narrowly lost the popular vote, he got the 
opportunity to assemble a coalition government when the more liberal candidate, Tzipi 
Livni of Kadima, failed in her efforts to do so. Netanyahu set out to recruit hardline 
conservative and religiously-affiliated parties, together with the hawkish Labor party led 
by Ehud Barak, to join him in governing the country.604 
Since Netanyahu continued his practice of constructing messages aimed at 
Israelis’ feelings of insecurity, his Iran narrative, which he had spent much of his political 
life developing, did not significantly change. He continued to accord the Islamic Republic 
a prominent role in his promotion of fear, and he maintained that the Iranian regime 
threatened Israel’s continued existence.605 As a politician, Netanyahu’s abiding belief in 
the Iranian threat was likely not due to a stubborn insistence on consistency as much as 
it was to evidence suggesting that the message resonated with Israeli voters. 
Developments in the interim between his first and second terms as prime minister 
conditioned Israelis to be more receptive to Netanyahu’s rhetoric. During this period 
                                                        
603 Several competing political parties shared the imperative to protect Israel’s national 
security. Shmuel Sandler, Manfred Gerstenfeld, and Hillel Frisch, Israel at the Polls 2009 
(Routledge, 2013), 24.  
604 This coalition included Yisrael Beitenu, the ultra-orthodox Shas party, the Jewish 
Home Party, and later United Torah Judaism. Netanyahu also secured the support of 
Labor. Led by Ehud Barak, it had secured 13 seats in the new Knesset. 
605 See discussion in Chapter Three on the development of this narrative. 
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Israelis had experienced two wars, a second Intifada, and periodic incidents of violence 
both within and along its borders. Israelis had internalized the fear associated with 
uncertainty, most especially that they could be victims of violence, whether it took the 
form of a random terrorist attack or a nuclear bomb dropped by Iran on their country. 
Not surprisingly, a leader’s promise of relief from enduring fear offered an assurance of 
security that many chose to embrace. Whether or not an Israeli had voted for 
Netanyahu’s party, she accepted that he was now the prime minister and hoped he 
could deliver on his promises.  
As a national leader, Netanyahu again commanded a global megaphone for 
disseminating his message, making it harder for world leaders and world Jewry to 
ignore. In a world beset by the specter of terrorists acquiring weapons of mass 
destruction, a masterfully constructed narrative about the nuclear threat posed by an 
accused state sponsor of terrorism resonated with more than Israelis. No world leader 
could afford to dismiss the scenario, and, in particular, the American political 
establishment took it seriously.606 Iran had not dispelled its image as a member of the 
Axis of Evil, and it had acquired few international friends.607 For Netanyahu, promoting 
suspicion at home and with certain audiences abroad did not prove difficult.  
 At home, the Iranian threat served two purposes. First, by occupying a place 
atop Israel’s national security agenda, it distracted attention from more divisive foreign 
policy issues, most notably territorial concessions associated with seeking peace with 
the Palestinians. It also enabled Netanyahu to project his capability as a leader. Having 
                                                        
606 For a number of reasons, not all of which had to do with the facts on the ground, the 
message particularly resonated with politically conservative Americans, who were long-
time political and financial supporters of Netanyahu. Pfeffer, Bibi. 
607 Historical Gallup polling trends indicate that Iran’s annual average unfavorability 
rating never dropped below 79% between 1990 and 2015. ‘Gallup In Depth: Iran’, 
Gallup.com, 2018, http://news.gallup.com/poll/116236/Iran.aspx.  
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not received a majority of votes, he needed to demonstrate support for his leadership. 
Consequently, Netanyahu’s recrafting of the Iran threat narrative was neither 
extemporaneous nor random. As this chapter will examine, Netanyahu chose both 
tropes and strategies to optimize its impact. These choices were consistent with his 
adoption of populist messaging to intensify the receptivity of the Iran threat narrative. 
In so doing, his behavior exemplifies the populist securitization theory that frames this 
project.  
Deconstruction of Netanyahu’s Iran messaging reveals the ways in which the 
prime minister utilized a populist strategy within a securitization process to build and 
sustain the threat narrative during his second term. He recreated and reinvigorated a 
threat narrative that could not be minimized by his political opponents nor be resolved 
through compromise. In his telling, Netanyahu’s leadership drew strength by fanning the 
flames of conflict with two different opponents: first, the enemy itself, namely Iran and 
its proxies; and second, those who would disagree with him. Utilizing both creative 
content and strategic delivery opportunities, he targeted audiences that would actively 
embrace both the message and the messenger.  
II. Netanyahu’s Messaging 
 
Netanyahu built his support for Israel’s Iran policy using rhetorical tropes that 
aimed at eliciting emotional responses from his listeners. With the emphasis on 
listeners’ perceptions, Netanyahu was less troubled by the accuracy of his words. 
Through the use of hyperbole, passion, innuendo, and historical revisionism, among 
other techniques, he sought to create an incontrovertible fear of Iran’s targeting Israel 
for destruction. Netanyahu succeeded in advancing a narrative in which the Iranian 
threat morphed from a significant, but largely manageable, security challenge into a 
mortal threat to the nation’s existence. Although it is unlikely that everyone in his 
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targeted audience believed him, a sufficiently large swath of influential Israelis, world 
Jewry, and Western political leaders acted as if they agreed.  
Netanyahu constructed his Iranian narrative using three principal tropes that 
illustrate a populist approach toward his objective of securitizing the threat as 
existential, which requires an extraordinary response. First, Netanyahu set up Israel’s 
conflict with Iran as a moral crusade.608 In his telling, the clash between the two nations 
represented a struggle between a morally superior democratic state fighting for its 
survival and a depraved and untrustworthy regime that should not be allowed to 
participate in the community of nations. Moreover, those Israelis questioning the 
legitimacy of the threat would be setting themselves apart from the struggle to ensure 
that good triumphs over evil. Based upon this characterization, his second trope then 
highlighted the crisis associated with the struggle, appealing to the fear aroused by the 
uncertainty of Iran’s plans for attacking Israel. Finally, he positioned himself as uniquely 
qualified to lead this modern crusade against the would-be destroyer.  
His leadership drew power from the unity occasioned by Israelis’ shared fear. He 
offered a distinctive voice by insisting that resolution of the threat required 
extraordinary measures against the evil perpetrator. He was the leader of Israelis who 
feared that world leaders could be duped into believing that conventional means, such 
as diplomacy and compromise, would reduce the danger. He gave voice to those who 
saw appeasers as opponents of Israel. While his appeal to international leaders for 
direct action was largely tactical posturing, as he knew he was unlikely to secure support 
for military intervention, he projected Israel’s resolute strength. Regardless of political 
disagreements on other issues, few questioned his muscular Iranian policy. Connecting 
                                                        
608 See ante, Chapter 5, Part V, Section B for discussion of how Netanyahu carried out his 
morality crusade. 
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with a polity unified by a morally-branded crisis, he could withstand the criticism by 
professed experts, including professional analysts and political opponents within Israel’s 
military and national security establishments. Perceptions of fear overtook factual 
analysis. 
I will examine below how each of these tropes served Netanyahu’s policy 
objectives. Taken together, they exemplify how Netanyahu not only skillfully 
constructed a securitization narrative, but also crafted a populist message built upon 
Israel’s security vulnerability. Before turning to this analysis, it is helpful to examine two 
features of the political environment in which Netanyahu delivered his message. In the 
next subsection, I note how Netanyahu’s messaging addressed two ancillary policy goals, 
both of which served and were served by his Iran narrative. In addition, following this 
introduction, I discuss the events in Iran at the time of Netanyahu’s ascent and how they 
facilitated the salience of Netanyahu’s threat narrative.  
Netanyahu’s messaging suggests two goals that help explain our understanding 
of his obsessive focus on Iran.609 One involved distracting Israelis’ attention from the 
more divisive Palestinian issues. This was part of Netanyahu’s strategy for political 
survival. A second goal sought to change the image of Israel from an occupier and 
aggressor to that of the victim of Iranian perfidy, by which Netanyahu sought to 
strengthen his entreaties for international allies. To be sure, his principal tropes were 
crafted to emphasize the threat and his leadership served these ends, but he added 
particular messages that suggest his deliberate pursuit of these related aims. 
                                                        
609 In December 2017, Netanyahu publicly acknowledged the perception of his Iran 
obsession. In a video message to the Saban Forum in Washington, DC, he jokingly 
remarked, “Today, I want to talk about a topic that I almost never bring up: Iran.” 
Benjamin Netanyahu, Benjamin Netanyahu’s Remarks for the Saban Forum, 2017, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=9&v=3M-dvKOqQJU.  
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 To support his claim for the primacy of Iran on Israel’s foreign policy agenda, 
Netanyahu offered a comparative threat assessment. Accordingly, the Palestinian 
terrorist threat rested on the randomness and uncertainty of the violence. That Israelis 
perceived terrorists could strike anywhere at any time was disruptive and emotionally 
upsetting, but, Netanyahu indicated, such attacks did not endanger the integrity and 
stability of the Israeli state. Terrorism as currently experienced did not compare to the 
potential of a life-ending nuclear attack. Moreover, because a nuclear Iran held the 
prospect of substantial and lasting destruction, all Israelis should unite behind his 
leadership to prevent this catastrophic fate. 
Netanyahu carried a similar message to world leaders. For example, in his first 
meeting after his reelection with President Obama, he sought to put Iran atop the 
agenda while downplaying the Palestinian issue. Netanyahu spoke at length about the 
“worst danger we face is that Iran would develop nuclear military capabilities.” At the 
end he acknowledged it would “help” to reach a Palestinians settlement so that Israel 
and the Palestinians, who would also face danger in the event of an Israeli war with Iran, 
could present a united front against Iran.610 
 Taking this message to the world, Netanyahu portrayed Israel as the victim of 
Iranian genocidal intentions. He occasionally returned to his older claim that Iranian 
leaders considered Israel a “one bomb” country, likely referring to Rafsanjani’s 2001 
Quds Day speech described in Chapter Three. For example, in 2010 he told a gathering 
of American Jews that “It’s instructive that the ingathering of Jews doesn’t deter [the 
Iranians]. In fact, it whets their appetite.”611  
                                                        
610 ‘Remarks During Meeting with U.S. President Barack Obama’, 18 May 2009, Israeli 
Prime Minister’s Office. 
611 Benjamin Netanyahu, ‘Prime Minister Netanyahu’s Speech at the AIPAC Conference’, 
22 March 2010, Israeli Prime Minister’s Office. 
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Israel’s victimization by Iran was more serious than the struggle over contested 
territory. Could nations really afford to ignore the threat posed by a nuclear Iran to 
Israel and by extension to other civilized nations?612 Netanyahu sought not only to 
marginalize Palestinian peace initiatives, but also to deflect criticism of Israel’s 
aggressive responses to terror attacks by connecting both policies to the Iranian threat. 
He maintained that Israel could not afford any additional uncertainty or changes in its 
behavior, which would accompany an investment in negotiations.  
 Netanyahu’s leadership at home and abroad depended upon dispelling the idea 
of equivalency between Iran and the Palestinian issues. Israel might lose control of the 
narrative on the plight of the Palestinians, but he dared his opponents to contest his 
accusations against the Iranian regime.  
* * * 
In the next section, I examine the political environment during Netanyahu’s 
initial years in office. This factual predicate also reveals the space between the reality of 
Iran’s actions and Netanyahu’s characterization of them. It is also instructive to note one 
extraordinary venture reportedly launched against Iran by Israel and the United States. 
Ironically, Netanyahu had nothing to say about the action and it never became part of 
his narrative.  
III. Iran’s Facilitation and Contradiction  
 
A. Ahmadinejad the Facilitator 
 
 As Netanyahu assumed the mantle of power in 2009, Iran projected a complex 
and perplexing image to the world. Iran’s transition, albeit slow, into a post-
Revolutionary society with a highly educated population of mostly young people and an 
                                                        
612 As will be examined infra, Netanyahu would develop this into a claim that there 
exists a “clash of civilizations” between Iran and the civilized world.  
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electoral process that gave voters choices, albeit limited, clashed with the lingering 
perception of a brutal theocratic police state. But for the coincidence of Netanyahu’s 
return to power in Israel and the controversial reelection of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as 
Iran’s president in 2009, Netanyahu might have had to modify his message.613 Instead, 
Ahmadinejad’s antics provided Netanyahu with considerable material for intensifying his 
warning of impending doom.614  
 By the time Netanyahu assumed office, Ahmadinejad had already established 
himself as a bloviating contrarian. On the international stage, he was the source of 
derision and ridicule. He trafficked in conspiracy theories, openly questioning the 
historical accuracy of the Holocaust, as well as the American account of the September 
11, 2001 terrorist attacks. In 2006, he had hosted the International Conference to 
Review the Global Vision of the Holocaust, which brought together some of the world’s 
most prominent Holocaust deniers and revisionists, including the American white 
supremacist and former Ku Klux Klan Grand Wizard, David Duke.615  
Ahmadinejad was also not particularly popular among Iranians. During his first 
term his administration bungled attempts at economic stimulus, and the disastrous 
distribution of direct cash payments led to widespread inflation and unemployment.616 
The government’s economic mismanagement and perceived wide-spread corruption 
                                                        
613 Yaakov Katz, editor-in-chief of The Jerusalem Post, former top advisor to Jewish 
Home party head Naftali Bennett, and author of a book on Israel’s conflict with Iran, said 
in an interview that Ahmadinejad was one of Israel’s great public relations victories.  
Interview with Yaakov Katz; Katz and Hendel, Israel vs. Iran. 
614 See ante, Chapter 4, Part IV, Section A for an analysis of how Ahmadinejad increased 
the interest of Israeli media in Iran.  
615 Daniel Schorr, ‘Iran Further Isolates Itself with “Holocaust Denial”’, Weekend Edition 
(National Public Radio, 17 December 2006), 
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=6637685. 
616 Nader Habibi, ‘The Economic Legacy of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’, Middle East Brief, 
no. 74 (June 2013), https://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB74.pdf. 
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had sparked occasional protests and riots. 617 This was one indication of an emerging 
post-Revolutionary society. While economic sanctions imposed by the United States and 
its Western allies made it difficult for the government to provide sustainable relief to its 
citizens, they also enabled Ahmadinejad to disclaim responsibility and to shift the blame 
elsewhere.618 Ahmadinejad targeted the United States and Israel as scapegoats for Iran’s 
economic woes in an effort to unite Iranians against foreign powers.619 Using a strategy 
common among insecure leaders, he frequently and publicly attacked the two nations 
so as to distract attention from his corruption and unpopularity. Given Ahmadinejad’s 
unpopularity, it was not surprising that accusations of fraud accompanied his reelection. 
What was unexpected, however, was that his victory generated public protests, 
including a nascent opposition movement that came to be known as the Green 
Revolution.620 This complicated the outsider’s traditional perceptions of Iran: Since Iran 
was not a democracy, one would not expect the manipulation of election results to spur 
dissent. Although Ahmadinejad led a violent government crackdown on the protesters, 
which resulted in several dozen deaths and thousands of arrests, the incident suggested 
the presence of active unrest in Iranian society, which might be emboldened by 
international condemnation.  
                                                        
617 For example, in 2007 a surprise announcement by the government that it would 
begin gasoline rationing led to the burning of twelve gas stations in Tehran. ‘Iran Fuel 
Rations Spark Violence’, 27 June 2007, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/6243644.stm.  
618 Thomas Erdbrink, ‘Ahmadinejad of Iran Ties Currency Drop to Sanctions’, The New 
York Times, 2 October 2012, sec. Middle East, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/03/world/middleeast/iran-president-mahmoud-
ahmadinejad-ties-currency-drop-to-sanctions.html. 
619 In one highly publicized incident, he blamed the U.S. for orchestrating the 9/11 
attacks as part of an effort to aid Israel. Ed Pilkington, ‘Ahmadinejad Accuses US of 
“orchestrating” 9/11 Attacks to Aid Israel’, The Guardian, 23 September 2010, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/sep/23/iran-unitednations. 
620 Green was the campaign color of the opposition candidates, Mir Hussein Mousavi 
and Mehdi Karroubi. 
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 Ahmadinejad further complicated the perception of Iran’s government as a 
unitary militant theocracy when later in his second term he publicly questioned the 
power of the country’s ruling religious establishment.621 His criticism not only reflected a 
division within Iran’s government leadership, but also echoed the discontent of many 
Iranians.622 This disunion did not resolve. In 2012, Iran’s parliament, the Majlis, in a 
historic move, summoned Ahmadinejad to answer questions concerning his 
presidency.623 Any foreign government or analyst monitoring developments in Iran 
might find in such action reasons to reconsider policy options. 
 Netanyahu, however, did not acknowledge the nuances, choosing instead to 
view Ahmadinejad as validating the narrative of Iranian fanaticism. When asked by an 
American television reporter during the protests whether the election was a fraud, 
Netanyahu seized the opportunity to vilify “the Iranian regime” and belittle the idea that 
Iran has meaningful elections.624 In multiple interviews over the ensuing two weeks, he 
stressed the “true nature” of the Iranian regime, its lack of legitimacy, and its threat to 
world peace. Netanyahu cited the protests and the government response as further 
evidence of the truth of the criticisms he had advanced during his days as opposition 
leader: “This is a regime that represses its own people, supports terrorism worldwide 
                                                        
621 Neil MacFarquhar, ‘A Divine Wind Blows Against Iran’s President’, The New York 
Times, 22 June 2011, sec. Middle East, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/23/world/middleeast/23iran.html. 
622 Jamsheed K. Choksy, ‘Tehran Politics: Are the Mullahs Losing Their Grip?’, World 
Affairs Journal, June 2012, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/tehran-politics-
are-mullahs-losing-their-grip. 
623 Saeed Kamali Dehghan, ‘Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad Summoned to 
Parliament’, The Guardian, 14 March 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/world/iran-
blog/2012/mar/14/iran-ahmadinejad-appears-parliament; ‘Ahmadinejad Critic Named 
Speaker’, BBC News, 5 June 2012, sec. Middle East, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
middle-east-18328882. 
624 Netanyahu insisted, “It’s a totalitarian state that perhaps has elections on occasion.” 
Benjamin Netanyahu, Benjamin Netanyahu Interview: Full Text, interview by Jeff Glor, 
15 June 2009, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/benjamin-netanyahu-interview-full-
text/. 
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and openly denies the Holocaust, while calling for the elimination of Israel. This regime 
is not only a great threat to our existence, but also to moderate Arab countries, the 
safety of Europe and to the peace in the world.”625 
 Ahmadinejad’s most valuable contribution to Netanyahu’s messaging was his 
Holocaust denialism. Netanyahu’s rhetoric had often suggested a link between the 
Nazis’ extermination of the Jews and the intent of the Iranian regime. Thus, 
Ahmadinejad’s invoking of the Holocaust, even if to deny it, highlighted Netanyahu’s 
message. Israelis had adopted a rallying cry of “Never Again” to remember and respond 
to the murder of six million Jews during World War II. Over the years the meaning had 
expanded from maintaining an aggressive defensive posture to repel or discourage an 
attack on Jews to engaging in preemptive actions to prevent an attack. Most likely both 
Ahmadinejad and Netanyahu saw the Holocaust denial as provocation. 
 As reprehensible as such behavior is, not all those espousing such hate merit the 
same attention to their utterances. While grounds for condemnation, the hateful speech 
is not always deserving of official denunciations.626 Arguably, there are times when 
expressing a serious outrage can prove counterproductive if the espouser is accorded 
more serious attention than he would otherwise merit. Attacking those promoting anti-
                                                        
625 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Iran: Statements by Israeli Leaders-June 2009’, 22 
June 2009, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs Documents, 
http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Iran/Pages/Iran-Statements_Israeli_leaders-
June_2009.aspx.  
626 Context matters. For example, in Germany, Holocaust denialism is a public offense, 
which protects against certain factions’ disavowing the country’s Nazi past. In America, 
the speech of pseudo-academics, publicity seekers, and aspiring leaders of ultra-right 
political organizations is protected from prosecution if it is not intended to incite 
violence. When an avowed white supremacist ran for political office in the American 
state of Louisiana, the condemnation by the Jewish community of his anti-Semitic 
remarks often brought him the media attention he craved. In many instances, leaders of 
the African-American community refused to respond to his racist remarks arguing that 
public action would enhance the candidate’s profile. John Maginnis, Cross to Bear 
(Pelican Publishing Company, Inc., 2011), 28.  
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Semitic messages is thus a strategic decision. In some cases, unified condemnation 
accompanied by protest actions against the messenger can achieve productive results. It 
can also expose an advocate of anti-Semitic messages as a fraud or buffoon more 
deserving of ridicule than serious condemnation. In the latter case, continuing 
denunciation of such a fool prolongs the attention accorded to the individual, potentially 
obscuring other developments.  
 While it is understandable that Israel is excruciatingly sensitive to national 
leaders who deny the Holocaust, Netanyahu’s use of Ahmadinejad’s pronouncements 
demonstrated no strategic thinking. Instead, he argued that it validated his claim that 
Iran was intent on destroying Israel.627 Ignoring the buffoonery of Ahmadinejad’s 
publicity-seeking behavior, Netanyahu merged the Holocaust denialism and Iran’s 
determination to exterminate the Jewish State to increase the resonance of his narrative 
with Jewish audiences. There is no evidence that Netanyahu considered whether the 
validation of Ahmadinejad’s pronouncements added long term value to Israel’s 
position.628 Netanyahu ran the risk that if Iran’s leadership changed, his message could 
lose its salience. By overreliance on the analogy between the Nazi and Iranian leaders, 
he risked finding himself as isolated as the target of his accusations. Conversely, the 
                                                        
627 The most prominent example of this occurred shortly after Netanyahu took office in 
2009 during his address to the United Nations General Assembly. In that speech, 
Netanyahu drew a direct comparison to the Nazis, saying, “And like the belated victory 
over the Nazis, the forces of progress and freedom will prevail only after an [sic] horrific 
toll of blood and fortune has been extracted from mankind. That is why the greatest 
threat facing the world today is the marriage between religious fanaticism and the 
weapons of mass destruction. The most urgent challenge facing this body is to prevent 
the tyrants of Tehran from acquiring nuclear weapons.” Benjamin Netanyahu, ‘Prime 
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Speech to the UN General Assembly’, (24 September 
2009), http://www.haaretz.com/news/prime-minister-benjamin-netanyahu-s-speech-
to-the-un-general-assembly-1.7254. 
628 Some argued that Ahmadinejad’s behavior added to his image of buffoonery and 
belied his dangerousness.  
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fixation on Holocaust denialism could raise the international profile of both men, with 
neither benefitting from the exposure. 
In the end, it proved unimportant whether, as an objective matter, the Holocaust 
denial controversy enhanced the threat narrative. For the first four years of Netanyahu’s 
second term as Prime Minister, Ahmadinejad’s antics provided Netanyahu with 
numerous occasions for generating publicity. If he believed in the adage that for a 
politician no publicity is bad publicity, he could risk criticism by continuously citing 
Ahmadinejad’s assertions when seeking to publicize his repetitive messages about the 
dangers of Iran. Moreover, few of the world powers voiced disagreement. A broad 
coalition of nations imposed a new round of economic sanctions on Iran. In 2010 and 
2011 the United States and European Union adopted a series of measures which 
included completely cutting Iran off from the international banking system, thus 
disabling Iran from participating in international money transfers around the world.629 
These measures increased Iran’s already substantial economic problems and intensified 
domestic pressure on Ahmadinejad and his administration. 
  The danger in accusatory and inflammatory rhetoric is that the predictions 
become self-fulfilling. For Netanyahu, sanctions were an insufficient response. After 
nearly four years of intimidation and recriminations, Israeli leaders seriously considered 
starting a war with Iran. By 2012, they had developed plans for a preemptive strike 
against Iran’s nuclear facilities. Reportedly, Israel scrapped the initiative when U.S. 
President Barack Obama refused to back such an operation.630  
                                                        
629 Philip Blenkensop and Rachelle Younglai, ‘Banking’s SWIFT Says Ready to Block Iran 
Transactions’, Reuters, 17 February 2012, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-
sanctions-swift/bankings-swift-says-ready-to-block-iran-transactions-
idUSTRE81G26820120217. 
630 Adiv Sterman and Mitch Ginsburg, ‘“US Pressure Nixed Israeli Strike on Iran Last 
Year”’, The Times of Israel, 3 September 2013, http://www.timesofisrael.com/us-
pressure-nixed-israeli-strike-on-iran-in-2012/. 
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B. Rouhani’s Contradiction 
 
 Few international leaders regretted the departure of Ahmadinejad from the 
world stage when Iranians voted in new leadership. By Iranian standards, Hassan 
Rouhani was a moderate cleric. As a career government official and former National 
Security Advisor, his narrow victory in the first round of balloting in June 2013 surprised 
observers. Rouhani campaigned on a platform that called for an end to Iran’s 
international isolation, proposing to increase diplomatic engagement. Shortly after his 
inauguration, he thus began a global campaign to improve Iran’s image. Dubbed by the 
international press as a “charm offensive,” Rouhani stressed Iran’s new moderate 
direction under his leadership, one that valued diplomatic and economic engagement 
over the boisterous threats of his predecessor.631  
 These developments represented a direct challenge to Netanyahu’s message. He 
had built his threat scenario by making Ahmadinejad the face of the “Islamic regime.” 
The idea of a regime led by a madman enabled Netanyahu to enlist the international 
community in isolating Iran and to perpetuate the sense of crisis among Israelis. Rouhani 
did not just change Iran’s rhetoric, he attended the World Economic Forum in Davos, 
where he again called for “constructive engagement” with the world.632 Importantly, he 
invited the United States and its Western allies to negotiate a deal over Iran’s nuclear 
                                                        
631 Rouhani displayed the change in Iran’s direction during his 2013 trip to New York. 
Ahead of his appearance at the United Nations, he published an op-ed in the 
Washington Post and sat for an interview with NBC news. He struck a notably moderate 
tone and vowed to “engage in constructive interaction with the world.” Hassan Rouhani, 
‘President of Iran Hassan Rouhani: Time to Engage’, Washington Post, 19 September 
2013, sec. Opinions, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/president-of-iran-
hassan-rouhani-time-to-engage/2013/09/19/4d2da564-213e-11e3-966c-
9c4293c47ebe_story.html. 
632 Hassan Rouhani, ‘President’s Speech Addressing the 44th World Economic Forum’ 
(23 January 2014), http://www.president.ir/en/74125. 
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program. That such an agreement might end the crippling economic sanctions was an 
anathema to Netanyahu’s strategy. 
Not surprisingly, Netanyahu and his supporters were unwilling to be charmed. 
While skepticism and suspicion of Iran were understandable, Israeli leaders were 
immediately dismissive. Within days of the election, Deputy Foreign Minister Zeev Elkin 
speaking in the Knesset called Iran a “joke of democracy.” He claimed that the idea of 
Rouhani’s election as a significant change in the country was “funny.” Elkin attacked the 
new president’s credibility, claiming that Rouhani had said that the best way to move 
forward with the Iranian nuclear program was to “delude the West” into thinking they 
were seriously negotiating while secretly continuing with its technological 
development.633 In general, the response to the Iranian elections from Israeli officials 
capitalized on uncertainty to advance worst-case scenarios that could not be refuted. 
Echoing the official distrust, Israeli media and policy outlets were similarly unwilling to 
give Iran the benefit of the doubt. News stories invoked ad hominem attacks, mockingly 
referring to “Rouhani and his shy, sweet smile” to question his sincerity. Israel arms 
control experts reminded officials to remain vigilant and determined “when your 
adversary is smiling.”634  
Rouhani’s diplomatic demeanor required Israelis to pivot away from the Iranian 
president as an avatar of its governing regime. Without acknowledging the 
contradiction, commentators asserted that the post of president in the Islamic Republic 
was a figurehead rather than a chief executive. This new version was equally misleading. 
                                                        
633 ‘43rd Meeting of the 19th Knesset’, 19 June 2013, Knesset Transcripts.  
634 Lior Akerman, ‘Rouhani and His Shy, Sweet Smile’, Jerusalem Post, 22 November 
2013; Emily B. Landau, ‘After Round One with Rouhani: Staying Focused on the 
Dynamics of Nuclear Bargaining’, INSS Insight (Institute for National Security Studies, 17 
October 2013), http://www.inss.org.il/uploadImages/systemFiles/No.%20477%20-
%20Emily%20for%20web.pdf. 
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By maintaining that the levers of political power rested entirely with the Iranian clerical 
establishment, it continued to ignore the complicated political dynamics at work in Iran 
as it transitioned from a revolutionary government to a post-revolutionary society.635 It 
overlooked the reality that Iran had a young and educated population contributing 
energetically and creatively to the development of a new society. It also attacked the 
legitimacy of diplomatic initiatives being pursued by Iran’s newly- elected “figurehead.”  
 In short, the departure of Ahmadinejad made Netanyahu’s messaging far more 
difficult. The challenge involved more than coming up with a different factual predicate 
for maintaining his foreign policy and positioning himself as his nation’s leader. It also 
eroded his ability to muster support from world leaders for isolating Iran and threatened 
to take military action off the table. Rouhani not only presented a different face, but his 
lower key manner opened space for the world to learn more about Iranian society. He 
made it tenable for international leaders to engage with Iran in a meaningful way. No 
longer did leaders risk embarrassment if they tried to negotiate with the unpredictable 
Ahmadinejad. Most importantly, the picture of Iran advanced by Rouhani offered little 
evidence that Iranians collectively shared the intention ascribed to their government of 
eradicating the Jewish state.  
                                                        
635 These oversimplified narratives of Iranian governance belie the complicated truth of 
the Iranian political system. In a comprehensive social survey of Iranian society, one of 
the few conducted through extensive fieldwork inside of Iran, Kevan Harris documents 
the social changes in Iran in the decades since the Islamic Revolution. He explains how 
societal pressure on the government to provide opportunities for upward mobility 
created by the state’s welfare and social policy institutions – the mechanisms through 
which most Iranians relate to the state – have altered Iranians’ view of the Islamic 
Republic. Iran’s success in implementing social welfare programs for its citizens in the 
post-Revolutionary era expanded the middle class and provided citizens with 
opportunities for social advancement. Similarly, the fractious nature of the ruling elite, 
divided along a spectrum running from reformers to hardliners, underlined the 
importance of mass politics. At the very least, the book dismisses the notion of Iran as a 
fervently religious society dominated by clerics and devoted to Islamic law. Kevan Harris, 
A Social Revolution: Politics and the Welfare State in Iran, First edition (Oakland, 
California: University of California Press, 2017). 
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V. Netanyahu’s Tropes 
 
A. The Opening Act 
 
“Making peace is harder than making war” according to the American statesman 
and former Ambassador to the United Nations Adlai Stevenson. For an ambitious Israeli 
politician, advancing a vision of a peace agreement is a dangerous proposition given 
Israelis’ strong and vocal disagreements over what a regional peace should look like. The 
inability of Israel to reach a comprehensive peace with its neighbors meant that Israelis 
had lived in a state of emergency since the country’s founding. Unifying constituents 
against a shared threat to the status quo, no matter how fragile, was an easier strategy 
for a self-promoting leader than seeking agreement on land concessions and future 
promises. Benjamin Netanyahu, like many national leaders, promoted security as the 
top priority of his political agenda. Notably, he chose to use messages designed to make 
Israelis and world Jewry feel insecure. 
For Netanyahu, an astute politician with a perfect command of English,636 his 
leadership position allowed him to follow the strategic path of elite Israelis who 
frequently address their messages to audiences abroad to enhance their receptivity at 
home.637 Focusing the world’s attention on Iran was more important than just building a 
domestic political base. If Israel was going to eliminate the threat, it would need allies to 
take action. Ideally, he sought the support of the leaders of Western nations, most 
                                                        
636 Netanyahu, who was raised in the United States, speaks English fluently with very 
little trace of an Israeli accent. He reportedly frequently uses English in conducting 
official government business, including cabinet meetings, since most of his advisors are 
also fluent English speakers. Pfeffer, Bibi. 
637 A notable practice among Israeli academics is that they often choose to publish their 
work examining political issues in English before they do so in Hebrew. Interview with 
Yael Berda, interview by Jonathan Leslie, Email, 13 July 2018.  
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especially the president of the United States. He knew as well, however, that such 
leaders’ positions can often be influenced by politically powerful Jewish interests.638 
Significantly, on the day of his inauguration, Netanyahu chose an English 
language media outlet for his first interview of his second term as prime minister. Sitting 
down with The Atlantic magazine’s Jeffrey Goldberg, he outlined his foreign policy vision 
and proposals for enhancing Israel’s security. In retrospect, the interview provided a 
preview of the tropes that Netanyahu would invoke to support the objectives of his Iran 
policy. It also initiated Netanyahu’s practice of directing Iran pronouncements to the 
English language press as well as using English in his social media messages. This practice 
signaled that he saw Western Jewry as a key constituency to be courted for support of 
his Iran strategy. Concomitantly, by emphasizing the existential risk posed by a nuclear 
Iran, Netanyahu could mute the criticisms of progressive Jews disturbed by some of 
Israel’s controversial foreign and domestic policies, which were, by implication, “lesser 
concerns.” By also maintaining that the danger extended to Western nations, he could 
broaden the base of fearful potential victims.  
Netanyahu’s use of domestic and foreign-based journalists created a synergy in 
which the awareness of each other’s reporting and analyses on Iran intensified the 
attention accorded to Netanyahu’s messages in Israel and around the world. In Israel, 
this strategy produced a feedback loop for the Iran debate: reporting on Netanyahu’s 
claims elicited threats and counter threats from Iranian and Israel officials. This, in turn, 
generated additional reporting that escalated the Israeli-Iranian conflict, at times 
                                                        
638 The English language media coverage of Netanyahu’s messages, both the interviews 
and speeches he gave to English language audiences and the reports in the English press 
about his statements and activities, is particularly instructive. Comparison of the English 
reports to those in the Hebrew press for Israeli audiences, however, are not materially 
different, although sometimes less extensive. The Hebrew press generally reported on 
significant English language speeches by the Prime Minister.  
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resembling a rhetorical war. As noted above, Israel came close to firing a “real” shot, but 
ultimately decided not to follow through on a military attack.639 
The published remarks in The Atlantic focus primarily on two themes: First, the 
Iran threat is real and unprecedented; and second, the United States should honor its 
strong relationship with Israel by joining in some as-yet-undefined confrontation with 
Iran.640 Netanyahu stressed that complacency about Iran is dangerous, and he 
positioned himself to lead a response as well as to mute critics who questioned his 
foreign policy priorities and focus.  
 The one-on-one format with a familiar journalist enabled Netanyahu to control 
and expand upon his themes.641 He used the occasion to test a populist strategy by 
focusing on the moral dimensions of the conflict. This is what Müller refers to as “the 
moral imagination of politics.”642 In Netanyahu’s telling, both Israel and its prime 
minister were engaged in a moral crusade against a corrupt Iranian regime. This trope 
signaled a change between his approach to Iran during his first tenure as prime minister 
and the present.  
 In his first administration in the late 1990s, Iran had been a foreign policy issue, 
but not all Israelis saw it as the singular danger. Now, Netanyahu portrayed Israelis as on 
the front line of a clash of civilizations, defending not only themselves but the entire 
                                                        
639 See discussion at end of Section A, infra.  
640 Significantly, the interview occurred just months before the U.S. and Israel reportedly 
launched a cyberattack on Iran’s nuclear facility, which may have been planned during 
Netanyahu’s first term. (See Appendix II) One could speculate that an additional aim of 
Netanyahu’s messaging to American audiences was to shore up approval for such an 
action should it come to public attention. It set a precedent for further joint aggressive 
operations against Iran. 
641 Netanyahu, a savvy observer of American media, had reason to believe Goldberg 
would produce sympathetic inaugural interview. Goldberg had emigrated from the 
United States to Israel and served as a prison guard in the IDF. As a journalist, he 
frequently penned articles attacking critics of the Jewish State and placed them in 
prominent publications.  
642 See Populist Securitization discussion in Chapter One. 
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Western world. As Western powers explored the possibility of diplomatic engagement, 
Netanyahu threatened preemptive military action. The interview was thus infused with 
Netanyahu’s casting the struggle in terms of a moral deficit between the two 
combatants, and offering an apocalyptic vision. According to Netanyahu, Iran not only 
embraced a death wish, it willingly accepted its own destruction in its quest to destroy 
others. He claimed that Iran was a nation that “glorifies blood and death, including its 
own self-immolation.”643  
Engaging in hyperbole, he argued that Iran had been remorseless about the 
conduct of its eight-year war with Iraq. In Netanyahu’s retelling, the great human cost of 
that conflict apparently meant nothing, since Iran had “wasted over a million lives 
without batting an eyelash.” Despite having no knowledge or corroboration, he asserted 
that conflict “didn’t sear a terrible wound into the Iranian consciousness.”644 He claimed 
that Iran was not Britain after World War I, lapsing into pacifism because of the great 
tragedy of a loss of a generation.645 Netanyahu further asserted that Iran was not 
entitled to argue that it too had been a victim of enemy aggression or that it feared 
future attacks on its sovereignty. This enabled him to implicitly distinguish Iran’s nuclear 
development program from Israel’s entitlement to maintain a military arsenal. Israel, 
surrounded by enemies, needed weapons for defense, while Iran sought to acquire 
nuclear weapons to engage in immoral aggression. In subsequent statements, 
Netanyahu would dismiss as lies Iran’s statements that it did not intend to build nuclear 
                                                        
643 Jeffrey Goldberg, ‘Netanyahu to Obama: Stop Iran—Or I Will’, The Atlantic, March 
2009, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2009/03/netanyahu-to-obama-
stop-iran-or-i-will/307390/. 
644 Anyone who visits Iran knows this to be false; memorials to individuals killed in the 
conflict are ubiquitous throughout the country. 
645 Goldberg, ‘Netanyahu to Obama’. 
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weapons. Instead, he would accuse Iran of acting deceptively, and attack those who 
believed Iran’s leaders as being naïve or ignorant about Iran or Middle East politics.646  
Consistent with his move toward populism, in the interview Netanyahu 
portrayed himself as likely the only politician willing to speak the ugly truth. He directly 
addressed the United States, although he likely knew that America would neither 
approve nor support military action against Iran. He nevertheless pressed his case that 
confronting Iran represented a “great mission,” both for himself and President Barak 
Obama and that ridding the world of Iran’s threat would serve as a “hinge of history” for 
the future of Western civilization. The rhetoric of glory and promise contrasted with an 
America weary from years of unproductive wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, a loosely 
defined “war on terror,” and a financial crisis that made even the cost of posturing too 
expensive. In stating his case, Netanyahu did not address whether he expected 
President Obama, who had recently received the Nobel Peace Prize, to embrace a new 
conflict. 
Whatever his doubts, Netanyahu was unwilling to abandon efforts to publicly 
pressure the United States for its support. In his first face-to-face meeting with 
President Obama in May 2009, which was shortly after both men had assumed office, he 
used Iran as the bargaining chip for his willingness to address the issue of negotiations 
with the Palestinians. In noncommittal language regarding the latter, he explained, “We 
                                                        
646 Netanyahu frequently called diplomacy with Iran a “mistake,” and warned world 
leaders not to be taken in by Iran’s “deception.” He repeatedly stressed that Iran was 
only using negotiations as a cover for its bomb building intentions. An example of such 
claims is Netanyahu’s response following Rouhani’s address at Davos: “Rouhani has 
admitted that a decade ago, he deceived the West in order to advance the Iranian 
nuclear program. He is doing this today as well. The goal of the Iranian ayatollahs' 
regime, which is hiding behind Rouhani's smiles, is to ease sanctions without conceding 
on their program to produce nuclear weapons. Therefore, the international community 
must not go astray after this deception.” Benjamin Netanyahu, ‘Prime Minister 
Netanyahu’s Remarks on Iranian President Rouhani’s Davos Speech’, 23 January 2014, 
Israeli Prime Minister’s Office. 
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want to move simultaneously and then parallel on two fronts: the front of peace, and 
the front of preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear capability.”647 Netanyahu probably 
understood that if President Obama remained unsympathetic, he might still rally 
American Jews, political conservatives, and those committed to opposing any position 
taken by President Obama. Such a collection of Israel supporters might pressure 
American legislators for a more robust commitment. The danger in Netanyahu’s strategy 
was the risk of alienating the new U.S. president, making him less receptive to Israel’s 
future entreaties and more willing to criticize Israeli actions toward the Palestinians. 
Moreover, if Netanyahu failed to muster significant international support, he could find 
himself isolated and excluded from discussions on Iran policies.  
B. The Morality Crusade  
 
Netanyahu aimed his morality-based anti-Iran messages at both international 
and domestic audiences. The basic trope was a simple message that pictured Iran as 
intent on doing evil; however, it carried complex implications. In his inauguration day 
interview Netanyahu spoke of Iran’s leaders as comprising a “messianic apocalyptic 
cult,” and he warned that “When the wide-eyed believer gets hold of the reins of power 
and the weapons of mass death, then the entire world should start worrying.”648 Later in 
the interview he added, “Since the dawn of the nuclear age, we have not had a fanatic 
regime that might put its zealotry above its self-interest.” Emphasizing the fear inherent 
in uncertainty, he warned, “People say that they’ll behave like any other nuclear power. 
Can you take the risk? Can you assume that?”649  
                                                        
647 ‘Remarks During Meeting with U.S. President Barack Obama’.  
648 Goldberg, ‘Netanyahu to Obama’. 
649 Goldberg. 
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Implicit in his message is a challenge to world leaders not to remain silent in the 
face of an existential threat as did their predecessors during the Nazi extermination of 
the Jews. Thus, in his first speech to the United Nations General Assembly in fall 2009, 
Netanyahu admonished the world leaders for their willingness to listen and talk to Iran, 
as well as for their criticism of Israel. He challenged them by asking “Have you no 
shame?”650 Embedded in this trope was an anti-Islamic bias manifested in his choice of 
language. Addressing world leaders, he described Iran as “fueled by an extreme 
fundamentalism,” which “has swept the globe with a murderous violence and cold-
blooded impartiality of its choice of victims.” He then warned that if this “most primitive 
fanaticism can acquire the most deadly weapons, the march of history could be 
reversed.”651  
Israeli columnists and editorial writers, especially the right-leaning Jerusalem 
Post and Yisrael Hayom, which regularly reported the Prime Minister’s speeches and 
comments, echoed and embellished the disparagement of Iran’s version of Islam. As an 
English language newspaper, the Jerusalem Post aimed to “inform” an international 
audience as well as resident immigrants, or olim. Many in the latter cohort had come to 
settle in Israel as committed religious Zionists but had not experienced security 
uncertainties. Reporters and opinion writers emphasized Netanyahu’s message 
regarding the zealous “mullahs” or “ayatollahs,” who comprised a messianic Iranian 
regime willing to pursue an apocalypse “with no concern for the millions of Iranians who 
would die in the conflagration.” A textual analysis of Jerusalem Post opinion pieces and 
choices of quotations from Israeli officials show a steady increase in usage of the terms  
                                                        
650 Netanyahu, ‘Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Speech to the UN General 
Assembly’. 
651 Netanyahu. 
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“Ayatollahs” and “Mullahs” to describe Iranian leadership beginning in 2001. (See Figure 
4, next page.) It reached its peak (228 articles) in 2015.652 This trend reflects 
Netanyahu’s effort to vilify Iran’s leadership even after the departure of Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad and the initiation of negotiations with the Rouhani administration began 
to soften world opinion toward Iran. 
Netanyahu’s critique of Iranian Islam served two purposes. It enabled him to 
distinguish between the ruling Islamic fundamentalists in Iran and the would-be 
theocrats in Israel who sought to impose religiously-based policies upon the secular 
population. It also allowed him to argue that any Iranian conciliatory statements, which 
appeared inconsistent with his portrait of extremism, could not be trusted. It is 
worthwhile noting here that to an objective observer, Netanyahu’s pronouncements 
would appear both shortsighted and ironic. The simplicity of his bellicose moral picture 
overlooked the nuances and developments in Iran’s political environment and post-
revolutionary societal evolution. This was particularly true if one looked past the antics 
of Ahmadinejad and noted the change in Iranian politics after he left office. Moreover, it 
was difficult not to notice the irony associated with Netanyahu’s promoting the dangers 
of Islamic fundamentalism while playing to his religiously conservative base.  
The American president and others were not impressed with Netanyahu’s 
rhetorical attempts to thread this needle. They were frustrated by Netanyahu’s vocal  
 
  
                                                        
652 Pluralizing the religious honorific as stand-ins for Iran’s political leadership became a 
common rhetorical flourish among Iran’s opponents. Portraying Iran’s political leaders 
as a collective of religious fanatics implied that Islam motivated its murderous intent. 
Rather than acknowledging Ayatollah and Mullah as honorifics accorded by Islam, Israeli 
leaders, led by Netanyahu and facilitated by supportive media, employed these terms 
pejoratively.  
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religious supporters, who opposed any peace negotiations that compromised Israel’s 
biblically designated borders of Judea and Samaria.653 World leaders, too, appeared 
unimpressed by Netanyahu’s daring them not to engage with Iran to seek a diplomatic 
solution to nuclear disarmament. 
Israeli scholars and experts assisted Netanyahu’s moral arguments for 
discrediting Iranian actions or statements. Those scholars preternaturally inclined to 
suspect Iran’s intentions offered the concept of “taqiya” as the proof-text for distrusting 
Iranian motives behind seemingly conciliatory statements. They claimed that taqiya was 
a religiously-permitted lie if intended to deceive one’s enemies.654 This gave credence to 
Netanyahu’s claims that Iranian negotiators were likely to be deceitful and dishonest in 
their dealings with the heathens in the West.655 A close Netanyahu advisor, Dore 
Gold,656 in his book The Risk of Nuclear Iran: How Tehran Defies the West, the 
publication of which coincided with Netanyahu’s return to office, argued that such 
dishonesty was a key feature of Iranian behavior. According to Gold, Ayatollah Khomeini 
                                                        
653 Judea and Samaria are the biblical names for the territory comprising the Kingdom of 
Israel. In the modern context, they refer to the occupied territory of the West Bank. 
Israeli hardliners and advocates for increased Jewish settlement in this area frequently 
use Judea and Samaria in place of the modern administrative names defined by the Oslo 
Accords (Areas A, B, and C). 
654 According to The Oxford Dictionary of Islam, taqiya is defined as the “Precautionary 
denial of religious belief in the face of potential persecution. Stressed by Shiite Muslims, 
who have been subject to periodic persecution by the Sunni majority.” John L. Esposito, 
‘Taqiyah’, in The Oxford Dictionary of Islam, ed. John L. Esposito (Oxford University 
Press, 2003), 
http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780195125580.001.0001/acref-
9780195125580-e-2338. 
655 Harold Rhode, an American Middle East scholar, has claimed that taqiya is an 
important part of Iranian strategy. In an introduction to a strategic assessment of Iranian 
negotiating behavior, which he wrote for an Israeli Center, he argued that “The Western 
concept of demanding that a leader subscribe to a moral and ethical code does not 
resonate with Iranians.” Harold Rhode, ‘The Sources of Iranian Negotiating Behavior’ 
(Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs), accessed 17 December 2015, 
http://www.jcpa.org/text/iranian_behavior.pdf. 
656 Gold, a longtime friend and confidant of Netanyahu, served as an Israeli diplomat and 
think-tank director before being appointed Director General of Israel’s Foreign Ministry.  
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had invoked taqiya to hide Iran’s nuclear development program and its support for 
terrorist groups.657 Influential author Ronen Bergman, whose book The Secret War with 
Iran contributed to the Israeli public’s understanding of the Iranian challenge, noted that 
taqiya was an important part of the Iranian psyche. Bergman explained that “This 
blatantly cunning style of leadership would have a significant impact on the conduct of 
government in Iran after [Khomeini’s death], and on the conduct of Shiites all over the 
world.”658 
C. Invoking Populism 
 
While Netanyahu had reason to believe that his morality-based threat narrative 
would resonate with religious Jews, he undoubtedly realized he needed a broader base 
to secure support for action against Iran. At home, he needed secular Israelis both to 
believe that Iran threatened Israel’s existence and to agree that proposals seeking 
diplomatic solutions would not resolve the conflict. Resorting to populist strategies, 
Netanyahu manipulated the fractures in Israeli society to define an Israeli polity in which 
those rejecting his message would be excluded. His appeal was emotional rather than 
substantive. Israelis, and by extension all Jews, were bound by the Jewish imperative of 
solidarity when threatened with annihilation. According to the populist playbook, 
Netanyahu implied that Israelis should recognize that the shared threat trumped any 
disagreement between secular and religious political factions over other issues. At a 
minimum, they should not engage in active public disagreement with his Iran messaging. 
Having only succeeded in forming a government with the support of the religious 
factions, Netanyahu could not compromise his fealty to this core base. That they had 
                                                        
657 Dore Gold, The Rise of Nuclear Iran: How Tehran Defies the West, 1 edition (Regnery 
Publishing, 2009), 293. 
658 Bergman, The Secret War with Iran. 
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become a powerful constituency resulted from what Michael Walzer has called the 
“paradox of liberation.”659 Walzer observed that Israel’s founders, having eschewed 
religious orthodoxy and historic Jewish victimhood to create a modern state, had 
effectively instigated a backlash among the religious communities. They resented having 
been excluded from the vision of the new state,660 and they were now determined to 
reestablish their religious authority in the “Jewish State.” They had become numerically 
strong due to their high birthrates and the immigration of religious Zionists, as well as 
politically savvy. They developed messaging that secured the support of many non-
orthodox Jews, who were offended by the idea that the founders had denied Jewish 
history and tradition. By forming active religious political parties and adopting modern 
political strategies, they made it increasingly difficult for the political elites to oppose 
their demands for a greater role in government.661 
As the religious parties enlarged the political space for their messages, they 
eventually proved astutely practical in accepting the personally secular, but politically 
ambitious, Netanyahu as their leader. With no strongly held domestic agenda of his 
own, Netanyahu was open to promoting policies embraced by Israel’s right-wing 
religionists. In securing his leadership, he received unintended help from the fractious 
political left, which had few appealing ideas for Israel’s future to counter the right’s 
                                                        
659 Michael Walzer, The Paradox of Liberation: Secular Revolutions and Religious 
Counterrevolutions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015). 
660 Ironically, developments in Iran followed a somewhat similar historic arc. The Shah’s 
attempt to modernize his country included discounting the political power of Islam. This 
enabled a fundamentalist cleric to mobilize popular support and succeed in 
overthrowing the Shah’s regime. Not all supporters of the Islamic Revolution wanted a 
return to a theocratic society as much as they wanted an end to the increasingly 
dictatorial and terrorizing government of the Shah. Unlike Israel, the backlash in Iran 
occasioned a revolution, while in Israel the return of orthodoxy was evolutionary.  
661 Walzer notes that a commonality among states emerging from religious-based 
societies and embracing a secularized national liberation is that they were, like Israel, 
unable to sustain their secular vision for more than a couple of generations. Walzer, The 
Paradox of Liberation, 29.  
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agenda. By yielding to the religionists’ domestic policy demands and by offering foreign 
policies that they could enthusiastically embrace, Netanyahu could create the illusion, if 
not the reality, of a significantly large active polity that would ostracize or silence those 
inclined to criticize his Iran message.  
Employing a strategy to capitalize on these developments enabled Netanyahu to 
use his co-religionists to invoke the concept of “Jewish Peoplehood,” defined by its 
moral superiority and survival of historical existential challenges. Israelis questioning 
whether Iran posed such an existential threat risked being accused of not being “of the 
people.” Non-Jewish opponents of Israel unwilling to acknowledge the Iran threat could 
be accused of anti-Semitism. No skeptic was immune. Foreign allies who questioned the 
veracity of and failed to respond to Israel’s entreaties faced charges of enabling anti-
Zionism. Netanyahu could not silence his foreign critics, but he could continually voice 
Israel’s moral standing against inaction or compromise.  
i. The Crisis: Israel in Iran’s Crosshairs 
 
 According to Netanyahu, Israel faced an ongoing crisis in its clash with a 
normatively unbounded and unpredictable enemy regime that would soon possess a 
nuclear bomb. This was not an easy case to make to world leaders, since Iran had yet to 
produce the weapon or a delivery system capable of reaching Israel.662 The risk 
                                                        
662 The assumption was that Iran’s nuclear program was being developed in conjunction 
with its ballistic missile program, such that when the country developed the bomb it 
would also possess the capacity to deliver it. Iran had been periodically testing missiles 
since the mid-1990s, although they achieved only limited success. Testing increased 
after Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s election in 2005, including the first successful test of the 
Shahab-3 missile, the first medium-range missile capable of reaching Israel. The 
medium-range missiles were the first class of weapons that U.S. intelligence 
assessments believed were “inherently capable” of carrying a nuclear payload, although 
there was no evidence to suggest that Iran was attempting to pair its missile 
development with its nuclear technology. UN Security Council Resolution 2231 in 2010 
forbade Iran from developing and testing missiles that were “inherently capable of 
delivering nuclear weapons.” It did not prevent them from developing missiles as part of 
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associated with factual claims is that they can be refuted. If proven wrong, Netanyahu 
risked undermining the credibility of his indeterminate claims, most especially those 
attributing genocidal intent to Iran’s leaders. At home, however, producing fear did not 
require facts. Manipulating uncertainty could sustain the sense of crisis. 
To stress the tangibility of the uncertainty, Netanyahu advanced Iran’s 
sponsorship of terrorism. In effect, he pictured a crisis featuring Iran as a double-edged 
sword. One side was conceivable, while the other was familiar. He sought to convince 
Israelis that both were believable, but he hedged his bets by offering alternate bases for 
fear. Those skeptical about Iran’s capacity to bomb Israel should still fear that Iran might 
do so in the not-too-distant future. At the same time, they should fear the possibility at 
any moment of an Iranian- sponsored terrorist attack. He conflated the two risks by 
claiming that Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear weapon would likely embolden terrorists.663  
That Iran intended to target Israel was the worst-case scenario, which he 
emphasized frequently. This formed an essential element of the crisis narrative. 
Representative of this trope was his 2009 speech to the gathering of Jewish Federations 
of North America. He stated that “The Iranian regime tyrannizes its people, sponsors 
and supplies terrorists, and openly pledges to wipe Israel off the map. Now just imagine 
                                                        
a conventional weapons program. Steven A Hildreth, ‘Iran’s Ballistic Missile and Space 
Launch Programs’ (Congressional Research Service, 6 December 2012), 3. 
663 Netanyahu frequently suggested that an Iranian bomb would embolden terrorists by 
providing them with nuclear protection against Israeli retaliation, or worse, might 
enable Iran directly to supply terrorist groups with nuclear weapons they could use 
against Israel. He suggested both possibilities in his May 2009 joint statement with 
President Barack Obama, explaining, “In this context, the worst danger we face is that 
Iran would develop nuclear military capabilities…if Iran were to acquire nuclear 
weapons, it could give a nuclear umbrella to terrorists, or worse, it could actually give 
terrorists nuclear weapons.” Benjamin Netanyahu and Barack Obama, ‘Meeting 
Between PM Netanyahu and U.S. President Barack Obama’, 18 May 2009, Israeli Prime 
Minister’s Office, 
http://www.pmo.gov.il/english/mediacenter/speeches/pages/speechobama.aspx. 
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how much more dangerous this regime would be if it had atomic bombs.”664 He would 
cite as proof text a 2001 quote from former President Hashemi Rafsanjani about the 
effects of a nuclear bomb on a small territory like Israel. Netanyahu reported that 
Rafsanjani had maintained that one bomb would completely destroy Israel, while a 
similar bomb could not annihilate the Muslim world even if it caused massive 
damage.665 Netanyahu’s frequent invocation of this trope with its support coming from 
Rafsanjani served two purposes. It reminded Israelis of their vulnerability, while it also 
obfuscated any difference between Iranian hardliners and more moderate voices. It 
ascribed the same voice to all present and future Iranian leaders. “It’s instructive,” 
Netanyahu said in his address at the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) 
meeting in 2010, “that the ingathering of Jews to Israel doesn’t deter them. In fact, it 
whets their appetite.”666 Netanyahu was effectively stoking the fire of crisis by enlisting 
the support of American Jews.  
 After three years of exchanging threats and counter-threats with Ahmadinejad’s 
Iran, in 2012 Netanyahu’s rhetoric expressed certitude regarding Iran’s intention to 
destroy Israel by any means necessary. Although he admitted on occasion that the 
destruction might not be wrought by a nuclear weapon, he also reaffirmed his 
conviction that that Iran intended to use its nuclear weapon on Israel. Thus, Netanyahu 
hinted that the only way to eliminate the Iran threat was through direct military action. 
In a May 2012 private talk, Netanyahu conceded that he would be willing for Israel to 
suffer collateral damage from Iranian retaliation if an attack by American forces could 
                                                        
664 Benjamin Netanyahu, ‘Prime Minister Netanyahu’s Speech at the Jewish Federations 
of North America General Assembly’, 9 November 2009, Israeli Prime Minister’s Office. 
665 This quote, speculating about what a nuclear bomb might do to Israel, is detailed in 
Chapter Three.  
666 Netanyahu, ‘Prime Minister Netanyahu’s Speech at the AIPAC Conference’. 
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guarantee an end to a nuclear weapons threat. He maintained that such an outcome 
was “preferable to an atom bomb over our head.”667 
For his part, Ahmadinejad contributed to the resonance of Netanyahu’s rhetoric. 
In August 2012, he delivered a series of highly inflammatory speeches in the lead up to 
the annual celebration of Quds (Jerusalem) Day on August 17. To a gathering of 
ambassadors from Islamic countries, Ahmadinejad argued that the key to solving the 
Palestinian problem was the elimination of the Zionist regime. Invoking a variety of anti-
Semitic tropes, he maintained that “a horrendous Zionist clan has been ruling the major 
world affairs” for 400 years. Echoing well-worn anti-Semitic rhetoric, he claimed that 
Zionists were “behind the scenes of the major power circles, in political, media, 
monetary, and banking organizations in the world.”668 According to the Anti-Defamation 
League the address was Ahmadinejad’s “most anti-Semitic assault to date.” This was 
remarkable given Ahmadinejad’s past conduct and the ADL’s careful monitoring of anti-
Semitism. Two weeks later, on Quds Day, Ahmadinejad reiterated his calls for the 
destruction of the Jewish State by claiming it was time to “remove the cancerous tumor 
of Israel” from the region.669  
                                                        
667 Itamar Eichner, ‘PM: Israel Won’t Be Spared Even If US Attacks Iran’, Ynet News, 8 
May 2012, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4264459,00.html. 
668 Asher Zeiger, ‘Ahmadinejad’s New Call for Israel’s Annihilation Is His Most Anti-
Semitic Assault to Date, Says ADL’, The Times of Israel, 2 August 2012, 
http://www.timesofisrael.com/adl-blasts-ahmadinejads-latest-call-for-israels-
annihilation-as-ominous/. 
669 Since 2006, the Israeli Foreign Ministry has published monthly reports of statements 
made by Israeli leaders on Iran. In August 2012, it published its first roundup of Iranian 
officials’ statements containing threats of destruction or delegitimization of the State of 
Israel and anti-Semitic remarks. Ahmadinejad was the source of most quotes, but other 
hardline political figures, such as Ayatollah Khamenei and IRGC Brigadier Gen. Ali 
Hajizadeh made contributions. The quotes were mostly sourced from English language 
outlets of Iran state media. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Recent Iranian Statements: 
Threats, Delegitimization of Israel and Antisemitism’, 19 August 2012, Israel Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs Documents, 
http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Iran/Pages/Iranian_statements_Aug_2012.aspx. 
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Israel accorded Ahmadinejad’s remarks international attention by directing its 
Ambassador to the United Nations to demand that it take action regarding Iran’s threat. 
The Israeli Ambassador opened his letter to the President of the UN Security Council by 
claiming that recent statements and actions by Iran’s leaders “mark a new phase in its 
war against the State of Israel.” The letter went on to highlight what it deemed to be 
Iranian-sponsored acts of terror in Bulgaria, Delhi, Georgia, Thailand, and Azerbaijan.670 
Netanyahu responded personally a month later during his address to the United 
Nations General Assembly. Holding up a diagram of a cartoon bomb meant to symbolize 
Iran’s progress toward building a weapon, he drew a red line on the diagram to illustrate 
the point at which Israel and the world would no longer be able to prevent Iran’s 
production of the bomb. He repeated his claim that “Nothing could imperil our common 
future more than the arming of Iran with nuclear weapons,” warning that the danger lay 
in Iran’s providing such weapons to terrorists. “Imagine the world with a nuclear armed 
Al Qaeda,” he added. This amounted to a rhetorical flourish as it elided over the 
traditional enmity between Shiite Iran and Sunni Al Qaeda.671  
  In conflating terrorism and Iran’s nuclear capability, Netanyahu emphasized the 
increasing vulnerability of all Israelis. As a sponsor of terrorism, a nuclear Iran could 
protect terrorists from Israeli retaliation. Israel would be unable to respond if doing so 
provoked a more dangerous Iranian response. Not only could a relatively small act lead 
                                                        
670 Ron Prosor, ‘Israeli Letter to UN on Iranian Incitement’, 27 August 2012, Israel 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Documents, 
http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Iran/Pages/Israel_submits_letter_UN_Iranian_incit
ement_27-Aug-2012.aspx. 
671 Interestingly, Netanyahu chose to use Iran’s enemy Al Qaeda rather than the terrorist 
organizations Hamas and Hezbollah to which it had known ties, perhaps believing that 
the global terrorist network would resonate more with his audience than more 
regionally-focused organizations. Netanyahu pressed his case for crisis by enlarging the 
sources of danger to include Muslims with nuclear weapons in the hands of the “world’s 
most dangerous terrorist regime or the world’s most dangerous terrorist organization.” 
Benjamin Netanyahu, ‘Speech to UNGA’ (27 September 2012). 
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to a disastrous escalation of hostilities, but Israel’s advanced missile defense systems 
would be less effective against a guerilla-style attack. The compromise of Israel’s 
defenses added to the aura of crisis. By 2012, over half of Israelis believed that there 
was a real possibility of being harmed by an Iranian attack.672  
In contrast to his imagery of danger and crisis, Netanyahu displayed a notable 
lack of interest in presenting a realistic picture of the nuclear threat. Thus, he never 
elaborated upon the consequences of using a nuclear weapon, which should have 
served as a deterrent to its use. He devoted little attention to the consequences of 
nuclear destruction, fallout, radioactive contamination, and regional collateral damage. 
He also failed to note that Iran, and not Israel, was a signatory of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty. Of course, he never admitted that of the two nations, only Israel 
actually had a nuclear weapon. 
 As previously discussed, Netanyahu’s employment of his crisis trope did not 
abate with the election of the more moderate Hassan Rouhani to replace Ahmadinejad 
as Iran’s president. Neither did Netanyahu not stop forecasting imminent doom when 
Iran entered into negotiations with world powers to restrict its nuclear development 
program. Counterintuitively, as Figure 5 shows, the prime minister’s warnings about the 
dangers of Iran and its leadership increased on both fronts. In 2013 alone, Netanyahu 
addressed the Iran threat on forty separate occasions, more than double that of the 
previous year.673 They spiked again in 2015 (31 statements, 20 more than the year prior) 
                                                        
672 Ephraim Yaar and Tamar Hermann, ‘The Peace Index’ (The Israel Democracy Institute, 
August 2012), http://www.peaceindex.org/files/The%20Peace%20Index%20Data%20-
%20August%202012(1).pdf. 
673 Evidence of Netanyahu’s fixation on the Iran threat lies in a comparison of the 
number of separate statements on Iran made during his administration with those of 
previous administrations. From 2006-2009, Netanyahu’s predecessor, Ehud Olmert, 
mentioned Iran in public statements on 17 different occasions. Netanyahu, by contrast, 
did so 127 times between 2009 and 2015.  
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as negotiations concluded with an “Iran Deal,” strictly limiting Iran’s enrichment 
activities in exchange for sanctions relief. Additionally, the textual analysis of transcripts 
of Netanyahu’s speeches presented in Figure 6 shows how Iran gradually became a 
greater focus of his rhetoric amidst the global effort to engage diplomatically with Iran. 
Netanyahu’s speeches and public statements averaged more mentions of “Iran” during 
the Rouhani administration than during the confrontational years of Ahmadinejad’s 
presidency. The density plot of his Iran references in Figure 6 shows that Netanyahu 
increased his attacks on Iran as Iran’s diplomatic engagement with world powers drew 
closer to critical milestones on an agreement over the fate of Iran’s nuclear program.  
Netanyahu, using force of repetition and access to powerful media platforms, 
seized the opportunity to be heard as a dissenting voice through his messaging. As he 
increased his messaging on to foreign and domestic audiences, the Israeli Prime Minister 
assumed a new role: the leader of the global opposition to negotiations with Iran.  
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Figure 5 
 
Source: Prime Minister’s Office Archives 
 
Figure 6 
 
Source: Prime Minister’s Office Archives  
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ii. Netanyahu’s Claim to Leadership  
 
Netanyahu’s leadership trope did not differ appreciably from the messages 
about himself conveyed during his earlier service as Prime Minister. Nothing that 
happened in the interim caused him to believe he needed to change his image. Thus, he 
had no reason to modify what Eyal Arad, his former advisor, called “a messianic notion 
of himself.” 674 Rather, his self-perception confirmed his belief that he was the leader 
bold enough to confront Iran and condemn those who refused to so. He was prepared 
to take whatever steps he deemed necessary.675  
Netanyahu used a selective recounting of history as the justification for moving 
forward. The lessons he derived from the past required that the Jewish people not wait 
for their enemies to attack them before seizing the opportunity to act against would-be 
destroyers.676 As leader, Netanyahu saw his role as preventing another Holocaust. In his 
historical recounting, Iranian leaders were Adolph Hitler and his collaborators, and the 
nuclear development program represented the Nazi extermination enterprise. His 
mandate did not come only from twentieth century events but stretched back to the 
biblical account of the rescue of Jews from Persian annihilation. As discussed earlier, 
Netanyahu conveniently omitted from his retelling of the Hebrew Bible’s Esther story 
                                                        
674 Sarah Moughty, ‘Eyal Arad: A “Messianic” Netanyahu’, 6 January 2016, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/eyal-arad-a-messianic-netanyahu/. 
675 Arad went on to say that Netanyahu believed that Jews can “never trust the outside 
world to protect them, because it won’t.” Moughty. 
676 In Netanyahu’s version of events, world history is comprised of a long list of nations 
that have sought to persecute the Jewish people, ranging from the “bloodletting of the 
Middle Ages,” to “the expulsion of the Jews from England, and then from Spain and then 
from Portugal,” to “the wholesale slaughter of Jews in the Ukraine,” and “the pogroms 
in Russia.” Netanyahu, ‘Prime Minister Netanyahu’s Speech at the AIPAC Conference’. 
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the part where the Jewish Queen saves the Jews by prevailing upon the Persian King to 
counter the order he had been duped into issuing by his evil viceroy.677  
In Netanyahu’s telling, he is the inheritor of the biblical mission. Contrary to the 
text, he claims the tale testifies to the long-standing enmity of Jews and Persians, but 
that, like the heroic Esther, he will intervene to prevent harm to his people. In a 
remarkable speech to a Joint Session of Congress678 on the day before the 2015 Purim 
holiday, Netanyahu began his address by referring to the “powerful Persian viceroy 
named Haman, who plotted to destroy the Jewish people some 2,500 years ago.” 679 
After addressing his topic of the “grave threats radical Islam and Iran pose to our 
security and way of life,” he concluded by returning to the biblical narrative. He 
articulated his leadership mission: “Today the Jewish people face another attempt by 
                                                        
677 Netanyahu also omitted mention of the final chapter, in which the Jews, having been 
authorized by the King to kill those who might seek to harm them, slaughter thousands 
of people. The text does not specify whether the killing is conducted in self-defense or 
revenge. The story of Purim has always played an important role in Jewish history and 
provides a poignant example of the way in which collective memory can be manipulated 
for political purposes. (See discussion in Chapter 2 for more on the Purim story.) Peter 
Novick points out that during the medieval period, “these ‘memories’ provided 
gratifying revenge fantasies” to the Jews, but they have been excluded from more 
recent celebratory traditions. Some factions in Iran have sought to exploit this detail to 
cast the story as a tale of Jewish savagery; some even referring to it as an “Iranian 
holocaust.” Peter Novick, The Holocaust in American Life (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 
2000); Estrin, ‘Iranians and Israelis Are in a Battle over History — and the Holiday of 
Purim’; ‘ ﺟﺸﻦ »ﭘﻮرﻢ« ﺗﺮاژدی ﻏﻤﺎر اﯾﺮاﻧﺎن ’. 
678 The speech represented a violation of international protocol and the Prime Minister’s 
insertion of himself into American politics. He had accepted the invitation of the 
Republican Speaker of the House without the consent of President Obama. Moreover, 
his remarks implicitly, but unmistakably, criticized the president’s policy. The speech 
also came at a precarious moment: U.S. negotiators were nearing a deal with Iran on the 
fate of Iran’s nuclear program, while Israel’s elections, in which Netanyahu was seeking 
re-election, were less than two weeks away. That Netanyahu was campaigning by 
addressing the American Congress is further evidence that Israeli politicians and 
intellectuals often seek to influence opinion in Israel by promoting themselves and their 
ideas abroad. 
679 Nicky Woolf Amanda Holpuch in Washington, ‘John Boehner Invites Netanyahu to 
Address Congress on Iran next Month’, The Guardian, 21 January 2015, sec. US news, 
http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jan/21/boehner-netanyahu-invite-
congress-iran-obama. 
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yet another Persian potentate to destroy us. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei 
spews the oldest hatred, the oldest hatred [sic] of anti-Semitism with the newest 
technology.”680 Even Russian President Putin rebuked him for this analogy.681  
As the Western powers approached reaching an agreement with Iran, 
Netanyahu’s speech to the U.S. Congress represented a watershed moment in his savior 
trope. He essentially set forth three related goals of his leadership mission. First, he 
vowed to oppose a “bad” and “dangerous” diplomatic agreement to reduce the Iran 
nuclear threat. Second, he sought to prevent normalization of Iran in the international 
order. Finally, he promoted recognition that Iran’s threat to Israel was larger than its 
nuclear program. Iran’s support of terrorists targeting Israel represented an ongoing 
significant danger.  
Netanyahu had long drawn on his morality trope to enhance his leadership 
status and highlight Israel’s, if not the world’s, need for a savior. Iran could not be 
trusted: its ideological destiny was to destroy Israel and no negotiation, engagement, or 
agreement with Iran would end its quest or remove the threat it posed. In 2012, 
Netanyahu had told the American Israel Public Affairs Committee conference that “As 
                                                        
680 In subsequent references, Netanyahu was even bolder in co-opting the story to 
further his policy agenda. For example, in 2017 he instructed a group of Israeli 
schoolchildren who were celebrating the Purim festival that the holiday symbolized the 
efforts of modern Iran to destroy the Israeli state. Benjamin Netanyahu, פורים שמח!, 
2017, https://www.facebook.com/Netanyahu/videos/10154454625947076/; 
Netanyahu, ‘The Complete Transcript of Netanyahu’s Address to Congress’. 
681 In 2017, Netanyahu received a rare rebuke for his invocation of the Esther story 
when he repeated his interpretation of the tale to Russian President Vladimir Putin. 
Putin publicly scolded the Israeli Prime Minister telling him to stop dwelling on the past 
and that “We now live in a different world. Let us talk about that now.” In a surreal 
twist, the incident also elicited a response from Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, who 
took to Twitter to lecture Netanyahu on biblical scripture and to accuse Netanyahu of 
“selling bigoted lies against a nation which has saved the Jews.” Karami, ‘Zarif Gives 
Netanyahu Lesson in Jewish Scripture’. 
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Prime Minister of Israel, I will never let my people live in the shadow of annihilation.”682 
He had reason to believe that this message resonated with Israelis. Similarly, two 
prominent Israeli journalists published a book purporting to examine a lengthy history of 
secret Israel-Iran proxy conflicts.683 A poll taken in 2012 showed that the Israeli public 
saw war as a real possibility.684 A majority of Israelis (56%) even expressed skepticism 
about the sincerity of Western diplomatic efforts to stop Iran from acquiring a nuclear 
weapon.685 Israelis still embraced Netanyahu as their leader three years later when they 
reelected him as prime minister two weeks after his address to the U.S. Congress.686 
At the time of Netanyahu’s re-election, Ahmadinejad had been out of the picture 
for nearly two years. Yet Netanyahu continued to position himself as the most 
knowledgeable prophet of doom. Intelligence leaks have revealed Netanyahu’s 
                                                        
682 Benjamin Netanyahu, ‘PM Netanyahu’s Speech at AIPAC Policy Conference 2012’ (5 
March 2012), 
http://www.pmo.gov.il/English/MediaCenter/Speeches/Pages/speechAIPAC060312.asp
x. 
683 The book, Israel vs. Iran: The Shadow War by Yaakov Katz and Yoaz Hendel, 
exemplified the national zeitgeist. It included fantastical passages imagining Iranian 
nuclear strikes against Israel and preemptive Israeli military missions against Iran. Years 
later Katz explained that his inspiration for writing the book came from observing that 
“Israeli panic” over Iran’s nuclear program was at its highest point and thus, by 
implication, there would be great public interest in reporting and speculation about 
these topics. Interview with Yaakov Katz.  
684 Yaar and Hermann, ‘The Peace Index’, August 2012. 
685 Ephraim Yaar and Tamar Hermann, ‘The Peace Index’ (The Israel Democracy Institute, 
February 2012), http://www.peaceindex.org/files/The%20Peace%20Index%20Data%20-
%20February%202012.pdf. 
686 Citing disagreements within his coalition partner Yisrael Beiteinu, Netanyahu called 
for early elections to be held in January 2015. Netanyahu’s Likud won with a plurality of 
the vote (23.4%), picking up 30 seats. He defeated the combined Labor/Hatunah “Zionist 
Union” party, which came in second. Netanyahu joined with Naftali Bennett’s Jewish 
Home, United Torah Judaism, Kulanu, and Hatunah to form a governing coalition with 
the bare minimum of 61 seats. In the wake of the election, several commentaries 
described Netanyahu’s new government as the “most right-wing” in the country’s 
history. Mairav Zonszein, ‘Benjamin Netanyahu Just Formed the Most Right-Wing 
Government in Israeli History’, The Nation, 25 May 2016, 
https://www.thenation.com/article/benjamin-netanyahu-just-formed-the-most-right-
wing-government-in-israeli-history/. 
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willingness to overstate the danger facing Israel. Documents reveal that Netanyahu 
accelerated the timetable by which Iran was likely to produce a nuclear weapon at the 
same time he was informed that Israeli intelligence did not believe Iran was working on 
producing weapons. The “Mossad spy cables” covered the period from 2006 through 
2014, which included five years of Netanyahu’s second term as prime minister.687 
Similarly, Netanyahu’s advocacy of military intervention contradicted the advice of his 
generals. They voiced concern that starting a regional war with Iran could prove 
detrimental to Israel. In continually pressing his case, Netanyahu ignored the many elite 
voices who had publicly acknowledged the futility of stopping Iran by a conventional 
military response.688 At the same time, top military officials privately delivered similar 
messages.689 It is hard to know whether Netanyahu so strongly believed that the 
justness of his cause was worth the risk of failure or whether he was engaging in 
strategic posturing. In either case, he used the push for action as an element of his 
leadership trope.  
Cabinet meeting minutes reveal Netanyahu’s unwillingness to accept that any 
negotiated agreement with Iran would reduce the existential threat to Israel. Rather, he 
claimed that the result would “enable Iran to arm itself with nuclear weapons.”690 In a 
                                                        
687 ‘The Spy Cables: A Glimpse into the World of Espionage’, Al Jazeera, 23 February 
2015, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/02/spy-cables-world-espionage-snowden-
guardian-mi6-cia-ssa-mossad-iran-southafrica-leak-150218100147229.html.  
688 In what was perhaps the biggest defection from Netanyahu’s position on Israel, 
former Mossad chief Meir Dagan said publicly in 2011 that an Israeli attack on Iran’s 
nuclear facilities would be a “stupid idea.” Isabel Kershner, ‘Ex-Mossad Chief Warns 
Against Strike on Iran’, The New York Times, 8 May 2011, sec. Middle East, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/09/world/middleeast/09israel.html. 
689 Lucas reports that Defense Minister Barak and several top military officials told 
Netanyahu that they believed a military engagement would result in an unsatisfactory 
outcome similar to the 2006 war with Hezbollah in Lebanon. Scott Lucas, ‘How Israel’s 
Military Stopped Netanyahu Attacking Iran’, The Conversation, 26 February 2015, 
http://theconversation.com/how-israels-military-stopped-netanyahu-attacking-iran-
38009.  
690 ‘Cabinet Meeting Minutes’, 18 February 2015, Israeli Prime Minister’s Office. 
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display of what Richard Hofstadter called the “fundamentalist mind,”691 Netanyahu 
demonstrated his unwillingness to adapt his view to changing circumstances. Thus, he 
blurred the line between nuclear technology and weaponry. Even if Iran was not actively 
engaged in producing a bomb, he argued, it would still remain a “nuclear threshold 
state.”692 He maintained that there was no functional difference between Iran’s nuclear 
energy program and the acquired technological knowledge on how to produce a nuclear 
weapon. Therefore, there was no solution to the Iran threat short of regime change.  
 With this argument, his populist strategy had effectively securitized Iran as an 
unresolvable existential threat to Israel. 
VI. Conclusion 
 
Netanyahu’s political acumen enabled him to construct a narrative positioning 
Israel as the victim of an existential threat and himself as the leader determined to save 
Israelis from its actualization. Choosing his narrative content carefully, he ensured that it 
could withstand most unforeseen developments in world events without material 
change. This allowed him to repeat his populist tropes by which he recruited and 
maintained public support for his message and for the messenger. By manipulating the 
concepts of uncertainty and Israeli identity, he made it difficult for opponents to critique 
his narrative. Israelis, he insisted, had compelling reasons to fear what Iran could do, 
and those voicing skepticism risked undermining Israel’s security. Israeli critics forfeited 
                                                        
691 The “fundamentalist mind,” according to Hofstadter, is “essentially Manichean; it 
looks upon the world as an arena for conflict between absolute good and absolute evil, 
and accordingly it scorns compromises (who would compromise with Satan?) and can 
tolerate no ambiguities. It cannot find serious importance in what it believes to be 
trifling degrees of difference…the secularized fundamentalist mind begins with a 
definition of what is right, and looks upon politics as an arena in which that right must 
be realized.” Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism in American Life, 135. 
692 ‘Cabinet Meeting Minutes’, 25 January 2015, Israeli Prime Minister’s Office.  
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their identity as members of the Jewish peoplehood, while foreigners were either anti-
Semites or anti-Zionists, or both, or enablers of Israel’s opponents.  
Invoking Holocaust imagery and the selective recounting of history, Netanyahu 
emphasized the consequences of the threat in a manner designed to secure support for 
his proposed responses. Although the strategic use of the Nazi’s extermination of six 
million Jews did not originate with Netanyahu, he was expert in capitalizing on the 
Holocaust denial of Iran’s president in a manner designed to resonate with Israelis and 
world Jewry. As Peter Novick points out, the Holocaust and historical memory makes 
Israel “a country whose population…has a special relationship to the victims of the 
crime.”693 In Netanyahu’s narrative, Iran was the criminal regime embracing a 
murderous intent to annihilate Jewish victims.  
Even as the Iran narrative changed for most of the world with consequential 
developments – which included the election of a new Iranian president; the publication 
of intelligence reports indicating that Iran was not engaged in weapons development; 
and the engagement of Western nations with Iran to suspend its enrichment of 
uranium, which effectively deprived it of bomb making capacity – Netanyahu did not 
modify the core of his threat narrative. Instead, he redefined his leadership mission to 
become the principal opponent of an agreement and to remind Israelis and the world of 
Iran’s continuing danger. Israelis reelected him as their leader, exemplifying the political 
power of populism and the policy consequences of securitization. 
 
 
 
                                                        
693 Novick, The Holocaust in American Life. 
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Conclusion and Epilogue 
 
I. Back to the Beginning: A Predicate for a Narrative 
 
 In 1961, a young Israeli diplomat arrived in Tehran on his first overseas posting. 
Unlike his colleagues at the diplomatic mission in Tehran, Zvi Rafiah’s portfolio did not 
include collaboration with military officers or high government officials in the Shah’s 
court. Instead, Rafiah aimed to engage with Iran’s vibrant cultural scene. His 
responsibilities included arranging intellectual and cultural exchanges, including 
providing Iranians with all-expense paid trips to Israel as part of Israeli “Hasbara,” or 
public promotional campaigns.  
 In February 1963, a famous Iranian writer and scholar named Jalal Al-e Ahmad 
embarked on one of those trips. His presence on such an obviously promotional 
endeavor was odd considering that he was among the most vocal intellectual opponents 
of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s regime. At the time of the trip, Iran and Israel were 
still partners in the Periphery Alliance, which included intelligence sharing, military 
cooperation, and other exchanges. The previous year, Al-e Ahmad had published 
Gharbzadegi (Westoxification), a harsh critique of the Shah’s regime that decried the 
monarch’s efforts to initiate Western style reforms across Iran. This earned him favor 
with some of Iran’s most prominent anti-Shah clerical elite, including Ayatollahs 
Ruhollah Khomeini and Ali Khamenei, both of whom were vocal critics of the Shah and 
the Jewish State.694  
                                                        
694 Al-e Ahmad’s work denouncing Western cultural influence in Iran would play an 
important role a decade and a half later during the Islamic Revolution led by Khomeini, 
providing part of the ideological foundation for the Shah’s overthrow.  
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While not devoutly religious himself, Al-e Ahmad used the language and 
philosophy of Shiite Islam in his literary works to describe Iranian culture.695 Thus, while 
on his trip, Al-e Ahmad analyzed his surroundings through a uniquely religious lens, 
publishing his observations after his trip. He began his account in Journey to the Land of 
Israel by describing Israel as a “velayat,” a term typically associated with Shiite 
jurisprudence involving the concept of guardianship. In the political context, it refers to 
the idea that the authority of national government comes from more than the people 
within its borders; a higher power must also bestow legitimacy on the leadership.696 Al-e 
Ahmad saw Israel as not just a country for the two million inhabitants of a small strip of 
desert land, but as a symbol of global Jewry. Much like Israel’s founders, he called the 
establishment of the state “a true miracle.” Ironically, he saw the country’s leaders as 
modern-day prophets, writing that “Ben-Gurian [sic] is no less than Enoch, and Moshe 
Dayan no less than Joab.” Invoking velayat he continued, “These guardians, each one 
with his own prophecies or – at least – clear-vision, built a guardianship state in the land 
of Palestine and called to it all the Children of Israel.”697 Thus, Al-e Ahmad concluded, 
“Like it or not, [the State of Israel] now governs and acts in the name of all twelve 
million Jews scattered around the world.”698 
                                                        
695 Al-e Ahmad professed a fascination with the founding of the Jewish state, in 
particular its socialist roots and religious ethos.  
696 Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini would later espouse his political vision of Velayat e-
Faqih, or “Guardianship of the Jurist,” in a book published in 1970. Based on a series of 
lectures delivered while in exile in Iraq, Khomeini posited that clerics should serve as 
leaders of the Islamic community in a governmental capacity. This interpretation 
provided the doctrinal basis for Khomeini’s Islamic Revolution, although it is unclear the 
extent to which Al-e Ahmad was aware of this interpretation at the time of his writing 
on Israel. Ruhollah Khomeini, Islamic Government: Governance of the Jurist, 1970. 
697 Jalal Al-e Ahmad, The Israeli Republic: An Iranian Revolutionary’s Journey to the 
Jewish State, trans. Samuel Thrope, Translation edition (Brooklyn, NY: Restless Books, 
2017). 
698 In support of this proposition he cited the trial of Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann. 
Israeli courts convicted Eichmann of mass murder of Jews during the Holocaust. His 
execution was the only case of capital punishment in Israel. Al-e Ahmad believed that 
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Significantly, this respected Iranian intellectual, who would have an influential 
role in the Islamic Revolution sixteen years after his visit, conveyed to his readers an 
understanding and appreciation of the role of Israel not just as a nation-state but as a 
homeland for the Jewish people. At the same time, he noted two important criticisms of 
its leaders’ policies. The first concerned the invocation of the Holocaust as justification 
for the treatment of Muslims; the second questioned the promotion of fear among its 
Jewish citizens.  
Al-e Ahmad criticized the West for making Easterners pay for the creation of 
Israel in compensation for the Holocaust, which he viewed as a sin generated by the 
West. He wrote that it was unfair and questioned the reasoning behind why the Muslim 
world had to surrender its territory to the Jews for crimes committed by foreign peoples 
on another continent. This was a concern shared by many of Israel’s regional opponents. 
Al-e Ahmad also noticed a pervasive sense of insecurity among Israelis. During a 
visit to a kibbutz, a type of socialist farming collective, in northern Israel near the Syrian 
and Lebanese borders,699 a military commander lectured the group on weaponry and 
took them on a tour of the underground bunkers dug in preparation for war with the 
Arabs. In response to Al-e Ahmad’s inquiry about fear as a motivational tool, a local 
school teacher explained that displays of power and war preparations were necessary 
“as long as we are under siege by the Arabs.” Al-e Ahmad reported encountering this 
common refrain throughout the country, and he voiced skepticism. He noted that he 
warned the teacher, “You yourselves are constantly playing with fire. When you frighten 
                                                        
this event demonstrated that Israel’s leaders were acting in the name of guardianship of 
Judaism rather than simply the state itself. He argued that by mounting a massive 
operation to kidnap Eichmann for trial in Israel, the country’s leaders engaged in 
“something loftier than human rights declarations.” 
699 They visited kibbutz Ayelet HaShahar situated adjacent to the border with the Syrian-
controlled Golan Heights. Israel later captured that territory in the 1967 War, four years 
after Al-e Ahmad’s visit. 
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their side, you yourselves have to become frightened as well. And in place of eliminating 
your class differences, you spend your resources building shelters.”700  
As an astute political observer, Al-e Ahmad’s account captured both the tension 
between and co-existence of the admirer and the critic of the Jewish State. Ironically, as 
an Iranian, he was far more critical of the leader of his own country than he was of 
policies of Israel’s leaders. From Al-e Ahmad’s perspective, Israel provided a model for a 
religious republic, a successful combination of socialist principles with religious ideals.  
One suspects that, as he recorded his observations, he considered what lessons 
Israel held for a future Islamic state. 701  Most importantly, Al-e Ahmad’s observations 
encapsulated the history of the relations of the two countries, illuminating the 
complexities emerging from a history of uneasy friendship and political conflicts arising 
in a region undergoing significant change. He thus provides us with a testament to a 
narrative that might have been; one that challenges the idea that Israel’s present view 
of Iran, born of the populist securitization examined in this study, was inevitable. 702 
II. Fast-Forward 1992-2015: Project Conclusion 
 
Admittedly, we can only speculate what Al-e Ahmad would have thought had he 
returned to Israel in 2015 after witnessing the development of the Israel-Iran enmity 
examined in this project. He almost certainly would have been both surprised and 
disappointed by the changes in the characteristics he had admired in the nascent state 
of his first visit, as well as its failure to alter some of the practices that he believed would 
                                                        
700 Al-e Ahmad, The Israeli Republic. 
701 Al-e Ahmad would not live to see his vision for Iran become a reality. He died in 1969. 
702 I am not suggesting that events should not have produced some degree of enmity 
between the nations. There were many bases for the nations to distrust and suspect 
each other’s intentions. Al-e Ahmad later denounced Israel’s preemptive action in the 
1967 Six Day War by comparing Israeli aggression to Nazism. Ironically, Netanyahu often 
invoked a Nazi comparison in his threat narrative tropes.  
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one day prove damaging. Would he understand how and why Israelis had come to view 
Iran as an existential threat? 
Given the post-revolutionary developments in his own country, he probably 
would not have been surprised by Israel’s divergence from its founders’ ideological 
roots, which Al-e Ahmad had admired and respected. Israel’s not-so-secret alliance with 
the Shah, including its training of his repressive SAVAK secret police, earned it disdain 
from the Iranian public. At the same time, Ayatollah Khomeini’s embrace of the 
Palestinian cause in the early days of the Islamic Revolution coupled with his fierce 
condemnations of Israeli and American aggression provided cause for alarm in Israel. 
The transitional period in Iran infused uncertainty into the relationship, breeding 
confusion among Israeli elites who were aware of the divergence between public 
posturing and private transactions. During the long and bloody war between Iran and 
Iraq, the hidden reality saw Israel selling arms to Iran in exchange for Iran providing oil 
to Israel. Some Israelis at least hoped that despite the rhetorical attacks, some restraint, 
if not mutually beneficial arrangement, would be possible. Others, however, introduced 
warnings of significant dangers ahead, foreshadowing concerns that would eventually 
come to dominate the Israeli foreign policy discourse. These concerns would furnish the 
seeds for implantation into Israeli political discourse of an existential threat narrative. 
Over the years, leaders would succeed in first securitizing Iran and later elevating it to 
the top of Israel’s foreign policy and international agenda.  
Although securitization meant that the Israeli public internalized the message of 
Iran as a mortal foe, there were remarkable similarities in the domestic political 
situations of the two countries. The State of Israel and the Islamic Republic each faced a 
foundational rift that generally defined their society and politics. Both had been riven by 
tensions between orthodox religious elements wielding political power and those who 
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consigned religion largely to the cultural and social spheres. While Iran’s government 
was more theocratic and Israel’s more democratic, each struggled with internal 
dissension over how to strike a balance between the religious and political elements 
within their respective systems. Competing factions alternatively colluded with or 
fought one another in a struggle for control over policy and positions of power.  
For both nations, international politics provided the contestation for religious 
parties to test citizen identity and loyalty. If Al-e Ahmad had looked back in 2015 to 
consider the origins of the Israel-Iran conflict, he would have discerned that religiously 
and culturally-motivated conservatives exerted their strongest political influence by 
advocating a foreign policy agenda grounded in fear of the “other.” Unlike in Iran, 
however, where the Revolutionary Guard Corps sought to expand Iranian influence in 
the region through military means, Israel turned inward by focusing on the threat to its 
continued well-being and, eventually, its existence. Particularly after Iraq’s defeat in the 
Second Gulf War and the diminishment of the threat to Iran posed by Saddam Hussein’s 
Baathist regime, Israelis’ fear of Iran intensified. Israeli politicians were unwilling to 
modify their narrative even as Iranian interests converged with the West, and, by 
extension, with Israel, over the rise of Sunni extremism. Instead, Israeli politicians 
offered new reasons to fear Iran’s intentions.  
The Islamic Republic’s resurrection of the Shah’s nuclear program provided 
Israeli leaders the foundational material for constructing the Iran threat as existential. 
From a theoretical perspective, it added a new dynamic to regional and international 
relations, which could not be explained simply by realist theory grounded in power 
relations. Regardless of the facts regarding Iran’s actual nuclear capabilities, Israeli 
leaders used the perception of Iranian malfeasance as a building block for a new threat 
calculus, thereby initiating a process to promote the acceptance and internalization of 
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this narrative by the Israeli public. The securitization of the Iranian threat required more 
than a powerful actor casting the collective as the putative victim. Iran certainly saw 
scientific expertise and nuclear development as part of its modernization effort and 
symbolic of its position as a regional power. Yet Iran, and not Israel, was a signatory to 
the NPT, and only Israel possessed “secret” nuclear weapons. Particularly as Iran’s 
nuclear program came under increased public scrutiny, intelligence agencies struggled 
to find data supporting the claim that Iran was building a military nuclear capability. An 
astute observer such as Al-e Ahmad, who knew Ayatollah Khomeini, would understand 
that the Supreme Leader had reluctantly agreed to restart the program after Iran’s 
experience as a victim of Iraqi chemical attacks during the 1980s. Thus, given Iran’s 
eventual willingness to negotiate a suspension of its nuclear development program, a 
knowledgeable analyst might wonder why Israelis in 2015 still refused to believe reports 
that Iran in 2003 had abandoned plans to use the program for military purposes.  
As a man of letters, Al-e Ahmad would have undoubtedly understood the power 
of narrative to create a perceived threat that may diverge from the facts. During his 
earlier visit, he had observed that given Israel’s location as a Jewish state surrounded by 
hostile Arab neighbors, security issues necessarily occupied a prominent place on Israel’s 
political agenda. Having developed a democracy beset by an overabundance of political 
parties and a surfeit of political and military elites, Israeli public discourse featured a 
competition among leaders who exploited citizens’ sense of insecurity. Each would-be 
actor offered promises and proposals for keeping the public safe from exogenous 
threats. Israel’s right-wing hawks, the securitization actors, manipulated the threat 
characteristics of obviousness, imminence, and harm capability not only to identify a 
distinctive and catastrophic danger, but also to justify proposals for extraordinary 
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actions to reduce the risk. The promotion of military action was a distinctive message 
that further intensified the sense of insecurity. 
 From the vantage point of the second decade of the twenty-first century, Al-e 
Ahmad could look back and discern how events in Iran contributed to the narrative arc 
while Israel’s changing political landscape catalyzed Iran as the priority foreign policy 
challenge. Iran’s election in 2005 of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as its president provided 
Israel’s leaders with the perfect avatar for the Iran they claimed to be confronting. As an 
avid Holocaust denier, with a bombastic style and messianic proclamations, he directed 
outrageous threats at Israel and its principal ally, the United States. Although not a 
cleric, Ahmadinejad still served to personify the threat of a dangerously unhinged 
Islamic regime. Coincidentally, just over a year following Ahmadinejad’s ascension, 
Israel’s supposedly indomitable army ineptly invaded Lebanon and suffered the 
humiliation of a stalemate in its effort to eliminate the terrorist threat of Hezbollah. 
Israeli leaders cleverly tempered the humiliation by blaming Iran, Hezbollah’s strategic 
advisor and sponsor, as the reason for the calamity. The antics of Ahmadinejad 
contributed to the believability of the new narrative twist, conveniently tying words to 
deeds at a moment when the Israeli public was demanding answers.  
Israel’s failure in Lebanon spawned a reimagining of the Iran threat as a matter 
of urgent public concern. It concretized for the public the danger posed by Iran, 
conveniently tying words to deeds at a moment of national vulnerability. An Iran led by 
an unhinged Holocaust denier that controlled a major military force situated along 
Israel’s northern border was an issue that required a reckoning. If Al-e Ahmad had 
listened carefully to Israelis’ recounting of the history of the Ahmadinejad years and the 
Second Lebanon War post mortems, he would have heard echoes of the fears exhibited 
by Israelis during his first visit and been reminded of his concern that Israelis’ continuous 
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preparations for war would become a self-propelling prophecy. The focus on Iran, the 
debacle in Lebanon, and the antics of Ahmadinejad not only fueled the fear narrative, 
but also held the potential to provoke an action, such as preemptive measures against 
the perceived threat of Iranian-led destruction. As the narrative embraced an action 
component, so too did it target a larger international audience. Thus, Israel sought to 
enlist the world in sharing its Iran threat narrative. Ironically, notwithstanding Israel’s 
well-equipped and technologically savvy army, with its not-so-secret nuclear arsenal, 
and its repression of the Palestinians, which earned it international condemnation, Israel 
used the threat narrative to position itself as the victim.  
The securitization of Iran as an existential enemy facilitated Benjamin 
Netanyahu’s return to power. His defiant security rhetoric vis-à-vis Iran resonated with 
an increasingly strong religiously nationalist political base not only because of a fear of 
Iran, but also because it diverted attention and resources from addressing a territorial 
compromise with the Palestinians. From the perspective of a theorist, Netanyahu 
applied a strategic populist filter to the lens of securitization to further both his 
campaign against Iran and to bolster his leadership of that campaign. To do so, he 
engrafted three populist-themed messages onto his securitization speech act. First, he 
ascribed unverifiable motives to Iranian leaders, thereby transforming the conflict from 
a battle of strategic interests into a primarily moral pursuit. Netanyahu’s vision was that 
of a Manichean struggle between the forces of evil, embodied by Iran, who were the 
inheritors of the Nazi pursuit of Jewish annihilation, and the forces of good, represented 
by Israel’s ongoing struggle to survive and thrive in a hostile region. Netanyahu’s posture 
aligned with the theology of his religious and nationalist followers, who believed that 
the Jews were, in fact, “The Chosen People.” Second, Netanyahu understood that his 
base was invested in ensuring Iran remained the priority of Israel’s foreign policy agenda 
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regardless of the nature of the actual threat. Collectively, they viewed an Israeli 
muscular response as a moral imperative. As a skilled orator, Netanyahu invoked 
populist rhetoric to affirm for his followers that they were the “true” Israelis, entitled to 
ostracize and ridicule the skeptics and “experts” who questioned the factual basis of the 
narrative. As Iran strengthened its regional influence, Netanyahu stoked the fire by 
presenting the issue as an ongoing crisis both to rally his base and to denigrate his 
political enemies. He crafted an image of strength and leadership against an implacable 
foe without ever having to deliver substantive results that would have diminished the 
threat posed by Iran. 
Finally, after securing Iran as an indispensable part of Israeli political discourse 
and solidifying his strategic populism, Netanyahu maneuvered to challenge the norms of 
government conduct both at home and in the international arena. Domestically, he used 
his morally grounded messages to mute the fact-based challenges of skeptics seeking to 
debate his policies. Internationally, Netanyahu worked to enlist Western nations as allies 
in opposing pursuit of a diplomatic solution. He maintained that negotiation was 
impossible since the enemy would not engage in good faith. This, in turn, strengthened 
his position at home as a courageous leader among misguided or hostile, or perhaps 
even anti-Semitic, world leaders. 
Viewing Netanyahu’s populist appeals, Al-e Ahmad would have been especially 
disappointed, although perhaps not surprised, that the Israeli leader used this tactic to 
obscure the humanity of his adversaries, the Palestinians as well as the Iranians. In his 
travelogue, Al-e Ahmad had voiced a commonly held Arab critique of using the 
Holocaust to justify creation of a Jewish homeland in the Middle East when it had been 
Europeans who had perpetrated the extermination campaign. Over its 70 years of 
existence, Israel not only achieved entrenchment, but with the “help” of its enemies’ 
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belligerence in both word and deed, including commission of horrific acts of terrorism 
against civilians in Israel and world-wide, also succeeded in largely obscuring the debate 
over the justness of Israel’s location. Yet here was Netanyahu boasting to his base of his 
defiant refusal to address the Palestinian demand for a state, while simultaneously 
invoking the Iran threat on the world stage to justify Israel’s intransigence in seeking a 
diplomatic solution. Like the Iranians, the Palestinians could neither be trusted nor 
admitted to the community of nations. Eliding over the differences in the two pressing 
foreign policy concerns, Netanyahu challenged world leaders to either stand with Israel 
or align itself with evil.  
By 2015, Netanyahu’s unique brand of populism had largely united the Israeli 
polity against a shared exogenous enemy and positioned him as the country’s savior. 
Unlike the growing populist movements in countries around the globe, however, 
Netanyahu did not ground his claim to leadership in ardent domestic nationalism. 
Rather, he chose to harness a collective fear to emphasize an Israeli foreign policy 
agenda that defied the expectations of his allies as well as enemies. He broadened his 
message beyond Israel’s borders, directing his message at world Jewry and other 
supporters of Israel, whatever their motives. At home, he energized his right-wing base 
with his rhetorical skills and media support; no politician wanted to risk accusations of 
failing to prevent – or worse, enabling – the annihilation of Israel. On the world stage, 
Netanyahu vigorously opposed an international “deal” under which Iran would suspend 
its nuclear program in exchange for an end to its international isolation. Positioning 
himself as the prophetic lone voice of reason, he continued to speak of military 
intervention and regime change.  
 As of 2015, Netanyahu presented a paradox. He had failed to block progress 
toward a negotiated agreement over the fate of Iran’s nuclear program and had become 
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estranged from many world leaders. At the same time, his willingness to challenge the 
world powers’ diplomatic overtures to Iran promoted his standing at home and 
reinforced his image as the only leader capable of saving Israel from a nefarious Iran and 
a credulous West. Yet as he pressed for regime change in Iran, his certitude masked the 
possibility that the doctrine of unintended consequences could produce a worse result. 
Reportedly, his inability to secure support of the United States caused him to order a 
last-minute cancellation of a planned attack.  
Thus, if in 2015 Al-e Ahmad departed from a second visit to Israel, he would have 
been hard-pressed to speculate regarding Netanyahu’s proverbial “endgame.” 
Netanyahu’s opposition to the Iran Deal was a risky strategy. If the Prime Minister 
believed his own narrative, a possible outcome would be Iran’s continuation of its 
nuclear enrichment program, and, in the worst-case scenario, the successful completion 
of a military component. His message to world leaders, therefore, was counterintuitive: 
Israel would be less safe if Iran agreed to suspend its program, allowed international 
monitoring, and accepted strict limits on future development capabilities. According to 
this logic, notwithstanding inspections and sanctions, Iran would cheat while it would 
also acquire significant funds from its unfrozen assets to support its terrorist proxies and 
its regional hegemonic ambitions.703 
                                                        
703 It’s worth noting that while Iran provides considerable funding and material support 
to groups engaged in terrorist activities, its level of strategic control is debatable. Most 
scholars agree that Iran exerts considerable influence over Hezbollah in Lebanon, but 
they are less certain of Iran’s impact on Hamas in Palestine or the Houthis in Yemen. 
Karim Sadjadpour, Iran Supports Hamas, but Hamas Is No Iranian ’Puppet’, interview by 
Bernard Gwertzman, 7 January 2009, Council on Foreign Relations, 
https://www.cfr.org/interview/iran-supports-hamas-hamas-no-iranian-puppet; ‘Why 
Yemen’s Political Implosion Is Dangerous for the U.S.’, PBS NewsHour (PBS, 22 January 
2015), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/yemens-political-implosion-dangerous-u-
s.  
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But Netanyahu’s securitization process and strategic populism rely neither on 
logic nor on factual accuracy. If Iran remained isolated by the world community, it could 
threaten to acquire a bomb, which would continue the crisis, even if, due to sanctions, it 
might lack the resources to do so. It could withdraw from the NPT, but this would only 
serve to confirm Netanyahu warnings. This process of Iranian isolation via populist 
securitization could facilitate regime change since Iran’s moderate government, having 
failed to improve its citizens’ lives through engagement, would lose credibility. That this 
might result in a resurgence of hardliners would at least push the world to action as 
envisioned by Netanyahu. These developments would validate both Netanyahu’s 
leadership and his Iran threat narrative. As an astute observer, Al-e Ahmad might have 
recognized that Netanyahu’s populism conflated his message of existential danger with 
his status as the messenger and would-be savior of both Israel and the Jewish people. As 
an analyst of contemporary events, Al-e Ahmad would have realized that Netanyahu’s 
message was more consequential for Israeli politics and society than it was for Iran’s 
conduct. As a scholar, Al-e Ahmad might have agreed that Netanyahu was operating 
within a conceptual framework of populist securitization. 
III. Epilogue and Questions for the Future  
 
In 2015, Benjamin Netanyahu won a fourth term, his third consecutive, as prime 
minister by a surprisingly large margin. With polls showing him behind in the last weeks 
of the campaign, he engaged in an offensive that included a pledge not to allow the 
establishment of a Palestinian state during his remaining service as prime minister. 
Given that he also did not abandon the Iran threat narrative, he effectively promised 
Israelis a continuation of their state of insecurity as he offered himself as their 
confrontational leader.  
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What might have been a successful political strategy was, from a geopolitical 
perspective, a questionable, even risky, posture for Israel and, perhaps, the Middle East. 
Through his bellicose attacks on Israel’s allies for engaging in negotiations with Iran over 
suspension of its nuclear enrichment program, he had isolated himself. He was also 
courting relationships with Iran’s enemies, notably Saudi Arabia, based upon shared 
opposition to normalizing Iran’s participation in the international arena. 
Just months after Netanyahu’s 2015 re-election, the five permanent members of 
the United Nations Security Council, the United States, Russia, China, Great Britain, and 
France, together with Germany and the European Union, agreed to terms on the 
JCPOA.704 Netanyahu had vigorously opposed the negotiations, and he was no happier 
about the final agreement. To be sure, the agreement was a compromise, one in which 
Iran would agree to accept severe restrictions on its nuclear program to prevent it from 
building a bomb, but not end its nuclear program entirely.705 There were reasons to 
continue criticizing Iran’s conduct, not the least of which was its support for militant 
groups targeting Israel, and to express disappointment that the agreement was not 
more comprehensive. Still, there was very little space for opposition if the primary 
concern was to reduce significantly the threat to Israel of a soon-to-be nuclear-armed 
Iran. The agreement represented an unambiguous rejection by the world powers of 
Netanyahu’s worldview.706  
                                                        
704 The agreement is known in Persian as the م ﺑﺮﺟﺎ , or the ﺑﺮﻧﺎﻣﻪ ﺟﺎﻣﻊ اﻗﺪام ﻣﺸÖ§ک  (an 
acronym that translates to JCPOA). It emerged from a years-long process of negotiations 
dating back approximately 12 years. The negotiations that eventually led to the JCPOA 
began with a series of interim agreements beginning in November 2012. 
705 As a signatory to the NPT, Iran had a legal right to develop “a peaceful” nuclear 
program.  
706 Iran’s involvement in regional conflicts had already made it a power to be reckoned 
with in ways that many argued undermined regional stability. While Netanyahu claimed 
that the Iran Deal would strengthen Iran’s military power, it is equally arguable that the 
deal would strengthen Iran as an economic competitor by opening its economy to global 
opportunities. 
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The deal illustrates the clash between a fact-based narrative and Netanyahu’s 
“perfected” threat narrative. Years before the agreement, the world heard reports from 
U.S. intelligence agencies and the IAEA confirming Iran’s insistence that it had long 
abandoned active pursuit of military applications in its nuclear program. While Iran 
could develop the capability to produce a bomb, there was no evidence that Iran had 
ever engaged in nuclear weapons manufacture.707 Israel, however, refused to accept 
this as fact and instead claimed that Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear bomb was imminent. 
Israel also refused to believe that Iran’s replacement of an avowed anti-Semite in favor 
of a lower-key moderate reformer who professed an interest in engaging with the 
international community represented a substantive change. By contrast, international 
leaders believed that the world would be safer if international inspectors could 
continuously monitor and verify that Iran was not producing a bomb. Thus, they 
negotiated an agreement in which Iran agreed not to do what it was already not doing, 
and also to end processing and stockpiling nuclear material, which would have enabled 
it to produce a nuclear weapon in a shorter period of time, should Iranian leaders decide 
to do so. The agreement would last for fifteen years, during which any violation by Iran 
would carry harsh penalties. In exchange, the world powers agreed to return to Iran its 
funds that had been frozen and, most importantly, to end certain sanctions that 
prevented Iran’s engagement with international commerce.708  
The threat narrative, by contrast, maintained that Iranian leaders could not be 
trusted to abide by any agreement, particularly one that was not permanent. Israelis 
                                                        
707 To the extent that Iran had ever explored building a nuclear weapon, most expert 
assessments concluded that they had never progressed beyond exploratory phases and 
feasibility studies. Few dispute that Iran had acquired the knowledge to construct a 
weapon. Board of Directors, ‘Final Assessment on Past and Present Outstanding Issues 
Regarding Iran’s Nuclear Programme’.  
708 ‘Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action’, 14 July 2015, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/122460/full-text-of-the-iran-nuclear-deal.pdf. 
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believed that they and the world were less safe because international leaders were not 
sufficiently punitive. Not only would Iran continue developing the mythical bomb, it 
would recover funds that would be used to finance attacks on Israel and other global 
targets. Their claims that the agreement was “giving” a monetary reward to Iran ignored 
the fact that the funds legally belonged to the Iranians. Beneath the rhetoric, the major 
objection was that by negotiating with Iran, world powers normalized the regime that 
Netanyahu and Israeli leaders had invested in undermining. 
No one disputed that Iran would continue to engage in regional conflicts. The 
agreement did not require that the country move to the sidelines of those conflicts in 
which it was a presence. The Middle East remained a complicated and hostile region, in 
which there were many players. Iran supported Hezbollah in Lebanon, along with Shia 
insurgents and militias in Yemen and Iraq. In Syria, Iran and Russia were both supporting 
the Assad regime, while the United States sent assistance to rebel groups engaged in 
that bloody civil war. Yet both Iran and the United States were nominally fighting against 
a shared enemy in Al Qaeda. For its part, Israel targeted Iran and its proxies, who did not 
refrain from provoking Israel. Thus, the waxing and waning of the potential for a hot war 
between the two nations was not alleviated by the Iran deal. The dangers associated 
with these confrontations, however, involved potential conventional military 
engagements, as well as the menace of terrorist attacks, which posed a significantly 
lower risk to Israel’s security and continued existence than nuclear war.709  
                                                        
709Admittedly, Netanyahu invoked the comparison between terrorism and nuclear 
threats to support focusing on the Iran threat rather than the Palestinians’ discontent. It 
is possible that Netanyahu believed that Iran’s support of Hezbollah and Assad was 
more dangerous than the Palestinian unrest, but this is a difference in the degree of risk 
not in the type of danger, e.g. existential versus conventional. Moreover, in a 
conventional confrontation, Israel’s military resources would be stronger than those of 
Iran and Israel would have the backing of the United States. Iran had no equivalent 
sponsor. 
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The vehemence of Netanyahu’s denunciation of the Iran deal was predictable. 
Writing soon after the departure of Ahmadinejad as Iran’s president, two journalists 
examined Netanyahu’s rhetoric that described the Iranian regime as messianic and 
apocalyptic. They questioned whether the intentions Netanyahu ascribed to the Iranian 
leaders amounted to projection of his own leadership ambitions. Expressing skepticism 
about his sincerity, they predicted the rhetoric would intensify: 
[I]t’s difficult to tell whether Netanyahu actually believes any of this or is just 
trying to rally support for Israel’s hard-line positions and deflect international 
attention from the Palestinian question. While we are inclined to view his 
rhetoric as mostly cynical, his recently-espoused claim that Iranians are not 
permitted to wear jeans or listen to western music suggests that we can’t 
completely discount sheer ignorance or a Manichaean worldview that can’t 
reconcile blue jeans with his image of the Islamic Republic. In either case, we can 
probably expect his rhetoric to become increasingly messianic and apocalyptic if 
and when the possibility of peace between the US and Iran increases.710 
 
Netanyahu’s posture as a lone voice in the international arena did not deter him. 
He continued to propagate his narrative as truth, embracing his cause as a moral 
crusade and as his own historic mission. He took his populism global, finding audiences 
outside of Israel who were receptive to his attacks on world leaders. Netanyahu 
repeatedly directed his narrative at international Jewry,711 and found adherents among 
conservative American politicians, especially those who opposed any policy favored by 
                                                        
710 Jim Lobe & Daniel Luban, The Messianic, Apocalyptic Bibi Netanyahu, lobelog.com 
(Oct 9, 2013) 
711 In particular, Netanyahu sought to inspire support for his position from the 
supposedly non-partisan but politically active American Israeli Public Affairs Committee 
(AIPAC) as well as the public affairs committees of the America’s Jewish Federations. He 
also enlisted several hawkish American think tanks, including the Heritage Foundation, 
the American Enterprise Institute, and the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, as 
well as far-right organizations such as the Gatestone Institute. 
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President Barak Obama,712 as well as those who pandered to Jewish voters or wealthy 
donors, or both.713  
With Jews in the Diaspora, Netanyahu manipulated feelings of guilt to intensify 
the message of fear in his standard narrative. He suggested that for choosing not to live 
in Israel, Jews in western nations, most notably American Jews, owed Israel an 
allegiance that required them to subordinate their own personal political preferences to 
Israel’s security needs. He urged them to lobby their government officials and cast their 
votes accordingly. Ironically, while the majority of American Jews did not follow 
Netanyahu’s lead,714 American domestic policies enabled him to recruit supporters 
                                                        
712 Many Republican legislators opposed Obama initiatives regardless of content. Led by 
Senate Republican leader Mitch McConnell, they announced a strategy of opposition at 
the beginning of his first term, and few waivered. Thus, blocking the Iran Deal may have 
been based upon political considerations rather than substantive analysis of the issues. 
Moreover, for many U.S. legislators, their position on the Iran Deal had few political 
consequences as it was not a decisive issue for their constituents. In the end, Republican 
Senators failed to secure the votes to reject the Iran Deal. The measure required a super 
majority of 60 votes in the 100-member body; it fell four votes short. Democratic 
Senators, however, did not have sufficient votes to ratify the agreement, which meant 
that the JCPOA was not considered an official treaty. Thus, a future President could 
withdraw America from participation. In May 2018 Trump announced that the United 
States would withdraw from the JCPOA and re-impose sanctions on Iran. Since there 
was no evidence that Iran had failed to comply with its terms, and European signatories 
urged him not to do so, it is likely that he based his decision on political or egotistical 
calculations. 
713 For example, New Jersey Democrat Bob Menendez continually emphasized his 
opposition to the deal to Jewish constituents. Menendez, who was under indictment on 
federal corruption charges, faced reelection in 2018. He likely believed that wealthy 
Jewish donors would overlook financial impropriety in favor of a strong Israel advocate. 
He also sought the support of voters whose single issue was Israel, although the 
majority of American Jews are not single-issue voters. Seventy percent voted for 
President Obama’s reelection in 2012 despite Netanyahu’s obvious support for his 
Republican challenger. In 2016, 70% voted for Hillary Clinton, although her opponent 
promised to relocate the American Embassy to Jerusalem, a move long sought by 
Israelis. He also promised to “tear up” the Iran Deal. Judy Maltz, ‘Clinton Won 
Overwhelming Majority of Jewish-American Vote, Polls Say’, Haaretz, 9 November 2016, 
https://www.haaretz.com/world-news/clinton-won-majority-of-jewish-american-vote-
polls-say-1.5459522. 
714 Netanyahu’s threat narrative was not overwhelmingly resonant with ordinary 
American Jews. Polls varied, not surprisingly based upon who conducted them. A poll for 
a Jewish political action committee, J Street, which favored the agreement, found that 
 309 
among anti-Obama Republicans. Having made no secret of his dislike for the American 
President, Netanyahu could make common cause with Republicans’ political objectives 
as well as their generally hawkish positions. Even where his Jewish identity may have 
been problematic, Netanyahu was strategically adept at recruiting allies among the 
enemies of his enemies. He also provided the emotional message to politicians seeking 
support from wealthy Jewish donors, enabling them to attach themselves to his 
message and adapt the Israeli security narrative as they courted Jewish money and 
votes. As a cynical politician, Netanyahu knew that his address to Congress in 2015, at 
the invitation of the Republican Speaker of the House of Representatives, would not sit 
well with President Obama. By denouncing Iran and the President’s willingness to 
negotiate with, rather than directly confront, his enemies, Netanyahu demonstrated 
that, like many of the legislators he was addressing, he was not willing to compromise 
on his political ambition even if his position arguably undermined Israel’s security. 
Fortunately for Netanyahu, in 2016 America elected an unapologetic right-wing 
populist as its president, who campaigned on a platform of undoing President Obama’s 
achievements, including the Iran Deal. With no experience in foreign policy, government 
                                                        
60% of Jews questioned supported the agreement. A poll conducted for the American 
Jewish Committee found only a narrow favorability of 50.6% to 47.2%. A Quinnipiac poll 
of New York City Jewish voters reported that only 33% supported the agreement while 
53% opposed it, with 51% agreeing that the world will be less safe. The same poll found 
that New York City voters opposed the agreement by 43% against to 36% in favor. In 
contrast, a Public Policy Polling survey of New York City voters found that 58% of voters 
supported the agreement and 35% opposed it. ‘J Street National Survey’, 2015 Iran 
Polling (J Street, 28 July 2015), J Street Polling, 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.jstreet.org/images/J_Street_Iran_Deal_Poll_Topline_Fina
l_Results_715.pdf; ‘Jews Back Iran Deal by Narrow Margin, Poll Says’, The Forward, 11 
September 2015, https://forward.com/news/breaking-news/320816/jews-back-iran-
deal-by-narrow-margin-poll-says/; Maurice Carroll, ‘New York City Voters Oppose Iran 
Nuclear Pact, Quinnipiac University Poll Finds’ (Quinnipiac University, 11 August 2015), 
https://poll.qu.edu/images/polling/nyc/nyc08112015_Nd74njf.pdf/; Julian Hattem, 
‘Dem Poll Finds Broad Support for Iran Deal’, The Hill, 27 July 2015, 
http://thehill.com/policy/national-security/249244-poll-commissioned-by-dems-finds-
broad-support-for-iran-deal.) 
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service, or international diplomacy, and no meaningful knowledge of Middle East 
politics, Donald Trump’s policy decisions were personal and self-promotional. Having 
received financial support from wealthy right-wing Jewish donors, the new President 
inclined toward support of their causes. He selected his policy advisors based upon his 
assessment of their loyalty to him and evinced his openness to flattery, including from 
foreign leaders such as Netanyahu and the Saudi Arabian royal family. Unlike 
Netanyahu, Trump was not a believer in a consistent situational narrative, but like 
Netanyahu, he embraced the populist style and tactics to secure support for his self-
promotional policies.715  
Netanyahu could work with and on President Trump to assist him in following 
through on his campaign pledge to end the nuclear agreement.716 He undoubtedly 
recognized that if Israel, with little international leverage, secured an alliance with the 
world’s most powerful nation, it would not rest upon legal justification or power politics. 
Iran had not violated any of the terms of the JCPOA – international inspectors had 
consistently verified Iran’s full compliance with the deal – nor had it given its negotiating 
partners reason to suspect it would fail to fulfill the agreement’s terms. Rather, the 
United States would need to claim that the Iran Deal was flawed and ignore concerns 
about how a renunciation might damage American credibility. President Trump needed 
a narrative that not only represented his action as something more than merely a 
reversal of an accomplishment of his predecessor but also would justify his repudiation 
                                                        
715 While Netanyahu used populist strategy to garner support for his foreign policy 
agenda, he also appeared to mirror Trump in adopting domestic measures, including 
attacks on the press, suppression of non-governmental organizations, and attempts to 
discredit corruption probes by law enforcement authorities. See also, Jonathan G. Leslie, 
‘Netanyahu’s Populism: An Overlooked Explanation for Israeli Foreign Policy’, SAIS 
Review of International Affairs 37, no. 1 (12 October 2017): 75–82. 
716 President Trump also moved the American Embassy to Jerusalem and recognized 
Jerusalem as the official capital of the State of Israel, longtime goals of Netanyahu. 
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of the European powers who participated in the negotiations. Populism provided Trump 
with his strategy: He could ignore the concerns of those, including world leaders, who 
were not among his supporters, and he could devise reasons acceptable to his base 
regardless of the truth of his claims.  
As Trump had demonstrated repeatedly both during the campaign and in the 
early months of his presidency, his Republican base expected neither coherency nor 
consistency in his policy pronouncements. Hence, Netanyahu could facilitate Trump’s 
crafting of a narrative. Having successfully securitized the Iranian issue, Netanyahu 
never wavered from his declaration that Iran was an existential threat. He could help 
Trump ignore the results of the 2017 Iranian presidential elections, in which voters 
rejected the conservative candidates in favor of reelecting the moderate Rouhani. 
Significantly, although Iranians reported their disappointment that the JCPOA had not 
brought the expected economic benefits, they nevertheless decisively expressed their 
hope that the deal negotiated by Rouhani would improve their lives.717 The contrast 
between the Iranians’ optimism for their future and the pessimistic messages Israelis 
were hearing from their leaders could not have been sharper. Likewise, Netanyahu’s 
portrait of Iran could not have been further from reality and still maintain a patina of 
plausibility.  
Remarkably, Trump followed Netanyahu’s lead.718  
                                                        
717 Rouhani won decisively in the first round of balloting, receiving 57% of the vote in an 
election with a 73.3% turnout. The runner-up, conservative cleric Ibrahim Raisi, received 
only 38% of the vote even after the other main conservative candidate, Tehran Mayor 
Mohamad Baqer Qalibaf, withdrew and endorsed Raisi in the week before the election, 
seeking to defeat Rouhani. ‘Iran’s Rouhani Wins Decisive Re-Election’, BBC News, 20 
May 2017, sec. Middle East, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-39984066.  
718 Trump rejected the personal entreaties of the French and German heads of State, 
who personally visited him before a JCPOA recertification deadline. They failed to 
convince Trump to honor America’s commitment either to the Deal or to its 
international allies. Despite any evidence of Iran’s non-compliance, Trump refused to 
certify compliance, effectively ending U.S. participation. 
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 As I conclude this project, Netanyahu is poised to achieve his short-term 
objectives of disrupting, if not ending, the Iran Deal and of engaging Iran in at least a 
warlike confrontation, if not an actual war. Events during the week of April 22, 2018 
illustrate the complexities associated with Netanyahu’s strategy. During that week, 
three foreign interests with a stake in the American President’s decision on the Iran Deal 
– a European President, the Iranian Foreign Minister, and the Israeli Defense Minister – 
each visited the United States to argue their case prior to the deadline for the decision. 
 In his high profile official state visit, French President Emmanuel Macron 
reportedly sought to a way to “save” the Iran Deal.719 The countries of Europe and the 
European Union very much wanted to preserve the agreement, not only to promote 
stability in the Middle East, but also to realize the economic benefits it promised to 
European companies.720 In addressing Trump’s opposition, Macron and his colleagues 
recognized that the issue was not Iran’s continuing dangerous behavior but rather 
Trump’s egotistical aims of undoing his predecessor’s achievement and possibly claiming 
credit for a hypothetical better deal. They appeared willing to deal on his terms. In the 
end, Macron did not succeed in convincing Trump not to abandon the JCPOA.721 The 
European Union is still trying try to salvage a deal with Iran on its own. It remains an 
open question whether Iran can realize any economic benefits for continued compliance 
                                                        
719 Ishaan Tharoor, ‘Can Macron Save the Iran Deal?’ Washington Post, 25 April 2018, 
sec. WorldViews: Analysis. 
720 Jonathan Leslie, Reza Marashi, and Trita Parsi, ‘Losing Billions: The Cost of Iran 
Sanctions to the U.S. Economy’ (National Iranian American Council, July 2014), 
https://www.niacouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Losing-Billions-The-Cost-of-
Iran-Sanctions.pdf.  
721 Macron realized the impossibility of this almost immediately after his visit, telling 
reporters just before leaving the United States that he believed he had failed to 
convince Trump not to walk away. William Dobson, ‘Macron Doesn’t Believe He 
Changed Trump’s Mind On The Iran Deal’, NPR.org, 25 April 2018, 
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/04/25/605904232/macron-doesnt-
believe-he-changed-trump-s-mind-on-the-iran-deal. 
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given the reach of United States sanctions.722 A more challenging question is what to 
expect from Iran if the JCPOA collapses. Might Iran feel compelled to resume its nuclear 
development or intensify its weapons development program? Might it even consider 
reviving its long-dormant nuclear weapons initiatives? Would any of these moves 
initiate a scramble among Middle East nations for acquisition of nuclear weaponry? If 
such proliferation eventually destabilizes the region, Netanyahu will have finally 
succeeded in constructing a stronger factual basis for the fear and insecurity he has 
promoted among Israelis and those concerned about his nation’s continued existence. 
 In the second visit, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif visited New York and 
undertook a whirlwind tour of the think tank and media circuits ahead of a planned 
meeting at the United Nations. In his public appearances, Zarif made it clear that, should 
the United States withdraw from the deal, Iran would likely reciprocate. “There won’t be 
any deal for Iran to stay in,” Zarif told the Associated Press.723 With little actual leverage, 
however, Zarif and other Iranian officials hinted at dangers resulting from a U.S. 
withdrawal, which echoed the Netanyahu narrative. Thus, Iranian President Hassan 
Rouhani warned of “severe consequences,” and Ali Shamkhani, Secretary of Iran’s 
Supreme National Security Council, suggested that Iran might also consider withdrawing 
                                                        
722 Soon after leaving the agreement, U.S. officials began discussing the possibility of 
levying secondary sanctions on European companies should they engage economically 
with Iran. ‘Background Briefing on President Trump’s Decision To Withdraw From the 
JCPOA’ (U.S. Department of State, 8 May 2018), U.S. Department of State Press 
Releases, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/05/281959.htm; Steven Erlanger and 
Milan Schreuer, ‘Europe Asks U.S. for an Exemption From Sanctions on Iran’, The New 
York Times, 9 June 2018, sec. World, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/06/world/europe/iran-europe-us-sanctions.html. 
723 Josh Lederman and Edith Lederer, ‘Trump, Top Iran Diplomat Trade Threats as US 
Decision Nears’, AP News, 24 April 2018, 
https://apnews.com/746693a068ec408784861a7e3024ae38/AP-Interview:-Iran-says-if-
US-exits-deal,-it-likely-will-too. 
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from the NPT.724 Shamkhani’s comment was a subtle reminder that Iran, and not Israel, 
was a signatory to the international agreement not to build nuclear weapons. Both men 
left open the meaning and potential impact of their warnings. 
 The visit that received the least attention was that of Israel Defense Minister 
Avigdor Liberman, who met with several high-ranking Trump administration officials. 
Among the most hawkish members of Netanyahu’s cabinet, Liberman called the Iran 
Deal an “attempt to avoid reality,” claiming, without evidence, that it had done nothing 
to moderate Iranian behavior.725 Liberman, who had long preferred military action over 
diplomacy,726 likely received a sympathetic hearing from President Trump’s new 
national Security Advisor John Bolton,727 and at least a cordial one from Secretary of 
Defense James Mattis. Both men shared hawkish views on Iran and were concerned 
about that country’s regional conduct, including its “hegemonic” pursuits. Bolton, 
having publicly called for direct military action against Iran,728 shared Israel’s hope that 
America could assist in armed conflict that would achieve regime change. It is 
                                                        
724 ‘Iran to Trump: Stay in Nuclear Deal or “Face Severe Consequences”’, Al Jazeera, 24 
April 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/04/iran-trump-stay-nuclear-deal-
face-severe-consequences-180424073800698.html. 
725 Times of Israel Staff and AP, ‘Liberman: In Future War, Lebanon Will “Pay Full Price” 
for Iran Ties’, The Times of Israel, 31 January 2018, 
https://www.timesofisrael.com/liberman-in-future-war-lebanon-will-pay-full-price-for-
iran-ties/. 
726 JPost.com Staff, ‘Avigdor Liberman: Iran Nuclear Deal Yielding Similar Results to 
North Korea Deal’, Jerusalem Post, 19 February 2017, https://www.jpost.com/Breaking-
News/Liberman-Iran-nuclear-deal-yielding-similar-results-to-North-Korea-deal-481973. 
727 In this meeting, Liberman presented the presidential advisor with a painting depicting 
Bolton tearing up a copy of the 1975 UN Resolution 3379 that equated Zionism with 
racism. As the United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Bolton had worked to 
abolish that resolution. Arutz Sheva Staff and AFP, ‘Liberman Meets with John Bolton, 
Jared Kushner’, Arutz Sheva, 26 April 2018, 
http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/245043.tearing up a UN 
resolution  
728 John R. Bolton, ‘To Stop Iran’s Bomb, Bomb Iran’, The New York Times, 26 March 
2015, sec. Opinion, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/26/opinion/to-stop-irans-
bomb-bomb-iran.html. 
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questionable whether these men considered any of the potential intended or 
unintended consequences of their preferred outcomes. Given the experiences of both 
the United States and Israel in their recent military engagements, there are plenty of 
reasons to fear the consequences. 
Remarkably, while Netanyahu’s commitment to his threat narrative inspired 
Israel’s advocacy of the current direction of events, his narrative has been largely 
marginal to the considerations of other participants. Few have argued that ending Iran’s 
suspension of its nuclear development program makes the world safer. At the same 
time, however, we can trace the origin of the present tension to the durability and 
resonance of Iran as an existential threat. Moreover, the public reporting, whether 
speaking approvingly or critically of abandoning the agreement, echoes the Israeli threat 
narrative by focusing on the danger of Iranian bomb-making despite all the evidence 
suggesting this had not been Iran’s objective at the time the agreement was signed. It is 
notable that the public’s understanding of the case for abandoning the Iran Deal, as well 
as the future risks of doing so, is confused and uncertain. It is this uncertainty rather 
than Netanyahu’s current narrative that intensifies the fear of all concerned for the 
future of the region. 
There is reason to suspect that neither Netanyahu nor Trump is acutely 
interested in Iran’s nuclear program as much as they are in destabilizing Iran. The failure 
of Iran’s elected government to meet the economic expectations of its population 
promised by the JCPOA opens the door to more hardline factions to capitalize on the 
discontent. They could move to marginalize the existing government, or they might seek 
to concentrate more power in the hands of hardline and conservative factions. These 
efforts may result in an Iranian government that is in fact militantly hostile to the 
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Western world and the “Zionist regime.” Such developments might make regime change 
a more compelling and realistic option for Iran’s opponents.  
In the confusion and maneuvering generated by the present uncertainty, 
Netanyahu’s populist securitization of Israeli foreign policy endures. Netanyahu’s threat 
narrative succeeded in according the fear of a nuclear-armed Iran a prominent place on 
the world’s action agenda, yet curiously his advocacy against a diplomatic solution did 
not undermine his or his narrative’s credibility.  
It is unquestionable, however, that raising consequential questions regarding the 
political fate of Iran’s government and its people; possibly initiating a nuclear arms race 
in the Middle East; and increasing the potential for war between Iran and Israel, with 
the assistance of the United States, render the future dangerous and unpredictable.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix I: Constructivists’ Concept of Identity  
 
NOTE: Identity is a concept developed by constructivists and adapted by securitization 
theorists. Its contribution rests principally in offering an understanding of a national 
collective that provides a basis for analyzing foreign policy decisions based upon 
promotion or protection of that identity. Theorists offer different methodologies for 
defining identity while agreeing that it is a concept important to theoretical analysis. The 
definitional contestation is not, however, material to this project’s use of the 
securitization lens. I therefore include it in this appendix to offer a complete background 
for the discussion of identity as applied to Israel’s development of the Iran threat 
narrative and the politics and policies it generated.  
 
Constructivists believe that both individual and collective identities are material 
to understanding the construction of foreign policy. While their effort to define identity 
is a significant contribution to the theoretical literature, it also presents the greatest 
difficulty in applying constructivism as a theory. It is an intuitive proposition that how we 
see ourselves dictates how we interact with the world. This is what Iver Neumann was 
affirming when he observed that the value of considering collective identity in the state-
based international system is that it gives “ontological status to the sundry subjects or 
‘actors’ in world politics.”729  
It is apparent, however, that the challenge associated with using identity rests in 
capturing its applicability as a generalizable concept that is universally applicable across 
the spectrum of international relations situations. There are two definitional challenges. 
First, what are the metrics for determining identity? Second, what is the process for 
constructing the collective identity of the state as an actor in the international arena?  
As to the first challenge, if the processes for identity formation are not defined, 
there is nothing to constrain scholars from designing their own metrics to fit their 
interpretations and reasoning. As a starting point, we are forced to concede that identity 
                                                        
729 Iver B. Neumann, Uses of the Other: The ‘East’ in European Identity Formation 
(Manchester University Press, 1999), 1. 
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cannot be reduced to a single explanation.730 Scholars have sought to constrain 
theoretical individualism by defining processes for constructing collective identity. 
Neumann illustrates the difficulty of this task.731 He cites a plethora of theorists, 
including Schmitt, Nietzsche, Bakhtin, Foucault, Said, and Marx, in a sprawling work 
seeking to arrive at an acceptable definition of identity. His exegesis is enlightening, but 
he fails to achieve his goal, admitting that the issue is too complex to allow universal 
simplification.732 Thus, he articulates his preference for a custom-built approach to 
identity creation and the study of collective identity, one that enables and maintains 
flexibility and avoids the trap of ideological orthodoxy in describing identity.  
Such ambiguity is frustrating, but Neumann demonstrates that it is necessary 
since it captures the reality that the building blocks of identity often shift both 
geographically and temporally. This is the case when analyzing actions by Middle East 
actors, where religion, which is itself a social construction, is a crucial component of 
individual and collective identity. In countries ruled by clerics, religion can dictate 
behavior. Religious leaders forge a polity that will expect and support policies based 
upon theological interpretations. By contrast, a multi-ethnic state may encounter 
internal conflicts when publics hold differing religiously-based values and thus expect 
different standards of officials’ behavior. When countries are comprised of populations 
with different belief systems, the struggle of collectives of believers for domination of 
national identity can produce internal conflict. By contrast, in nations embracing a 
                                                        
730 Shibley Telhami and Michael Barnett concede this point in the introduction to their 
volume on the relationship between identity and foreign policy in the Middle East, 
admitting the unlikelihood of finding a “monocausal explanation of state or national 
identity formation” or a “single master variable operating in any one case.” Shibley Z. 
Telhami and Michael Barnett, eds., Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), 13. 
731 These include the ethnographic, psychological, continental philosophical, and what 
he calls the “Eastern exclusion” methods. Neumann, Uses of the Other. 
732 Neumann, 163. 
 319 
separation of church and state, leaders may eschew religion in asserting their own and 
their nation’s identity in favor of other policy motivations. In such a secular state, if a 
political leader unexpectedly seeks to embrace religion as the national identity, he may 
succeed in building a power base among those who share such a goal. Thus, the 
assertion of religion as a feature of collective identity in a modern political world 
highlights the dynamic nature of the construction process. An identity grounded in 
history can be reinterpreted to adapt to changing conditions. Exogenous political 
developments can also modify religious beliefs and practices, which in turn modify 
identity perceptions. This struggle has been part of both Iranian and Israeli politics. 
Treating the identity construction process as dynamic requires accounting for 
time and location. Formation and modification of identity adapts to internal and 
external stimuli. In this way, it resembles a living organism that exists in a state of 
constant temporal motion. No one disputes that as a person moves through life, her 
identity changes, sometimes dramatically, in response to events both within and beyond 
her control. A single woman in her early 20s will have a different conception of the self 
than she will at age 45 if she is married with children. Similarly, the collective identity of 
a nation does not remain constant throughout its history. Edward Said advises that the 
researcher should “regard society as the locale in which a continuous contest between 
adherents of different ideas about what constitutes the national identity is taking 
place.”733 For example, consider the forging of identity during the foundational period of 
the State of Israel. For some, the violence that followed Israel’s declaration of statehood 
represented a continuation of Jewish persecution in a hostile world. At the same time, 
Israel as a homeland for the European Jews displaced by the Holocaust represented the 
                                                        
733 Said, ‘The Phony Islamic Threat’, 62 via Telhami and Barnett, Identity and Foreign 
Policy in the Middle East, 6. 
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fulfillment of a biblical promise. These ideas resonated with supporters in the Diaspora. 
Some of the state’s founding leaders, notably David Ben Gurion and Max Nordau, 
offered a different identity and embraced a different narrative. For them, the new Israel 
embodied what they called “muscular Judaism,” in which the Israeli people were not 
history’s victims.734 In this telling, Jews were pioneers engaged in labor-intensive 
activities, excelling in martial prowess as well as in athletic pursuits. They sought to de-
emphasize the memory of the Holocaust, which they feared portrayed them as helpless 
victims of evil actors.735 These contrasting self-perceptions animated the debates over 
collective identity and the foreign policy decisions they generated.  
Constructivists’ response to the challenge of narrowing and generalizing the 
components of identity formation is to focus on the process for collective identity 
formation. Here they explain that this process operates in two ways: horizontally, 
involving distinguishing members’ characteristics from those of outsiders, and vertically, 
referring to the indigenous source of the collective’s characteristics. They further 
distinguish the vertical process either as initiated from top-down by elite actors or as the 
result of a bottom-up organic movement wherein a community’s defining characteristics 
are diffused to a national polity. 
The horizontal construction originates in distinguishing the collective self from 
the other. 736 It is a process of inclusion by excluding those who are different according 
                                                        
734 Alex von Tunzelmann, Blood and Sand: Suez, Hungary and the Crisis That Shook the 
World (Simon & Schuster UK, 2016). 
735 This concept is explored in further detail in Chapter Five.  
736 This conception is described in numerous theoretical critiques; I list just a few 
examples here: Maja Zehfuss, ‘Constructivism and Identity: A Dangerous Liaison’, 
European Journal of International Relations 7, no. 3 (1 September 2001): 315–48, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066101007003002; Bahar Rumelili, ‘Constructing Identity 
and Relating to Difference: Understanding the EU’s Mode of Differentiation’, Review of 
International Studies 30, no. 1 (1 January 2004): 27–47; Thomas Diez, ‘Europe’s Others 
and the Return of Geopolitics’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs 17, no. 2 (1 
July 2004): 319–35, https://doi.org/10.1080/0955757042000245924; William E. 
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to chosen characteristics. Bukh describes the struggle to establish identity as a kind of 
“’ongoing boundary drawing process’ in which the borders of the ‘self’ are defined and 
redefined in opposition to difference embodied in a multiplicity of others.”737 In Israel, 
the debate over foreign policy proposals often reflects competing narratives of how the 
polity is defined vis-à-vis both its hostile neighbors and its political opponents.  
Vertical identity construction focuses on who defines the collective’s identity. 
Constructivists distinguish between a definitional process dictated by elite members of 
society and identity formation that emerges from a shared project among individuals 
within a community. The distinction may have significance, but it may also be true that 
elite drivers can exploit the organic identity of particular communities in seeking support 
for their policies. Communities evolve and leaders come and go in response to changing 
conditions. This makes identity formation a dynamic and iterative process.  
Looking at Israeli identity struggles, we see that elites have the means to dictate 
the terms of historical memory, which is so much a part of the Jewish identity. Yet the 
state’s founders embraced a version of the Israeli identity that marginalized history. In 
their effort to suppress the traditional narrative of Jews as victims, they rejected state-
sponsorship of public events memorializing the Holocaust; adopted school texts that 
highlighted Jewish resistance to persecution; and promoted physical activity and 
sport.738 They emphasized the importance of cultural achievement over religious 
observance. In so doing, they distinguished the modern Israeli identity they embraced 
from the historic Jewish identity. Michael Walzer has observed that modern states, 
                                                        
Connolly, Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox, Expanded 
Edition (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2002). 
737 Bukh, Japan’s National Identity and Foreign Policy, 11, citing Zehfuss, ‘Constructivism 
and Identity’; Neumann, Uses of the Other. 
738 Ian S. Lustick, ‘The Holocaust in Israeli Political Culture: Four Constructions and Their 
Consequences’, Contemporary Jewry 37, no. 1 (1 April 2017): 129; Tunzelmann, Blood 
and Sand. 
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including Israel, that have reinterpreted the role of religion in their new society have 
eventually faced a backlash from the religious communities excluded from the policy 
making process. This produces political contestation over competing visions of collective 
identity.739 
When religiously-based organizations enter politics professing to recapture the 
“soul” of their country, they exemplify a bottom-up identity formation process. They 
seek to convince their fellow citizens to identify with the historical memory and 
formative experiences that inform their religious-based vision of the shared state. As 
Rousseau explains this type of identity formation, “Interactions between individuals 
create a domestic society and…the interaction of domestic societies creates an 
international society. It is simply impossible to talk about how ‘social facts’ are 
constructed without referring to the entities that are doing the constructing.”740  
While the distinction between top-down and bottom-up may be consequential in 
some contexts, I submit that it is more useful to think of identity construction as 
simultaneously an individual and group endeavor. Wilhelm Dilthey advocated a middle 
path when he discussed the idea of a “weight of numbers” in which society exerts a 
greater influence over the individual than any individual can contribute to society.741 In 
this formulation, neither elite actors at the top nor individual citizens at the bottom are 
primarily responsible for the collective identity. For the individual and her immediate 
cohort, identity is constructed in “real time” from personal experience and small-scale 
communal interactions, such as with family, friends, schools, or churches. This accords 
                                                        
739 Walzer, The Paradox of Liberation. 
740 Rousseau, Identifying Threats and Threatening Identities, 8. 
741 Wilhelm Dilthey, Selected Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976); 
Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, ‘Islamic Utopian Romanticism and the Foreign Policy Culture 
of Iran’, Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies 14, no. 3 (1 October 2005): 269. 
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with Rousseau’s conception.742 At the same time, the communities form larger 
constituencies that often designate leaders, who are or who interact with elites. The 
cohort of elites exerts influence through its control of communications and state 
institutions. Officials can promote politics that facilitate or inhibit group insularity. 
Together the communities and elites select a leader, who articulates a vision of national 
identity. He can develop a common sense of belonging or a shared unity against those 
who do not belong, or both. 
 The leader either explicitly or inferentially embraces a vision of national identity 
to serve as the basis for his foreign policy decisions. The collective identity is particularly 
material when selecting allies and enemies.743 In defining the collective, the leader may 
consciously or unconsciously consider his own persona, most especially his beliefs and 
ambitions. Constructivism, while recognizing the role of individual and collective 
identity, has thus far been unable to generalize the variables material to identity 
formation. A consequence of this ambiguity is to make it easier for critics to dismiss the 
explanatory capacity of constructivism as a workable theory.  
One “solution” is to limit the circumstances in which identity-based 
constructivism may prove useful in analyzing decisions regarding a particular set of 
events or actions. If we accept that identity formation is dynamic and emerges from 
both vertical and horizontal processes – involving both the forging of collective identity 
of the state as well as defining self-identity with reference to an external other – we can 
locate situations in which identity theory can be most helpful.  
                                                        
742 Rousseau, Identifying Threats and Threatening Identities, 5. 
743 In his 1932 work The Concept of the Political, the German philosopher Carl Schmitt 
outlined what he termed the “friend-enemy” distinction. Schmitt was, by most 
interpretations, an arch realist, and he made sure to note that the terms were only 
meant to be “understood in their concrete and existential sense, not as metaphors or 
symbols,” or as “a psychological expression of private emotions and tendencies.” 
Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 27–28. 
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Appendix II: Israel’s Narrative Omission – Stuxnet and Assassinations  
 
Israeli leaders’ objective of securitization of the nuclear threat involved 
construction of a narrative to secure domestic and international support for extra-
ordinary action against Iran. At a minimum they envisioned crippling Iran’s capacity to 
enrich fuel required to construct nuclear weapons.744 As the Israeli public accepted the 
Iran threat, their leaders advanced options for military intervention ranging from 
destruction of Iran’s nuclear facilities to regime change. Yet at the same time, not only 
was the international community unmoved by Israel’s justification for extraordinary 
action but national leaders began exploring diplomatic engagement toward reducing the 
perceived threat of a nuclear Iran.  
Ironically, it appears that Israel secretly engaged in extraordinary actions prior to 
achieving securitization. Given the secrecy and the mystery associated with its efforts to 
launch a cyber-attack on the computers controlling Iran’s nuclear reactors and to 
assassinate two Iranian nuclear scientists, we can only speculate as to the strategic 
objectives. While Israel never admitted culpability in either action, it publicly 
acknowledged that the deployment of a computer virus to disable computer control 
                                                        
744 Preemptive attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities were a frequent topic of conversation 
among Israeli politicians and security officials. Prime Minister Menachem Begin’s 
decision to launch a preemptive attack against the Iraqi Osirak reactor in 1981 
established a precedent for such action. Another attack on a Syrian nuclear facility in 
2007 later reinforced this doctrine. Occasionally, Israeli fighter aircraft engaged in 
military exercises to simulate potential long-bombing runs against distant targets, which 
were clearly meant to symbolize Iran facilities. Judah Ari Gross, ‘With No Landings, 
Israeli Jets Train for Long-Range Missions in Greece’, The Times of Israel, 11 June 2018, 
https://www.timesofisrael.com/with-no-landings-israeli-jets-train-for-long-range-
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could be considered an act of war.745 As Deputy Prime Minister Dan Meridor explained, 
“It is a new battleground, if you like, not with guns but with something else.”746 
In the long run, the actions appear not to have significantly affected Iran’s 
nuclear development capacity. We cannot know whether Israel expected to fatally 
cripple Iran’s program or to delay its development so that it could recruit support for 
more aggressive intervention. Moreover, we have no clues as to the planners’ 
contingency and follow-up plans. One imagines that the failure to destroy Iran’s nuclear 
capability could provide justification for more militaristic measures at some point in the 
future. Success, too, could have incentivized further efforts to achieve regime change. 
As it happened, however, neither the attacks nor the assassinations became part 
of the Iran threat narrative and no national leader never admitted responsibility.747 The 
details remain shrouded in mystery, although Israel has provided some hints of its 
participation. At the same time, there are strategic reasons why Iran’s leaders were 
reluctant to credit Israel with a successful intervention. Nevertheless, since these actions 
                                                        
745 The action caused significant collateral damage. Estimates are that Iran suffered 
about 60% of the total damage. The reach of the malware was worldwide, also infecting 
computers operating in Indonesia, India, Azerbaijan, the United States, and Pakistan, 
among others. Jarrad Shearer, ‘W32.Stuxnet | Symantec’, Symantec Security Center, 
n.d., https://www.symantec.com/security-center/writeup/2010-071400-3123-99. 
746 Dan Williams, ‘Israeli Official Sees Cyber Alternative to “Ugly” War’, Reuters, 3 
February 2011, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-israel-cyber/israeli-
official-sees-cyber-alternative-to-ugly-war-idUSTRE71259U20110203. 
747 It is widely assumed that the United States worked with Israel to build and deploy the 
virus. In 2012, David Sanger of the New York Times reported on the joint American-
Israeli initiative begun under the George W. Bush administration codenamed “Olympic 
Games” that eventually led to the creation of the Stuxnet virus. Sanger indicated that his 
report was based on interviews with “current and former American, European, and 
Israeli officials,” but none were willing to comment on the record due to the classified 
nature of the materials they were discussing. There has never been any official 
declaration of responsibility from Israeli or American officials. David E. Sanger, ‘Obama 
Ordered Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran’, The New York Times, 1 June 2012, sec. 
Middle East, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/middleeast/obama-ordered-
wave-of-cyberattacks-against-iran.html. 
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are part of the historical account of the enmity between Israel and Iran, they merit 
mention in this appendix. 
It is probable that in 2009, Israel, in collaboration with the United States, 
launched what has subsequently been described as “the first digital weapon of 
geopolitical importance.”748 The cyber weapon took the form of an unprecedented 
malicious software worm that physically destroyed the equipment it infected.749 
According to reports, the first attack occurred a few months after Netanyahu assumed 
the office of prime minister for the second time. The “weapon,” however, had taken 
years to develop.750 Some speculate that the idea for a cyberwar project began in the 
late 1990s, which would have coincided with Netanyahu’s first term as Israel’s leader.751 
Reportedly, Mossad Chief Meir Dagan oversaw the development of the cyber weapon, 
which became known as “Stuxnet.” He later publicly explained that he did not favor 
conventional war with Iran, telling reporters that a military strike on Iran would not stop 
its nuclear development program.752 By the time of Dagan’s observation, the world 
knew of the Stuxnet attack, and most suspected the Israelis’ involvement.753 
                                                        
748 Holger Stark, ‘Mossad’s Miracle Weapon: Stuxnet Virus Opens New Era of Cyber 
War’, Spiegel Online, 8 August 2011, sec. International, 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/mossad-s-miracle-weapon-stuxnet-virus-
opens-new-era-of-cyber-war-a-778912.html.  
749 Zetter, Countdown to Zero Day. 
750 The 2009 attacks may not have been the only actions Israel planned against Iran. 
Reporter James Risen writes that Israel also attempted to develop a plot to attack Iran’s 
power grid. James Risen, State of War: The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush 
Administration (New York: Free Press, 2006). 
751 By many accounts the development of the actual Stuxnet virus probably began 
around 2005-2006, though no exact date has ever been revealed. Dan Williams, 
‘ANALYSIS-Wary of Naked Force, Israelis Eye Cyberwar on Iran’, Reuters, 7 July 2009, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLV83872. 
752 Dagan gave this interview on the final day of his seven-year service as head of Israel’s 
foreign intelligence service. Williams. 
753 Public discussion of the attack began in 2010 when a security firm in Belarus was 
called in to investigate computers in Iran that were repeatedly crashing and rebooting 
themselves. Although the virus targeted the computers at Iran’s nuclear plant, it soon 
spread to other parts of the world. Zetter, Countdown to Zero Day. 
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In 2011, on the same day as Dagan’s public statement upon his retirement as 
head of the Mossad, unknown assailants attempted to assassinate two Iranian nuclear 
scientists. One killed Majid Shahriari, a professor of nuclear physics at Shahid Beheshti 
University, and the other wounded Fereydoon Abbasi, a nuclear physicist. Both attacks 
used the same method: “sticky bombs” attached to the doors of the scientists’ cars by 
assassins on motorcycles while the cars were stuck in Tehran traffic. Israel did not claim 
credit for the attacks, although Dagan was an advocate of political assassination of 
Israel’s enemies.754 Iran’s President Ahmadinejad was quick to blame the Israelis and 
referenced the Stuxnet virus in his remarks, although he downplayed the consequences 
of the computer attack for Iran’s nuclear progress.  
The Stuxnet virus targeted Iran’s nuclear facility at Natanz with the intent of 
causing the self-destruction of uranium-enriching centrifuges that could theoretically be 
used to manufacture weapons-grade material for use in an atomic bomb. Initially, it was 
not apparent that the damage had been induced by an outside source. In the end, the 
extent of the damage inflicted by the worm on Iran’s program is debatable. Iran was 
reluctant to admit it had been attacked, and once it did so, it minimized the impact on 
its nuclear program.755 Iranian officials, however, agreed with its putative attackers that 
this action amounted to an act of war. Despite the danger inherent in this extraordinary 
                                                        
754 Stories later emerged about Israeli intelligence intimidation tactics used against 
Iranian scientists ahead of the assassination attempts. These included methods such as 
the delivery of flower bouquets to scientists’ families with condolence notes for the 
scientists who were still alive, as well as video recordings in Persian featuring fake news 
reports announcing the deaths of the scientists. ‘How West Infiltrated Iran’s Nuclear 
Program, Ex-Top Nuclear Official Explains’, March 8, 2014, Iran’s View, 28 March 2014, 
http://www.iransview.com/west-infiltrated-irans-nuclear-program-ex-top-nuclear-
official-explains/1451/.(Iran’s View post) 
755 Alexis C. Madrigal, ‘Ahmadinejad Publicly Acknowledges Stuxnet Disrupted Iranian 
Centrifuges’, The Atlantic, 29 November 2010, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2010/11/ahmadinejad-publicly-
acknowledges-stuxnet-disrupted-iranian-centrifuges/67155/. 
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action, the recriminations and the debates over its immediate impact and future 
consequences remained largely confined to security personnel, computer experts, and 
technology writers of the world press. Significantly, while a consensus emerged that 
Israel was involved and Israeli officials publicly embraced the strategy as a method for 
delaying Iran’s deployment of a bomb, few discussed Iran’s claim that it was not 
engaged in building a weapon, a claim supported by both United States and Israeli 
intelligence reports.756  
The principals, namely the leaders of Iran and Israel, did not materially alter their 
messages following the cyberattack. Netanyahu pressed his Iran threat narrative 
inflamed by Ahmadinejad’s antics. Moreover, even after Ahmadinejad left office two 
years after the discovery of the Stuxnet virus – and his successor floated the idea that 
Iran might agree to end its nuclear program – Netanyahu did not change his narrative 
content: Stuxnet and assassinations were not part of the public discussion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
756 Curiously, the controversy over the accuracy of the NIE assessments appears to have 
been treated as an issue separate from the potential danger inherent in Iran’s nuclear 
development program. This is probably due to the fact that Iran retained the capacity to 
build a weapon whether or not that was the intention of its program at the time or after 
the NIE. As noted in the main text, Israeli leaders appeared fond of predicting the time 
at which Iran would have a nuclear weapon. Few ever acknowledged that such deadlines 
came and went without evidence that a bomb had been produced. One fear implicit in 
Netanyahu’s suspicions of Iran’s willingness to negotiate a suspension of its nuclear 
program is that the nation could not be deprived of the expertise in nuclear technology 
its scientists had acquired. Netanyahu stressed this point during a presentation in April 
2018 in which he presented materials seized during an Israeli commando raid of an 
alleged Iranian storehouse for nuclear-related documents in Tehran. While the raid 
produced no evidence showing that Iran had been actively attempting to build a nuclear 
weapon after 2003, Netanyahu stressed that the documents contained indications that 
the Iranians had acquired the knowledge of how to complete a bomb should it choose to 
do so at some point in the future.  
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